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NAVAL MEMOIRS,

1910-1915

Yrom the portrait by de La^Io

THE NAVAL MEMOIRS

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET

SIR ROGER KEYES

The Narrow Seas to the T)ardanelles
1910 — 1915

LONDON

THORNTON BUTTERWORTH, LTD.

First Published . . . October , 1954

' Secoad Impression . . November,

Made and Printed in Great Britain

The Chapel River Press,
Andover, PIantS*.

TO MY WIFE

But for whose help this book would never have been written

AUTHOR’S NOTE

The official telegrams and other confidential matter
quoted in this volume have already been published in
the Dardanelles Commission’s Reports, Sir Ian
Hamilton’s “ Gallipoli Diary,” LotH Wester Wemyss’
“The Navy in the Dardanelles,” Mr. Winston
Churchill’s “The World Crisis,” or the Naval and
Military Official Histories.

I am greatly indebted to the authors of these books,
but above all to Brigadier^General C. F. Aspinall-
Oglander— the Military Historian— for much valuable
help and advice.

R. K.

CONTENTS

PAGE

FOREWORD 13

PART I

The Dev-elopment of the Submarine Service

CHAPTER

I THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE .SUBMARINE—

Trouble with Sir John Fisher; Naval manoeuvres
of 1910; Appointed Inspecting Captain of Sub-
marines ; Submarine construction . . *19

II TRAINING FOR WAR — Peace and War dis-

positions ; Submarine exercises ; Training for War;

A skirmish with Lord Fisher . . . ‘59

III THE GATHERING CLOUDS— Test Mobilisation ;

Review at Spithead ; War Clouds ; War Stations ;
Declaration of War 56

PART 11

War in the Narrow Seas

IV OUTBREAK OF WAR — Submarine reconnaissance

in Heligoland Bight ; Sinking of German minelayer
off Harwich; Loss of Amphion; Passage of Ex-
peditionary Force ; Submarines in Heligoland
Bight; Action of 28th August .... 67

V SUBMARINE WARFARE— Sinking of Pathfinder;

Submarine exploits ; Visit to Grand Fleet ; Loss of
Ahoukir, Cressj, Hogue and Hawke ; British troops
land at Zeebrugge ; Submarines enter Baltic . . 98

VI LORD FISHER AT THE ADMIRALTY— Visit to

Dover Patrol ; Co-operation with Army on Belgian
Coast ; Visit Submarine Patrol Flotillas ; Prince
Louis resigns ; Lord Fisher appointed First Sea
Lord ; Loss of D) ; Correspondence with Lord
Fisher 127

VII A LOST OPPORTUNITY— Change in disposition

of Patrol Flotillas ; A wild-goose chase ; Loss
of Dz ; French submarine arrives at Harwich ;

A lost opportunity; £11 attacks German battle-
ship ; Architnede has narrow escape ; Christmas
Day Air Raid ' 135

8 CONTENTS

CHAPTER

VIII BATTLE OF THE DOGGER BANK— Loss of
; Loss of Eio; German shdps reported at
sea ; Submarines endeavour to intercept their
return ; Battle of Dogger Bank ; Submarine adven-
tures ; I leave North Sea for Mediterranean .

PART III

Eastern Mediterranean: Gallipoli

FOREWORD^

IX INITIATION OF THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN .

X DESTRUCTION OF OUTER DEFENCES— I join

Admiral Carden at Malta ; Proceed to Tenedos ;
Admiral Carden takes command of Allied Fleet
off Dardanelles ; Attack on Outer Defences ; Bad
weather delays ; Outer Defences destroyed by
bombardment and landing parties ; General
Birdwood arrives ......

XI DISAPPOINTING DELAYS— Bad weather inter-

feres with operations ; Direct and indirect bombard-
ments ; Progress held up by inefficiency of mine-
sweepers ; Admiral Carden resigns owing to
illness ; Succeeded by Admiral de Robeck ; British
and French troops ordered to Dardanelles ; General
Sir Ian Hamilton appointed to command Allied
Army

XII PREPARATIONS FOR NAVAL ATTACK— Sir Ian

Hamilton and General d'Amade confer with
Admiral ; Lord Kitchener^s instructions to Sir Ian ;
Plan of Naval attack ......

Xm ACTION OF THE i8th MARCH— Action of i8th
March ; Bouvet^ Irresistible and Ocean sunk by
mines ; Fleet withdraws

XIV REORGANISATION — ^Review of damage sustained
by ships ; Reorganisation of minesweeping force ;
Preparation for renewal of attack ; Admiral post-
pones Naval attack until Army is ready for combined
operation

XV THE CHANGE OF PLAN — Change of Plan accepted ;
Enemy reports . . . " . .

PACE

159

173

178

187

202

222

232

249

273

CONTENTS

CHAPTER ' PAGE

XVI PREPARATION FOR COMBINED ATTACK— *
Naval and Military plans and orders ; 5 attempting

passage of Straits runs ashore ; Finally torpedoed to
prevent capture ; AEz enters Marmora ; Expedition
sails . zyS

XVII CAPTURE OF THE BEACHES— The Storming

and Capture of the Beaches : 25 th and 26th April . 291

XVIII BATTLES FOR KRITHIA^-French land at V

Beach ; Queen Elizabeth's effective fire ; Inspection
of Helles and Anzac ; Heavy ^ Turkish attacks
repulsed ; Raids from Anxac ; Second Battle of
Krithia . . . . . . . .3:2

XIX A POLITICAL UPHEAVAL— Turkish account; The
Army checked ; Waiting for reinforcements and
ammunition;* The Admiral’s appreciation of the
situation ; Churchiirs effort to renew the Naval
Offensive ; Fleet condemned to inaction ; Lord
Fishery’s resignation ; Fall of the Government ;

Lord Fisher’s ultimatum ; Coalition Government
formed ; Mr. Balfour becomes First Lord . .351

XX SUBMARINE ACTIVITY— Admiral transfers Flag

to Lord Nelson / Queen Elizabeth returns to England ;
British submarines in the Marmora ; Return of i3'i4 ;

Turks attack Anzac ; Repulsed with great slaughter ;
Albion aground off Gaba Tepe ; German submarine
torpedoes the Triumph and Majestic ; Third Battle
of Krithia 344

XXI THE NEW GOVERNMENT’S RESOLVE—

Indecision at Home ; Naval and Military reinforce-
ments proinised ; Submarine successes in the
Marmora ; Offensive action in the southern area ;
French attack on right ; Visits to Gallipoli ;
British attack on left ; Desperate Turkish counter-
attacks ; British and French attack in centre ;

A visit to Anzac 357

XXII THE AUGUST OFFENSIVE— The Plan ; Prepara-
tions ; Arrival of new vessels and troops ; Secret
reinforcement of Anzac ; The offensive opens at
Helles ; Attack on Lone Pine ; Attack on Sari Bair ;
Landing at Suvla ; Eii and £’14 co-operate in the
Marmora ; Two days’ delay ; The Turlush problem ;
Attack at Suvla repulsed; Attack on Sari Bair
repulsed \ Failure of the August offensive . * yj^

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

XXIII

XXIV

XXV

XX\T

XXVII

CAMPAIGN AT A DEADLOCK— Marking time at
Suvla ; El 4 comes out of Marmora for third time ;
General Stopford superseded ; General de Lisle
takes temporary command*; Visits to Anzac and
Suvla ; My endeavours to persuade Admiral to
force Straits ; Admiralty telegrams ; Sir Julian
Byng takes command of 9th Corps ; French project
to land in Asia ; Submarine exploits ; Bulgaria
]oins Germany .......

A VISIT TO ENGLAND— Sir Ian Hamilton super-
seded by Gaaeral Monro ; I return to England to
press for a Naval offensive ; Interviews with Mr.
Balfour and Lord Kitchener ; Visit French Minister
of Marine in Paris ; Return to Eastern Mediterranean ;
Meet Lord Kitchener at Salonika and Mudros ;
Interview with General Monro ^ Lord Kitchener
recommends evacuation and goes home ; Admiral
de Robeck goes on leave ; Admiral Wemyss takes
command of Fleet ......

FINAL EFFORT TO AVERT DEFEAT— Wemyss
opens his campaign; Fierce blizzard causes heavy
losses ; Efforts to persuade Monro to co-operate
in naval attack ; Conference with Gallipoli Generals ;
Our hopes raised by probable abandonment of
Salonika ; I visit Salonika to hasten transport of
troops ; Kitchener endeavours to bring about a
combined attack ; Evacuation of Anzac and Suvla
ordered ; Wemyss recommends evacuation of I Idles
if Army will not co-operate in another naval attack

EVACUATION — Collier sunk to complete harbour at
Kephalo ; All ships ordered to Mudros and boats
to Kephalo ; Frequent visits to Peninsula ; Fine
weather lasts until evacuation of Suvla and Anzac
on 19th December ; Sudden gale on 20th causes
havoc ; Admiral de Robeck returns ; Discussions
about Helles ; Admiral Wemyss leaves ; Evacuation
of Hclles ordered ; Difficulties and anxieties ; Heavy
attack by Turks on 7th ; Troops successfully
evacuate Helles night of 8th January in rising gale .

AND AFTER

APPENDIX — Eastern Mediterranean Squadron during
Naval engagements, February and March, 1915

INDEX *

PAGE

408

457

471

498

520

5^7

5?i

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Sir Roger Keyes (from the portrait by de Lazio) . . Frontispiece

I'AOR

Submarines with Mercury in background, Fort Blockhouse, 1910 . 38

Battle Cruisers steaming full speed into action, Heligoland
Bight, 28th August, 1914 88

Maimi capsizing ; Lurcher going full speed astern to get clear
after taking 220 Germans off her, 28th August, 1914 . . 88

Household Cavalry Brigade disembarking, Zeebrugge Mole,

6 th October, 1914 ^^4

Group of Officers Royal I-lorse Guards and Lurcher, Zeebrugge
Mole ”4

niri<!t-mas Day Air Raid, Lurcher towing seaplane back from
Norderney Gat -154

Si towed home by her captured German trawler . . 134

Queen ElU^aheth under lire in Dardanelles, i8th March, 1915 . 234

Implacable and trawler landing troops, Dardanelles, 25 th April,

1913 ^34

Admiral J. de Robeck and Staff, Dardanelles . . . 280

Commodore R. Keyes, Vice-Admiral J. de Robcck, General Sir
Ian Hamilton, Major-General W. Braithwaite, Dardanelles . 280

Lighter and men sheltering under bank of “ V ” Beach and
Sedd-el-Bahr Fort ; taken from River Clyde 8 a.m., 23 th April,

1915 . ^ 9*5

Camber at Sedd-el-Bahr : Naval demolition party landed here (jn
26thFebruary,i9i3,andDublinFusilierson25thAprjl,i9i5 . 296

Gallipoli Coast showing “ Y ” Beach }o 6

Captured Turkish Sniper, Anzac, 26th April, 1913 . . .320

£14 back from the Marmora, 18th May, 1915 . . .352

aground offAnzac, in tow of Custf/w, 23rd May, 1913 . 352

Anzac Beach, Ari Burnu yyith Gaba Tepe beyond , . . 376

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

TO FACE

PAGE

Nibtunesi Point, Suvla Bay and Salt Lake from Anzac . , 376

Aerial view of W ” and V’’ Beaches, Gallipoli . . . 426

V ” Beach and River Clyde under fire 466

W ” Beach under fire ....... 466

W ’’ Beach (West) 506

« W ” Beach (East) 506

Lord Kitchener greeting General Bailloud at ‘‘ V ’’ Beach, 12th
November, 1915 5 51^

Outside VIII Corps Headquarters at Tekke Burnu, December,
1915. Brigadier-General Street, Commodore Keyes, General
Davies, General Lawrence, Lieutenant Millot and Colonel
Aspinali

LIST OF MAPS AND DIAGRAMS

North Sea and entrance to Baltic .... , facing

Disposition of “ Overseas ” submarines and vessels of the Dover
Patrol during the passage of the Expeditionary Force in
August, 1914

Heligoland Bight, 28th August, 1914 ....

Enemy’s raid on the Yorkshire Coast

The Dogger Bank Action f^dng

Approaches to the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmora , „

Gallipoli and the Dardanelles „

Plan of outer defences issued with operational orders for engage-
ments of 1 9th and 2 5 th February, 1915

The Dardanelles. Action of i8th March, 19x5 . . facing

Diagram issued with instructions for Helles covering force

Turkish defences on “ V ” and “ W ” Beaches, 25th April, 1915

Anzac and Suvla Bay

PAGE

7 ^

144

162

174

188

191

228

285

293

• m

FOREWORD

“ Dream dreams, then write them, ay, but live them first.”

— Cervantes.

(Newdigate Prize Poem, 1921, by James Laver.)

After the war the great Universities honoured a number of
soldiers and sailors by conferring honorary degrees upon them.
My education, except in technical subjects, practically ceased
when I joined H.M.S. Britannia as a naval cadet, at the age of
twelve. It gave me much pleasure, therefore, to be made an
Honorary LL.D. of Qambridge, Aberdeen, St. Andrews and
Bristol, and an Honorary D.C.L. of Oxford — honours which
greatly intrigued my French naval friends, who wondered how
I could have found time to win such high scholastic distinction
during an active career at sea.

I was invited to the Enctenia at Oxford in 1920, but was
unable to attend, as the Battle Cruiser Squadron, which I com-
manded, was in the Baltic ; but the following year the invitation
was renewed, and I had the great honour of being made D.C.L.
in company with M. Clemenceau, the only other recipient.

After listening to the Public Orator telling us what he thought
about us, which I must confess conveyed very little to me, as I
had my last Latin lesson when I was eleven, we watched other
distinctions being conferred, including the Newdigate Prize won
by James Laver, a Commoner of New College, who from a
rostrum recited his poem opening with the words I have quoted
above.

I was thrilled, and listened with amazement to a youth telling,
with easy assurance, a brave tale of high adventure, fierce fighting
at sea, great hardships bravely borne, and ardent, passionate love,

I remember thinking that so young a man must have lived it
all in some previous existence, so truly rang the musings of
“ Cervantes in his dungeon cell at Seville,” dreaming the dreams
he had lived.

“ Far from the coast he knew the town to be.

But smelt {he full salt savour of the sea.”

FOREWORD

Well, I live in no dungeon cell, but in a pleasant country house
in the heart of England “ far from the coast,” with much to
occupy me, but still with leisure to dream dreams I have lived
in “ the salt savour of the sea ” ; so I will try to “ write them ”
in the hope that, if they meet the eye of the younger generation,
they will help them to avoid the mistakes we made, when they
seize the torch and strive, as ardently as we did, to live up to the
glorious tradition we inherited from the great sea captains of old.

When the Great War ended our Empire emerged mighty and
powerful. The hammer blows of our armies had been a decisive
factor in the winning of a victorious peace. Our gallant young
knights of the most powerful air force in the world had won
golden spurs. Our sea services had maintained the communi-
cations of our armies, carried troops from every outpost of the
Empire and the United States of America, and had kept the seas
in the face of unseen and unforeseen dilficulties.

Our race was indeed at the very zenith of its prestige ; and we
who had fought, perhaps above all others, were determined to
maintain the peace which the devotion of our people had won,
and to take the necessary steps to safeguard the sea routes from
the heart of the Empire to the Dominions which had played such
a valiant part in the struggle.

Where do we stand today ?

Despite the sorry example of Southern Ireland, sentimental
idealists and politicians are busily engaged in dissipating the
Indian Empire which our forbears won, and are striving to
impose on India’s many irreconcilable races an imitation of a
Western parliamentary system, in which so many powerful
Western countries have lost faith.

In 1930, supported by so-called pacifists and sailors too
amenable to political requirements, they bound our sea forces in
trammelling agreements, which are not in the interests of
efficiency, security, peace or even economy ; bonds moreover
which were wisely rejected by our more practical Continental
neighbours.

In the vain hope that their example would be followed, they
have steadily reduced our naval, military and air forces, the only
real guarantors of peace and security in this turbulent and
unchanging world, while the armed forces of almost every other
power have as steadily increased. Yet, when the dictates of the

FOREWORD

League of Nations were recently ignored, their pacifist supporters
clamoured for belligerent action, which could only have resulted
in war — a war in which our navy will never be in a position to
engage until its route to the East is provided with an eflScient
defended base.

What blind folly it all is !

To crown the unhappiness of those who fought, we see
thousands of our good comrades in the great army of unemployed.
Subjects of the King, regular soldiers and sailors, pensioners,
reservists, and civilians in every walk of life, from all parts of
the world, sprang to arms when the Empire needed them. I
had many opportunities of watching them — light-hearted and
confident — defiant and determined — shattered and almost
broken, perhaps even terribly afraid — and yet, in the face of
incredible hardships and cruel sufferings, dogged and unbeaten.
In the last year of the war I watched the daily stream of hospital
transports passing through my command at Dover, carrying
thousands of wounded ; and the leave boats bringing men from
the Front for a few days at home, often weary and haggard with
the mud and grime of battle still on them. I saw men going
back from leave, under no illusions as to the hell awaiting them,
with a look that filled one with pride and sympathy ; so different
to the gallant bearing of the early days, but a bearing of even
greater value in the critical time, when the issue hung in the
balance.

Then came the Armistice, and our men returned, in the words
of our old naval prayer, to enjoy the blessings of the land and
the fruits of their labours,” and now, after fifteen years, with a
heartache we see thousands of them tramping about with a look
of dull hopeless despair, seeking for work.

Surely there is a way out of the evil pass into which we have
been led ?

I have one more dream, which I have not yet lived, but please
Qod I will before I join my good companions who have passed.

A dream of a leader of proved courage, with a vision to see
beyond the barbed wire of No-man’s-land through which we
are still staggering in the wake of short-sighted, sentimental
idealists. A leader who will rally the youth of all parties and
classes, and all who tried, endured, and still hope confidently for
a happy issue for our rac? out of the world crisis which threatens

FOREWORD

to. engulf us. A leader who will form and lead a real National
Goverximent which is not afraid to govern, or to stamp out the
unfettered treason to King and Country which is allowed to
flourish unchecked. A government with the courage to treat
employer and employee alike, and to see that men who want
to work are allowed to work. A government which will put
the welfare of our Country, Colonies and Dominions, and the
Throne which unites the Empire, before all other considerations.
A government which, deaf to the cry of misguided pacifists, will
maintain sufficient armed forces to secure the sea communications
and guard the outposts of the Empire — and ensure peace.

Such a government cannot fail to solve the problems which
beset us, restore the prestige of our Empire, and find a way of
disbanding our army of unemployed.

Then, and not until then, will we wh® fought have kept faith
with our men who died.

R. K.

Tingemick House,

nth November, 1933.

PART I

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
SUBMARINE SERVICE

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

CHAPTER I •

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBMARINE

Naval Intelligence Work ; Trouble with Sir John Fisher ; Naval manoeuvres of
1910; Appointed Inspecting^Captain of Submarines; Submarine construction.

In the summer of 1903 I had just given up command of a
flotilla of eight destroyers, and was waiting on half-pay for
another sea-going appointment, when I was offered one in the
Naval Intelligence Department at the Admiralty. I thought
this would be a useful experience, and so it proved, for I found
myself in charge of a section which was concerned with the
Navies of Russia and Japan. Within a few months my two
countries were at war, and as we were in alhance with Japan, to
the extent of coming to her aid in the event of the interference of
a third power, my duties brought me into intimate relations with
the Japanese Naval Mission in England, and I obtained a very
valuable insight into the character and aims of that warlike
Island race, which is destined to play so great a part in the future
of the East.

Prince Louis of Battenberg, the Director of Naval Intelligence,
was a wonderful Chief, and looked after the interests of all who
had the good fortune to serve under him. At the end of 1904,
he offered me the appointment of Naval Attachd in Rome,
Vienna, Constantinople and Athens, a delightful post which I
held for three years and enjoyed immensely.

I hunted in Rome, played polo on the shores of the Bosphorus,
shot in Austria, made friends with interesting people of every
nationality, and, as the records of the Naval Intelligence I
hope show, reported very fully on the naval policy, navies and
the naval defences of the countries to which I was accredited.

zo NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

I v/as promoted to Captain in 1905, and when I was at home
on leave I ran into Sir John Fisher — ^the First Sea Lord — ^whom
I had met once or twice before, but hardly knew ; so I was
pleased and surprised when he recognised me, and said in a
very friendly way, “ We had to promote you, as every one said
you were going to be promoted.” I don’t quite know what he
meant, but gathered that my good fortune had his blessing.
Two years later I was at home on leave, and at a Court ball
at Buckingham Palace I found myself alongside Sir John;
remembering his kindness two years before, I spoke to him and
was about to introdflce him to my wife, but refrained, as he
gave me a most ferocious glare and turned his back ! I was
very much surprised and wondered why. I learnt a few
days later.

At that time I had been Naval Attach^ two and a half years,
and felt that although I was very happy and gaining most useful
experience, it was time I went to sea again ; so I called on the
Naval Secretary — Captain Evan-Thomas — to ask for a ship,
but I realised at once that I was not likely to get a command for
some time. As my contemporaries and one or two Captains
junior to me had already been appointed to cruisers, and I Icnew
there would be some vacancies in the next few months, I asked
why I was being passed over. He was obviously uncomfortable
and after some hesitation asked me if I had ever taken sides in the
Fisher-Beresford controversy. I repUed that I had not and never
meant to. He then asked me if I ever wrote to the papers. I
replied “ No, why ? ” He said “ Well, someone here in a high
position is certain that you do ; of course I have no right to ask
you such questions, but I do so in your own interests.” He then
asked me if I had ever had anything to do with The Times. I told
him I knew The Times correspondents in Rome and Vienna, they
practically had the entrfe of the Chanceries of those Embassies ;
we sometimes exchanged naval information, but I had had nothing
whatever to do with The Times or any other newspaper. He
admitted, in answer to my question, that the person was Sir John
Fisher, and went on to say that someone in The Times office had
told Sir John that I had tried to get an article against him
published on behalf of Lord Charles Beresford. He said that Sir
John knew that my mother lived at Hampton Court Palace, not far
from the Beresford’s house at Chobhan^, and “ no doubt the plot

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBMARINE

was hatched there.” I told him that as a matter of fact I had only
met Lord Charles once in my hfe, and that was in Rome.

Evan-Thomas told me that Sir John’s belief that I was working
against him had done me much harm ; in fact, it was the reason I
was not to be given a ship. He told me he would now tell Sir
John that the whole story was untrue, and asked me to leave the
matter in his hands. I said I did not think that was good enough,
and told him why ; he admitted that Sir John was unlikely to
believe in my innocence without definite proof, but when I told
him that I would go and have it out with Fi^er at once, he begged
me to do no such thing ; he ought not to have told me, it was a
breach of confidence on his part ; so then I said I would go to
The Times ; he said that would be just as bad. By that time I was
feeling very angry and, said, “ Times or Fisher ? I don’t mind
which.” He begged me to pause ; I thought hard for some
moments and then the solution came to me ; the name of Lord
Charles Beresford’s Naval Secretary was John Keys. Whoever
it was who went to The Times must have described himself as
Lord Charles’ Secretary. The mischievous busybody in The
Times office must have found John Keys’ name in the Navy List,
and then told Fisher that Keys was trying to get an article against
him published.

When I suggested this to Evan-Thomas, he said at once that it
was now all clear ; he could not understand why he had not
thought of it before. He had been Lord Charles’ flag captain
(with Keys), a fact that had made his relations with the First Sea
Lord very difficult at first, but he had managed to steer clear of
trouble. He then asked me if I would now leave the matter in
his hands. He showed me a list of ships that would come
vacant, and told me to select one. I chose the Venus and went to
her a few months later. But for Sir John Fisher’s intervention I
would certainly have gone to some other ship before the Venus
fell vacant, and would have missed the opportunities that
appointment gave me.

I learnt some years later from John Keys that it was not he
who went to The Times on Lord Charles’ behalf, but the latter’s
stenographer.

^ When I came home in January, 1908 , 1 tried to have it out with
Sir John. He sent me quite a friendly message about my work as
Naval Attach^, but was obviously determined not to see me. It

22 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

was indeed fortunate for me that I had already been promoted to
Captain when all this occurred.

The Venus was a second-class cruiser serving in the Atlantic
Fleet, under the command of Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir Assheton
Curzon Howe, and later Prince Louis of Battenberg. I had a
very happy time in the Venus^ which came to an end in the
autumn of 1910. Normally, after a spell of half-pay, I would
probably have been given the command of an armoured cruiser,
but in the meantime the naval manoeuvres carried out that
summer altered the wiiole course of my career.

These were of peculiar interest. The Red Fleet under the
command of Admiral Sir William May, Commander-in-Chief
Home Fleet, consisted of 23 battleships, armoured cruisers, light
cruisers, destroyers. Submarine Z?i, and some torpedo boats and
submarines for local defence.

The Blue Fleet was under the command of Sir Edmund Poe,
the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Station, who had come
home with practically the whole of his fleet, which was augmented
by the Atlantic Fleet under the command of Prince Louis of
Battenberg. The battleships only numbered 1 5 and the armoured
cruisers and destroyers were numerically considerably weaker
than those of the Red Fleet.

The Blue Fleet was based on the West Coast of Scotland. By
dint of shutting ojSF certain waters, and a little imagination, the
area was ingeniously turned into a very fair geographical
reproduction of the Heligoland Bight. The Kiel Canal was
reproduced by the Sound of Mull, and vessels passing through
it were subjected to the same restrictions, as to numbers entering
and time of passage, as vessels passing between Kiel and
Wilhelmshaven. Of course no reference was made to this in
any orders or reports, and it was not supposed to be generally
known in the fleet, that the manoeuvres were designed to test
our dispositions for a war with Germany, and the close blockade
of the Heligoland Bight; but it can hardly have escaped the
notice of any student of war.

I was fortunate enough to be given command of the light
cruisers, scouts, destroyers and some Admiralty colliers represent-
ing transports, based on Gigha Island with instructions to be
ready to carry out a raid on Red territory on the south side of the
Bristol Channel, when ordered to sail. The remaining light

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBMARINE 23

ctuisers and destroyers were based on Colonsay, and when
hostilities commenced they had several actions with the enemy’s
blockading craft, and inflicted, but also suffered, considerable
loss. I hid the whole of my force behind Gigha Island, which,
like Colonsay, was supposed to be fortified, and watched the
Red patrols from a lookout station on the hill. I decided to
leave the enemy alone until I had some definite object in view.
With the exception of a small watching patrol of destroyers, to
report any movements to the northward, my force lay quiet for
five days, much to the annoyance, I was told, of the destroyers
who were spoiling to go out and attack the enemy’s patrol.

When I was ordered to sail, my scouts and destroyers under
the command of Captain Godfrey Paine in the Sapphire fell on
the right flank of the enemy’s patrol line and rolled it up to the
westward and northward, whfle I escaped with the transports
and four cruisers, keeping close inshore, unseen and unreported.

I had always thought the close blockade of our war plan was
unpractical and invited attack in overwhelming superiority at
any selected point.

At that time our submarine service, with the exception of Di,
consisted of small craft, really only fit for local defence. Di,
however, the only submarine we possessed capable of operating
at any distance from our coast, proceeded under her own power
from Portsmouth to the west coast of Scotland, and in spite of
having one engine disabled, cruised off the Blue base for two or
three days and torpedoed two of the Colonsay cruisers. Di’s
enterprising exploit opened the eyes of the First Sea Lord,
Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, to the offensive possibilities of
submarines, which he had hitherto regarded as defensive vessels.

A couple of months after the manoeuvres, I was summoned to
the Admiralty and offered the appointment of Inspecting Captain
of Submarines. I protested that I knew nothing about submarines
except second-hand from my brother, who was one of the pioneer
submarine officers ; that the existing Inspecting Captain and
his two predecessors were torpedo specialists ; that it was a highly
technical service, and I was a mere “ Salt Horse ” without any
specialist attainments. The Naval Secretary, Rear-Admiral
Troubridge, replied that that was just what Sir Arthur wanted,
a sea-going officer who had every prospect of being a young
Admiral, who could be. relied upon to bring the submarine

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

service into close touch and co-operation with the fleet. I felt
highly honoured and accepted the appointment, and that was the
beginning of my long association with a splendid body of officers
and men whose deeds of enterprise, endurance and valour fill one
with admiration and pride.

When Lord Fisher decided to embark on the construction of
submarines, he placed a gifted torpedo officer with a genius
for invention (Captain R. Bacon) in charge of this new branch
of the service, with a free hand to experiment, develop and
organise it.

It was originally evolved from the American Holland boat,
five of these being built, under American supervision, at the
works of Messrs. Vickers at Barrow-in-Furness during 1900-1902.
The success of these boats encouraged the Admiralty to proceed
further, and the “ A ” type was designed, which was still a purely
Holland type boat, but a little larger and more seaworthy.

I don’t think anyone at the Admiralty in those days, or indeed
for some years to come, realised the immense possibilities which
lay in submarine warfare. Now some people, who have not the
knowledge to gauge their limitations, credit them with powers
they certainly do not possess.

In June, 1904, Mr. Alan Burgoyne, an amateur naval expert,
gave a lecture at the Royal United Services Institution on
the “Future of Submarine Boats,” to a number of Naval
Architects and Officers, including Captain R. Bacon, the Inspect-
ing Captain of Submarines. After an interesting historical
sketch on the development of submarines, the lecturer had the
temerity to criticise our latest, the “ A ” class, as being too small
and possessing insufficient reserve of buoyancy ; he even made
suggestions as to improvements in detail, such as subdivision,
a watertight hatch in the conning tower, telescopic periscopes,
etc. He expressed a hope that he would soon hear of 600- to
8oo-ton vessels being laid down, and eventually visualised
vessels of about 1,000 tons, declaring that there was no reason
why a large submersible should not have a surface speed of
26 and even 30 knots. He certainly made some technical
blunders, but the hopes he expressed fell far short of achievement
in a few years, and his ultimate vision is very little ahead of it
today. However, it was all too much for Captain Bacon, who

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBMARINE

alone of all those present, knew anything about the practical
working of a submarine, and he smothered the poor amateur
with scornful ridicule.* Two years later he upbraided his
successor for building Bi ; the “ A ” class, for which he was
]^ponsible, he declared, were the largest vessels which could be
/ usefully manoeuvred submerged ! {Bi was 142 ft. in length,
';:with a surface displacement of 285 tons, 37 ft. longer and 100 tons
greater displacement than the A ” type.)

In 1910 when I succeeded. Captain S. S. Hall had been
Inspecting Captain of Submarines for ^four years, and the
submarine service owed him a great debt for the organisation he
had built up, and the training he had introduced ; which had
produced an invaluable body of officers and men, who provided
the nucleus and the leaders for the service which expanded and
developed so rapidly during the next few years. The second
senior submarine officer was Captain F. Brandt, also a torpedo
officer who, like Captain Hall, would have been a good deal
senior to me, but for my good fortune in getting early promotion
during the war in China in 1900. He was a most devoted and
energetic officer, who never spared himself, and did much for
the submarine service, f

The technical knowledge of Hall and Brandt was immense,
there was no small detail in which they did not concern themselves.
To me machinery and materiel detail were a closed book. At
first this filled me with concern, but I soon came to the conclusion
that as I must necessarily always be an amateur, the best thing I
could do was to collect a small stajfF of highly expert submarine
officers, and the best available engineer oificer and constructor,
to advise me in technical matters, leaving myself free to devote
all my energies to submarine performance and training for war ;
incidentally to fight the battles in the interests of the submarine
service and its personnel, which my records show were endless.

On taking charge I inherited a highly selected body of officers
and men, credited in the navy generally, with an inclination to
regard themselves as almost a separate service; 12 A^s/' 11

‘^BV’ 37 ‘‘C's” and Di; eight other “D^s'' completing

♦ Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, Vol. XLVIII, July-Dcc. 1904.

t Captain Brandt commanded the Monmouth under Admiral Craddock at the
Battle of Coronel, and went down like his gallant Admiral with his colours flying.
Not one soul of that devoted coinpany was saved by the enemy.

z6 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

and on the stocks, and eight “ E’s ” projected and about to be
laid down. It was a goodly heritage for a young captain.

I am very conscious that the following record of the develop-
ment of maUriel, and the training of personnel, during the three
years preceding the war, may be rather dull reading to the layman,
and I recommend anyone not interested to skip these pages. I
have included them because I am anxious to place on record the
great efforts that were made by the submarine service to fit itself
in every possible w^ for any duty it might be called upon to
perform. It will be seen later that the enterprise, devotion and
self-sacrifice of the “ Submariners ” in peace time, enabled them
to add a splendid page of achievement to the history of our Navy.

During the development of these classes of submarines, other
nations, including the French and Italians, had been seriously
considering the necessity of giving a higher percentage of surface
buoyancy in order to increase their sea-worthiness. In France
this led to a controversy and a series of trials were carried out
between the two types “ Sousmarin ” and " Submersible.” The
result of these trials was all in favour of submersible or high-
buoyancy type, and the French therefore adopted it. The
Holland type did not lend itself to the development of a high-
buoyancy boat, and our designers, while evidently accepting the
principle of high buoyancy, were in difficulties as to how to apply
it without departing too drastically from the type hitherto
employed. In order to obtain the high buoyancy, French
designers adopted a form of double hull ; that is to say, they kept
the hull where the machinery was stored, and where the crew
were to live and control the boat, as small as possible, and placed
outside the pressure hull a thinner hull of torpedo boat shape.
The space between the two hulls provided the ballast tanks, and
enabled a high percentage of buoyancy to be obtained. The
Italian designer Laurenti had a portion of his boat on this
principle, with single hulled ends. He obtained a very high
buoyancy by means of a water-tight superstructure which
automatically filled as the vessel trimmed and emptied as she rose.
The Germans in the “Germania” design placed most of the
double hull on the top and at the ends.

Our designers, recognising the necessity for more longitudinal
stability on the surface, evolved the “ D ” design which proved

the value of the high-buoyancy boats, and were a considerable
improvement so far as sea keeping qualities went. The “ D’s ”
were single hulled, reserve of buoyancy being obtained by
imposing saddle tanks on the hull. When Di was tried it was
felt that the limit of length had been reached as, regards end-on
attack, as it was found difficult to manoeuvre her submerged into
a position of safety after she had fired her torpedoes, at the short
range necessary to secure success, as she took roughly three
times her own length to turn. My predecessor was very strong
on this point, and was responsible for the “‘E ” class which had
sufficient beam to take broadside torpedo tubes. These were
about to be laid down when I joined.

It was intended that they should have no bow tubes, but
misgivings as to their^ ability to deliver bow attacks were
considered rather exaggerated by submarine officers, after
further experience had been gained with the “ D ” class, and it
was not too late to incorporate these in the original design. The
“ E’s ” proved admirable submarines — submerged ; but the
“ hard lying ” money to which all submarine ratings were
entided, was stHl well earned !

It was decided in 1910 to prepare designs for submarines
carrying four broadside tubes, and to consider these early in
1911, with a view to settling the 1911-12 programme. The
Director of Naval Construction, Sir Philip Watts, produced
three designs ; they were described as “ French,” “ Italian,” and
“Improved E.” The first was closely copied from a Laubcuf
design, the second from a Laurenti design, which the FIAT
Company had widely advertised, and the third was simply an
enlarged “E.” There were no two opinions among serving
submarine captains as to the superiority of the two former over
the latter, but the Director of Naval Construction was unable to
recommend the construction of so large a vessel, involving
entirely new and, so far as we were concerned, untried principles,
so eventually it was found necessary to repeat the “ E ” type.

It was felt by the submarine officers I had formed into a small
advisory committee, that our “ E ” design, though a good one
in many ways, could not by any means be regarded as the last
word. I was advised by the technical experts, that the “ E ”
design could not be driven at a higher speed than about 15 knots,
without considerable risk of diving while running on the surface,

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-191J

but the French and Italian types could be driven safely at
considerably higher speeds. In order to give effect to these
views I felt it was most desirable to study designs abroad, since
our constructors were very naturally not prepared to embark
on the construction of such vessels without experience and
experiment. But time was passing and I felt very strongly that
we could not afford to wait for the laborious procedure which
this entailed.

Other considerations made it desirable to go abroad for designs.
Messrs. Vickers had^hown great enterprise at a time when other
firms would not undertake the construction of submarines, and
they were rewarded by a contract which practically gave them
a monopoly in Great Britain. This contract was valuable to
us in the early days, when requirementj were small and secrecy
was considered essential, but its terms debarred us from ordering
vessels of Admiralty design, involving Holland patents, from
any other firms. These restrictions were intolerable when it
became evident that Vickers not only would be quite unable to
meet our future requirements, but were getting seriously behind-
hand in their current orders.

To terminate the contract it was necessary to give two years’
notice at the end of a financial year. I managed to get this done
on the 31st of March, 1911. Vickers, who were naturally loath
to lose such a valuable monopoly, used every argument to get
the notice withdrawn and I was much afraid they would succeed.
In the meantime we were getting more and more behindhand, and
if other firms were to be brought into the field of submarine
production, it was necessary to go abroad for designs as soon
as possible, since, at the earliest, our existing designs could not
be given to them before April, 1913.

The submarine was Lord Fisher’s child, and his dynamic
energy overrode all naval and departmental obstruction and gave
it a good start in life, but Lord Fisher had passed into retirement,
and it was extraordinarily difficult to make progress towards
the provision of a large force of submarines, capable of blockading
the enemy’s coast, in the face of the ponderous machinery of a
departmental Admiralty, and the doubts of many senior naval
officers as to the value of submarines in war.

And then came Winston Churchill and the whole atmosphere
changed.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBMARINE 29

Shordy after he took oiBce as First Lord in 191 1, he visited my
headquarters at Gosport, and I took him to sea in a submarine
for some hours. He asked me if I had any requirements. I
told him of the difficulties I have just outlined, and how vital
it was to shake off the binding monopoly, in order to widen the
field of production, introduce competition, and be in a position
to develop and build any number, or type, of submarines that we
might require. He was keenly interested, and from that moment
the Submarine Service had a warm friend and supporter.

The next few years were full of interest. In the light of
German declarations and ambitions, war seemed to some of us
inevitable, and we strained every nerve to fit ourselves for the
great ordeal, should war be forced upon us. Under the energetic
drive of Winston Churchill, we made tremendous strides towards
efficiency and readiness. • His methods were not always popular,
indeed they were sometimes deeply resented, but he possessed
foresight, courage and unbounded energy, and I think few, if
any, of his most bitter pre-War naval critics, would deny that
we owe him a great debt for the determination and vision
he displayed in preparing the Navy for the great struggle
before it.

When I was Naval Attache in Italy I made friends with an
Italian officer, who had since become Managing Director of
Messrs. FIAT’S Works, where the Laurenti type of submarine
was built. He invited me to send any expert officers I liked to
Speaia to inspect the latest type of Italian submarine. I had told
him that as there was not the remotest chance of our ever buying
one I did not like to accept his offer. He assured me that there
would be no obligation to buy, though he felt certain we should
wish to after seeing one. I was now able to arrange the visit,
and officers representing the Director of Naval Construction,
Engineer-in-Chief, and my principal assistant, went to Spezia
and inspected FIAT vessels under all conditions. They were
very favourably impressed with many points in the design and
as the result of their report, it was decided to order a vessel of
this type from Messrs. Scott, of Greenock, who were licensed
by Messrs. FIAT, in order that the advantages and disadvantages
of this type over our existing vessels could be compared. She
was named Si, A visit was also paid by the same officers to
Messrs. Schneider’s Works at Toulon, where vessels of the

3 °

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Laubeuf type were inspected. Although there were many
points of interest in these craft the design was not recommended.
They were of a design built for the Greek government for service
in the Mediterranean, and were not adapted to our requirements
in the North Sea coast patrol ; moreover they compared
unfavourably with their contemporaries in our service. Monsieur
Laubeuf could, given time, no doubt have produced a vessel
answering to our requirements, but the Admiralty, in their desire
to start Messrs. Armstrong, Whitworth and Co., the licensees of
the Schneider Co.,, building at once, placed an order for two
submarines of the type inspected, in spite of the objections raised
by submarine officers, which I had strongly supported. They
were named Wi and Wi.

In 1905, when I was in Italy, I visited an exhibition in Florence
and s^w what was described as a “ Cleptoscopio,” a submarine
periscope in fact. I had looked through a periscope in my
brother’s submarine. This one struck me as being greatly
siAerior, so I sent details of it to the Admiralty, remarking that
M^ew nothing whatever about periscopes, that its apparent
supjeriority might be due to the clearer atmosphere of Florence,
but I thought it well worth an expert’s inspection. My report
was sent by the Admiralty for remarks, to the firm which made
aU our periscopes under the Vickers monopoly, with the result
that no competition ensued, and the reply I received did not
encourage me to pursue the matter further. Remembering this
incident, I arranged to send my experts to inspect Italian, German,
and French periscopes. They reported that all three were
superior to ours, both optically and mechanically. We were
able to purchase a French periscope for trial, and it was arranged
for a British optical firm to work the Italian patents. After 12
German periscopes had been purchased, similar arrangements
were made for their manufacture in this country. The threat
of competition spurred our periscope maker to make strenuous
efforts, and before long he was able to embody all the latest
improvements in his instruments. Thus when war broke out
we not only had a vastly improved periscope, but the ability to
meet the rapid expansion of the submarine service.

For a successful attack it is vital for a submarine to remain
unseen and unsuspected, the importance of her periscope there-
fore can hardly be exaggerated, and it is interesting to note the

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBMARINE

many stages through which periscopes passed in the process -of
their evolution.

In the early boats the image was inverted, and the submarine
captain had to attack a target which he saw upside down ’’ !

In all our small submarines the periscope could only be used
jfixed, and when the captain wished to raise or lower it, in the
course of an attack, the vessel had to “ porpoise ” I

Vessels of the size of the “ D ” class could not “ porpoise
without risk of disturbing the surface and being discovered — a
disadvantage the smaller craft shared to a Jpsser degree — so the
early D’s ’’ steered a steady course and the periscope was raised
and lowered jerkily with cumbersome tackles, the position of the
captain varying from standing tiptoe on a stool, to crouching
on the deck.

When I pleaded fof mechanical, or better still, electrical
devices which would overcome these handicaps, I was told they
were luxuries we could not afford. In the early stages of the battle
for the improvement of periscopes, I pointed out to the holder of
the purse strings, that the military value of a submarine which
cost over 100,000 depended entirely on the sldll of her captain,
the clearness of his vision, and his ability to raise and lower his
“ eye ” swifdy. Surely it was bad policy to save £zoo or £300 on
the price of his eye or to give him only one eye when two
could be fitted. If he lost his eye the military value of the
submarine disappeared.

Before the war descended on us, the captains of our
larger submarines were able to sit on stools, swing round,
raise and lower, without any effort, the finest periscopes in the
world.

In connection with the purchase of the German periscopes, I
had an unpleasant e^crience. My experts considered that they
were optically superior to any others and we were very anxious
to try them. The makers had a shop in England for the sale of
telescopes, cameras, etc., and the manager — a German — was most
a^ous to arrange the sale. He came to see me two or three
toes, but the price was considered too high by the head of the
department which had to authorise the purchase, and the matter
hung fire. Eventually I was told that if I could get the price
lowered by 5 per cent. I could have six of them. I sent for the
manager and he came intotny room with a large leather case slung

32 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

ovet his shoulder. I told him the Admiralty decision ; after a little
hesitation and looking at me queerly, he asked me how I would
like the 5 per cent, discount paid. I replied that I had nothing
to do with such matters ; the purchase would be made by the
Director of Contracts. He then put his leather case on my table
and asked if I was interested in reflex cameras. It suddenly
dawned upon me that I was being bribed. My expression must
have alarmed him, as he picked up his case and hurried from the
room and never came near me again. I must confess I felt
physically sick, and ifowas a lesson to me not to mix myself up in
the financial side of administration — ^but we got our periscopes
and that was really the only thing that mattered.

When the German came to speed up the sale, armed with a
camera worth about £40, it must have been a nasty shock to him
when he thought I wanted a commission of 5 per cent. —
over £300 !

As a result of the inspection of the Laurenti and Laubeuf
submarines, and the reports thereon, I was ordered to form a
committee of submarine officers, to put forward definite recom-
mendations as to future design. I included the officers already
advising me, who had the entire confidence of the Submarine
Service, and heard the opinions of other submarine captains.
The recommendations we made in February, 1912, were to build
two types, Oversea ’’ and ‘‘ Coastal, the former of about
a 1,000 tons displacement with a large reserve of buoyancy

E’s ’’ were about 660 tons).

As the best results could not be obtained by increasing the
displacement of the “ E ” class, and it would be necessary to
depart widely from our existing design, we recommended that
every advantage should be taken of considering the design of
private constructors in conjunction with Admiralty proposals.

We stressed the importance of habitability from the point of
view of the health and endurance of the personnel. The lack of
habitability in our submarines, we declared, placed a limit on
their range of action. (The submarine captains associated with
these recommendations were to prove, within three years, that it
was almost impossible to place any limit on the endurance and
hardihood of the crews of the submarines they commanded so
brilliantly.)

We recommended that the Coastal'’^ should have a displace-

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBMARINE

ment of about 250 to 300 tons, following as closely as possible
the characteristics of the “ Oversea ” t3^e.

In submitting our proposals for an “ Oversea ” type we had
in view a high-buoyancy ship-shaped vessel of sufficient speed to
accompany a battle fleet, and capable of keeping the sea for
extended operations in all conditions of weather. We knew that
Germany and France were building large vessels but we under-
• stood that these were not fitted with broadside tubes ; this no
doubt would enable their designers to give them finer lines and
obtain comparatively high speed for their alisplacement. At the
time, our submarine officers undoubtedly placed an exaggerated
tactical value on the possession of broa^ide tubes and were
ready to make sacrifices in other directions in order to have
them.

Vickers and Scott were invited to submit designs for an
“ Oversea ” submarine conforming to our recommendations.
Vickers’ design was of considerably higher displacement than
was anticipated, with a speed of only 17 knots. Scott, who
employed Laurenti, produced a design of much smaller displace-
mmt and guaranteed 18 knots, but hesitated to guarantee the
reliability of the FIAT engines, which were to propel the
vessel, suggesting as an alternative steam turbines.

About this time we were experiencing many difficulties in
connection with the internal combustion engines of the “ D’s ”
and early “ E’s.” We viewed with misgivings the much more
powerful engines necessary to propel Vickers’ “ Oversea.”
Other nations had experienced similar difficulties with high-power
internal-combustion engines. It was known that the completion
of a large number of German submarines had been delayed on
this account, and that France, after much experiment, had reverted
to steam for all her larger submarines. These were difficulties
whi(ffi we knew would be overcome in time, but timo -^sras
passing and we were most anxious to produce a submarine
capable of working with the Fleet. We welcomed, therefore,
with relief the introduction of such a simple and well-tried
means of propulsion as a steam turbine.

Orders were then placed for a Vickers’ “Oversea,” which
was named the Nautilus, and one from Scott which was namM
me Swordfish. It was considered advisable to await the i-i-ials of
these vessels before repeating them, or proceeding further with a
c

34 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

large “ Ocean ” type of submarine, which had been designed by
the Director of Naval Construction.

In the meantime, accepting generally our recommendations,
the Admiralty included in the 1913-14 estimates, “ Coastals ” for
the Coast Patrol ; from Scott “ S’s,” from Vickers “ V’s ” (their
“ Coastal ” design), and from Armstrong, Whitworth a new
“ W ” class, designed by Laubeuf to meet our requirements. In
our opinion these latter compared unfavourably with the two
former. In order not to lag behind in larger boats, “ E ” class
were ordered up to Si 8.

For some years before the war the German vote for submarine
construction had been approximately equal to ours, but thanks,
no doubt, to the fact that the defence of their harbours was not
dependent on submarines, as ours was to a great extent owing to
the abolition of defensive minefields, they had devoted the whole
of their vote to the construction of “ Oversea ” submarines,
with the result that they had more built, building, and projected
than we had or could build, a statement of fact which I reiterated
ceaselessly during the years which preceded the war.

In December, 1913, the First Lord presided over a conference at
which the German programme was discussed ; after which it was
deaded to devote nearly the whole of the sum available for
submarines in 1914-15 Estimates to the construction of “ Over-
sea ’’ vessels of the high-buoyancy, subdivided type of approxi-
mately the same displacement as the “ E ” class.

As it was desired to bring other firms, experienced in the
constru^n of destroyers, into competition. Admiralty designs
for a Coastal” and an "Oversea” were prepared. The
Director of Naval Construction, and the officer of his department
connected with the design of submarines, approached the subject
m ffie most open-imded manner, welcomed the co-operation
of the Submarine Committee, and made every endeavour to
follow Its recojtmnendations.

lEe Admiralty “ Coastal ” was named “ F ” and was the
^dt of the study of “ S,” " V,” and " W ” designs, coupled
^th our o^ experience. Orders for one " F ” were given to

Messrs.

Tfiomeyaoft The Admiralty "Oversea” was caUed "G”
aod Armstrong TOtwor* were inrited «>

der for them for the 1914-15 programme. That was the

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBMARINE

situation in the summer of 1914. At that time I was expecting
to be succeeded in September by Captain Reginald Hall (Director
of Naval Intelligence throughout the War) and I prepared a
memorandum for his information, the gist of which is in the
foregoing account.

To sum up, as long as submarines were only required for local
defence, which seems, at that time, to have been the limir of
vision of Lord Fisher and his technical adviser, the Holland boat
was, I think, unquestionably the best type to adopt. The iruain
object Lord Fisher seems to have had in'view, was to employ
submarines for the defence of harbours, and abolish defensive
minefields, a policy which he had carried into effect before I
came on the scene. As the material developed, and our vision
cleared and extended to the enemy’s coasts and the high seas,
it became more and more evident to the officers who had to
live in ^e vessels, that better sea-going qualities and surface
habitability were essential.

The definitely limited speed of the “ E ” type made it desirable
to build submersible, rather than submarine, vessels for work
with the Fleet and on the high seas.

As we had no tme to experiment, surely it was a good policy
to buy our experience from those who had expended years in
esperimenting with the submersible type, add this to our
unrivalled experience in the submarine type, which we had
developed to the highest pitch in the “ E ” class, and then trust
our constructors to produce the finest submarine submersible in
the world.

That was the policy which crystallised under the advice of my
smaU body of experts, and which I pressed with all the energy,
persistence and blarney in my being. It was condemned by Lord
Fisher who felt, I suppose, that the poUcy of those who preceded
me was being mdicted, but I hope it is clear from the foregoing
that what we did was reaUy only a short cut in the natural
evolution of submerged vessels. Also that our policy could only
have been built up on the sound foundations which had been
laid by those we succeeded.

There was one objection which was insistently advanced ; the
loss of prestige w-e would sustain by going abroad for designs.
I thought that rather absurd ; after aU, our original design cSme
from America ready-made. Anyhow, loss of prestige, however

36 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

mortifying, must be ignored ; it was the price we had to pay for
the monopoly under which we suffered long after its utility had
ceased to exist.

In this connection, at an opportune moment in the battle I was
waging for submarine development, the Electric Boat Co., of the
United States, from whom we obtained the design of our first
Holland submarine, had an advertisement in an American
engineering journal of a double hull, subdivided submarine
which, they claimed, embodied all the features of the Laurenti
and Laubeuf types, Adding with characteristic modesty, but
“ better than either.”

Before leaving these technical matters I would like to place
on record the names of the submarine committee which I formed
to advise me, and whose recommendations I championed.

Commander P. Addison, my principal technical assistant
throughout four and a half years — ^now Director of Dockyards.

Commander C. Little, a very experienced submarine officer
and one of the original Holland boat captains — ^now a Lord
Commissioner of the Admiralty and Deputy Chief of the Naval
Staff.

Lieut-Commander Lawrence, commanded D\ in the 1910
manoeuvres and Ez, the first British submarine to enter the
Baltic, where he torpedoed the battle cruiser Molthe and other
German ships— now Rear-Admiral in command of the Sub-
marine Service.

Commander M. Nasmith, won the V.C. for his glorious
exploits in the Marmora, where he spent 97 days during the
Galhpoli Campaign and sank 100 enemy vessels. Rear-A dmiral
in command of the Submarine Service, 1929-31 — ^now the
youngest admiral afloat and the Commander-in-Chief of the East
IndiacL Station,

Lieut.-Coinmander C. Craven, rendered invaluable service as
a submarine captain, and instructor of young submarine officers
—now a Director of Messrs. Vickers and Managing Director of
all their Works.

Ei^ineer-Commander Skelton, to whom the Submarine
Service is greatly indebted for the development of internal
combustion engines and submarine machinery generally —
Engmeer-in-Chief of the Navy, 1928-32.

Their recommendations were supported at every step by

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBMARINE

Mr. A. Johns, who, under Sir Eustace Tennyson D’Eyncourt,
the Director of Naval Construction, designed all our latest
submarines — ^now the Director of Naval Construction.

The introduction of new firms and new designs proved
exasperatingly slow, with the result that when the war burst
upon us, we had a number of submarines on the stocks and
projected, which were as yet untried. This was unfortunate
for the working out of our experimental designs, because of
course our so-called foreign excursion came in for a good deal
of criticism, as every departure from the stereotype always does.
It is a fact, however, that the Submarine Service and our designers
reaped many advantages from the pooling of new ideas, both
British and foreign, which the breakaway from the Vickers
monopoly made possible. The Swordfish^ for instance, made the
design of the “ K ’’ class a practical proposition, and our
submarines today have many features which can be traced to
the various designs we were studying when the war came.

Before the end of the war we had submarine vessels of 354 ft.
long, 1,883 surface/2,560 submerged displacement, driven by
steam turbines at a speed of 25 knots, armed with the largest
torpedoes in existence, and quick-firing guns, fit to accompany,
the fleet in all weathers — diving destroyers in fact. We had
three large submarines of 1,600/1,950 tons displacement which
possessed admirable diving qualities, and were armed with a
12-inch gun of the pre-Dreadnought battleships ; these were
really submarine monitors. ATi, which was laid down
immediately after the war, can only be described as a submarine
cruiser, her length being 369ft. and displacement 2,425 /3,6ootons.

When I was Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station, in
1928, Xi and Kz 6 were in my fleet, and when inspecting them I
took the opportunity of testing their powers. We were diving
at a depth of 100 feet in JVi when the order was given Surface,
engage the enemy.” In one minute she was on the surface and
had fired simultaneously her two four-inch guns, controlled as
a salvo from the director tower, two hits being obtained on a
target 2,000 yards distant. In ^^26 we were steaming at a
speed of 23.5 knots when the order was given to dive. In three
minutes 12 seconds she was at a depth of 80 feet.

The present Director of Naval Construction — Sir Arthur
Johns ^told me that, but for the ready-made experience we

38 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

bought, he could never have produced our diving destroyers
and monitors for use in the war. Vessels, I may add, which
raised our prestige and placed him among the Olympians of his
profession.

I have tried to give an outline of my only connection with
materiel during my career in the Navy. I do not think that
materiel is much in my line, but the battle to get the very best
in the world for my gallant Submariners ” was of absorbing
interest, and became an obsession. After all, the efficiency of
their vessels and weajjpns was a matter of life and death to them,
for in the course of our exercises and manoeuvres they ran
almost every risk they would have to face in war — short of
destruction by gunfire if caught on the surface, and deliberate
ramming — and our Roll of Honour includes many gallant
pre-War pioneers.

SUBMARINES WITH MERCURY IN BACKGROUND
Fort Blockhouse, 1910

CHAPTER n

TRAINING FOR WAR

Peace and War dispositions ; Submarine exercises ; Training for War ;

A skirmish with Lord Fisher.

The post of Inspecting Captain of SiAmarines was unlike
anything else in the Navy.

I had an office at the Admiralty, my headquarters were in
H.M.S. Dolphin^ an old hulk secured alongside the submarine
depot at Fort Blockhouse, and I was nominally in command of
H.M.S. Mercury^ a hulk moored head and stern off Haslar Creek.
There were seven submarine sections, as they were called in
those days, and these were maintained by :

Fort Blockhouse, which had very primitive living quarters
for officers and men, and none of the amenities of the naval
barracks and other shore establishments ; plant for charging
submarine batteries, workshops, torpedo store, etc., and a
floating dock. All officers and Portsmouth ratings were
trained there.

H,M.S. Forth, a sea-going depot ship and the Onyx,
a small hulk at Devonport. West-country ratings were
trained by this section.

H.M.S. Bonaventure and Antelope, sea-going depot ship
and tender based on Portsmouth.

H.M.S. Mercury (hulk) depot ship, and Hazard, sea-going
tender based on Portsmouth.

H.M.S. Thames and Sharpshooter, sea-going depot ship
and tender based on Harwich. East-country ratings were
trained in this section.

H.M.S. Vulcan and Hebe, sea-going depot ship and tender,
based on Dxmdee.

The depot ships, which were old cruisers, provided living
quarters for officers and men ; they were fitted with charging
plant, workshops and store-rooms for spare torpedoes and
submarine stores.

40 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

The teaders were old torpedo gunboats.

The aews of the submarines only lived in their vessels on

passage.

That was the situation when I assumed command. My first
step was to find a technical assistant, and I had no difficulty in
selecting Commander Percy Addison, after inspecting his and
other sea-going sections.

I then visited the oudying units, embarked in the depot ships
and tenders for cruises, watched submarine attacks from the
surface, and took par^,in many, submerged.

As I have already said, the military value of a submarine lies
in the skill of her captain and, I would add, his powers of leader-
ship. It is given to some to excel at ball games, to others to be
first-dass shots with gun or rifle ; if you can add the “ hunter’s ”
instinct to a first-class eye and steady nerves, you will probably
have a first-class submarine captain. But skill in attack is not
enough. Unless the captain has the absolute confidence of his
crew, unless the crew is trained to the highest pitch, and the
machinery and weapons are maintained in a state of efficiency,
you will not have a first-class submarine.

It was so interesting to stand beside a captain when he was
delivering an attack and to watch his crew, they knew in whose
hands their fate lay, and one could soon assess the military value
of an individual submarine. In the very rare event of its being
clear that the atmosphere was not a happy one, I had no hesitation
in taking immediate steps to correct it.

They were the salt of the earth those pioneer submariners and
I felt very proud when I found myself in command of a personnel,
knitted % the nature of their service into such a band of good
comrades.

Before Captain Hall left, it had been arranged to send three
“ C’s ” to Hong Kong, where they would be mothered by H.M.S.
Rosario, a sloop which had been fitted as a small sea-going depot
ship. As he was taking a cruiser out to the Mediterranean, it
was arranged that he should convoy the submarines so far. All
went well, but their voyage across the Indian Ocean was a great
adventure, attended by some risk, and I think the shades of our
great navigators of old must have saluted their crews as brothers.
I know that the hardy fishermen of the North Sea hailed the

TRAINING FOR WAR

submarines of those days as comrades and always threw fish to
t hem when conditions permitted, for they had often watched
two or three oilskin-clad figures clinging to their tiny conning
tower, washed down by seas like a half-tide rock.

In January, 1911, I received a memorandum from the
Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet giving the war stations
of all the submarines. This was sent to me through the Vice-
Admiral commanding the Third and Fourth divisions of the
Home Fleet, under whom the “ sea-going ” side of my
command was administered. That struck rge as a very unsatis-
factory arrangement. The Vice-Admiral lived during most of
the year in the old Admiralty house at the Nore, quite out of
touch with us, but all my correspondence in such mattens,
had to pass through him. From the Commander-in-Chief’s
order it was clear that the sole duty of the submarines was to
co-operate with the older destroyer flotillas for coast defence.
The sections were allotted areas i&om the Firth of Forth to the
Dover Straits.

War orders are of course a striedy guarded secret and I do not
know who was responsible for this disposition, I am sure it
was not my predecessor, and certainly I was never consulted.
The disposition had no relation to the peace-time training head-
quarters of the submarines or the capabilities of the various
classes.

In the course of the next few months, a thorough reorganisation
of the flotillas was approved, and on 3rd June, 191 1, there being
no orders in existence for the employment of submarines in war,
I submitted a memorandum giving the allocation of all the
submarines in home waters, and my views as to their employment
in peace and war.

I pointed out that in order to get full value out of the sub-
marines, it was absolutely essential that they should dive before
they were sighted by an enemy. In clear fine weather, provided
a good look out was kept, they should always be able to do so,
and under such conditions it was preferable that submarines
should not be accompanied by surface craft, while lying waiting
for an enemy, or proceeding to attack some definite object, as
they would be ready to dive at short notice and could attack
unsuspected. In hazy weather, such as often prevailed in the
North Sea, however, they -were certain to be seen and avoided

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

by an enemy, before they could get into a position to attack,
they also ran great risk of coming under the gunfire of fast
vessels before they could dive. Under such conditions, or
when tn<i1ring a long passage, when there was a possibility of
fialltng in with an enemy, they should be accompanied by fast
surface craft to scout for them. For this duty whenever possible,
one or more destroyers from the flotilla operating in the same
area should be attached to each group of submarines.

The " D ” class were able to proceed under their own power
on the surface about 2,500 miles at ten knots, they should be able
to remain self-supporting on an enemy’s coast for some days.

They would be most valuable a few miles behind an inshore
blockading squadron, ready to dive and attack any large vessels
which might come out to drive it olF (which shows that as far
as I knew the close blockade policy, referred to in my account
of the 1910 manoeuvres, was still in existence, despite the
risk the blockading ships would now also tun from enemy
submarines).

In this memorandum I gave an account of our routine training
and concluded by begging for frequent opportunities to attack
battleships and armoured cruisers, both in the interests of the
submarines and the fleet. Three months later I was informed
that my proposals were approved generally.

In the meantime, however, before the end of June, I was
directed to take some submarines to Berehaven and place myself
under the orders of Rear-Admiral L. Bailey, in command of the
Battle Cruiser Squadron. Admiral Bailey had been Commodore
of the Home Fleet Destroyer Flotillas, and later Head of the War
CoEege. His command, consisting of his squadron, an armoured
cruiser and some light cruisers, was based on Berehaven, which
was invested by enemy destroyers supported by light cruisers
and armoured cruisers. The old war plan in fact 1 The object of
these exercises was to test the ability of submarines to get past
the investing destroyers in order to attack the supporting ships
in the oflSng. This, of course, would have presented no difficulties
a year or two later, but the safety restrictions still in force were
such that the excrdse was rather unreal. However, the
most ardent supporter of the dose blockade could have been left
in no doubt as to the menace of submarines to such a
disposition.

TRAINING FOR WAR

My office in the Admiralty was of the greatest value to me,
and gave me to all intents and purposes the status of an Admiralty
officer. There I was able to deal direct with the First Sea Lord
in matters of policy, training and tactics ; with the Second Sea
Lord as regards personnel, which was voluntary and highly
selected ; with the Third Sea Lord and Controller of the Navy
(to give him his full title) in all questions of materiel ; and with the
Fourth Sea Lord for supplies. Also I had ready access to all
Naval and Civil Departments.

Above all this great organisation stood the First Lord — ^when
Winston Churchill assumed the office in (October, 1911. He
interested himself in every conceivable detail connected with the
service, its efficiency and preparation for war. (Incidentally the
latter part of the Third Sea Lord’s tide was abolished.) One
has heard Mr. Churchill condenaned for interfering in technical
matters and overriding technical opinion. There is no denying
he frequently did, but I think his quick brain and vivid imagina-
tion were invaluable and, in the majority of cases, his intervention
was in the best interests of the Service.

I do not suppose that any officer fell foul of him more acutely
than I did, on two or three occasions, mainly in connection with
the use he made of the opinions of young officers whom he
encouraged to talk. Also at the time of the Curragh incident,
being an Ulsterman, I felt bitterly about the risk he ran of
dividing the Navy by the order he issued for the employment
of a squadron, or I think it would be fairer to say, the interpreta-
tion that was put on that order. When these incidents occurred
I avoided having anything to do with him, though I don’t suppose
that bothered him much !

However, all that passed, and I have nothing but gratitude for
the help he gave me in my heavy responsibilities, and, I would
add his sympathy — ^for it was not too easy to ask the personnel
to run all the risks they so cheerfully faced, as our training for
war developed, even if one shared them.

He was so accessible, it would have been all too easy to
overcome many of the difficulties and obstructions I experienced,
by an app^ to Caesar, but in our Service loyalty is the foundation
of discipline and tradition — ^those who have been led into
forgetting this fundamental axiom have generally fallen by the
way anyhow I felt it a point of honour to sail down the Service

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

rUnnp] on the surface, reserving the power to attack “ unseen
and unsuspected ” like one of my submarines, for the King’s
enemies.

This did not prevent me, however, when I found one Service
channel blocked, trying to reach my objective through another.
In connection with my anxiety to devote all our energies and
resources towards providing oversea vessels, I found a valuable
ally in the Second Sea Lord, Sir John Jellicoe. In addition to
helping me in every possible way in the provision and selection
of officers, he shared my view that submarines would be able to
take the place of t&e inshore blockading squadron and the look-
out frigate of old, and at an opportune moment he came to my
assistance with an admirably lucid paper which helped to clear
the way for the building programme I wanted.

One of the first things Mr. Churchill did was to form a War
Staff, and to go very fully into war orders. It is satisfactory to
record that the disposition of the submarines and their proposed
employment in war, for which I obtained approval in August,
19 1 1, stood the test of the most searching investigation by the
First Lord and his War Staff, and, ultimately, the crucial test
of war.

With the exception of Aj and Bii which were
lost with only two survivors, the patrol sections remained
unaltered throughout the next three years, the only change being
in nomenclature, “ FlotiUa being substituted for Section,”
as a more naval term, and the flotillas were numbered from west
to east. When the First Lord introduced Flights ” of seaplanes,
he aptly suggested Shoals ” for submarines, but did not press
the point after hearing my views.

D’s ” and E’s ” joined the Oversea ” flotilla, but very
slowly and with exasperating delays, so it seemed to me, with an
eye on the rapid expansion of the German submarine flotillas,
and with my thoughts impatiently fixed on the provision of a
force sufficient to maintain the blockade of the Heligoland
Bight.

When I joined, a specially designed depot ship, the Maidstone^
fitted to mother 12 D’s,” and two tenders, the Alecto and

Adamant^ to mother three “ D’s ” each, were on the stocks, and
these came into service in 1912, They were of ereat value to
the Oversea ” flotillas.

TRAINING FOR WAR

On I St May, 1912, a reorganisation of the Home Fleet and
all vessels in Home Waters was brought into force. It was
laid down that the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth destroyer
flotillas would form the command of a flag officer, styled
‘Admiral of Patrols,’^ who would be under the direct orders of
the Admiralty.

The submarine sections in Home Waters would remain under^
the general control of the Inspecting Captain of Submarines,
who would be responsible to the Commanders-in-Chief of the
Home Ports for those sections assigned to •port defence, and
would be responsible to the Admiral of Patrols for the remainder.
Rear-Admiral J. de Robeck was the first Admiral of Patrols.
He had an office at the Admiralty, where his staff worked, and
he occasionally flew his flag afloat in one of the destroyer depot
ships. My office at the Admiralty, which I or my assistant used
to visit about once a week, was moved to a room adjoining the
AdmiraPs. The situation might have been difficult with some
Admirals, as the dividing line between my sea-going duties and
many other responsibilities was not too well defined. However,
it all went admirably, and we worked together for the next two
years for the confusion of the enemy. That association will
always be a very happy memory. De Robeck was a charming
man and a good companion ; he, his staff officer — Captain Walter
Cowan — and I had all commanded destroyer flotillas, and we
had another link in common, love of fox-hunting. De Robeck
had an eye for coxmtry,” was an excellent horseman and always
had a good horse or two, and there was no better-known man to
hounds in Warwickshire in those days, than John de Robeck.
Walter Cowan hunted in the same county and went desperately
hard, as he stiU does. I think the First Lord and his Naval
Secretary — ^Rear-Admiral David Beatty, who is still second to
none across country — ^must have thought that men with destroyer
experience and hunting tastes, were well fitted to hunt the pack
Df small craft, to whose care the protection of the coast was
:onfided. If that was in their minds I do not think they were
"ar wrong.

Apart from routine training we carried out constant exercises
ii the patrol areas. The Admiral acted as umpire, Cowan and
[ commanded opposing sides ; the depot ships and tenders
Lcted as battleships, cruisers or transports as the case might be.

46 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

These exercises were of the greatest value, tested every link in
the and were carried out under conditions not far removed
from war, at any rate as far as submarine risks were concerned.
By confining each operation to one area of the coast, a large
force could be provided from the other areas to act as enemy.
Apart from the value of these exercises to the personnel engaged,
they were of infinite value to Cowan and me, in t^t they gave us
opportunities of handling large forces and assuming considerable
responsibilities, under the supreme responsibility of our Admiral,
who we knew worfid support us whatever we did.

So much for the Coast Patrol.

The t r<»ining of “ Oversea ” submarines was my constant
c on rfrn. They of course took part in the Coast Patrol exercises,
generally as a marauding enemy, but I was most anxious to get
them into close touch with the fleet. I knew that the fleet,
generally speaking, used to look upon submarines as local defence
vessels whose officers and men, dressed like North Sea fishermen,
were almost a service apart ; they naturally hated the thought of
rnlliding -with a submarine, and were only too glad to keep out
of their way. This attitude was changing in the principal fleet,
however, thanks to OUT young officers, who, after a few years in
submarines, had to do a year’s service in a sea-going ship. They
proved wonderful ambassadors. I took great pains to get them
appointed to the best ships, where their technical knowledge and
unbounded enthusiasm made them in a short time first-class big
ship officers, particularly when placed in charge of turrets.
I constantly received letters from captains, when an officer was
due to return to the Submarine Service, thanking me for sending
them so-and-so, regretting his departure, and asking me to send
another like him. Our young ambassadors recruited ardent
spirits like their own, and so we built up a magnificent corps
Petite of officers and men.

By a happy chance in 1912-14 the Commander-in-Chief of the
Home Fleet was Sir George GJlaghan with whom I had taken
part in the rdief of Pekin. The two Vice-Admirals comnaanding
the Rrst and Second Batde Squadrons were Sir Stanley Colville
and Sic George Warrender ; both had commanded the battleship
in China to which my destroyer Fame was attached. Sic George
Warrender was in command of our base in the Pei-Ho river after
the capture of the Taku Forts, and I was in constant touch with

TRAINING FOR WAR

him for many weeks. He and Sir George Callaghan were
witnesses of an incident, which later involved me in one of the
most exciting and critical half-hours of my life. Friendships
formed under war conditions usually endure, and the warm
friendship of these two Admirals and Admiral Colville, and the
help they gave me in the training of the submarines was of
infinite value. I frequently embarked as a guest in one of the
flagships, and the course of the squadron was arranged to pass
through areas occupied by submarines. The restrictions which
had been imposed to minimise the risk of accident were gradually
removed, as they had been in our own routine exercises, attacks
were pressed in to a very close range, and often the ship was
struck by a torpedo which she could not have avoided, fired by a
submarine which had not given a sign of her presence.

The battle fleet became much interested and impressed. Having
proved that submarines’ torpedoes ran straight, and that, given
the opportunity, they could be relied upon to deliver a large
percentage of successful attacks, it seemed to me of the greatest
importance for the "" poacher to turn gamekeeper ” and help the
fleet to defeat enemy submarines. We knew our limitations and
difficulties, but I found it as hard to make the converted enthusiast
realise a submarine’s limitations, as to make an unconverted
sceptic appreciate their powers, or either to draw the happy
medium.

Once a submarine has dived, her low submerged speed and
limited vision are a tremendous handicap, and her limited range
* of action submerged, make her very dependent on opportunity ;
hence it is important to force, with light screening vessels, every
submarine within reach of a fleet, to dive before the fleet appears,
and keep them down until the fleet has passed the danger area.
If a submarine is seen to dive, her danger zone can be plotted on
the chart by a circle, with her full submerged speed as radius,
and the course of the fleet, given sea room, can then be altered to
Woid the danger zone of the submarine. The alteration may of
course, take it into the danger zone of another submarine which
has not been located ; the importance therefore of an extended
screen weU ahead of the fleet is evident. Even if it does not
succeed in detecting a submarine before she dives, it will impose a
considerable handicap on her ability to reach a position from
which she can attack.

4$ NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

The first subtoarine exercise against a fleet, protected by a
destroyer screen, was carried out in September, 1912, when Sir
Stanley Colville undertook to bring the First Battle Squadron
and a destroyer flotilla, through an area occupied by the Dover
Submarine Flotilla, to the west of Portland Bill, well clear of
the Channel shipping. I embarked in the submarine of the
senior officer of a group of three “ C ” class submarines. We
managed to dive unseen by the screen and passed well under it.
In the long interval during which we waited for the battle
fleet, submerged wdl beneatli the keels of any ships, the Captain
gave me an excellent lunch which included hot roast partridge.

those days we had no sound receiving or signalling apparatus ;
nevertheless one could distinctly hear the beat of a vessel’s
propeller, sometimes at a considerable distance, except from
right ahead, when her hull seemed to screen the sound. The
chief risk a submarine ran, therefore, was rising inadvertently
ahead of a vessel too close to avoid collision.

When we rose to periscope depth, the battle fleet was in
sight in a favourable position and our attack was successfully
pressed home to close range unseen. A quarter of an hour
later, when we were lying on the surface gloating over the
flattened noses of our torpedoes, floating in the wake of the
disappearing battle fleet, a destroyer closed, with a message
&om the Admiral inviting me to stay with him, to witness the
attack of the “ Oversea ” flotilla off the Sdlly Islands next
morning. An hour later I found myself on board the Colling
wood with no kit, and after witnessing an excellent attack I was
carried off to Berehaven, in the south-west of Ireland, whence
I returned some days later in borrowed clothes, via O^rk and
fiolyhead.

That was the beginning of a series of progressive trials
towards devising the best screen for a fleet, and the best tactics
for it to carry out, in the face of the submarine menace, which
was very real if disregarded.

As can be imagined, one’s anxieties during these exercises
were heavy, but the help and sympathy of the First Lord, the
admirals I have mentioned, the personnel of the surface vessels
of the Patrol Flotillas, and the ships of the Home Fleet with
which we exercised, will always be a pleasant memory. The
annual naval manceuvres, which lasted five or six days, were a

TRAINING FOR WAR

very different matter. Of these I have some nightmare memories,
particularly when submarines were operating in shoal water,
with insufficient depth below the keel of a heavy ship to dive
under her. A large number of officers were engaged in these
manoeuvres who possessed no submarine experience and had
very vague ideas of submarines and their methods of attack
and evading attack, judging by the claims made against sub-
marines, and the manner in which the claims of the latter were
often ignored and overruled. Unfortunately we were not
permitted to fire torpedoes, otherwise sctoe misconceptions
might have been removed.

It was very galling for the submarines, filled with enthusiasm
and determined to face any risk to prove their worth, to be told
when they rose to claim a successful attack, that they were out
of action. For instance, in the hazy weather which often
prevailed in the North Sea, a submarine might be caught on
the surface and destroyed before she could dive ; on the other
hand she might be sighted for a few moments only before she
dived. Light cruisers and destroyers would rush at her at full
speed, and after fixing a few shots at her or her periscope, would
decide that she was out of action. Thanks to the training they
had xindergone in the last year or so, the submarines would
generally submerge very rapidly, dive deep, and escape, under
their assailants if necessary, and ^though diving under battleships
was not encouraged, even that had to be resorted to occasionally
to avoid being rammed. When the submarine eventually rose
to periscope depth she would find her enemy, as often as not,
still in the neighbourhood ; she would then take full advantage
of the opportunity given her, and deliver an unseen and successful
attack, offiy to be told to hoist the out of action flag and
proceed into harbour.

Such incidents continually occurred.

In the 1913 manoeuvres an admiral was embarked in a cruiser
as chief umpire with a rear-admiral as chief of stajff; neither
had any submarine experience, the latter was an incurable
sceptic, consequently the decision of the senior officer of
the vessels engaged was generally confirmed, and the
submarine was disqualified from taking further part in the
manoeuvres, thus losing perhaps three or four days’ valuable
experience.

50 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

In these manoeuvres I witnessed a rush, such as I have
described, on the submarines defending the Humber. The
whole operation bore no sort of relation to actual war. Destroyers
which claimed to have put aU the submarines out of action
were followed by a battleship and transports, crowded with
troops who were disembarked at Immingham. This gave the
submarines wonderful opportunities, of which they could not
have failed to take full advantage in war. Yet the chief umpire,
on the strength of the attackers’ claim, put eight submarines
out of action ! Sorfie obviously faulty decisions were eventually
reconsidered later at the umpires’ office at the Admiralty, after
rather fiery protests on my part, but that did not make up to
the submarines for their lost opportunities.

I must confess I was very incensed at the treatment my
submarines had received at the hands of some of their assailants
and the umpires, though some of the former were gener-
ous and fair. I commented hotly on this in my official report,
and submitted that the time has arrived to face the question,
if we are to prepare ourselves to deal with the submarines of
an enemy. I am convinced that there will be a very rude
awakening if tactics which were common during the recent
manoeuvres are repeated in actual warfare.”

However, the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet wrote
that ^‘he was much impressed with the achievements of the
submarines during the manoeuvres, and greatly appreciated the
manner in which the ' D ’ and ‘ E ’ boats were handled.”
He went on to say that, in spite of a double screen of destroyers
ahead of the fleet, which was 2ig-2agging at high speed, and
the fact that the surface of the sea was as smooth as glass,
D8 delivered a successful attack. On another occasion, he
said, £5 had attacked Collin^ood successfully when she was
steaming knots. He asked for information as to what
effect the anti-submarine measures he had carried out had had
on the submarines. That was vdry satisfactory.

I frequently stayed with Sir George Callaghan during the
two years he was Commander-in-Chief, and during the last year
he detailed Commander Roger Backhouse of his Staff to work
with me in the preparation of screening ” and look out ”
diagrams which, in the opinion of submarine officers, would
hamper their attacks most effectively.

TRAINING FOR WAR

The screening dispositions were tried out by the Overs<
Flotilla on the Maidstone and her tenders^ screened by destroy
of the Coast Patrol Flotillas, and eventually on battleships
the Home Fleet screened by their flotillas. In the course of tl
trials, the submarine personnel learned to dive from the suri
very rapidly, and to considerable depths very speedily, anc
face bravely and confidently the unpleasant music of propel
overhead. On the other hand, the personnel of the i
learned, or should have learned, that if they did not take ]
cautions they ran great risks ; but that 4 f they proceeded
high speed, zig-zagging with well-placed destroyer sere
submarine attack could only be delivered with great diffici
attended by tremendous risk to the submarine. The dange
a long-range torpedo fired at the fleet from a distance of tl
or four miles was always present, but well-extended 1(
outs ” minimised the risk considerably ; besides there
much more water than ship in the target presented by a flee
cruising disposition.

In the autumn of 1913 I asked the Commander-in-Chie
allow me to operate four submarines of the Oversea fle
in conjxinction with one of the fleets, in an exercise bet\‘
opposing battle fleets. He consented and placed the Swl
fast destroyer leader, at my disposal. The Smft led the
submarines, stationed in line abreast a mile apart, in rear of
battle fleet’s cruiser screen. The latter kept me well infoi
of the enemy’s movements, and I was able to direct the
marines to dive in a position favourable for one or tw
attack the enemy during deployment, unseen and unsuspe^
Two of the submarines delivered entirely successful atta
they were only allowed to fire one torpedo each out of th
they carried. Curiously enough, both hit the same battle
almost simultaneously from opposite sides.

The speed of our fleet, of course, had to be limited d\
the long approach, to that of the submarines, about 14 k
It was a somewhat primitive effort, but in the last two
of the war our K ” class diving destroyers ” were ope
on similar lines.

I had some very bad moments during that exercise, wat<
heavy ships, cruisers and destroyers manoeuvring in all direc
over the submarines, and for some hours I was in morta!

5z NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

that one of the submatines had come to grief; however, she
rose at last and all was well.

For a couple of years before the war an Admiralty Committee
had been studying offensive measures against submarines. In
May, 1914, the Committee forwarded a report giving its views
about submarine warfare generally, based on information
supplied by us. It recommended that an explosive sweep
should be towed by the vessels screening the battle fleet, but it
made it clear that, in the opinion of the Committee :

(a) No effective means of direct attack on a submerged
submarine has yet been produced ;

{b) The best means of attacking a hostile submarine
lying on the surface is for a submarine to stalk and torpedo
her ;

{{) The development of the submarine has necessitated
the revival of defensive mining.

With reference to (<z) it is an amazing fact that such an
obvious anti-submarine weapon as the depth charge, which
was used with such deadly effect in the later stages of the war,
had not been thought of by the enemy, ourselves or our
Allies.

In commenting officially on the Committee’s report, I said
that the opinions stated at {a), (V) and (c) were concurred in.

I remarked that there were so many considerations which
were not taken into account by “ theorists ” who “ believed in
submarines.”

In a memorandum, for instance, which was given by Lord
Fisher to the First Lord in December, 1913, submarines were
endowed with most wonderful powers of offence in blockade,
against vessels on the high seas, and against those attempting to
raid our coasts, and at the same time immunity from attack
was practically claimed for them.

Such optimism was not shared by those who had worked in
and with submarines during the last three years. They were
not inclined to exaggerate their powers, and were quite alive
to their limitations, and to the great risks they would run of
being caught on the sur&ce at night, in a half Hght, or in hazy
weather, and rammed or destroyed by gunfire before they could

TRAINING FOR WAR

dive.* Casualties in this connection were bound to be heavy
in time of war, particularly among those carrying out the
blockade of an enemy’s port. Submarines on this service
would also be very liable to the risks mentioned at

Submarine ojSicers claimed that, given opportunities and a
favourable position, they were able to deliver a very high per-
centage of successful attacks, with little more risk than was
run in our daily peace exercises, but they fully realised that
opportunities were Ukely to be few and, until we had a great
many more submarines in commission, the submarine menace
to an enemy would be more moral than real, particularly on
the high seas or at a distance from a base. The moral effect of
submarines would certainly be great, for one could never feel
secure from attack, but numbers were essential if offensive
operations were to be maintained.

Lord Fisher’s memorandum, however, correctly visualised
one aspect of submarine warfare which we all discarded as
impossible and unthinkable, the indiscriminate sinldng by the
Germans of British and foreign merchantmen, without any
regard to the safety of their crews.

I cannot pass without mention of my curious relations with
that great man, since these had an. extraordinary influence on
my career both before and during the war, his interventions
in my affairs being to my ultimate advantage on each occasion.

Sir John Fisher left the Admiralty and was made a peer in
January, 1910, and I did not come across him again until July,
1914, when the First Lord, with whom he was staying in the
Admiralty yacht Enchantress at Portsmouth, sent him over to
Fort Blockhouse, and told me to show him our latest submarine
and the foreign periscopes we had recently acquired. I did not
anticipate a very pleasant visit, as I knew from the criticisms he
had made to the First Lord, which were passed on to me, that he
disapproved of what I had been doing. He arrived in a very
aggressive mood, showed no interest in the submarine I took him
to, but looking at me very sourly asked me why we had not built
more submarines, I said I wished we had, and that acting on a

* The first submarine the Germans lost was C/15, on 9th August, 1914,
caught on the surface at dawn and rammed by the Birmingham,
t 'l^e first submarine we lost was E3, on i8th October, 1914, stalked and
g^cooed by an enemy’s submarine, when on blockade duty in the Heligoland

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

saying which I was told he frequently quoted — “ Reiteration is
the ^’ ? ? ? (I forget how it goes on — it was one of Fisher’s
slogans), I remarked on almost every paper that I minuted at the
Admiralty, and I dealt with every kind of question connected with
submarines, strategy, tactics, training, persormel and materiel
that “ the Germans had more ^ Oversea ’ submarines built^ building
and projected than we had:' He said, Well, why have we not
built more ? ” I replied that if he really wanted my opinion,
I could only say the responsibility was his ; his policy of doing
away with all defensive minefields, and undertaking to replace
them with submarines, had resulted in our producing a number
of coast defence vessels, of poor sea-going qualities, which could
not operate on the German coast, or at any distance from our
own ; vessels, moreover, which in my opinion could never take
the place of defensive, minefields in war*

He was naturally very angry, and said he did not propose to
enter into an argument with me about his poHcy, or the relative
value of minefields and submarines ; besides, that was no answer
to his question, Why had we not built more submarines ? ”
I said I considered he was responsible for that also ; he had given
Vickers and their periscope makers an absolute monopoly, aU
Vickers resources for some years had been devoted to building
small submarines, which in my opinion would be of little value
to us in war. Vickers and Chatham Dockyard, the only
government establishment equipped to build submarines, had
been given orders for “ Oversea ” submarines to their full
building capacity, but they had entirely failed to keep pace with
our requirements, with the result that we had fallen behind
Germany, who had avoided our mistake and built nothing but
“ Oversea ” submarines for some years. I said I had made every
possible effort to get the monopoly broken, in order to increase
the field of production, but could get no definite action taken
until Churchill came. Then we had to wait two years before we
could build elsewhere to any but foreign design. His policy had,
in fact, had disastrous effects on our capacity to build. Lord
Fisher said, with scathing emphasis, “ Very interesting ! ’’
turned his back on me, and went away without looking at any-
thing or speaking another word.

I felt ashamed of myself afterwards for being so brutally frank
tcr~a-vejy^di5tmgmshed“& officer, to whom the Navy owed so

TRAINING FOR WAR

much, and the Submarine Service its birth, but he had been so
scathing and unfriendly that I could not resist giving him the
answers to his criticisms. That was my hour. His came four
months later.

On 15 th July, 1914, three weeks before the declaration of war.
Sir George Callaghan, the Commandet-in-Chief, issued a memor-
andum to the Home Fleet entitled Remarks on submarine
defence generally and on the employment of destroyers for
screening and look out duties.” It embodied the fruits of our
joint labours ; except that it kept an open mind as to the towing
of explosive sweeps by screening destroyers, which we thought
impracticable — as it proved — and the absence of any suggestion
in the nature of a depth charge. I would not alter, and could add
little to, the memorandum, in the light of our war experience.

CHAPTER in

THE GATHERING CLOUDS

Test Mobilisation ; Review at Spithead ; War Clouds ; War Stations ;
f Declaration of War.

The normal length of naval appointments was two years, and in
1912 I began to think about going to a capital ship in the fleet.
It is the duty of the Naval Secretary, at that time Rear-Admiral
David Beatty, to submit names for all commands to the First
Lord, and when I learnt that he was to succeed to the command
of the Batde Cruiser Squadron early in 1913 , 1 asked to be con-
sidered for the command of a battle cruiser. I had seen Beatty
in the China War in 1900, under conditions which made me
“ his man ” for the rest of my life ; I knew that the battle cruisers
under his command would be the spearhead of the Navy in time
of war, and I was most anxious to command a ship under his
flag. He said he would be glad to have me, and at first it was
arranged that I should go to the Queen Mafy, which was complet-
ing and due to commission in the summer of 1913. However,
this fell through as I was appointed Commodore in charge of
the Submarine Service in October, 1912, and told that I could
not be spared for another year or so. It was then decided that I
should have the Tiger, which should have been ready for service
early in 1914, Owing to labour troubles and other causes, she
was delayed for some months and my appointment was postponed
until September, 1914, when she was due to carry out her
trials.

These delays altered the whole course of my career, for when
the war broke out there could be no question of my leaving the
Submatme Service, until it had settled down under war conditions,
and in the meantime another captain was appointed to the Tiger.

In October, 1913, it was decided, mainly in the interests of
economy, not to have the usual naval manoeuvres in 1914,
substituting in their place a test mobilisation of the Third Fleet ;

THE GATHERING CLOUDS

the cost of the latter being well covered by the economies which
would be effected in fuel consumption.

This entailed the calling up of the reserves, some 20,000 officers
and men, and the arrangements for their reception, kitting up, and
drafting of such numbers, occupied the naval depots for some
time beforehand. The ships of the Third Fleet, which were
swinging round their buoys on the Mother Bank and elsewhere,
with very small maintenance crews on board, were in the ordinary
course by no means ready for service, and the Dockyards were
engaged for some months in thoroughly overhauling and
refitting them, with the result that when orders were issued for
the test mobilisation on loth July, and the fleets assembled at
Spithead between the 1 3th and 17th July, the whole great pre-War
Navy was practically on a war footing, manned and in all respects
ready for service.

This was an amazing stroke of good fortune — or perhaps it
was conscious or sub-conscious prevision on the part of the
First Lord, who was entirely responsible for initiating this
unprecedented innovation.

The King was to have joined the fleet on the 17th, but at the
last moment his departure from London was postponed on
account of the Irish situation, which was very serious. However,
he arrived on the i8th, accompanied by Mr. Asquith, the Prime
Minister, in time for a dinner party on board the Victoria and
Albert, to which I was invited. I remember remarking that the
King and Mr. Asquith were in very good spirits and that an air
of optimism prevailed, which surprised me, as the Irish question
seemed to have arrived at an absolute deadlock, but this was
explained next day by the publication of His Majesty’s appeal to
all parties to confer at Buckingham Palace. On the 19th I rl inH
on board the Enchantress with the First Lord and after dinnpf
went on with Sir George Callaghan to the Iron Duke where I
remained as his guest until the zjth July.

On the 20th the whole fleet sailed in single line ahead, passing
dose to the Victoria and Albert anchored off the Nab. His
Majesty took the salute from each ship as she passed, after which
he signalled his approval conduding with the words, “I am
proud of my Navy.” I wrote a pencil note opposite this record
less than a month later “ I hope he will be able to say the same
at the end of the war.”

58 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

I spent the next few days on the bridge of the Iron Duke and
was much impressed by Sir George’s placid coolness and
imperturbability, under conditions which would have tried a
good many men, particularly during a tactical exercise on the
23rd July, when almost every ship in the Navy was engaged in
thick weather.

After this exercise the ships of the Third Fleet dispersed to
Home ports, and on the 25th July a general demobilisation took
place, the reservists being disbanded and the nucleus crews sent
on leave by watches. The First and Second Fleets assembled at
Portland and Weymouth Bay, where all the flag officers holding
commands in home waters and those at the Admiralty, were
ordered to attend on board the Iron Duke on the 24th July, for a
conference which was to be presided over by the First Lord

at which a variety of subjects dealing with naval war will be
discussed,” to quote the official summons. The agenda included
almost every possible question connected with the conduct of
naval war, some of which were to be answered in the course
of a few weeks, others as the war developed, and some remained
unsolved to the end. That agenda will be of intense interest to
students of naval history in years to come, if it ever emerges
from the secret archives of the Admiralty, In addition to the
four Sea Lords there were to be 52 admirals and five commodores
at the conference. On the 24th it was postponed by the First
Lord until the next day owing to the Irish trouble, the Bucking-
ham Palace meeting from which so much had been hoped having
broken down. On Saturday, 25th July, the conference at
Weymouth was indefinitely postponed, we were given no
reason, but from that moment events marched apace.

I left the Iron Duke that day to spend a week-end at home at
Fareham, with no thought of the European situation, but after
reading the Sunday papers, I had a most definite foreboding that
war was upon us.

My thoughts turned to my naval attache days when I made
taends with many foreigners, with some of whom I had kept
m touch, I was in Rome and Vienna when the Algedras
Conference was sitting and one heard the German point of view
pretty freely expressed. I recalled a remark made to me at the
time of ffie Agadir incident by an Austrian admiral with German
connections, nevertheless a warm friend of England You

THE GATHERING CLOUDS

simply cannot treat us Teutons like this, we must and will have
a place in the sun.” I knew from my Austrian friends how
bitterly they resented our attitude when Austria annexed Bosnia
and Herzegovina. It seemed to me that the Teutons felt that
they were ready, that we were fuUy occupied with our Irish
troubles, and that the moment was opportune to put their claims
to the test.

The crews of the submarine flotillas were due to go on leave
by watches on the following day. I gave orders that leave was
not to commence until further notice, and wei^jt up to London by
an early train on Monday to see the Chief of the War Staff, who
gave me a message from the First Sea Lord, directing me to get
the submarines ready for service directly the first watch returned
from leave, the leave of the second watch to be postponed.
Similar orders were issued to all destroyer flotillas. Prince
Louis was much relieved when I told him that I had already
stopped all leave, the submarines were fully manned and could
proceed to their war stations at once. I then urged that the

Oversea ” flotillas should be moved into the North Sea, and
the Dover Patrol flotilla to its station, but could get no decision
up to the time I left London that evening.

When I reached home, I found my wife and our Goodwood
party were starting for a dance in a country house a few miles
away. To my relief, orders had arrived for the submarines to
proceed to their stations, and when all arrangements had been
made, I went to the dance about ii p.m. feeling convinced
that we were going to war, or at least if we did not, we would
be perfide A.lhion indeed. Several officers were recalled from
the dance to rejoin their units ; one after another, submarine
officers came up to my wife, to say good-bye and be wished
God-speed. One has since heard the dance described as a
miniature of the Duchess of Richmond's ball before Waterloo.
There was a curious tense atmosphere about that Goodwood
party of soldiers, sailors and their womenfolk, which is difficult
to put into words, but of course no one had the remotest idea
of the magnitude of the upheaval into which the world was
heading, Tyrwhitt, who was there, received a telegram from
the Commander-in-Chief ordering him to go to Portland as soon
as possible. The next day he returned through Fareham, on
his way to Portsmouth, having telegraphed to ask me to meet

6 o NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

him, in order that he might hand me a secret packet from Sir
George Callaghan, containing the Eighth Flotilla’s war orders.
That evening Sir George telegraphed me to meet him at the
Admiralty the following morning, Wednesday, 29th July. I
did not see my home again until I returned from the Eastern
Mediterranean in June, 1916, except for a few hours in October,
1914, and a few days in November, 1915.

I spent some time with Sir George Callaghan, under whose
orders the Eighth Flotilla (“ Oversea ” submarines) was to
operate in the event of war. Later in the day I learnt, much to
my annoyance, that owing to some misunderstanding the Eighth
Flotilla had been ordered to the Humber, instead of its proper
war station at Harwich. The former was, in my opinion,
thoroughly unsuitable for its base, and I asked permission to
move it at once. I was told that I could, subject to the Com-
mander-m-Chief ’s approval ; I did not succeed in getting into
touch with him until about 10 p.m., when he gave me a free
hand to do what I wished. I just had time to catch the last train
to Grimsby that mght and arrived there at 5 a.m., then went on
by workmen s train to Immingham, where I found the Maidstone,
Adamant and ten “ D ” and “ E ” class submarines. I hoisted
my broad pennant in the Maidstone and took the whole flotilla
to Harwich, where we arrived safely on the 3 ist July, much to
my relief. The Maidstone carried spare torpedoes and parts of
machinery for ail the “ Oversea ” submarines and was invaluable
as a base for the Eighth Flotilla. Her loss would have been a
v^ senous matter, and I did not wish to risk her at sea after
me outbreak of war ; besides, however remote, one could not
disregard the possibiHty of a stroke before the declaration of war
such as the Japanese attack on the Russian fleet off Port Arthur ’
After seeing the Maidstone berthed and placed in telephonic
commi^cation with the Admiralty, I went there to Iptir n the
latest developments, and to beg for two fast destroyers to be
pkced under my command. I returned that evening to the
Maidstone and she became my home and headquarters for the

I wrote to the Commander-in-Chief that evening to give him
Ae dispositions I proposed for the “ Oversea ” submarines on
the outbreak of war : Two submarines to reconnoitre in the

THE GATHERING CLOUDS

Heligoland Bight, four to take up positions to the southward of
the destroyer force which was to sweep the southern part of the
North Sea, in order to report any movement of enemy ships from
the Heligoland Bight to the southward, and the remaining four
in reserve at Harwich. I informed him that direcdy Rear-
Admiral Campbell arrived at Chatham, I would confer with him
as to future movements. The latter had been appointed to
command the Seventh Cruiser Squadron, consisting of four old
armoured cruisers of the “ Bacchante ” class, which would be
the only armoured vessels in the southern are* of the North Sea.
Learning on Sunday evening, and August, that Admiral Campbell
had arrived at Chatham, I went up to London to see the Chief of
the War Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, and early
the following morning went down to Chatham. I met Admiral
Campbell and his four captains on board the Cressj, and was very
glad to find my friend Algy Boyle was captain of the flagship
Bacchante and Chief Staff Officer to the Admiral. The ships’
companies were mainly pensioners, fleet reservists and men of the
Royal Naval Reserve ; the officers included a number of R.N.R.
and very youthful-looking cadets from the Royal Naval College.

I must confess I did not feel particularly happy about such an
obsolete squadron with untrained crews, unsupported by modern
ships, in close proximity to the Heligoland Bight, and suggested
that I should attach a submarine to each cruiser, the submarine
to be towed during daylight when weather permitted, to prolong
the effective life of the engines, which at that date were not too
reliable, and in any case required refitting after a definite amount
of steaming. My object was to enable the cruisers to drop the
submarines, to form a screen behind which they could retire, if
they encountered a superior force. The Admird fully approved
of this proposal. On my way back to Harwich, I went to the
Admiralty and saw the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the War
Staff, and told them of the arrangements we had made, and learnt
iat the iMrcher and Firedrake, two very fast destroyers which
lad been acting as tenders to the Vernon, had been placed under
ny orders and were on their way to join me. I then left for
riarwich, taking some instructions for Tyrwhitt about his
lestroyer sweep.

^ Sir Edward Grey was to make a statement in the House of
Commons that afternoon, and from the stop press in the latest

6z NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

evening papers ■which reached us at Harwich that night — to
quote from my diary :

“ It looked as if we were going to leave France in the
lurch, and I felt horribly distressed. Woke up in the
morning feeling as if something dreadful had happened,
and remembered the depression of the night before. How-
ever, when I read Sir Edward Grey’s speech in the
morning paper, all was well.”

On the 4th AiJgust, I -wrote to the Commander-in-Chief to
report the arrangements made to support the vessels of the
Seventh Cruiser Squadron and told him that whenever possible
I would attach a submarine to the Ametl^st, Commodore
Tyrwhitt’s flagship. The latter was very inferior to the enemy’s
light cruisers in speed and armament, a fact which caused me
considerable concern, though it did not seem to perturb Tyrwhitt.
I mentioned that I had been given very definite orders not to
expose myself to any risks until all arrangements had been
satisfactorily completed, and said that after satisfying myself as
to this, I would return to Harwich with one of the destroyers,
keeping her in readiness to lead the reserve of submarines to any
point at which they might be required.

The Lurcher as a Vernon tender was commanded by a
junior lieutenant, Harold Campbell, and when I learnt he was to
be relieved by a more senior officer, I asked that Commander
Wilfred Tomkinson might be given the command. Lieutenant
Campbell remaining as first lieutenant. Commander Tomkinson
had been first lieutenant of my destroyer Fame in the Chine War
and had been in some pretty tight places with me ; for the
past three years he had been in command of submarine flotillas
under my orders, and had been about to go to the Ti£er with
me as commander.

■^e Lurcher flew my broad pennant whenever I went to sea,
until I left the Submarine Service.

On the evening of the 4th August I received the signal that an
ultimatum had been given to Germany which expired at mid-
night. I assembled all the officers and men of the submarines

j would be at war in a couple of hours,

told them briefly the cause of the war, and said I felt that aU they

THE GATHERING CLOUDS

had done in the way of fitting themselves for service by taking
war risks during the past three years, would now be rewarded.
They gave a tremendous cheer.

Before going to sea I wrote to the Chief of the War Staff to
ask that, in the event of my death. Captain Addison might remain
at the Admiralty in charge of submarine materiel^ and Captain
Waistell of the Maidstone be given the direction of all Oversea
submarines. I said I had discussed every possible contingency
with him and was convinced that their direction could not be in
better hands. The First Lord himself replied, The arrange-
ments you recommend will be carried out. All good wishes.”

PART n

WAR IN THE NARROW SEAS

CHAPTER rv

OUTBREAK OF "WAR

Submatine reconnaissance in Heligoland Bight ; Sinking of German minelayer
oflf Harwich ; Loss of Amnion ; Passage of Expeditionary Force ; Sub-
marines in Heligoland Bight ; Action of 28th Au^t,

On the outbreak of war I happened to be the Senior Naval
Officer at Harwich, but there were three practically independent
commands there. These were :

H.M.S. Ganges and the Shotley Training Establishment for
boys, were under the command of Captain Cuthbert Cayley,
and he administered the port of Harwich. It would be quite
impossible to exaggerate the help he and his command gave
the fighting forces which used Harwich as a base.

The First and Third Destroyer Flotillas ; 40 vessels with their
attached light cruisers Fearless and Amphion^ were under the
command of Commodore Reginald Tyrwhitt, flying his broad
pennant in the light cruiser Ametl^st,

The Eighth Flotilla of “ Oversea ” submarines at the moment
consisted of ten “ D ” and “ E ” class with their depot ships
the Maidstone and Adamant^ under the command of Captain A.
Waistell ; these and the attached destroyers Lurcher and Fire-
drake were operated under my directions.

During the previous year Tyrwhitt’s command had exercised
constantly with the submarines of the Eighth Flotilla. When
we were working together in May, 1914, destroyer officers,
including the Commodore, embarked in submarines, and
Tyrwhitt had actually fired a torpedo from £'4 which struck
the ship she was engaging. The good comradeship of our
respective commands was thus assured — apart from the fact
that Tyrwhitt and I were warm friends and shared an intense
desire to engage the enemy.

By the time the ultimatum expired all ships were cleared for
action, and in all respects ready for war, and at 3 a.m. on

68 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

5 th August the whole of Tyrwhitt’s force sailed to carry out a
sweep towards the Heligoland Bight. E(> (Lieut.-Com-
manripr Talbot) and E% (Lient.-Commander Goodhart)
followed in their wake, in tow of the Amethyst and Ariel, which
slipped them oflF TerscheUing that evening, whence they pro-
ceeded into the Bight independently to seek the enemy. Four
other submarines followed to take up a patrol line between the
Galloper and Hinder Shoals, and later I brought up the rear
in the Lurcher. It was all very inspiring, and the Ganges and
the pier and foreshere of Shodey, despite the early hour, were
crowded with boys who cheered themselves hoarse as each
ship passed.

Admiral Campbell, who was under way in the Bacchante,
with the Ahoukir and Euryalus in company, asked me to meet him
o£F the Kentish Knock, and I went on board to make the final
arrangements for his submarine escort. The weather was wet
and beastly, the Bacchante was incredibly dirty, having left the
dockyard immediately after taking in stores, ammunition and
coal, and I found the atmosphere rather depressing. Algy
Boyle was quite untouched by his surroimdings, and when I
nest went on board the Bacchante she had “ fotmd herself.”
While I was on board, a wireless message was received which
was reported as, “ Third Flotilla engaging scouting cruisers.”
As support might be required, I returned to the Lurcher and
steamed full speed to the northward, in order to try and lay the
submarines on to the enemy. It was, however, a false alarm
due to a coding error. The vessel engaged was the Kiiniffn
Louise, which was sunk by the Amphion and some of her flotilla,
after she had laid a number of mines. It turned out afterwards
that she intended to pass as a Hook of HoUand-Harwich
packet and lay mines off Harwich, but, on sighting the destroyers,
had turned to the N.E. and then north, laying her mines as
fast as possible in the open sea, nowhere near pur territorial
waters.

When the Lurcher returned to Harwich, the Lance, which
had fired tire first British shot in tiie war, was landing 22 German
wounded; several had bullet wounds which, they declared,
were inflicted by their own officers.

I heard on the 5 th August that Sir George Callaghan had
been superseded by Sir John JeUicoe on the eve of the declaration

OUTBREAK OF WAR

of war. I felt deeply for Sir George in the anguish he must
have felt at giving up his command at such a moment. I had
been so closely associated with him during the last two years,
and knew that he, perhaps above all other flag ojSicers, appreci-
ated the powers and limitations of submarines, and the fact
that they were bound to play an important part in the great
struggle before us.

The Home Fleet, commanded, captained, staffed and officered
as it was during 1913 and up to the outbreak of war can
have had little to learn about the tactics ef submarine attack,
and defence against submarines, but the Navy as a whole was
still very ignorant about submarine powers and limitations, and
the new Command had to learn its lesson in the hard school
of war.

Di had operated successfully for seven days at a distance of
over 500 miles from her base in 1910 ; four years later German
submarines were not given credit for similar enterprise, and the
Monarchy a Dreadnought battleship of the Grand Fleet, narrowly
escaped being torpedoed while she was towing a target for her
consort within 500 miles of Heligoland on the 8th August, 1914.
(^‘The Grand Fleet, 1914-16,” by Admiral Viscount Jellicoe,
page 93.)

On the morning of the 6th August the German Ambassador
and his staff arrived by train and embarked for the Hook of
Holland in the G.E.R. packet St, Petersburg, I asked the
Marine Superintendent to instruct the Captain to manoeuvre
his ship as if he were passing through intricate channels in
a minefield. I was told later that he played his part
very realistically and greatly intrigued the German Naval
Attach6.

During the night of 5th~6th the Amphion reported that she
was returning at about 9 a.m. with her flotilla and about 20
prisoners of war. But, about an hour after she was due, a
sign^ was received from Captain Fox of the Amphion that he
was in the Llewellyn and had important news to communicate ; on
this we could put only one interpretation, which was confirmed
when the War Signal Station reported that the flotilla was in
sight without the Amphion, Shortly afterwards it was reported
that the destroyers had turned and were apparently engaging

7 ®

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

an enemy. It appeared that the Sf. Petersburg, carrying the
German Ambassador, looked exactly like the Konigin Louise,
and, as she was flying a large German flag, the flotilla rushed
at her open mouthed, which was not surprising, as they had
just seen Captain, to whom they were devoted, lose his
ship on a minft laid by the Konigin Louise. Luckily they were
stopped in time by Fox, but they seriously alarmed the Embassy
party, and the German flag came down like a rocket stick.
Cayley and I went on board the Llewellyn and were shocked
to see poor Fox .stagger out of the chart-house looking
horribly burnt and disfigured.

The loss of the Amphion by a mine on the high sea, my visit
to tiie Seventh Cruiser Squadron, and conversations with
Tyrwhitt as to the extended disposition of his flotiUa, owing
to the immense area he had been ordered to sweep, all gave
me “furiously to think,” and I recorded my impressions in
my diary of 6th August thus :

“ Four things strike one very forcibly :

(1) Since the Amphion was mined on the high seas in
the track of trade, it appears that the Germans are going
to wage a very ruthless war, and the situation in the North
Sea requires reviewing ;

(2) Oxir destroyer patrols are much too extended and
cannot possibly occupy the area committed to them without
great risk of being caught and attacked in detail ;

(3) The ‘ Bacchante ’ squadron badly wants a ‘ shake
down ’ before it is fit to fight — and it ought to be removed
from such an exposed position ;

(4) The only operation of any real military value the
High Sea Fleet can carry out, which caimot be promptly
dealt with by our Grand Fleet, is a raid in force into the
Channel to annihilate the Channel Squadron and attack
the Expeditionary Force. They may not do it, but it is
our duty to ensure that if they try they will regret it.”

My office at the Admiralty was to prove of immense value
during the next few months — as it was during the pre-War
battles for the development of the submarine — ^but now that we
were involved in a bloody ruthless war against the King’s
enemies, I did not feel bound to confine myself strictly to Service

OUTBREAK OF WAR

channels when I found these blocked. So, on the evening of
the 6th I went to London and was at the Admiralty from 10 p.m.
till I a.m. I must say I was very weU received by the Board,
who, with the exception of the Third Sea Lord, were all present,
and I put my views, which I knew were shared by Tyrwhitt,
very forcibly, with the result, in regard to (2), the destroyer
patrol was considerably restricted, though in my opinion it
was still too extended, but this was perhaps necessary, in view
of the vital importance of getting timely warning of the approach
of a fleet, which might attack our ExpeditioJj^ry Force. (3) The

Bacchante ” Squadron was ordered to the Downs, later to the
west of Dover. (4) I was given permission to concentrate all
the Oversea ” submarines between the Galloper and West
Hinder during the passage of the Expeditionary Force. The
Admiralty did not consider that the High Sea Fleet would
attack, as I suggested that they might, but agreed that it ought
to be our first consideration. At the time it seemed to me
incredible that the German Fleet could He idle, at a moment
when their army was sufiering a check in Belgium, and
British reinforcements were being poured into France. We
know now that the German High Command was under the
impression, as late as 21st August, that no considerable landing
of British troops had taken place ; apart from the fact that it
did not regard the intervention of our Expeditionary Force as
a very serious menace, and counted on annihilating it in the
early stages of the war I

When I learnt that the transportation was commencing, I
informed the Admiralty on the evening of the 8th that I was
sailing in the Lurcher^ and with the Firedrake and all available
submarines, would remain between the Galloper and Hinder,
until the transport of the Expeditionary Force was complete. By
the loth the flotilla was reinforced by three submarines, which
had been refitting, and on the nth E(> and E% rejoined
from the Heligoland Bight, which brought the patrol up
to 13.

Finding the Galloper-Hinder line too extended, it being
practically impossible to keep touch except in the clearest
weather, I moved the flotilla to the westward, and disposed it
in parallel lines in echelon, between the North Goodwin, San-
dettie and Ruytingen Shoals, in such a manner that at least seven

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

would be practically certain of getting home their attacks, if
an enemy tried to force a passage into the Channel.

On the loth I was informed that the patrol might be required
for a fortnight, but on the 14th I was ordered to the Admiralty,

OUTBREAK OF WAR 73

so I landed at Dover, sending the Lurcher back to the patrol
line.

At the Admiralty I was told that cruisers ftom the north,
supported by the Grand Fleet, and T5nrwhitt’s force from the
south, supported by the Seventh Cniiser Squadron, would
sweep towards the Bight on the i6th ; so I suggested that four
submarines should proceed at once to watch the mouths of
the Elbe, Jade, Weser and Ems. This was approved, and I
was directed to withdraw the Sandettie patrol on the 15 th.
I was told that as the 0 >mmander-in-Chief ha^ found it difficult
to keep in communication with the forces in the southern area
of the North Sea, he had asked the Admiralty to take over
their direction. In consequence, Rear-Admiral Christian had
been appointed to take command of all forces in the “ Narrow
Seas,” consisting of five armoured cruisers, with the light cruiser
Sapphire attached, Tyrwhitt’s command and mine. I learnt that
he had already hoisted his flag in the Eurjalus.

I reported to the Admiralty that EG and E% had been unable
to achieve anything ; they found the Heligoland Bight occupied
by several hundred fishing vessels, Dutch, Danish and German.
Some of the latter were fitted with wireless and appeared to be
acting as look-outs and not fishing. One dogged EG so per-
sistently that she came to the surface and ordered her in Inter-
national code to hoist her colours, which proved to be German.
Then she ordered her to stop ; the trawler obeyed but later
followed EG at a distance towards Heligoland. I proposed
that the German trawlers should be swept up, as the submarines
in the Heligoland Bight would not be able to do much until
they had been dealt with.

The return of the old armoured cruisers into the Narrow
Seas, to support us, was very disconcerting to Tyrwhitt and me.
To us they were never anything but an anxiety, and I had hoped
that my efforts on the 6th would result in their permanent removal.

On 15 th August I wrote to the Commander-ia-Chief to tell
bim of our proceedings since he had cast us off, and enclosed
i copy of my correspondence with the Chief of Staff. I con-
fluded : ‘ I am very strongly of the opinion that the destroyers
Dperating in the Heligoland Bight should have more formidable
support than three or four ‘ Bacchantes ’ which, I understand,
3ave not fired their guns for some years, and are manned mainly

74 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

by reserve men and Naval Reserve officers. I have submitted
this opinion to the First Sea Lord, Chief of War Staff and Rear-
Admiral Christian, and I know it is shared by the latter and
Commodore Tyrwhitt."" I continued to keep the Commander-
in-Chief informed of all the submarines’ proceedings as long
as I remained in Home Waters.

On the 1 8th, Z>2, 7?3, and Ej returned from the Heligo-
land Bight, having had a very exciting time. They were in-
cessantly hunted by destroyers zig-zagging at high speed over
them, and pursuing tactics which made it almost impossible for
the submarines to deliver an attack, though several attempts were
made. However, they brought back very valuable information
as to the disposition and procedure of the enemy’s destroyer
patrols, and reported that they were not troubled by fishing
vessels.

E^ and jEy, returning together on the surface, sighted a
cruiser near Smith’s Knoll and, thinking she was British,
narrowly escaped destruction by gunfire. Immediately after
they dived, the cruiser withdrew at high speed out of their
reach. She was evidently the Rostock which engaged the
First Flotilla the same day, under circumstances to which I wiU
refer later.

On receiving the submarines* reports, I informed the Admiralty
that I would take the Lurcher ^ Firedrake^ four destroyers which
Tyrwhitt had put under my orders, and three submarines to carry
the reconnaissance of the Heligoland Bight farther than had
as yet been attempted. I told Admiral Christian of my in-
tentions, and owing to a badly worded signal I found his force
oflF Smith’s Knoll, when I arrived there the next morning,
instead of 20 to 30 miles to the southward, as I had hoped.
He followed us towards Terschelling, and on that occasion, at
any rate, the cruisers had destroyers in company, and would
have had three very efficient submarines, behind which they
could have retired had they encountered a strong enemy force ;
but the thought of that squadron of obsolete cruisers being
fallen on by enemy battle cruisers or modem armoured cruisers
was a nightmare to me. I felt so strongly that their presence
was of no military value, and that their annihilation by gunfire
would be too cheap a victory for the enemy ; and a greater blow
to our prestige even than their loss by submarine action.

OUTBREAK OF WAR

On my return to Harwich I wrote, on 21st August, to the
Director of Operations, to whom I always expressed myself very
freely, and with whom I remained very good friends, in spite of
many fiery passages. As my letter gives the views I held at the
time, on the situation generally in the Southern Area of the North
Sea during the early days of the war, I will quote from it :

I write to you because I have heard you talk about
war in a way that appealed to me, and you expressed views
which I hold very strongly. ^

I am 41, old enough to talk on equal terms with anyone,
for if one has not definite views and is not ready and fit
for war at that age, one never will be.

When I commanded a destroyer flotilla, I tried to train
it to know that it could do anything in any weather —
Sir Gerry Noel would tell you I succeeded. These last
three years I have been trying to train the submarines for
war, and war only. If they had not been exercised under
destroyers whenever I could get destroyers, they would
not have stood the bucketing they got off Heligoland.
That they are ready for war I think is proved by the fact
that when those four came back on Tuesday they got no
sympathy — ^the others made it quite clear that they thought
they had made a mess of it, and that they all ought to
have done better — ^and they are spoiling to go back and
try again.

I am not rash and foolhardy. For instance, the theorists,
knowing nothing about the actual conditions under which
we work, light-heartedly wanted the submarines to keep
a close blockade of the enemy’s ports, and I strenuously
objected, until I knew more about it. I do know now,
and I have no hesitation in sending my selected people
there periodically again and agaiu.

Having bucked about myself and my command, I will
get to the point. I quite realise that die main thing to
be considered by the Admiralty during the last two weeks
has been the safe conduct of the Army, and as long as the
Channel Squadron and the Expeditionary Force were open
to attack, my one object was to place my whole command
between them and the German High Sea Fleet. I did

76 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 19 10-191 5

not think anything else the latter could do reaUy mattered.
Nearly a week ago I was told that all risk of an attack on
the Expeditionary Force had disappeared.

When are we going to make war and make the
Germans realise that whenever they come out — destroyers,
cruisers, battleships or aU three — ^they will be fallen on and
attacked ?

I feel sick and sore. Owing to our scattered destroyer
disposition, a light cruiser equal in offensive power to the
Fearless, ha^put 16 destroyers and the Fearless to flight ;
however one glosses it over, those are the facts. It is
true that at first she was thought to be the U.S.S. Tennessee,
and then a German armoured cruiser, and was reported as
such to the Captain (D) who was out of touch. But surely
even a cruiser of the ‘ Roon ’ type ought to have been
dogged, and would have been but for the fact that the
flotilla was acting under restrictions, and on a patrol the
front of which extended 30 rtules, with their leader miles
away out of touch. They were origiually between the
Rostock and her home, and she should have been rushed
at open-mouthed by a concentrated flotiUa directly she
was identified.

Don’t t h i nk I am blaming Blunt or his captains, whom
I have seen a lot of ; they are gallant fellows, ready for
war. But it is not by such incidents we will get the right
atmosphere — ^for ourselves, absolute confidence and a
certain knowledge that ‘ \S^en the enemy come out we
will fall on them and smash them,’ and, on the other side,

‘ When we go out those damned Englanders will fall on
us and smash us.’

These are the views I have heard you express — ^for
Heaven’s sake preach them 1 Think of the tale the Rostock
must have told on Tuesday night — doesn’t it fill you with
shame ? Think of the tale two or three well-trained German
cxuisers may well go back and tell, if they fall in with those
‘ Bacchantes ’ 1 How can they be expected to shoot
straight or have any confidence in themselves, when they
know they ^e untrained and can’t shoot, and may meet
a highly-trained enemy? Why give the Germans the
smallest chance of a cheap victory and an improved morale ?

OUTBREAK OF WAR

They will be ten times more difficult to smash when they
do come out, if they are ever allowed to think they can
meet us even on equal terms.

For Heaven^s sake take those ^ Bacchantes ’ away I How
can the atmosphere there be the right one ? I have been
into it twice, feeling buoyant and confident, and come out
of it feeling depressed and unhappy. Goodness knows
this is no reflection on the gallant fellows in them ! I don’t
say those cruisers will be attacked, but the Germans must
know they are about, and if they send oiff a suitable force,
God help them.

When I came back yesterday, I was cheered by getting
the Commander-in-Chief’s signal 0022 of i8th August. The
sweep hardly seems to go far enough, because I know now
from the submarines that it will probably find nothing ;
but at least it is a move in the right direction, and no doubt
will be pressed further later on.

I really am very cautious. I don’t want to risk a single
cruiser, unnecessarily, and I quite realise that we have got to
be in a position to meet the enemy when he comes out in
force — ^but please let us commence by putting the fear
of the British Navy into the Germans. It was thus our
forbears won — ^not by trying to preserve materiel as their
enemy did.”

Then followed a rather lengthy reference to an intercepted
gnal, which made it clear that the submarines returning from
lc Bight might well get involved in the movements of the
uisers of the Grand Fleet and Cruiser Force “ C.”

I have warned the cruisers, and I merely mention this
as an example of the confusion which may arise due to
the want of central control. Incidents such as that which
occurred when E’) and j&y were fired on by a vessel which
they took to be friendly should be impossible, but ^ regret-
table incidents ’ can hardly be avoided, unless there is one
central control.

I ought to be in touch with the Commander-in-Chief,
Grand Fleet, and in a position to arrange for submarines
to co-operate when they can usefully do so, the flotilla

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

being based at Harwich under Captain Waistell, awaiting
orders to proceed as they may be directed from Head-
quarters — ^not in this stagnant backwater.

It was a different matter when there was a possibility
of the High Sea Fleet coming into the Channel, and the
whole of my force was sitting open-mouthed off Sandettie,
praying that it would do so ; but the area has shifted and
I ought to go with it, and act directly under the Commander-
in-Chie£

What woiSdn’t I give for a Command consisting of a
few light cruisers, destroyers and submarines, acting under
the direct orders of the Commander-in-Chief, supported
as necessary at a distance by cruisers.

The German destroyers are asking for it ! For instance,
one of our divisions of four destroyers could mop up the
patrol off the Western Ems, located by i?2, without any
risk.

We must prepare for ^ The Day ^ by creating the correct
atmosphere on both sides. If that is achieved, the loss of
a few light craft would surely be a small price to pay.”

I sent a copy of this letter to a great friend, the Captain of the
Fleet of the Grand Fleet, who was also serving as such under
Sir George Callaghan, when I was so often the latter^s guest.

On 23rd August, £*4, E() and Dj returned with
much more information of great value. They were incessantly
hunted by destroyers and made many attempts to torpedo
their pursuers, which the latter’s tactics and a flat calm sea
defeated.

Leir, after recording the efforts of the enemy to destroy £'4,
and his to torpedo them, laconically concluded : “ After 24 hours
under, breathing nearly twice as quick, otherwise no difficulty
at all”

Horton in £9 spent eight hours at one stretch trying to
torpedo the destroyers which were hunting him.

Herbert in £5 sighted a four-funnelled cruiser screened by
three destroyers on either bow. In spite of a flat calm, he pressed
his attack to within 600 yards and fired two torpedoes, apparently
missing. The enemy was very alert, and shells fell round £5’$
periscope withm a few moments.

OUTBREAK OF WAR

Herbert was absolutely miserable when he reported his failure
to me, and told me I had better disrate him. He said bitterly that
the only excuse he could offer was that the enemy was not flying
the large red flag, which our target ships hoist when they are
open to attack. We know now from German official records,
the Rostock reported that, in spite of a flat calm and a destroyer
screen, a British submarine attacked her unseen and fired two
torpedoes which passed under her. It was some time before we
discovered that the warheads of our toirpedoes were 40 lbs.
heavier than the practice heads with which tfe exercised. The
result being that they would not pick up their set depth until
they had run a considerable distance. Until this defect had been
cured, our torpedoes ran under their target ships.

These three submarines and their four predecessors provided
information from which we were able to form a clear picture of
the German dispositions for patrolling the Bight, both night and
day, and approximately the time the day and night patrols
relieved one another.

With this information I felt we could organise an enterprise
to cut off the night patrols on their way home, the day patrols on
their way out, and generally smash up the look-out organisation
of the Heligoland Bight. Incidentally, the enemy’s heavy vessels
would be certain to come out to drive off our raiding force, and
thus provide more satisfactory targets for our submarines than
destroyers 2ig-2:agging about at high speed.

In forwarding these submarine reports to the Chief of the War
Staff on 23 rd August, I was able to follow up my private letter
of the 2ist to the Director of Operations, with a definite proposal
for action, based on our reconnaissances of the past week, thus :

''A very large number of destroyers are employed in
the daytime north and south of Heligoland, apparently with
the • object of preventing minelaying and of harassing
submarines.

They proceed at high speed, and apparently on some pre-
arranged system well calculated to foil submarine attack.
In this they have been greatly assisted by the glassy calm
which has prevailed, and which makes an unseen attack
practically impossible, even with the briefest exposure of
the periscope.

8o NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Ouf most skilful submarine captains are strongly of the
opinion that it is merely a matter of time and luck. If the
destroyer s-weep happens to come near in the middle of a
straight run, an attack with some prospect of success is
possible, but it is hopeless to follow a destroyer while so
employed.

The tactics of the destroyers make it necessary for sub-
marines acting so close to the enemy’s ports, to keep
submerged practically the whole day, and they run great
risk of redu^g their battery power to a dangerous degree.
This was the case with £4 and Ef, both of which were
forced to lie on the bottom for several hours before they
could rise to recharge.

The best way of getting rest appears to be to lie on the
bottom for the night, or in deep water to cruise at a depth
of 60 feet at slow speed, if battery permits.

At about 5.0 or 6.0 p.m. the destroyers detailed for night
work appear to be led to certain points by light cruisers.
They then ‘ fan out ’ and proceed to sea at a good speed
— ^returning at dayUght.

I would submit that a well-organised drive, commencing
before dawn from inshore close to the enemy’s coast, should
inflict considerable loss on these destroyer patrols.

Before the drive takes place, tiae submarines might take
up a position close to the enemy’s port, lying on the bottom
until a pre-arranged time, when they might rise and be in
a position to attack the enemy’s cruisers proceeding out
to attack the drive, or vessels returning which may have
escaped through or round the drive. This, of course,
will require some organisation, but a carefully thought out
and weU-executed plan might achieve great success.

The local patrol torpedo-boats off the Ems proceed
to sea before dark and return to harbour at daylight.
These might be dealt with without much risk.”

I discussed it all with Tyrwhitt, who authorised me to say that
he fully concurred in my proposals, so I took the paper to the
Admiralty the same afternoon, in order to try to pilot it through
the proper channels, but I found the Staff too fuUy occupied with
the daily task to give the matter much attention, so I asked the

OUTBREAK OF WAR

Naval Secretary to tell the First Lord that I was in the Admiralty,
in case he wished to see me. This gave me an opportunity of
bursting into ilame about it, which fired the First Lord, and
Tyrwhitt was ordered to come to the Admkalty the following
morning. The First Lord presided over a meeting attended by
the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the Staff, Tyrwhitt and myself, and
the plan I had submitted in my letter of the previous day was
considered. After some discussion it was decided to commence
the sweep to the westward at 8 a.m. after the night patrols had
returned, and when the day patrols were w^ out to seaward
hunting our submarines, which would do their best to keep
them well occupied. The First Sea Lord (Prince Louis of
Battenberg) fully approved of this plan, and it was arranged to
carry it out as soon as possible. I ventured to suggest that if
the Grand Fleet Light Cruiser Squadron could support Tyrwhitt ;
and the Battle Cruiser Squadron under Sir David Beatty, could
be in the offing, it would be all to the good. Tyrwhitt and I felt
that the two battle cruisers, the Invincible, flying the flag of Rear-
Admiral Sir Archibald Moore, and the New Zealand, which had
just arrived in the Humber, and Cruiser Force “ C ” would not
be able to afford us much support if the enemy’s battle cruisers
came out in force. However, the Chief of Staff said that the
Grand Fleet vessels would not be available, and as we were
both ardently keen to correct the atmosphere in our area as soon
as possible, we thought no more about the Grand Fleet ships,
until we fell in with them in the Heligoland Bight on the 28th
August — ^incredible as it may seem..

It appeared that when the Commander-in-Chief was informed
of our intentions, he at once said that he would send Beatty with
the Lion, Queen Mary, Princess Royal and Rear-Admiral Good-
enough’s squadron of six “ Town ” class cruisers. Before the
Admiralty had received this information, Tyrwhitt and I were
well on the way to the Heligoland Bight, quite out of touch on
the destroyer wireless wave-length, by which the Admiralty
Communication Staff attempted to pass the message to us. No one
troubled to ascertain whether we had received it, with results
that might well have proved disastrous, and caused me intense
anxiety for some hours.

It means so much to a ship to know that if she falls in with
another, it is beyond the shadow of a doubt a friend or an enemy ;

82 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

indeed it is the essence of good staff work to ensure this if possible.
Knowing that the only light cruisers we should have in the
Heligoland Bight would be the new Arethusa (to which Tyrwhitt
had just transferred his broad pennant), with one mast and three
funnels, and the Fearless with one mast and four funnels, I made
a great point of impressing on the submarine captains that the
enemy had no vessels resembling our two cruisers, whose
silhouettes they should carefully note. If they sighted light
cruisers with two masts and two, three or four funnels, they would
be enemy. ^

The Lurcher^ Firedrake and nine submarines sailed from
Harwich during the night of 26th August, in order to be in their
positions before dawn on the 28th. The submarines were disposed
in two lines, the inner to attack enemy vessels coming out to
drive oflF our raiding forces, and those returning, and the second
to attract the attention of the enemy’s destroyers well to seaward,
as they had succeeded in doing during their previous expeditions
into the Bight. Before daybreak on the 28th August, as the zero
hour of the operation approached, Tyrwhitt’s force and mine
were taking up our positions according to plan ; Cruiser Force
“ C ” was off Terschelling, and we thought the Invincible and
the New Zealand were the only ships to the north-westward,
ready for us to faU back upon when we had completed our task.

During the night of the zyth-zSth August, Lurcher and
Firedrake cruised to the southward of Admiral Moore’s battle
cruisers, and the destroyer flotillas. On the morning of the
28 th, after searching the area to the southward of the battle
cruisers for submarines, we proceeded towards Heligoland in
the wake of the submarines of the second ime, with the object of
inducing the enemy to chase us to the westward. On approaching
Heligoland, the visibility which had been very good to seaward,
was reduced to two-ania-half to three miles, and considerably
less in patches.

At 3.30 a.m. Tyrwhitt fell in with Goodenough’s Squadron,
and, in the half light before dawn, an engagement was narrowly
averted, Tyrwhitt having no reason to think that he would
encounter any but enemy ships.

At 4 a.m. Tyrwhitt’s force proceeded to the southward,
followed eight miles astern by Goodenough’s cruisers.

From intercepted signals it was evident at about 7 a.m. that

OUTBREAK OF WAR

our destroyers were engaged to the N.W. of Heligoland, and I
proceeded in that direction at full speed. At 7.50 a.m., two
four-funnelled light cruisers loomed up about 5,000-6,000 yards
away on the port quarter ; they appeared to be steering towards
the Jade river. It was impossible to make out details in the mist,
but their general outline closely resembled the silhouette of the
Rostock class.

As I knew for certain, or thought I did, that no British cruiser
with four funnels and two masts could possibly be in that area,
I took them to be enemy, and kept them in ^!ght — of necessity
within their range — ^reporting them from time to time to the
Arethusa and destroyers, as I thought if they fell in with a division
of destroyers unsupported, it would go badly with the latter.
When the two light cruisers were first sighted in the mist, they
were so close that it was a question whether I turned at full speed
to torpedo them, or endeavoured to escape out of range. The
silhouette of the British and German destroyers differed so
gready, that our cruisers were fortunately never in any doubt as
to the nationality of the Lurcher and Firedrake. At about
8.40 a.m. I lost sight of them in the mist and thought they
must have altered course to the N.E., so stood in that
direction.

Heavy firing was then heard to the N.E. and E., and the latter
being closer I went full speed towards it. Shordy after, four
cruisers appeared ahead of me on a S.E. course ; two looked like
the first two sighted, the others I could not identify owing to the
mist. As the former were well within range, I stood to the N. W.,
followed by the cruisers — ^my object being to lead them towards
the Invincible and TSfew Zealand.

It had been intended that the whole British force should alter
course together at 8 a.m, and sweep to the westward, but shortly
before 7 a.m. an enemy’s destroyer was sighted, and later others,
and these were chased towards Hehgoland by the Arethusa and
her flotilla.

At 8 a.m. two German cruisers — ^the Stettin and Frauenlob —
came out to support their fleeing destroyers. After a brief
exchange of shots with the Stettin^ on opposite courses, the
Arethusa became hotly engaged with the Frauenlob, and suffered
rather severely ; and apart from the enemy’s fire, some of her
guns developed defects and jammed.

84 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Meantime the Fearless and her flotilla had been engaged with
the Stettin until 8.iz, when the latter made OS' in a south-easterly
direction, whereupon the Fearless and her destroyers proceeded
to the westward according to plan.

We know now from the German official account, that their
patrols were spread on the arc of two circles, extendin g from

HELIGOLAND BIGHT, zSth AUGUST, 1914

Sketch plan for Ae attack on German Patrols by ist and jrd

the north to the south-west of Heligoland, the inner patrol
consisting often torpedo boats, at a distance of 12 miles ; and
Ae outer consisting of ten destroyers, at a distance of 25 miles
from the island.

OUTBREAK OF WAR

It will be seen from the accompanying plan, that Tyrwhitt’s
course — designed to keep his vessels outside the effective range
of the powerful fortress guns of Heligoland — actually passed
through the outer, and very close to the inner, patrol ; but at
8.10 the enemy, learning of the presence of our vessels, recalled
all torpedo craft under the guns of Heligoland. Several vessels
did not wait for this order, and fled before our superior force,
but two of the inner patrol were severely damaged by Arethma's
flotilla, and were eventually towed into Heligoland ; others
suffered losses. Of the outer patrol, was sunk by a

division of Fearless destroyers, and another German destroyer
was severely damaged.

At 8.25, when things were not going too well in the newly
commissioned Arethusa^ her one remaining six-inch gun scored
a hit on the FrauenloVs fore bridge, she broke off the action
and retired towards Heligoland, which from Tyrwhitt’s point
of view was unpleasantly close ; so he reformed his flotilla
and commenced his westerly sweep at 8.30.

Goodenough^s cruisers, and the Arethusa*s and Fearhss*s
flotillas were now all standing to the westward, but owing to
the various engagements and low visibility, they had lost touch
with one another.

A little later the Arethusa and Fearless joined forces, and
collecting all their destroyers, which had been chasing the enemy
or picking up survivors of both flotillas were with-

drawing, with no enemy patrol vessels to the westward of them.

Meanwhile, as the Lurcher and Firedrake went to seaward
followed by the supposed enemy cruisers, the visibility improved,
and it could be seen that all four cruisers had four funnels and
two masts, like our Light Cruiser Squadron, so at 9.50 a.m. I
challenged by searchlight and the Southampton answered. I did
not do this before, as I did not wish to give away the challenge,
and it did not occur to me that they could possibly be friends.
The Southampton then informed me that the First Battle Cruiser
Squadron was also in the area. I was very much concerned, as
the submarines had no idea of their presence, and I greatly
feared that our ships might be attacked by them, particularly the
Hght cruisers, which resembled the enemy sighted by the
submarines on previous occasions. I signalled to this effect to
the Southampton^ who passed my signal to the Lion.

86 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

At 9,45, Tyrwhitt received my signal, saying we were being
chased by four enemy cruisers, and thinking I was to the eastward
of him, he turned his whole force 16 points to support me.
Finding that the Arethusa could only steam ten knots, Tyrwhitt
stopped at 10.15 make good defects, and after communicating
wiA the Fearless^ he decided to wait until the situation was
cleared up. At 10.45, concluding that the Lurcher must have
been reporting our own cruisers, and temporary repairs having
been effected, he resumed Ms westerly course at 20 knots.

TMs delay of %n hour enabled the enemy’s cruisers wMch
had been ordered out to reinforce the Stettin and Frauenlob, to
appear on the scene ; otherwise our flotillas would probably
have withdrawn without further incident. In the course of
the next hour, the Arethusa^ Fearless and destroyers were
engaged with the Strasburg^ Koln and Maii^ and at 11.30
TyrwMtt signalled for support. Beatty and Goodenough
proceeded at full speed to join him.

I was endeavouring to regain touch with Tyrwhitt, who had
not answered my signals, when at noon a great grey shape
loomed up in the mist of lighter tint than our batdesMp grey —
with the silhouette of a light cruiser in dark grey or black painted
on her side — followed by other phantom-looking sMps, steaming
at Mgh speed towards the Jade. I had never heard of any such
disguise being adopted by our ships, and for some moments I
felt sure that they must be enemy battle cruisers, but as they
were sufficiently close to blow us out of the water and they
refrained, our anxiety for our own safety was brief, but mine on
account of the submarines was intense, and I went back at full
speed to try and warn them.

I realised, of course, that it was practically hopeless to get into
communication with them, for in the visibility prevailing, a
submarine had to dive directly she sighted any sMp, if she wished
to avoid being destroyed by gunfire on the surface. I felt that
the issue could only lie in the skiU of their captains to avoid
being rammed, and to their discretion to refrain from torpedoing
doubtful vessels ; but my feelings can well be imagined, in view
of the information I had given them, as to th^only British vessels,
which would be operating in their area.

At 12.37 p.m., when steaming at about 32 knots towards heavy
firing which had just broken out ahead of me, I sighted our

OUTBREAK OF WAR

Light Cruiser Squadron, engaged with a light cruiser which
turned out to be the Mainz* As she appeared to have struck,
and had a British cruiser standing by her, I stood on towards
heavy firing to the N.E., but in crossing the track of the Mainly
nearly a mile astern of her, we sighted in her wake a number of
Germans supported by lifebelts or hammocks, so I ordered the
Lurcher and Firedrake to stop and pick them up. As we closed
the Mainz from astern she seemed to be on an even keel, and
to have full buoyancy ; for a few moments I had thoughts of
taking possession of her by boarding and, possible, towing
her home ! As a small boy, long before I joined the Britannia y
I knew James’ Naval History almost by heart, at any rate the
part relating to Light Squadrons and Single Ships.” The
actions of those days ended either in capture by boarding, or
when a ship had sustained a number of casualties, and considered
she was beaten, she struck her colours to avoid further loss of life.
I remember talking this over with Tyrwhitt, and we agreed
that in this war there would never be any question of surrendering
a British ship. Under modern conditions it would be easy to
open the seacocks, or sink the ship with explosive charges to
prevent capture if she was overwhelmed.

I ought to have given the enemy credit for the same spirit ; the
officers certainly possessed it. I ordered the Firedrake to con-
tinue to pick up the swimmers, and the Commander of the
Lurcher to lay her alongside the Mainz* When we were about
100 yards off, and obviously about to come alongside, some
officers ran to her starboard after gun, and swung it round
directly on to the Lurcher* s bridge. Tomkins on remarked quite
quietly, “ They are going to fire at us.” On the spur of the
moment I picked up a megaphone and shouted ‘"Don’t fire,
damn you, I am coming alongside to save life. Get your fenders
out at once.” They obeyed very promptly, and the Lurcher was
speedily secured alongside, her stem being just abreast the
Mainz*s after funnel.

By that time it was obvious that the ship was doomed. She had
settled considerably by the bows, the after part was crowded
with men, many terribly wounded, the battery was a ghastly
shambles, amidships she was a smouldering furnace, two of her
funnels had collapsed and the wreckage appeared to be red hot,
the heat scorched one’s face as far off as the bridge of the Lurcher y

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

everything was dyed saffron with the fumes of our lyddite shells.
Her mainmast had gone, and with it her colours, which I am sure
she did not intend to strike. There was a man aloft on the
foremast who was, I think, trying to reeve halyards to hoist
another ensign.

When the Lurcher and Firedrake arrived on the scene, the
Liverpool lying some little way off. Three of her boats had
been alongside the Maiu^ and taken one load of wounded from
her; they were returning for another, but the Maiu^ was so
heavily on fife, the captain of the Liverpool thought she might
blow up at any moment, and ordered his boats to lie off well clear,
and on no account to go alongside again. Not noticing my broad
pennant, he gave similar orders to the Lurcher as she approached.
A number of woxinded had been lashed to hammocks and lowered
into the sea ; these and several unwounded, who had jumped
overboard, were endeavouring to reach the boats.

When the Lurcher went alongside the Maim(^ there were still
over 200 Germans on board, about 60 of these, who were very
badly wounded, were carried on board the Lurcher^ and when
they had all been transported, about 150 unwounded clambered
on board. The Main^ by this time was slowly listing to port, her
starboard propeller could be clearly seen projecting xinder the
Lurcher y and I was anxious to clear out as soon as possible, as I
feared she might capsize rapidly in the end. The rescue work
was practically completed, and there seemed to be only three people
left alive on board, when the Maimi suddenly capsized to port and
sank, her starboard propeller narrowly missing the Lurcher as
we went full speed astern. The man aloft, and an officer on the
forecastle (who I think was Tirpitz, the son of the Admiral),
who were cut off from the Lurcher by the fire in the waist ; and
a young officer on the poop, went down with her. The latter had
been very active in directing the transport of the wounded, and
only a few seconds before the Main^ capsized I told him he had
done splendidly, there was nothing more he could do, we must
clear out, he must come at once and I held out my hand to help
him jump on board. He drew himself up stiffly, saluted and said

Thank you, no.” I think all three were picked up by the
LiverpooV s boats ; I hope so, particularly the young officer on the
poop, whose bearing was admirable.

In the meantime, the batde cruisers had sunk the Koln and

BATTLE CRUISERS STEAMING FULL SPEED INTO ACTION
HELIGOLAND BIGHT
28th August, 1914

MAINZ CAPSIZING

iMuier going fuO speed astern to get dear after taking 220 Germans off her
28th August, 1914

OUTBREAK OF WAR

Ariadne., and we knew now that but for the low visibility, the
Stettin, Strasburg, Stralsund, Kolberg and Dane^g might well
have shared a similar fate. On the other hand, the three latter
were too late to take part in the action with our flotillas before
support came ; further, the German battle crxxisers, which had
been tide-bound in the Jade River, were unable to cross the
bar until noon, and they did not actually do so imtil a p.ni.
Had they come out at the earliest possible moment, there is hardly
any limit to the “ might have beens ” on that misty morning.

While our rescue work was in progress a wireless signal was
received from Admiral Beatty, ordering a general retirement,
and directly the Liverpool had hoisted her boats, she withdrew
to the W.N.W. at high speed to rejoin her squadron, taking
with her 87 German prisoners.

I felt it was time to clear out too, and as quickly as possible,
for we were between Heligoland and Borkum, less than 20
miles from the latter, and the Lurcher, with a crew of 70 (at
least 20 of whom were required below to steam her at full
speed), had 224 Germans on board !

. When the unwounded came on board they were told to sit
down on the forecastle, but as the Maine^ disappeared they all
jumped to their feet and gave three “ Hochs ” for the Kaiser ;
I am sure this was a pre-ordained ritual. When they had
finished, they were sharply ordered to sit down again, and they
obeyed very promptly.

Directly the Lurcher and Firedrake had hoisted their boats,
which had been picking up Germans in the water over a large
area, I gave the order to withdraw at fuU speed, but the Engineer-
Officer of the Lurcher reported that the condenser inlets were
choked by scum, which came to the surface after the Mai/r^^
sank, and our speed could not exceed 25 knots, instead of the
33-34 which I always relied on to keep me out of trouble during
my excursions into enemy waters.

We were not able to maintain even 25 knots for long, as we
fell in with the destroyers Laurel and Liberty limping out of the
Bight sorely wounded, and they reported that they could not
steam, more than 16 knots.

The situation for the next few hours was not without its
anxieties, and the thought of falling in with an enemy was not
an attractive one, the limit of visibility being still well within

90 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

gun-range. The Lurcher's forecastle was crowded with un-
wounded Germans, and this put one of her two four-inch guns
out of action, but ihc prisoners could be better controlled there
than anywhere else in the ship, as the narrow gangway each
side of the bridge and charthouse could be held by armed
sentries. It is true that the prisoners were quiet and obedient,
but one wondered whether they would remain so if we had
to fight their friends. The after part of the upper deck was
encumbered with wounded, many in a terrible condition.
Indeed the Lurcher was in no condition to fight an action,
neither were her consorts ; the Laurel and Liberty had been
badly mauled, the Firedrake was in a better plight, but she
had 58 prisoners, whose presence on board would have been
an embarrassment in action.

With considerable relief we sighted the five Bacchantes ” and
Amethyst at about 4 p.m. The appearance of my betes mires
was for once very welcome, and at 4.15 the Firedrake transferred
her 38 prisoners to the Bacchante and the Lurcher her 165 un-
wounded and slightly wounded to the Cressy. A surgeon from
the latter told me that it would be inadvisable to attempt to
transport the 59 badly wounded in boats, and as there was
now too much swell to go alongside the Cressy^ I took the
surgeon with me, and made for Harwich at full speed, in company
with the Firedrake^ leaving the Laurel and Liberty with the
Cruiser Squadron. A number of the men picked up in the
water were suffering from bullet wounds, mainly in their
shoulders, which they declared were inflicted by their officers’
revolvers after they had jumped overboard. Several people
in the Lurcher had seen an officer firing at men as we came up
astern of the Maitis^. It is only fair, however, to say that the
Maim(^ put up a very gallant fight against overwhelming odds,
and must have been an absolute inferno, until her mainmast
fell, and with it her colours, which gave the impression that she
had surrendered, so the firing ceased.

In those days destroyers had no medical officer and only
carried a small medicine chest, which was of course quite in-
adequate to cope with the situation in the Lurcher before we
obtained help from the Cressy. To quote from my diary :
“ Our officers and men were splendid in the way they looked
after the German wounded. Campbell and Ranken never

OUTBREAK OF WAR

9 ^

stopped ; the latter took off several bits of limbs with a carving
knife, a very gruesome business.” Sheets and shirts were tom
up for bandages, blankets taken from every bed and hammock,
and the devotion and attention of our people must have saved
many lives. The fortitude of the wounded was admirable ;
they were obviously amazed at the attention they received from
our officers, and their gratitude was very genuine. Fourteen
died before we reached Harwich, and their bodies were com-
mitted to the deep witla proper ceremony. The traditional
chivalry of the Naval warfare of the past was'^closely observed,
and it was exasperating to read later, extracts from the neutral
press giving a German Minister’s account of our brutality in
the action of the Heligoland Bight.

The German destroyer KiSy had fought a great fight and
was lying in a sinkiug condition, with her colours still flying,
though most of her crew had abandoned her and were overboard
supported by lifebelts. The Goshawk (Commander the Hon.
H. Meade), the senior officer of the Division, lowered his boats
to pick up the crew and directed the Defender to stop and do
likewise. Whilst so engaged the Stettin appeared and opened
a heavy fire on the two destroyers and their boats. The
destroyers were forced to retire to avoid destruction; the
Goshawk removed her men from her boats, leaving them for
the Germans. The Defender ^ which had drifted some distance
from her boats, came under a very heavy fire and had to abandon
them with an officer and nine men, who were recovered by
some time later. Meanwhile the British officer and men
stripped themselves of everything except their trousers, and
tore up their clothes to tourniquet and bandage the wounded
Germans. Some of these wounded also had bullet wounds in
then shoulders, which no doubt required explanation when they
arrived in Germany. The German Minister in Copenhagen
declared that they were inflicted by us 1
One can have nothing but admiration for the determination
of the German officers to defend their ships to the end, and
go down with their colours flying. It does not, however, speak
well for the morale of the German Navy, if it was necessary
for the officers to use their revolvers to check the desertion of
men from their posts in action. It is not surprising that
disapHne, maintained in this manner, failed under the conditions

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

that prevailed at the end of the war, and resulted in the most
humiliating surrender in the whole sea history of the world.

The Lurcher and Firedrake entered Harwich at 3 a.m. on the
29th August in a thick fog. The wounded were taken to the
yacht L^erfj^ which her owner. Lord Tredegar, had fitted out
as a hospital ship. She was staffed and equipped by St. Mary’s
Hospital with every conceivable up-to-date appliance, so the
prisoners were fortunate. I believe some wonderful operations
\vere performed and marvellous recoveries were made.

The captain of the Cressy, off which we lay while the un-
wounded prisoners were transferred, could tell me nothing
about the action, the casualties we had sustained, or whether
we had lost any vessels. For some hours I was horribly anxious
about Tyrwhitt and the Arethusa as I could get no answer to
my signds to him, though mine apparently reached him through
a consort.

It happened that I had met the only two destroyers which
had been seriously damaged, and when I learnt that the captain
of one was killed and the other severely wounded, and that
both had suffered a number of casualties, I feared that the flotillas
must have had a very bad time. They also knew nothing
about the fate of other vessels, and it was not until I went on
board the Maidstone at 3.30 a.m., feeling very unhappy, that
I heard what had happened.

^^I was met by Waistell, who was full of congratulations,”
my diary records. I was feeling too sick for words until he
assured me no ships were lost or seriously damaged, losses
were not heavy, and it had been hailed as a great success in
the Press of the night before, as in addition to the Main^ two
other German cruisers had been sunk by the battle cruisers,
and a destroyer early in the action, and a number of other German
vessels had been severely damaged. Still I felt sick ; I had seen
and done practically nothing, and I felt so strongly that if we
had only known that Goodenough’s light cruisers were there,
and could have arranged for their co-operation, we ought to
have destroyed a number of enemy vessels, without bringing
in our battle cruisers.”

Our losses amounted to no more than 32 killed and 60
wounded; no ship was seriously damaged, and much to my
relief, all the submarines returned on the 29th. In the low

OUTBREAK OF WAR

visibility, which at no time exceeded 6,000 yards and was
sometimes less, a vessel was within effective range directly she
appeared out of the mist ; this necessitated a rapid dive, and
once submerged it was very difl&cult in the haze to identify
her through the periscope, except at very close range, which
added greatly to the anxieties of operating in an area occupied
by friend and foe. I will give three examples of this :

jE’ 6 (Lieut.-Commander C. T. Talbot) was stationed in the
second line to occupy the attention of enemy destroyers, and
sighted four between 4 a.m. and y.zo a.m. ; '^she remained on
the surface as long as possible, but only succeeded in inducing
one to stay and hunt her for any length of time. On two
occasions EG got within close range of our Town class
cruisers. . The first time, Talbot was about to fire a torpedo,
when to his consternation he distinguished the red cross of
St. George on her ensign (the German Naval ensign, being white
with a black cross, closely resembles ours at a distance). Until
then it did not occur to him that she might be British, and
instead of attacking her he had to dive deep to avoid being
rammed. On the second occasion, knowing that our Town ”
class cruisers were present, in spite of my assurances that any
light cruisers except the Arethusa and Fearless could be treated
as enemy, he manoeuvred at great risk to get close enough to
the vessel he was attacking, to make certain of identifying the
ensign, and this brought him to within 300 yards, before
he could be sure that she was one of our cruisers.
His care, patience and good judgment were altogether
admirable.

The following is an extract of the report of E4, (Lieut.-
Commander E. W. Leir) :

9.0 a.m. (about). Observed a destroyer sink, surrounded
by English destroyers.

9.10. Three-funnelled cruiser appeared, bearing E., and
opened fire on our destroyers, who then went away
to the S.W. Attacked cruiser, but five minutes later
she went away to the north. Proceeded south to
get between our destroyers and any vessel that might
chase them.

9.28. Came to surface ; observed boats with men in them.

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

9.58. Took on board Lieut. Richardson and nine men of
Defender^ whom I found collecting German survivors
in Defender's boats ; also Ober-Leutnant 2ur See
Frederick Braune, one petty officer and one stoker.
I did not take the remainder on board (some 30 to
40 men),* as I considered it would impair the efficiency
of E4. I ascertained that the boats were provided
with provisions and water, and directed the Ober-
Leutnant which way to go home.

10,10. Proceeded south-westerly, hearing heavy firing
in that direction."’

Later he tried to attack the Frauenloh and Stettin^ but was just
unable to get within torpedo range.

Lieut.-Commander Leir’s modest report does not do justice
to his gallant optimism, resource and confidence in his ability
to overcome all difficulties. His conduct in remaining on the
surface in the vicimty of the enemy, in a visibility which gave
him only a few moments" law ; his rescue of the boat’s crew of
the Defender^ who would otherwise have been taken prisoners,
and his generous treatment of the Germans, make a brave tale
of adventure.

When Leir reported to me personally on his return, he told
me that he had picked up the Defender's boat’s crew, but did
not mention having taken any prisoners. I remarked, without
any intention of reflecting on his failure to do so, that it was a
pity we had had to allow all those German prisoners to escape
with our boats. He was very apologetic and said, have
brought back ‘ samples," sir ! ” He then went on to tell me
how interested the German officer was in the handling of the
submarine ; no one, the latter declared, except those actually
employed in their submarines, was allowed to enter them, except
by permission of Admiral von Tirpitz. When Lek was attack-
ing the Stettin the German officer stood alongside him, and
when the attack failed and Leir remarked, I nearly got one
of your cruisers then,” the German said, Yes, I heard you
make ready the torpedo.”

E~i (Lieut.-Commander F. Fielmann), hearing heavy firing,
stood towards it, and saw flashes of gunfire and the splashes of

* “ Germany’s High Sea Fleet in the World War,” by Admiral Schecr, page 48.
Forty-four survivors were recovered.

OUTBREAK OF WAR

very big projectiles. Shortly afterwards he was able to dis-
tinguish four of our battle cruisers, under which he had to dive
hurriedly to a great depth, as they turned towards Him^ and
he heard their propellers overhead.

On the whole it was a very disappointing day for me and
my Command and we were out of luck, but at least the submarines
had proved, under incredibly difficult conditions, that they could
be trusted to work in co-operation with surface craft and take
care of themselves. This was most generously acknowledged in
letters I received from the Commander-in-Chief* and many others.

In the mist and imcertainty one thing stood out crystal rU^r
on that day of gallant enterprise and high endeavour. Beatty
and Tyrwhitt, two sea, or “salt horse,” officers, as they are
called in the Navy, brought up in the hard school of the early
destroyer service to act quickly, take risks, and accept responsi-
bility, seized the opportunity they were given of proving their
worth to those in power and to those they had the good fortune
to lead.

Thanks to intercepted wireless signals, which should have
been unnecessary with good staff work, the enemy, according
to the statements of prisoners, were well aware of our approach
and took measures to counter our attack by withdrawing th ei r
destroyer patrols and concentrating seven cruisers to cut off our
flotillas.

At 9 a.m. our effort had practically come to an end ; only
one enemy destroyer had been sunk, and Tyrwhitt, according
to plan, was withdrawing with no enemy destroyers to the
westward of him. The Arethusa, untrained and only 48 hours
in commission, and the Fearless had fought indecisive actions
with the Stettin and Frauenlob, without any help from the six
powerM “ Town ” class cruisers which had been in touch with
Tyrwhitt at a.m., but, thanks to the mist and lack of pre-
arranged plan, had lost contact. In these engagements the
Arethusa had driven the Frauenlob, heavily damaged, under the
shelter of HeHgoland, but had herself suffered a number of
casualties, including the Flag Lieutenant, who was lolled along-
side Tyrwhitt ; most of her guns were out of action and her
speed was reduced to ten knots.

This was the situation. when the Lurcher and Firedrahe sighted
the two phantom cruisers. My report tliat I was keeping in

96 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

touch with two “ enemy ” cruisers was intercepted by Good-
enough, who came to my assistance with the remainder of his
squadron ! On which I tried to lead my new “ enemy ”
towards the Itwincibk and New Zealand to be destroyed by them,
info rmin g the Invincible of my intentions !

At 9.45, after some delay owing to the destruction of the
Arethusa’s wireless by gunfire, it was reported to Tyrwhitt that I
was in trouble, and without any hesitation, in spite of the serious
condition of the Arethusa, he turned back towards Heligoland to
help me. But ioc this act of gallant good comradeship, the
last phase of the action of the Heligoland Bight would never
have taken place. The delay in the retirement had given the
enemy time to bring other cruisers into action, and before long
the Arethusa and Fearless and their flotillas were engaged inter-
mittendy with the Koln (flagship of the Destroyer Admiral),
Stettin, Stralsund, Ariadne, Strasburg and Mains^ and Tyrwhitt was
compelled to call to the Grand Fleet ships for help.

Goodenough’s cruisers arrived at an opportune moment and
took the Mains^ off his hands — and then came Beatty.

It is no secret that the risks he would run from mines, sub-
marines and the proximity of the whole German Fleet, were
very clearly pointed out to Beatty, when he directed his squadron
to steer to the eastward at full speed ; but our signals had made it
clear to him that we were in need of assistance, and he decided
that hypothetical risks and dangers must be accepted.

“ It was evident,” he reported, “ that to be of any value the
support must be overwhelming and carried out at the highest
speed possible. ... I considered we were powerful enough
to deal with any sortie, except by a battle squadron, which was
unlikely to come out in time, provided our stroke was sufficiently
rapid.”

It was thus our forebears made war, and that day Beatty and
T3rtwhitt established for ever their reputations as fighting sea
officers, raised our prestige and greatly improved the atmosphere
in the Narrow Seas.

We know from Admiral von Tirpitz* that this stroke on
the very threshold of the base of the High Sea Fleet, was a
bitter blow to the pride of the German Navy, and greatly upset
the Kaiser, who “ did not want losses of this sort,” with the

* “My Memoirs,” Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, Vol. II, pages J57 and 358.

OUTBREAK OF WAR

result that orders were issued by him “ to restrict still further
the initiative of the Commander-in-Chief of the North Sea
Fleet ; the loss of ships was to be avoided.”

In fact, the action in the Heligoland Bight had a far-reaching
effect on German Naval policy — quite apart from the loss of
the three cruisers and a destroyer, 781 officers and men killed
and 581 prisoners. Moreover, it happened at a very opportune
moment, when the German Army was advancing on Paris with
confident assurance ; and the Allied Armies were in the darkest
hour of their retreat. We were told that the hews of our naval
success, which was circulated to the Allied Armies, greatly
heartened our weary, hard-pressed troops.

CHAPTER V

^ SUBMARINE WARFARE

Sinking of Pathfinder ; Submarine exploits ; Visit to Grand Fleet ; Loss of
Ahoukir^ Cressy^ Hogue and Han^ke; British troops land at Zeebnigge;
Submarines enter Baltic.

Ttrwhitt was given the Lowestoft — one of Goodenough’s
squadron — as flagship while the Arethusa was being repaired.

waiting for her he stayed a couple of nights with me on
board the Maidstone. We decided that as soon as we could
get some definite information about the German dispositions,
which we felt might have been altered after our attack, we
would propose another assault.

On 31st August I sent seven submarines into the Bight, and
they reported on the 4th September that the Heligoland and
Ems destroyer patrols were being maintained as before. “ So,”
my diary records, “ Tyrwhitt and I went up to the Admiralty
to recommend another drive through the Bight, based on our
experiences of the 28th August and the latest submarine reports.
The First Sea Lord approved and he, the Chief of Staff, Tyrwhitt
and I met in the First Lord’s room. We proposed a scheme
which they approved and we were told to draft it. I drafted
the general idea, Tyrwhitt the destroyer part of it. I begged
for a light cruiser and was actually given one for a few minutes ;
then they took it away again. I said I would be happy enough
in- the Lurcher and proposed after taking the submarines to
their berth, to meet Goodenough’s cruiser squadron — ^which
was to support Tyrwhitt’s flotillas— and with the Firedrake
act as anti-submarine look-out for it. This was actually
approved. ... A few days later the Chief of Staff objected
to my going in the Lurcher and said he would not have me
barging about in the Bight on my own again, it was too risky,
and told me I was not to go. . . . I protested ... so he

SUBMARINE WARFARE

went in to Prince Louis and brought out a definite order.
" The Commodore is not to go in a destroyer/ signed L. B.
6/9/14. I was very disgusted. . . . The Chief of Staff then
said they would give me a free hand to go everywhere and
advise as to submarine tactics and procedure, but I was not to
go afloat.”

The next day I was directed to go up to the Firth of Forth
to report on the situation there. The Pathfinder had been sunk
by a submarine on the 5 th September, and the Admiral at
Rosyth had reported that his force was worn"^ out by incessant
patrolling. I had already proposed to employ six C ” class
submarines from the coastal patrol offensively, and I suggested
that these should be used, in the first instance, to stalk the enemy
submarines, which had been working in the vicinity for some
time, stressing the point that no surface patrol craft should
be in the area in which these submarines were working, as it
was essential that the enemy submarines should be caught on the
surface and sight nothing which would cause them to dive. This
was concurred in by the Admiral and approved by the Admiralty.

Exercises carried out between seaplanes and submarines before
the war, had proved that although there was little prospect of
an aircraft sighting a submerged submarine in the waters sur-
rounding our coasts — ^unless the latter happened to be proceeding
at a good speed on a calm day, making a feathery wash with
her periscope — ^there was a good chance of sighting a submarine
on the surface from the air before she could dive. I recom-
mended, therefore, that seaplanes should be employed off the
Firth of Forth and other fleet bases, to locate enemy submarines,
in order that they might be hunted by surface craft and kept
submerged within a limited range of action, while the Fleet
went in and out of harbour ; or if the field was clear of surface
craft, be stalked by submarines.

While I was at Rosyth I heard aU about the sinking of the
Pathfinder from her captain — ^Martin Leake — ^who had been
severely injured and was lying in Lady Beatty’s yacht, which had
been fitted out as a hospitd ship. Thinking of the Bacchante ”
Squadron and other vessels — ^which, as I had frequently pointed
out, were inviting submarine attack — took the opportunity in
the official report of my visit to the Firth of Forth to drive home
my warnings thus : The Pathfinder^ which had been patrolling

loo NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

the same area for some weeks, was of course an easy prey for
submarines, as are many other vessels similarly employed.”
I was told that this “ got home,” though not sufficiently.
A destroyer anti-submarine screen was provided for the
“ Bacchantes,” but they continued to patrol within reach of
the Heligoland Bight.

It would seem from my diary that I was rather obsessed
by my anxiety for the safety of that squadron, and I wrote to
the Director of Mobilisation to suggest ffiat there were a number
of young men solving in the depot ships at Harwich, who might
well go to sea and be replaced by the pensioners and reservists
now serving in the old cruisers.

The second operation in the Heligoland Bight was carried
out on the loth September. The Commander-in-Chief had
again entered keenly into the enterprise, and this time came
south himself with the Grand Fleet to within a hundred miles
of Heligoland, in case the High Sea Fleet came out. The
operation was to commence with a sweep by Tyrwhitt’s force,
supported by Goodenough’s cruisers, Beatty’s battle cruisers
and Cruiser Force “ C.”

The Admiralty Orders stated : “ The object is to tempt the
larger ships of the enemy, and possibly their main fleet, to
come out and protect the vessels attacked. There are pre-
sumptions that this was in progress in the attack on August a8th,
but the enemy were not in time.”

The forces engaged were told that “any submarine seen
could be taken as hostile,” and the submarines were ordered
to arrive at their positions off Heligoland and the Ems before
a.30 a.m., and remain on the bottom until 7 a.m., when they
were to rise, in readiness to attack enemy vessels proceeding
to chase our flotillas.

From the reports of the submarines it appeared, that the
destroyer patrol proceeded to sea from Heligoland and the
Ems on the loth as usual — ^too late, as was anticipated, to be
engaged by our destroyer sweep. The destroyers of the night
patrol, which it was hoped to catch, were not sighted and were
apparently not sent out on the night of 9th-ioth, although they
had undoubtedly been seen on several occasions after the
operation of 28th August.

SUBMARINE WARFARE

lOI

The sweep drew blank and achieved nothing. I told the
Chief of Staff that in the China War I was regarded as good
joss ; they could not expect to have good fortune in our
enterprises if they refused to allow me to take part.

Our submarines reported that on the loth a German submarine
patrol was working about lo to 15 miles from N.W. to S.W,
of Heligoland. It appeared that the enemy were supporting
their destroyer patrols with submarines instead of cruisers.
Several duels took place between our submarines and theirs ;
the following two incidents are typical of many.

£*4 (Lieut.-Commander Leir) sighted a submarine rising to
the surface about miles off. Leir dived at once and stalked
her, but was rather close when he fired his torpedo, and it
evidently passed under, '' judging by the gesticulations on her
bridge.” Seeing one of her crew signalling, he looked in that
direction, and then noticed another submarine following close
astern of the one he had missed. She opened fire with a gun
on £4’$ periscope, while the latter was manoeuvring into position,
and managed to avoid the torpedo which Leir fired directly
he could get his sights on. Both German submarines made
off at high speed on the surface. One was identified as Uz^
(53 feet longer than E4) ; the other was of the same class.

DS (Lieut.-Commander T. S. Brodie) and a German submarine
sighted one another simultaneously ; both dived at once.
After an hour, having seen nothing through his periscope,
Brodie rose, to find his enemy doing likewise; both dived
again promptly. Later the German rose a long way off and
went away on the surface. As Brodie remarked, "‘Neither
knew what to do with the other.” Many submarine encounters
ended thus in stalemate.

Five submarines went into the Bight on the nth September,
of which four had orders to carry their reconnaissance to the E.
and S. of Heligoland and into the approaches of the fleet
anchorages. As they would be operating in shoal water, in
which their vessels might be salved by the enemy if they were
sunk, I directed the Commanding Officers to leave all their
confidential books behind, keeping only, on a slip of paper, the
challenge and reply covering the days they might be absent. On
the 13th September, (Lieut-Commander Horton) torpedoed

102 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

and sank the German cruiser Hela^ six miles S, of Heligoland, in a
considerable sea and swell, which made accurate depth keeping
difficult ; a number of destroyers were evidently called to the
scene after had delivered her attack, and these hunted her for
some hours. On the 14th, Horton examined the outer anchorage
of Heligoland, a service attended by some risk. (During some
exercises before the war, this officer, when in command of Da,
dived outside May Island off the Firth of Forth, under the
destroyer patrols, up the channel through which a good deal of
traffic was passiflg and crossing, under the Forth Bridge, and
torpedoed the Submarine Depot ship off Rosyth, unseen and
unsuspected. An enterprise unsurpassed by a British submarine
before the war.)

Hitherto our submarines had had very fine weather and calm
seas, which made it very difficult to attack unseen. From the
14th to the 19th September, ten submarines experienced weather
which made submarine work almost impossible, from the other
extreme. In forwarding their reports on the 20th September,
I said : The brief reports of the Commanding Officers do not
adequately express the strain and hardship to which they and
their crews were subjected. Their position on a lee shore,
within a few miles of the enemy’s coast, in the notoriously short
steep seas, which accompany heavy westerly gales in the Heligo-
land Bight, was undoubtedly precarious. It was difficult to open
the conning tower hatch, and vision was limited to about 200 yards.
There was no rest to be obtained on the bottom ; even at a depth
of 20 fathoms, with several tons of negative buoyancy, the vessels
rolled and bumped heavily. Cruising at a depth of 60 to 100 feet,
the submarines were rolling and pumping — ^i.e. moving vertically
about 20 feet. It was creditable that the Commanding Officers
should have maintained their positions, in the hope that the
weather would moderate sufficiently to make submarine work
possible.”

On 14th September Tyrwhitt and I were told that we were to
go up to the West Coast of Scotland with the First Lord and
Chief of Staff, to a conference to be held on the 17th September
on board the Iron Duke^ Fleet Flagship. On the 15th, however,
we were directed to come up to London at once, as the Conference
had been advanced a day. I gathered that the First Lord had been

SUBMARINE WARFARE

103

able to get away a day earlier than he expected, owing to the Irish
debate in the House of Gammons coming to an end prematurely,
the Unionists having withdrawn their opposition. I recorded at
the time — ^no doubt from the point of view of an Ulsterman —
“ I must say the Government has behaved odiously. I wish
Bonar Law had not dragged in the German simile, though it was
thoroughly deserved.”

The First Lord’s party consisted of the Chief of Staff, the
Director of Naval Intelligence (Rear-Admiral H. Oliver), the
Naval Secretary (Rear-Admiral the Hon. H.'^Hood), Tyrwhitt
and myself. We travelled in great comfort by special train. At
breakfast the next morning I had my last passage of arms with
the First Lord about Ulster. He gave me the opportunity by
mentioning the reason for advancing our expedition a day,
whereupon I could not resist saying Why could not you do
what the Unionists asked and had every right to expect, you knew
that they would be loyal, and you had to buy the loyalty of the
Nationalists.” He made a sweeping gesture with his arms and
replied, Oh, let us wipe out the whole unpleasant incident —
when the war is over, and Ulstermen have fought for Catholics
in Belgium, and have shed their blood with that of the National-
ists, all these troubles will be over.” I felt that he was
ashamed of what the Government had done, though of course
he would not admit it, and took the line that it was necessary
to win over the Nationalists, unpleasant as it was. I wrote the
foregoing that night, and added — So let us forget and get on
with the war.”

If the Government had had the courage to impose conscription
in Ireland as well as in Great Britain, perhaps Winston Churchill’s
hope would have been realised. I have heard an eminent Irish
Nationalist say so.

After breakfast our train drew up at a little station on the line
between Dingwall and Kyle, and we drove in motors some 40
to 50 miles across the moors to Loch Ewe, where the whole
Grand Fleet was lying. Churchill, Tyrwhitt and I sat in the
roomy back seat of a very old-fashioned high-backed open motor.
The Director of Naval Intelligence sat alongside the driver.
Passing a big stone house with a high tower, Tyrwhitt and I
noticed a searchlight on the latter. The First Lord was very
intrigued when we told him, and so was the Commander-in-Chief

104 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

when it was mentioned at the Conference. I will not tell the
story, as Churchill has described the whole incident, exactly as I
remember it, in “ Thoughts and Adventures — ^My Spy Story,”
the only thing omitted being my presence ! I feel rather hurt
that he should have forgotten that I sat alongside him for at least
five hours in the back of that ancient motor car, during which
Tyrwhitt and I, in stout alliance, had “ submitted ” our views on
many service matters I He told us a good deal about the war in
other seas, for instance, the escape of the Goeben, details of which
neither Tyrwhitt mor I had heard. I remember we wondered
whether, in the event of an officer being found guilty of failure
to engage the enemy, a Court Martial would have the courage
to inflict the sentence ordained in the Articles of War.

When we got out of the car in the evening, the First Lord told
us that he had thoroughly enjoyed his day and his conversation
with us. His life, he said, had for some years perforce been lived
with men a good deal older than himself, and he had found it
pleasant and refreshing to spend a day with two contemporaries I
For our part, we agreed that he was a stouthearted fellow and a
good companion.

To hark back — ^the conference on board the Iron Duke was a
memorable one. The Commander-in-Chief had assembled the
Vicc-Adnoirals commanding the three Battle Squadrons (Sir
Cecil Burney, Sir George Warrender and Sir Lewis Bayley), his
Chief of Staff (Vice-Admiral Madden) and the Captain of the Fleet
(Commodore Everett) ; they were all very nice and complimentary
to Tyrwhitt and me about the Heligoland Bight action, and the
work of the submarines generally.

One could not help sensing a curious atmosphere of tension —
submarines, mines, aircraft, spies, and even a searchlight on a
country house within 50 miles of an andiorage — ^the use of which,
by the fleet, must be a closely guarded secret — all contributed
to the anxieties of those responsible for the maintenance of our
great fleet in a state of readiness to meet the High Sea Fleet
should it emerge. It would be impossible to imagine greater
responsibilities on the shoulders of one man, than those which
Sir John Jellicoe bore courageously in the early days of the war.

The menace of the submarine loomed so immense because,
until a torpedorproof base could be provided, he could never be

SUBMARINE WARFARE

105

certain that a submarine would not feel its way into the open
anchorages which the fleet, of necessity, had to use for fueUiti'g,
refitting and resting.

A few torpedoes might well wipe out the superiority he pos-
sessed which was so vitally important, when in opposition to an
enemy which could remain in the security of its defended bases,
until it chose to come out in full strength.

After the first few days, when to my mind, alarming risks were
unnecessarily run, the Grand Fleet was, and I think felt, compara-
tively safe on the High Seas — ^zig-zagging atf a good speed,
screened by destroyers and cruisers. The range of action of a
submerged submarine was so infinitely small, in comparison to the
great waste of waters in which the Grand Fleet could exercise its
functions of containing the enemy fleet, and covering the blockad-
ing squadrons and oversea operations. This duty the British
Fleet had carried out down the ages, in fair weather and foul, arid
in the days of sail, under conditions of hardship inconceivable in
modem times.

But now the strain on machinery and personnel steaming at
high speed, and the expenditure of fuel, made it impossible to

keep the sea,” as of old for weeks or even months at a time,
and in the absence of bases on the East coast, the Commander-in-
Chief found it necessary to withdraw to the West of Scotland and
North of Ireland to fuel, refit and rest.

As I have mentioned, I had been anxious to be attached to the
Grand Fleet in order to keep in touch with the Commander-in-
Chief, and operate the submarines under his direction, but I
realised now why my request had been refused, indeed it would
have been impracticable at that stage. The future employment of
submarines was raised at the conference, and I strongly urged an
expedition into the Baltic, as likely to provide a wider and more
profitable field for submarine activity than the Heligoland Bight.
Sir John supported me, and it was decided that enquiries should
be made, as to the feasibility of basing a few of our ‘‘ Oversea ”
submarines on the Russian naval ports. In the meantime I
proposed to send two submarines into the Kattegat to reconnoitre
and cruise in the approaches to the Belts, and this was
approved.

Tyrwhitt and I, of course, seized this opportunity of expressing
our views as to the presence of the old armoured cruisers in the

io6 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Narrow Seas, and these were concurred in by the Commander-
in-Qiief.

Returning in the motor car, the First Lord asked us a number
of questions, and it is on record that he took steps on the i8th
September (the day we returned from the Grand Fleet) to put an
end to their patrol. “ Prince Louis agreed and gave directions
to the Chief of Staff to make the necessary distribution of forces.”*

On the 19th I dispatched Ei and E^ to carry out the
Kattegat reconnaissance with the Lurcher and Firedrake to tow
them tmtil dark (3n the 21st, if weather permitted.

On the night of 21st September I slept on board the Maidstone ^
and at 2 a.m. my secretary woke me up to give me a letter from
the Admiralty which he thought might be important. It was from
the Director of Mobilisation, saying that he would carry out my
suggestion to exchange young men from the depot ships, with
the pensioners and reservists in Cruiser Force “ C,” and asking
“ how many are available.” So that was satisfactory. At about
7 a.m. I was awakened by a signalman, with an intercepted
signal from the Cressy ; “ Hogue and AbouJdr sinking.” I told
him to keep in touch with the Cressy, but that was her last
signal.

I knew that Tyrwhitt in the Lowestoft with the Third Flotilla of
destroyers was on his way to join the Squadron, and there was
nothing I could do at the moment, except order the Fearless and
First Flotilla to raise steam for full speed at once. My Lurcher
and Firedrake were well to the northward escorting the submarines
about to reconnoitre the Kattegat, so I had nothbg to go to sea
in. I was feeling very bloody minded and went on board the
Fearless, whose stouthearted captain (W. Blunt) had fought a
gallant fight on 28th August. We had no idea what had hap-
pened, whether the cruisers had been sunk by a superior enemy
force, mines or submarines. I could only wait, simply boiling
with rage, that my last effort on their behalf had been acted on
just too late.

We remained in ignorance until I received a signal from
Tyrwhitt “Loss due to submarine, send destroyers to cut
submarine off TerscheUing. 11.05.” I telephoned at once to the
Admiralty and told the Director of Operations of Tyrwhitt’s
signal, and said I was going out as a passenger with Blunt in

* *'Thc World Crisis, 1911-1915,” pages 323 and 324.

SUBMARINE WARFARE

107

the Fearless to hunt the submarines, having no ship of my own in
harbour. For some minutes there was a good deal of opposition,
which subsided when I assured the Chief of Staff that Blunt was
quite agreeable, and that there was no one better qualified than
the Commodore of Submarines to hunt submarines !

I might have added, and no one knew better than I did, that
there was no such thing as hunting submarines in the open sea
(before the invention of depth charges, sound listening devices,
etc.), but I had something else at the back of my mind, which
I unfolded to Blunt when we were well on the way to TerschelHng.
In the meantime I was able to teU Tyrwhitt at 11.36 that I was
proceeding with the Fearless and 17 destroyers, and before long
I got into touch with Waistell who was in the Firedrake^ and told
him to meet me with the Lurcher off TerschelHng, where I would
be at 6 p.m. with the First Flotilla.

We had such exceUent information from our submarines as to
the dispositions and procedure of the Ems destroyer patrol ; I had
repeatedly suggested mopping it up, and I felt that the destruction
of a few German destroyers would be a fitting answer and some
salve, to the wounded feelings of the country, when the loss of
the cruisers was pubHshed.

I told Blunt that direcdy we met tlie Lurcher and Firedrake^ I
would hoist my broad pennant on board the former, and take
him under my command. He said that he was quite ready to
place himself under my orders at once, if I would take all
responsibiHty, which of course I was deUghted to do. I knew
Tyrwhitt, who was fuUy occupied out of reach, would not mind
my borrowing a part of his command for such a purpose.

I told the Commander-in-Chief at noon, that the Kattegat
submarines were proceeding to the Skaw independently, as I had
ordered the Lurcher and Firedrake to TerschelHng, and feeHng
that it would not be fair to him to get involved in an action
with the enemy, in the area he controUed, without letting him
know my intentions, I made the foUowing signal :

From Commodore (S) to Commander-in-Chief Home Fleet.
Propose to attack Hght patrol off Ems river at dawn with
First Destroyer FlotiHa. Submit I may be informed whether
any vessels wiU be in the vicinity. Wireless signals wiU not
be made after 2 p.m. (1210).” The latter in memory of our
wireless signals of 28th August which gave us away. The

io8 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Commander-in-Chief replied Are you going East of
Terschelling ? (1327).” From this it was obvious that I was
causing him some concern, so I altered my plan and answered :
“Your (1327) would like to sweep past mouth of Ems
river during dark hours, if no support available, will leave
before daylight (1430).” This crossed one from him :

“ Urgent. No ships in vicinity (1430).” Eventually he sig-
nalled : “ Two ships of Second Cruiser Squadron under R.-A. in
Achilles will be miles north of Terschelling Bank Light
vessel at 5 a.m. tomorrow, in case support is needed. In view of
weakness of support leave before dayUght (1705)/’ To which
I had to reply : “ Your (1705). Regret am directed by Admiralty
to return to Harwich.”

My diary records : “ I knew the Admiralty would raise difficul-
ties, but thought they would be pleased enough if I was successful,
which I knew I would be. C.-in-C. played up and sent two
armoured cruisers down to support, but at 7 p.m., when we were
rushing east, Fearless and 19 destroyers in subdivisions in line
abreast, I was most peremptorily ordered back to Harwich, and
told to report myself at the Admiralty.” I hadn’t the courage to
disobey such a definite order, and I could not pretend I had not
received it, as Fearless^ s reception of it had been acknowledged
before it reached me. I learnt later that Ipswich had listened to
my signals to the Commander-in-Chief and his replies, and had
reported them to the Admiralty, The War Staff, of course, were
simply furious — ^but so was I ; for I travelled up with a train-
load of survivors, from whom I learnt that the Navy had lost
nearly 1,400 lives, including Johnstone, the gallant captain of
Cressjy who had commanded a submarine flotilla under me for
three years. He, I knew, was never under any illusion as to his
ultimate fate, if his ship was kept in the Narrow Seas. ^

As can be imagined, I received a warm reception at the
Admiralty, but was eventually forgiven. I never heard whether
the First Lord was told anything about my effort to deliver a
counter-attack, or if he was, what line he took, but I cannot
believe that his aggressive military spirit really disapproved.
Immediate counter-attack is surely one of the first principles
of war.

The Army had the South African War to guide it, with the
result that the Expeditionary Force, for its size, was probably

SUBIvIARINE WARFARE

109

the finest trained army the world had ever seen. The Navy had
been at peace for 100 years, and had so much to learn about war
under modern conditions. A school had sprung into existence,
and flourished exceedingly, which concerned itself mainly in the
production and development of materiel in peace-time, and its
preservation in war, I doubt if even now the lessons of the Great
War have been properly learnt, judging by the complacency with
which some of our failures are still regarded by the service
generally. ^

I had striking proof of the way the enemy viewed our failure
to take action on this occasion.

Not long after the German submarine’s determined and well-
executed attack, the New York World published the personal
narrative of Otto Weddigen, Commander of C/9. Apparently
he only fired four torpedoes, the first at the Aboukir ; evidently it
exploded a magazine and she sank in a few min utes. He said,
“ Her crew were brave, and even with death stating them in the
face, they kept to their posts, ready to handle their useless guns,
for I submerged at once. But I stayed on the surface long enough
to see the other cruisers, the Cres^ and Hogue, turn and steam
at full speed to their dying sister. , . .” The second torpedo
was fired at the Hogue, she took 20 minutes to sink. “ By this
time the third cruiser knew, of course, that the enemy was upon
her, and she sought as best she could to defend herself. She
loosed her torpedo defence batteries, both starboard and port,
and stood her ground, as if more anxious to help the many
sailors in the water, than to save herself.” Weddigen then
fired two torpedoes at the Cres^. After the second struck her,
he went on : “ Then she careened far over, but all the while
her men stayed at their guns, looking for their nimble foes.
They were brave, true to their country’s sea tradition.” He
concluded as follows : “ I hoped to entice the enemy, allowing
them now and then a glimpse of me, into a zone in which they
might be exposed to capture or destruction by the German
warships. But although their destroyers saw me plainly at
dusk on the 22nd, and made a final effort to stop me, they
abandoned the pursuit, as it was taking them too far from safety,
and needlessly exposmg them to attack from our fleet and
submarines.”

no NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

I neced hardly say that we did not see or we would have
buntecl,her through the night, and I would have had a good excuse
for Iximing a deaf ear to the Admiralty signal. But it is very
doubtfdl whether, in those days, we could have inconvenienced
her, beyond delaying her return, by forcing her to remain
submetged or lie on Ae bottom. After this successful enterprise
Wed<lj;gen was promoted to the command of [729. On 15 th
October he sank the Hawke^ which was as easy a prey as his first
ship, the Aboukir, Had he been an hour earlier, he would have
found the Hawke and Endymion stopped and communicating by
boat, and he might well have torpedoed them both. The
sinking of the Pathfinder^ AhouUr^ Hogue ^ Cressy and Hawke
in the early days of the war was about as simple an operation
for a submarine captain as the stalking of tame elephants,
chained to trees, would be to an experienced big-game hunter,
who 'dished to kill them unseen and unsuspected.

On 1 2th March, 1915, this lucky and enterprising officer sank *
three merchantmen off the Scilly Islands. Six days later,
when 4I729 was on her way home north about, she fell in
with the Grand Fleet which was zig-zagging at a good speed
well screened by destroyers. Weddigen’s first torpedo missed
the Neptune of First Battle Squadron; he then attempted to
attack the Fourth Battle Squadron. periscope was

sighted by the Dreadnought and Temeratre^ and, the story goes,
both increased to full speed to run her down, nearly meeting
on top of her. Dreadnought rammed her, the submarine
reared up almost perpendicularly, and sank stern first, the
numbejf “ 29 ” being clearly distinguished. That was the end
of an intrepid officer, who was responsible for sinking four of
our cmisers, with the loss of nearly 2,000 lives.

Aftet the loss of the cruisers, I was directed to suggest anti-
submicine tactics, and report generally on the situation. In a
memortandum dated 23rd September, I pointed out once again
that the main difficulty of a submarine was to find target ships,
and tbn her opportunities would be few and far between, if
regukf well-defined patrols were avoided. With regard to anti-
submarine tactics I called attention to the late Commander-in-
Chief 5 memoranda on the subject, issued before the war, and I
said the war had brought out nothing fresh beyond emphasis-

SUBMARINE WARFARE

III

ing the points mentioned, and bringing home to us that the
Germans had similar views, and had trained their destroyers
admirably in anti-submarine tactics.

I called the attention of the War Staff to the fact that after
the 28th August, many large German submarines patrolled in the
vicinity of their ports, seven or eight of their latest types being
sighted on patrol by our submarines working in the Heligoland
Bight. Prior to our raid, none was seen in that area. After
aearly a month of inactivity on our part, it vj^s evident from
reports received that their submarines were going farther afield
igain. I submitted that this emphasised the value of more
xequent excursions into the Bight.

An incident occurred on 25 th September, as the result of which
ve were able to locate a German minefield, and the knowledge
jf its position was of great value to us in subsequent operations.

£’6, while diving, fouled the mooring of a mine. On rising
o the surface, she weighed the mine and sinker ; the mine was
ying on the hydroplane, its mooring securely fixed between
he hydroplane and its guard ; fortunately, however, the horns
)f the mine were pointed outboard. The weight of the sinker
nade it a difficult and dangerous matter to lift the inin<» clear
vithout csploding it. After half an hour’s patient work this
vas effected, and the released m ine descended to its original
lepth. One can well imagine the feelings of the crew of £6
luring that anxious half-hour. Previously £6 had heard
something, presumably the mooring of a mine, which clattered
long the ship’s side and went clear.”

On 30th September £'9 spent five hours in the midrilp of the
estroyer anti-submarine patrol off West Ems. He described its
rocedure in detail, and I again submitted that this patrol should
e attacked by destroyers, which could do so with little or no
isk, either by night or by day, preferably by day in low visibility.

I outlined a plan of attack, and submitted that Tyrwhitt and I
ught be given permission to carry it out on the first available
ay. I also forwarded details of the destroyer patrols off the
ylt, and recommended an attack on similar lines in that neigh-
ourhood. I concluded this report (ist October, 1914) : “ I

ibmit tlmt our inactivity in the Hehgoland Bight, can but be

icouragmg to an enemy, which must necessarily be elated at its
tcent success/’

1 12 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

El and returned from the Kattegat with useful information
about the routes and movements of ships, which were to be
of value to Ei later.

On ist October E-; located a minefield between Norderney and
the Jade river, and was fortunate to escape. The mines appeared
to be laid at a shallow depth for submarines and destroyers.
Fortunately a mine was awash, and Ej saw it as she was about to
dive to attack two vessels, which had evidently been laying the
minefield. ,

On 5 th October I was informed by the Admiralty, that the
Seventh Division of the Army would be landed at Zeebrugge,
and was directed to confer with Tyrwhitt how the base and its
approach could best be defended by submarines and destroyers.
The Admiralty feared that, when it was known that our trans-
ports had arrived at Zeebrugge, the enemy might attack it.

Unfortunately, before there was any question of landing at
Zeebrugge, a minefield had been laid to cover the approaches
to Dunkirk, and its presence added greatly to the anxieties of
everyone.

Tyrwhitt came to see me, and showed me where he proposed
to put his patrols ; I concurred, and knowing how much it would
mean to our destroyers to be definitely certain that any submarine
they sighted would be an enemy, I undertook to arrange this.
I telegraphed to the Admiralty to this effect, and said I proposed
to go to Zeebrugge with the Lurcher and two submarines ; it was
rather shallow for submarines, but their presence would malrp
bombardment impossible in daylight. The destroyer patrols
would give good notice of the enemy’s approach.

I could get no answer to this proposal, and I learnt later that
it was not approved. The officer who replied to my telephone
request for a decision, my diary relates, “threw much cold
water on my proposal. He said the locality was unsuitable for
submarines. I replied that they had asked for my opinion, and I
had given it. He asked if I realised the proximity of the mine-
fields. I said. Yes, most painfully. Nevertheless I considered
my proposal as the best possible. The submarines would lie
at Zeebrugge with Lurcher, the latter in constant touch with the
destroyer patrols, 19 and 60 miles to the northward. Naturally it
was not pleasant to work in such shallow water, since submarines

SUBMARINE WARFARE

115

could not dive under their enemy if the latter tried to ram them,
but I intended to take two of the most skilful captains, and if an
enemy cruiser tried to bombard, she would most certainly be
torpedoed, or driven oif. This message was conveyed to the
Oiief of Staff who answered, ^ Yes, do as you propose/ I felt
very strongly that it was the duty of the Navy to use every
endeavour to help the Army to land safely, and get away from
the sea clear of interference from the enemy’s ships, so I sailed
at once for Zeebrugge in the Lurcher^ ^

Zeebrugge at that time was hardly mentioned in the sailing
directions, and there was no large-scale chart of the place ; I was
amazed at the size of the mole, its great length and breadth,
railway communications, electric cranes, etc. I had no idea that
such an ideal place for landing troops existed on the Belgian
coast. Large vessels can lie alongside the whole length of the
mole, which is a mile long with 28 feet of water at low-water
springs ; it is 100 yards wide, and there is room to disembark
any number of men, wagons and guns abreast of each transport.
The massive stone mole is connected with the Continental
railway system by a great steel viaduct, through which the tide
races and scours the harbour. Abreast of the railway line on
the viaduct, there is a good road and a raised footpath, which
continues along the stone parapet for the whole length of the
mole proper to the lighthouse on the extension.

During the two days I spent at Zeebrugge I explored the
mole and the canal entrance where our submarines were berthed,
the locks and the gates. I proposed to destroy the latter when
Antwerp fell, and we realised that the place must be abandoned
to the enemy ; but everyone was optimistic in those days, and
the army hoped to be using Zeebrugge again before long, so
diis was not approved. I little thought how invaluable all
the information I gathered would be to me three years later.

When I arrived at Zeebrugge four large transports were
unloading. The non-arrival of others, which had left earlier,
was causing much anxiety. We learnt later that several torpedoes
had been fired at the Dover Patrol during the previous 24 hours,
and the transports were held up at Dover. Originally they
were ordered to go outside our minefields. I urged that they
shoidd be sent inshore of the mines in shoal water, as sub-
marines hate shallow water. This was considered rather

1 14 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

inconsistent, as I had pressed to be allowed to defend Zeebrugge
with submarines during the disembarkation, but I had unbounded
faith in the skill of Nasmith in Eii and Leir in E4 to overcome
all diflBculties.

The Seventh Division was composed mainly of battalions
which had been serving abroad, and were up to full strength
with seasoned men.

Soon after we arrived I watched the Northumberland Hussars
(Yeomanry) ride oS ; they were acting as divisional cavalry,
and looked very smart and were beautifully mounted. The
following day, yth October, we watched troops land and move
off all day — ^the infantry mostly by train ; transport, horse,
field and heavy artillery by road. I noted at the time that by
the evening of the second day about 15,000 men had landed and
the mole was clear, all the transports having sailed. The third
day, the 8th October, regiments of the Second Cavalry Division
arrived, first a brigade of Household Cavalry. A composite
regiment, made up of the Royal Horse Guards and ist and 2nd
Life Guards, had landed with the Expeditionary Force in August,
and this brigade consisted of the remainder of the three regiments,
brought up to full strength with Hussars, Lancers and Dragoon
reservists, many of whpm looked very small to be wearing
R.H.G. or I or 2 L.G. on their shoulder chains, but they were
a splendid body of men, and a better weight than the troopers of
the Household Cavalry, for most of the magnificient hunters on
which they were mounted. I should think that I saw the pick of
the hunters of England on Zeebrugge Mole that day, and a
number of beautiful polo ponies which were being used to
carry officers’ baggage. The officers were a wonderful com-
pany ; the Queen’s two brothers, the Duke of Teck and Prince
Algy, were serving as regimental officers in the ist and 2nd
Life Guards respectively. I had shared an office in the Embassy
in Vienna for three years with the former when he was Military
and I Naval Attach^ in Austria, and I met a number of other
friends. There were five lots of two brothers and one of
three in the brigade ; in one case the elder was a subaltern
and the younger a captain. There were several officers who
had never served in the Army before. I knew one of these
who was 42, a second lieutenant in the Blues,” and met another
second lieutenant of over 40 ; the former was killed a few days

GROUP OF OFFICERS OF ROYAL HORSE GUARDS AND LURCHER,
ZEEBRUGGE MOLE

SUBMARINE WARFARE

115

later. Then followed the Royals, looking very workmanlike
and efficient, mounted on the horses they had brought with
them from South Africa.

The last day of that landing I stood on the raised footpath
of the mole viaduct— almost exactly where the submarine 6*3
was to blow up herself and 100 yards of it, three and a half
years later — ^and watched the Household Cavalry and Royals
ride out into the blue of a lovely still autumn evening, to the
distant boom of the guns at Antwerp. #

Before the end of the war I was to see soldiers of every
description, under varying circumstances, but that glimpse of
every arm of our splendid Regular Army will always be an
outstanding memory — a gallant company of knights and men-
at-arms marching into Flanders to give battle to the King’s
enemies, as their forebears had done at intervals during the
last 300 years. Their bearing was splendid, and I watched them
^ith pride and some envy, when I thought of the dull vigil
which probably lay before the Navy in a great Continental war.

I went back to Harwich the next day and learnt that on the
6th October, jE’9, when patrolling oflF the Ems, had torpedoed
and sunk the enemy’s destroyer Si 16, This was one of the
vessels which had been hunting our submarines for several
weeks, and Horton’s success was the result of infinite patience
and skill. I wrote at the time : To get one of those wriggling
destroyers is like shooting snipe with a rifle. Horton has
spent several hours at a time stalking them, but this was the
first torpedo he has fired. The enemy’s submarines have fired
II torpedoes at our destroyers in the past week without success,
and ours don’t trouble to be anything like as elusive as theirs.”

After the sinking of the three armoured cruisers the remaining
two were removed, and the Narrow Seas were only occupied
by Tyrwhitt’s force and mine. This seemed to cause the
Admiralty some concern, as from the submarine reports it was
evident the enemy were anxious to keep the Ems open.

On 8th October E4 sighted a white hospital ship flying a
large red cross flag ; she chased her on the surface, whereupon
the hospital ship hauled down her red cross flag and increased
speed. E4 could not overtake her, but later saw her entering the
Western Ems. She was evidently being used as a look-out ship.

ii6 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

After Horton’s exploit the German destroyers were very careful
and generally remained in shoal water behind the banks, where
our submarines could not get at them ; their submarines were
evidently sent out to stalk ours and several more stalemate
encounters occurred. On the 9th October a German submarine
broke surface only 50 yards from £'10, too close to fire at.

On loth October I wrote to the Commander-in-Chief giving
him the condition generally of the “ Oversea ” flotilla, and
submitted proposals for future operations, sending at the same
time a copy to the Chief of Staff. There was some opposition
at the Admiralty to the Baltic enterprise, as it was feared that
Denmark might be compromised by the passage of submarines
through the Sound, so I tried to overcome the opposition thus :

Proposed Operations.

“I understand we cannot send vessels through the
Sound without compromising Denmark, but I submit that
it is very much to Germany’s interest to maintain Denmark’s
neutrality, and the latter could hardly be held responsible
for the passing of a submarine without a Danish pilo t.

In the ‘ Naval Notes ’ of 4th October it is reported
that the two German cruisers patrolling the southern
entrance of the Sound have recently been joined by eight
torpedo boats. I consider that a submarine attack on
these vessels presents no great difficulty, and, if it could
be carried out without compromising Denmark, should
be attempted. The moral effect would be great.

In ‘Naval Notes,’ 7th October, it is stated that the
Germans, alarmed by the appearance of British submarines
in the Kattegat, stopped the exit of all merchant shipping
from Liibeck for 24 hours. I would submit, that the
enemy be given good cause for alarm, and loss might be
inflicted on his trade and on neutral shipping carrying
contraband, with little or no risk to ourselves. Even if
vessels are not captured, our presence in the Kattegat,
e xaminin g ships, would cause anxiety and inconvenience,
and would certainly raise the shipping insurance.

At the commencement of the war a great deal of trade
passed Horn Reef and inside Heligoland ; from our sub-
marine reports, this trade has almost entirely ceased. On

SUBMARINE WARFARE

the other hand, Ei and report a great many vessels,
flying the Norwegian, Danish and Swedish ensigns in the
Kattegat ; many of them were doubtless carrying contra-
band; some of them may have been German under a
neutral flag.

I would suggest the occupation of the Kattegat for a
few days at a time by destroyers and submarines. The
entrance to the Sound and Belts would be watched by
the submarines by day. The duty might be carried out
by destroyers at night. Both would be* well placed to
attack the enemy’s cruisers should they emerge. Or if it
is considered advisable to withdraw the destroyers by
night to avoid risk of their being cut off, the submarines
could watch by night, provided moonlight nights arc
selected. The destroyers might run some risk of being
caught to leeward of their supports in a strong northerly
blow, sufficient to reduce their speed below that of enemy
cruisers, should the latter get past our submarines ; but
if they exercise good judgment there should be no risk
of this. I would suggest the stationing of two submarines
off Horn Reef during the operations, with orders to attack
any vessels proceeding from the Heligoland Bight to the
northward ; their primary object, however, being to report
by wireless telegraphy if any considerable force proceeds to
the northward.

A combined destroyer and submarine operation,
ppported at a distance by cruisers, on the lines I have
indicated, would surely cause some annoyance and might
v/ell inflict considerable loss on the enemy. If you approve,

I would like to take part in it, using Lurcher and Firedrake
to link the submarines off the Belts with the destroyers
acting in the Kattegat. I would suggest that the latter
should keep clear of the land during daylight, when
approaching the Kattegat, and arrive at their stations so
as to commence operations at dawn. The submarines
can look after themselves for at least a fortnight. [It
will be seen that our views on the endurance of the per-
sonnel had already considerably lengthened.]

In the event of the enemy coming out of the Heligoland
Bight in force, I propose to proceed with all available

ii8 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

submarines to wait off his ports for his return. As mines
have been laid by the enemy, and the minefields are without
doubt marked by buoys, I submit that an aerial recon-
naissance be made without delay, and repeated from time to
time, as it is very important that our submarines should know
the position of the buoyed channels which the enemy will
make for. Submarines will probably be the first to know
of the enemy’s exit, and they can only report by proceeding
to within wireless reach of some vessel or station. To
ensure im;^ortant information being reported as soon as
possible, I would suggest that in future a few destroyers
or a cruiser should be within wireless touch of the
submarines at stated times night and day.”

I wrote to the Chief of Staff on the 12th to say that if the
Baltic enterprise was approved, I proposed to tow the submarines
as far as possible to conserve their fuel. They would proceed
independently down the Kattegat and endeavour to arrive off the
Sound, unseen by the enemy or neutral vessels, then go through
the Sound, preferably by night, evading the German patrol off
the southern end. When their fuel ran low they would use
Libau as a base for some weeks.

I was telegraphed for when this was received, and on the
13th October, after some discussion, was told that I could
send three submarines into the Baltic to remain for several
weeks, based on Libau or some other Russian port. I tele-
graphed to the Commander-in-Chief at once that Ei (Lieut.-
Commander N. Laurence), £'9 (Lieut.-Commander M. Horton)
and Eix (Lieut.-Commander M. Nasmith) would sail for the
Baltic the following day, 14th October. He replied wishing the
submarines all success.

I learnt later that an hour after I dispatched my letter to the
Commander-in-Chief he telegraphed to the Admiralty asking that
the question of sending the submarines into the Baltic might
receive consideration. I noted in my diary : “ A regular case of
mental telepathy. I had a most successful day at the Admiralty,
and carried my point. Laurence, Horton and Nasmith will have
an opportunity of winning imperishable fame.”

During my visit to the Admiralty I learnt that it was proposed
to carry out mining operations in the Bight, with the old cruiser

SUBMARINE WARFARE 119

minelayers. The thought of those waters being fouled for the
submarines by indiscriminate minelaying, alarmed me ; and
on 14th October I wrote to the Chief of Staff and made some
suggestions, based on a submarine reconnaissance in which
Z?3 (Lieut.-Commander C. Boyle) and Di (Lieut.'Commander
A. D. Cochrane) particularly distinguished themselves. Boyle
went into shoal water inside the Amrun Bank, and off the Sylt,
penetrating farther than had hitherto been attempted.
Destroyers and trawlers were located patrolling in shoal water,
and behaving, like those off the Ems, with mudi greater caution
than formerly. This pointed to the channel inside Heligoland
to the northward being kept clear and free of mines. Cochrane
was most enterprising off the Ems ; he found the channels
constantly occupied by trawlers and destroyers, but the latter
had evidently given up the day submarine hunting patrol after
SiiG was sunk. Lieut.-Commander C. S. Benning in £5 ob-
tained useful information from the Vyl Shoal and Graa Deep
lightships, having induced the captains to come alongside in
their own boats by offering them tins of soup !

I suggested we might mine the enemy’s waters, when this
could be done with some prospect of the operation being carried
out xmseen and unsuspected. For instance, to the northward
of Heligoland, across the route the enemy’s ships might use
when they came out; to the northward of the large buoy
marking the northern end of the minefield located by E (> ;
to the southward of the minefield located by S '] ; between
these two minefields, and close inshore between Ems and
Norderney.

Before these operations are carried out, aerial recormaissance
should be made to locate the buoys marking the enemy’s mine-
fields. As a good deal of this mining work would have to
be done by shallow-draught craft, I suggested that Lurcher
and Firedrake should be fitted to carry mines. I recommended
that before mining the Ems an attack should be delivered by
destroyers ; a division would be quite sufficient to deal with
anything that might be found off there at night. An attack
would probably keep the night patrol in harbour for a bit,
and enable us to mine the waters unseen. It would appear
to be questionable whether we could mine the Western Ems
channel— which was frequently used by the enemy— without

120

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

infringing Dutch neutrality, and I suggested that the Dutch
Government be asked vrhether their merchantmen use that
channel. In conclusion : “ I submit that the points I have
raised may be very seriously considered; the loss of a small
ship or two in action off the enemy’s coast, if such loss occurs,
which is doubtful, is surely preferable to the certainty of
occasional loss from the enem3fs submarines in our waters,
and in the Narrow Seas, with little or no prospect of retaliation.”

I found the original of this memorandum in my safe in August,
1923, when I waS Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, with the following
personal letter from me to the Chief of Staff.

“ I hope that my submission will be favourably con-
sidered. Since indiscriminate minelaying can only be a
source of danger to us — ^and it would be folly to risk our
minelayers unless we are going to obtain some adequate
result — ^I beg that you will recommend that I may be
allowed to lead them to the selected positions in Lurcher.
Commodore (T) and Captain (D) obviously cannot lead
them in their cruisers. The inshore minelaying will
have to be done by shallow-draught vessels ; therefore I
beg that Lurcher and Firedraks may be fitted as minelayers in
order that Waistell or I may lead. Of course the Lurcher
would not carry mines when leading cruiser minelayers.
Aerial reconnaissance first, please — and occasional destroyer
attacks on the Ems at night.”

I am afraid I was very insistent and rather a nuisance in those
days, and I think most of my offensive efforts remained pigeon-
holed in the War Staff offices, though I understand, with the
exception of the above memorandum, they are all in the archives
now.

On the 17th October, the Undaunted, which had just been
commissioned by Captain Fox (kte of the Amphion), in company
with four destroyers, feU in with and sank four German
torpedo boats. They belonged to the Ems flotilla, which had
given up submarine hunting, after their sister St 26 had
been sunk by E^. One officer and 29 men were picked
up out of about 240 Germans engaged. It was learnt from
the prisoners that they were scouting rather far afield to see

SUBMARINE WARFARE

121

what ships we had in those waters. One of the four vessels
had developed a leaky condenser, which reduced her speed to
19 knots, and the other three stood by her. The German
officer who was in the last to sink, stated that his vessel was
hit at least 40 times, hut was not in a sinking condition when
the captain gave the order to blow her up, although entirely
out of action as regards guns and torpedoes. They had orders
to blow up their ships to prevent their capture. The forepart
blew up but the after-part remained afloat, and as the helm
was jammed to starboard she steamed in a cirde, and continued
to return to the survivors who had jumped overboard ; thus
many were killed, as they could not swim out of her way in
their life-saving waistcoats.

reported that she sighted a German hospital ship off
Terschelhng at dawn on the i8th, steaming to the westward,
and she closed submerged, apparently unseen, to within close
torpedo range. A German seaplane evidently sighted £8 on
the surface during the day, and on the following day a German
submarine was seen diving about jBS’s patrol area.

The enemy announced that they had sunk on the
1 8th October. In reporting her non-return I remarked that
the German seaplanes and submarines had been very active
off the Ems and were probably working together in the manner
I recommended off the Firth of Forth. As the enemy had been
able to identify number, she must have been sighted on
the surface, and this pointed to her being stalked and torpedoed
by a submarine. This was a risk to which our submarines were
fully alive.*

The hospital ship which had been sighted under suspicious
circumstances on the 8th by £>4, and early on the i8th by Z)8, was
arrested by Tyrwhitt in the Arethusa that afternoon. She
claimed to be a hospital ship, searching for the survivors of the
German destroyers sunk on the previous day, but from her
movements, which had been watched by our submarines, and
the orders found in her, she was undoubtedly being used as
a scout. I The enemy seemed to have a different code and
mentality to ours.

* Wc know now that this was fate.

t She was condemned in out Prize Court, 21st May, 1915, “Official History of
the War ; Naval Operations,” Yol. I, page 221.

122

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 19 10-19 15

After the action of the HeHgoland Bight the Admiralty
wished to submit the names of a few officers and men to His
Majesty for the award of honours, and to publish them in the
London Gin^ette, with the despatches of the officers commanding
the units engaged. Three submarine captains had had oppor-
tunities of specially distinguishing themselves, but I foimd it
difficult to select subordinates for special recommendation, for
reasons which I reported thus :

“ G>namafiding Officers of all the submarines which took
part in the operations in the Heligoland Bight on the
28th August, and those engaged in the various recon-
naissances prior to the operations, have unanimously
expressed to me their admiration of the cool and gallant
behaviour of the officers and men under their command.

When a submarine is submerged, her captain alone is
able to see what is taking place ; the success of the enterprise
and the safety of the vessel depend on his skiU and nerve
and the prompt, precise execution of his orders.

Our submarines have been pioneers in waters which
might weU have been mined. They have been subjected
to skilful and well thought out anti-submarine tactics, by
a highly trained and determined enemy, attacked by gunfire
and torpedo, driven to lie on the bottom at great depths
to preserve battery power, hunted for hours at a time by
hostile torpedo craft ; and during the engagement of
28th August they were forced to dive under our light
cruisers and battle cruisers, in order to avoid interfering
with the latter’s movements.

Sudden alterations of course and depth, the swish of
propellers overhead and the concussion of bursting shell,
give an indication to the crew of the risks to which they
are being exposed. It speaks well for the morale of these
young officers and men and their faith in their captains,
that they have invariably carried out their duties quietly,
keenly and confidently, under conditions which might well
have tried the most hardened veterans.

These duties in no way differ from those in peace exercises,
and it is only when an accident occurs that it is possible
for a junior officer or man in a submarine to stand out above

SUBMARINE WARFARE

123

his fellows. Conunanding officers of submarines arc of
the opinion that it is impossible to single out individuals
when all perform their duties so admirably, and in this
I concur.

If a naval medal is eventually given, a clasp for sub-
marine work in the Heligoland Bight would be highly
appreciated.”

The despatches had of course to be edited, as it was un-
desirable to publish any information which iftight be of value
to the enemy- My report of the action, I was told, was un-
printable, and I was directed to forward another suitable for
publication, covering all submarine operations to date.

The first Naval Despatch of the war was dated 21st October
(the anniversary of Trafalgar), and brought submarine events
up to 17th October.*

We learnt from Russian sources that Ei and had arrived
safely in the Baltic, and on 25th October I was able to report
fuUy on jEii’s failure to get through the Sound. In my opinion
the moral courage displayed by Nasmith in giving up his attempt
to pass through the Sound, was as admirable as the bravery
and enterprise which won him the Victoria Cross in the Marmora
later. Unfortunately En had developed an engine defect,
which delayed the three submarines at Gorleston until the
fnnmifig of the 15 th. I considered it essential that the sub-
marines should pass through the Sound during the same night,
and arranged that they should proceed as far as possible in
company and enter the Sound at two-hour intervals. The
senior submarine officer, Laurence, of .Bi, under the impression
that Ell would be ready to sail at a certain hour, left with
£9 four hours earlier, and if all had gone well as he anticipated.
Ell would have followed four hours astern of Ei as originally
intended. This was leaving too much to chance and, as it turned
out, Ell had to postpone her attempt until the night after
El and £9 made their passage.

In the meantime, Laurence had unsuccessfully attacked a
German light cruiser ; thus the enemy were aware of the presence
of a hostile submarine and, concluding she was British, took

* Tbi London Gazette o£ Tuesday, 20th Oct., 1914. Third Supplement,
Friday, i5td Oct., 1914.

124

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

steps to prevent others passing through the Sound. Ei i dived
into the entrance of the Sound on the afternoon of the
1 8th October, preparatory to passing through on the surface
that nig ht. It would seem certain that her approach was
reported and her intentions suspected. After dark Nasmith
rose to the surface and shortly afterwards .Bii narrowly escaped
being rammed by a destroyer, by using extreme helm and
running out of the channel. ^J^en he turned into the channel
again he followed a vessel which suddenly stopped; just in
time it was seeif to be another destroyer, so Nasmith dived
and proceeded submerged for a while. When he rose again
he sighted four vessels which were evidently patrolling ; one
of these came full speed at ^ii, which promptly dived, the
vessel passing directly overhead. Although in neutral waters,
these vessels, which used coloured recognition signals, were
undoubtedly hostile destroyers ; they did not, it is true, open
fire, but they made repeated attempts to sink £'11 by ramming.
If successftil, her loss would of course have been put down to
accidental collision.

Nasmith decided that it was impracticable to attempt to get
through that night and went to the bottom at 2 a.m. At day-
light he stood out to sea submerged to get dear of the patrols,
in order to charge the batteries on the surface. On the way
out, when outside territorial waters, Nasmith sighted a sub-
marine which, from her silhouette, he took to be 1/3. He
fired two tprpedoes which fortunately missed, for she was a
Danish submarine ! Shortly after he rose to charge his batteries
the track of a torpedo was seen to pass ahead of £ii and the
torpedo leapt out of the water at the end of its run, on which
Nasmith of course had to submerge again, and in order to
conserve his batteries lay on the bottom for a time. When
he rose again to try and charge, £ii was sighted by a seaplane
which called up destroyers, and these proceeded to hunt her
whenever she came to the surface. Realising that it would
be impossible to get through the shoal waters of the Sound
in die fece of the hostile forces which had been gathered to
hunt £11, Nasmith dedded to return to Harwich.

He begged me to let him make another attempt, some days
later, when the enemy were likely to be less alert. As it was
obvious that the Germans had no intention of paying any regard

SUBMARINE WARFARE

125

to the neutrality of Denmark or Sweden, I recommended that we
should be content for the time being, and leave Ei and £’9 in
the Baltic for the winter, where their presence would of course
be a continual annoyance and anxiety to the enemy. Arrange-
ments could be made to send torpedoes and a liberal supply of
spare parts to them via Archangel. This was approved.

I asked that representations should be made to the Danish,
Norwegian and Swedish Governments, on similar lines to those
made to the Dutch, to the effect that if their m«n-of-war cruised
outside territorial waters, they must necessarily run risks of
being torpedoed by submarines. The uncertainty added greatly
to the responsibilities of our submarine officers, who felt very
strongly that while manoeuvring submerged to identify a
suspicious man-of-war, the opportunity of delivering a successful
attack might well slip by ; further, by waiting, the risk of being
rammed would be greatly increased, should she be hostile.

El and £9 succeeded in passing through unsuspected and
undetected. The difficulties of the passage, even under these
favourable conditions, can be appreciated by reference to a
very simple detailed account, given by Lieut.-Commander
Goodhart, of £8’s entry into the Baltic in August, 1915.*^

The penalty of failure is to be found in the story of £13'$
fate when she ran ashore on a Danish island. Despite
presence of a Danish torpedo boat, German destroyers shelled
the crew until the survivors jumped overboard, and then they
fired at those swimming with machine guns, killing and wounding
1 5 of her crew of 3 1. They would have murdered the remainder
had not the Danish torpedo boat got into the line of fire to
protect them. I

British submarines in the Baltic inflicted severe loss, and
caused intense concern to the enemy ; of their moral effect there
is abundant proof in German records. In addition to
torpedoeing a batdeship, a battle cruiser and an armoured
cruiser which were severely damaged but did not sink, an
armoured cruiser, a light cruiser and a destroyer were sunk ;
these were all well screened by destroyers. Our submarines
also captured or sank a number of merchant vessels carrying
iron ore to Germany, and in every case infinite pains were taken
* “ 0 £&dal History of the War : Naval Operations,” Vol. IV, pages 92-94.
t “Official History of the War : Naval Operations,” Vol. Ill, pages 135-136,

126 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

to secure the lives of their crews — often at a considerable risk
to themselves.

Libau having been abandoned by the Russians as a naval
base, our submarines often set out during the winter months from
Lapvik in the wake of ice-breakers before they reached open
waters. During these enterprises their devoted crews endured
appalling hardships ; after cruising on the surface, their hatches,
torpedo tube covers and periscopes were often covered with
ice, and this necessitated deep dives to warmer water before
they could be freed of ice sufficiently to operate. The names
of Laurence, Horton, Goodhart (who later lost his life in a
gallant effort to save the crew of Ki 3), Halahan (who was lost
with his crew in ^iS), and Cromie (who was murdered on the
steps of the British Embassy at Petrograd, facing a howling mob
of Bolshevists) will surely live in the annals of the submarine
service. Their achievements added honour and prestige to
our arms.

CHAPTER VI

LORD FISHER AT THE ADMIRALTY

Visit to Dover Patrol ; Co-operation with Army on Belgian Coast ; Visit Sub-
marine Patrol Flotillas ; Prince Louis resigns ; Lord Fisher appointed First
Sea Lord ; Loss of Dj ; Correspondence with Lord Fisher.

Towards the end of the month I was directed to visit all the
patrol flotillas, to confer with the Admirals, and report generally
on the working of the submarines, particularly in regard to their
employment against an enemy attempting a raid or invasion, I
went to Dover on the 23 rd October, and finding that Rear-
Admiral Hood (who had taken over the command of the newly
constituted Dover Patrol) was on the Belgian coast, I went over
in a destroyer to see him. I found him flying his flag in the
Crusader^ a “Tribal” class destroyer, bombarding the right
flank of the German Army. His force consisted of two shallow
draught monitors bought from Brazil, whilst still building in
this country, the Brilliant and Sirius, old second class cruisers,
a couple of old sloops, a “ flat iron ” gunboat (which was built
about the time of the Crimean War I) and some old British and
French destroyers ; these were busily shelling the German
trenches over the sand dunes. The .Germans had a sausage-
shaped captive balloon up, and the Allies a spherical balloon
opposite it. The firing was tremendous (or seemed so in those
days) ; one could see the shrapnel bursting over the enemy’s
lines. The Germans were replying, but their fire was not so
heavy as ours, and was not very accurate in our direction.
Hood was, of course, flying his flag in the forefront of the action.
He told me he thought it was rather absurd firing thousands of
rounds at nothing — as far as he knew from his own observation —
but messages from a wireless station on a motor car run by a naval
officer, and signals from Nieuport repeating telephone messages
from the captive balloon, were so fuU of praise and satisfaction,
he supposed they were doing some good.

127

128 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

It was all very interesting and reminded me of an incident
which occurred ten years earlier. When I was a Commander in
the Naval Intelligence Department in 1903-04, in charge of the
section which dealt with the Naval side of the Russo-Japanese
War, I reported on the use both the Russians and Japanese made
of obsolete vessels under similar conditions off Port Arthur.
Prince Louis of Battenberg, the Director of Naval Intelligence
in forwarding the report, questioned the wisdom of
scrapping our o]d ships to the extent we were doing; they
might well be of value under similar circumstances. The Sea
Lord who minuted the paper remarked, that such conditions
could never occur in any war in which we were likely to be
engaged.

After visiting Dover I went to Chatham to see the
Commander-in-Chief at the Note to suggest some changes
in the running of the local patrol ; and then to Newcastle
to visit the Admiral of Patrols, who was flying his flag
in the St. George, and the submarines based on the Alecto
there. While at Newcasde I inspected a ship that was fit ting
out as a submarine depot for the Russian Navy when the
war broke out. As she could not go to the Black Sea or Baltic, I
recommended the Admiralty to buy her, to mother the new
submarines which were beginning to come into service fairly
rapidly. This was approved, she joined the Maidstone at Harwich
shortly afterwards, and was a valuable addition to our Oversea
Submarine Flotilla until the end of the war. Then I went to
Leith to see how the submarines in the Firth of Forth were
getting on, and went back to London on the 28th October. The
next day I heard of Prince Louis’s resignation.

Prince Louis was a sea officer, and a Fleet Commander second
to none in our service. He had the gift of bringing out aU that
was best in his Captains, and gave them opportunities of handling
his fleet when cruising and exercising, which were invaluable
training for those who aspired to flag rank. I shall always feel
grateful for the encouragement and help he gave me, when I
commanded a vessel under his flag.

His resignation on 28th October, 1914, is a difficult subject
to write about. I will quote the only mention of his name in the
“ Ofl&dal History of the War.”*

* “Naval Operations,” VoL I, page 246.

LORD FISHER AT THE ADMIRALTY

129

In view of the rising agitation in the Press against
everyone German or of German descent. Prince Louis of
Battenberg thought it right to offer his resignation as First
Sea Lord/^

Not a very generous epitaph to the services of a Flag Officer
who had done so much for the Navy, and had shared with the
First Lord the responsibility for the mobilisation and dispositions
of the Fleet on the eve of the war.

I prefer Winston Churchill’s in the “ World Crisis, 1911-14.”
After referring to the cruel persecution he suffered from that
most poisonous of all reptiles, the anonymous letter writer — ^he
said ;

“ I was, therefore, not surprised when towards the end of
October Prince Louis asked to be relieved of his burden ;
the uncomplaining dignity with which he made this sacrifice,
and accepted self-effacement, as a requital for the great and
faithful service he had rendered to the British Nation, was
worthy of a sailor and a Prince.”

One more quotation — ^from a letter he wrote me a few days
later :

I am deeply grateful to you for your kind thought of me
at this, the most bitter moment of my life. The trust of my
brother officers is what I value most.”

When Lord Fisher’s appointment to succeed Prince Louis was
announced, the whole Service knew that there would be an up-
heaval. He was a wonderful friend to all who had served him well,
some of whom had rather fallen by the way, and good appoint-
ments must be found for them all. Those who had ever dared to
differ from him must of course be eliminated. He made no
secret of his dislikes and took pride in his ruthless vindictiveness,
in fact boasted that no one who fell foul of him ever escaped.
He was very bitter against Sturdee, I do not know why, but it
was a long-standing feud ; he had every reason to disapprove of
me, after I had the temerity to give him my views about
submarines,* so Sturdee and I were to be got rid of at once.
But he reckoned without the First Lord, who was not disposed
to let him have a free hand to wreak his vengeance, or get rid of

* See pages 54-55.

130 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

his victims, at any rate, until suitable appointments could be
found for them.

Fortunately for Sturdee there was an opening for him almost
at once, and he was given command of the two Batde Cruisers,
v/hich were hastily prepared for the pursuit of von Spec’s Cruiser
Squadron. Within five weeks of his departure from the
Admiralty, Sturdee had fought the action of the Falkland
Islands, and won an honoured place in our Naval History.

Lord Fisher dealt with my case with characteristic vigour.
Directly he arrived he gave orders that a certain officer, command-
ing a cruiser in the North Sea, was to come to the Admiralty,
without waiting for his relief. He made no secret that this officer
was to succeed me, directly I could be got rid of. In the mean-
time he appointed him to be one of his naval assistants. A couple
of days later Lord Fisher arranged a meeting over which he
presided ; I was summoned from Harwich to attend, and told
to sit at the opposite end of the table with Addison, my technical
assistant, beside me. On either side of the table were all the
priadpal Admiralty officials.

He opened the meeting by telling us his intentions as to future
submarine construction, and turning to the Superintendent of
Contracts, he said that he would make his wife a widow and his
house a dunghill, if he brought paper work or red tape into the
business ; he wanted submarines, not contracts. He meant to
have them built in eight months ; if he did not get them in eight
months he would commit hara-kari, Addison, in an aside
which I think Lord Fisher must have heard, remarked, Now we
know exactly how long he has to live ! ” I laughed, and I suppose
looked incredulous. It seemed absurd ; we had not been able to
wring submarines out of Vickers and Chatham Dockyard under
two and a half years. He fixed me with a ferocious glare, and
said, ‘‘ If anyone thwarts me, he had better comrsAt hara-kari too.”

By that time I felt pretty belligerent too, and the same evening
(5rd November) handed him a paper commencing thus :

First Sea Lord. In view of your remarks this morning
as to the vital importance of providing as many submarines
as possible in the shortest possible time, regardless of cost
and departmental restrictions, I submit as a first action that
every endeavour should be made to accelerate the com-

LORD FISHER AT THE ADMIRALTY

131

pletion of submarines under construction and recently
ordered.”

Then followed the action I proposed. I enclosed a list of the
vessels building, and their dates of completion under the existing
procedure ; a list of all the submarines which had come into the
service during the four years I had been in command, which
only amounted to 21, in spite of all our efforts to overcome the
monopoly and other restrictions ; and a paper on the develop-
ment of the Submarine Service which I had had printed for my
successor, and the new Third Sea Lord, when I was about to leave
to join the Tiger. My paper was, in fact, a reiteration and ampli-
fication of the answer I had given Lord Fisher less than four
months before, when he asked me why we had not built more
submarines. I knew he gave out that I had made a great mess of
the Submarine Service, and I wanted to show him that I was not
in the least repentant of anything I had done, that I stood to my
guns, and was quite ready to go down with my colours flying.
It may not have been tactM, but when one is unhappily involved
in war, there is only one way of waging it — to my mind — and
I would be ashamed of myself now if I had met Lord Fisher’s
onslaught otherwise. Of course it only made him all the more
determined to get rid of me, but the First Lord would not allow
me to be interfered with, as far as the sea-going side of my
appointment was concerned, and I went back to Harwich to
await events.

Meanwhile for about a week an engagement was fought over
my future — so I was told by the First Lord’s secretary and two
of Fisher’s men, who were friends of mine. To one of the
latter Lord Fisher declared : If that young man [Churchill]
who writes minutes in red ink thinks he is going to run the
submarine service, he is mistaken ; I shall go to the Cabinet,”*
To the other he said : Why can’t that fellow Keyes go to
sea and fight like Tyrwhitt 1 ” It was meant for my ears,
and meant to hurt. As a matter of fact, as I have mentioned,
I had a written order forbidding me to go to sea in a
destroyer, and they would not give me a cruiser ; it is true
I had had to ignore the order two or three times, but it was

. * Jbe First Lord always wrote all his minutes in red ink so Lord Fisher wrote
his in green.

132 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

definite enough. From that moment it was a dead letter to
me; I felt free, and took the earliest opportunity of getting
a breath of fresh salt air in the Heligoland Bight. The open
sea was so refreshing, inspiring and comforting after the
depressing atmosphere of the Admiralty, in which it seemed
only possible to see the dangers and difficulties of any undertaking,
instead of the goal beyond them.

On 3rd November the enemy made their first appearance with
surface craft off c?ur coasts, and a gunboat and two old destroyers
off Gorleston narrowly escaped destruction. Di, and E\o
were at Gorleston, the two former about to go into the Heligo-
land Bight, and the latter into the Kattegat. They immediately
put to sea on hearing gunfire. Unfortunately Z>5 struck one of
our mines, and was lost with nearly all her crew. If it were not
so well known, I would hesitate to mention the fact that, when
war broke out, our mines frequently went off like a feu de joie
when they were being laid, or parted their moorings and floated
about all over the surface of the North Sea after every gale, or
tripped their sinkers and drifted still submerged, towing their
moorings in the strong tideways until they re-anchored themselves
at slack water. The only satisfactory thing, from our point of
view, was that the pistols were very ineffective, and often failed
to e3q)lode when we bumped into them. But was very
unlucky, for the submerged mine she struck had an efficient
pistol. She was commanded by Lieut-Commander G. Herbert,
a submarine officer of the best type, who reported that he was
proceeding on the surface at full speed towards gunfire, when
struck a mine right aft and sank in less than a minute.
Herbert and five or six men were on deck and a few more managed
to come up from below, but there was a considerable sea and only
Herbert and a few men managed to keep afloat until fishing
vessels arrived and picked them up.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the extent of the stir
which Lord Fisher’s re-entry into the naval administration
caused in the Admiralty and throughout the Service. His
retirement four years earlier had been hailed with a sigh of relief
by the Navy generally, but I could not help feeling that, now that
we were engaged in a bloody ruthless war, his masterful
personality and the unbounded energy he would devote to the

153

LORD FISHER AT THE ADMIRALTY

production of ?}2dt6TiBl^ linked witli tlie vision, deteirniina.tion and
enterprise of Winston Churchill— who was entirely responsible
for recalling him — might well be of infinite value in the conduct
of the war. I find I wrote on the 7th November, while I was
waiting at Harwich to learn my fate :

^ “ I do feel that Fisher’s reappearance is for the good of

the Nation, and that we shall make war now. That is the
only thing that matters, or that I ought to care about,
whatever my fate may be.” ♦

On about the seventh day of the contest over my future, the
following letter from Lord Fisher was sent down to me by hand :

Dear Keyes. Yesterday I arranged for the progress of
the newly ordered 20 submarines and the First Lord con-
curred with me in putting S. S. Hall on the job — ^the First
Lord has got some name for him — ^I can’t remember it —
and he will also look after the building of those now in
progress, which will relieve Addison of that part of his
present duties, and so S. S. Hall wiU take on Craven. I
think this is all. But Graham Greene will circulate the
orders.

Yours in haste,

8/11/14. Fisher.

On no account imagine that I have any designs on you !
If I had any such designs you would certainly have been
told — ^but, like many other things, I have not yet mastered
on what basis our submarines harm the enemy more than
themselves 1 But there is someone now who suits me as
Chief of Staff* so I am quickly learning. ' Now we shan’t
be long I ’ ”

To which I replied :

Dear Lord Fisher. Thank you for your letter. I am
delighted to hear that you have no designs on me, for I
have no illusions as to the result if you had. I must confess
that I thought your advent would mean my eclipse, but like
others who may have had personal misgivings, I was glad
* Rear-Admiral H. Oliver succeeded Vice-Admiral Sir D. Sturdee.

134

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

because I felt it meant that — ‘ we shan’t be long ’ — ^in making
war, which is the only thing that matters — besides, if I am
translated to another sphere, I shall only regard it as Kismet
and trust to my luck to give me opportunities of engaging
the enemy and proving that you were right in promoting
me nine years ago.”

I wanted him to realise that I had no wish to stay on sufferance
and was not afraid of his being able to keep me under.

A few days later I met Lord Fisher in a passage at the Admiralty
and he came up to me beaming, caught hold of the lapels of my
coat and with a most friendly grin said “ I got your beautiful
letter,” Then he went on to tell me that whenever I came up to
the Admiralty I must come and see him, and if there was anything
I wanted to let him know.

I think but for other influences which are best forgotten, I
could have worked with Lord Fisher, he had such wonderful
drive, and I think it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that
he was one of the greatest producers of materiel in the history of
the country. There was no need for him to commit hara-
kari ; everything he set out to produce, even submarines, sprang
into being xinder the spell of his forceful personality. If he
approved of a policy, it was carried out on the instant, nothing
and nobody had ever been allowed to stand in his way — ^until he
clashed with Qiurchill.

CHAPTER VII

A LOST OPPORTUNITY

Change in disposition of Patrol Flotillas ; A ■wild-goose chase ; Loss of Di ,
French submarine arrives at Harwich; A lost oppormnity; Eii attacks
German battleship ; Archimede has narrow escape ; Christmas Day Air Raid.

Throughout the war a number of soldiers, sailors and poli-
ticians seemed to be obsessed by a fear of invasion ; I took it more
or less seriously at that time, as it did not occur to me that those
in authority had not some definite information to go upon. I
went very fully into the matter, therefore, and in forwarding the
report I was c^ed upon to make, I based the recommendations it
contained on experience gained in pre-War exercises, added to
war experience to date. The latter, I said, had brought little
to light, except that a well-handled submarine was more immune
from attack than even submarine officers anticipated, and a well-
handled destroyer keeping a good look-out, was fairly safe from
submarine attack.

With regard to invasion or a raid in force, the different sections
of the coast had frequently been tested in our patrol flotilla
exercises; sometimes over loo vessels being engaged. Con-
ditions were more favourable to the defenders than they were
likely to be in this war, since the defending commander knew that
his section would be attacked within a defined limit of time. Yet
in every case, without exception, a landing-place on an open beach
had been successfully secured. It was not to be supposed that
the invader exercised any brilliant strategy or the defender was
inert. They both did ihe obvious thing ; the invader arrived
before dawn ■with a number of torpedo craft, which swept towards
the enemy’s submarine stations, in order to make the enemy’s
submarines dive at a considerable distance, 20 miles or even more
from their objective. These facts proved, as I had always
strongly urged, that the submarines of the patrol flotillas could
not be relied upon to inflict loss on enemy’s transports landing

133

136 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

ttoops on an open beach, at a distance from thek base, unless
sufficient warning could be given to enable them to be in the
vicinity when the enemy arrived.

Dispositions which were considered the best to meet the most
likely action on the part of an enemy, compelled to act within
the short period of a peace exercise, and which had only been
previously tested for a few days at a time, had been maintained
for several weeks in some areas ; and I had viewed with much con-
cern the amount of sea work, and consequent wear and tear of
machinery, whicS many of the submarines of the patrol flotillas
had been carrying out, without commensurate military advantage.

It was obviously impossible, with the force at our command,
to be ready for the enemy everywhere, particularly when one did
not know within several months when, and within 300 miles
where, he was likely to deliver an attack. I thought it was about
time to reconsider our position, and employ our patrol flotillas
sparingly, with a view to preserving their efficiency, and con-
centrating them as far as possible in readiness, in positions where
they could best prevent the enemy from inflicting injury of vital
importance. Some risk must necessarily be taken elsewhere.
In fact I recommended a return to the dispositions which had been
in force when war broke out, but were departed from by the
order of the Admiralty, or local Authorities, to meet the dangers
which were feared, but had not as yet come to pass. It was
certain that the enemy would not attempt to land on an open
beach, unless the weather was fair and the wind westerly. It
was presumed that some warning would be received of the
embarkation at the enemy’s ports. On the receipt of the
information I proposed to send some of the “ D ” and “ E ”
class submarines to cruise off Ukely landing-places, while the
weather was favourable for disembarkation, others to the
Heligoland Bight, to watch off the ports from which an e^edition
was Hkely to leave.

Presumably only an advanced force of infantry, cavalry and
light artillery would be disembarked in the open ; heavy artillery,
transport^ etc., and the main disembarkation would have to be
taken to a harbour with quays. I proposed, therefore, to station
all the available submarines of the patrol flotillas, in the principal
harbours of the East coast ; to extend the g unfir e of those that
were defended, and protect others, such as Yarmouth and Blyth

A LOST OPPORTUNITY

137

which were not defended. I wished to use the submarines, in
fact, exacdy as I had done off the Humber during the 1913
manoeuvres. One or two transports sunk in the entrance of
a harboxir might well block the channel for the remainder. In
this connection, the provisions of a few blockships, held in readi-
ness, to be sunk in the channel or foul of the quays, was worth
consideration.

I was convinced that no consideration of shallow water, mines,
screens, etc., would deter the commanding officers of our sub-
marines from driving home their attacks, by 3 ay or night, if
opportunity offered. I had no doubt whatever of the ultimate
result of an attempt at invasion, but wished to place on record
that we had an insufficient force of submarines to meet invasion
in every possible locality. 1 was aware that the views I had
expressed would be unwelcome to Lord Fisher, but thought it
best he should realise the limitations of the small submarines
and destroyers of the coast patrols, and avoid placing a fictitious
value on their capabilities.

My paper was considered by the newly constituted War Staff,
and a week later the Admiralty issued “A memorandum as to' the
working of the Patrol Flotillas (to cancel present arrangements).”
It was based on my recommendations, and put an end to the
procedure which, in one area, caused me much concern.

Up to that time the enemy had not bombarded an undefended
coast town, and it did not occur to me that he would do so, any
more than that he woiild sink unarmed merchantmen and pas-
senger ships by torpedo, without giving the non-combatants a
chance of escape. I remembered, however, that in one of our
pre-War exercises, I arrived at dawn off the Tees with a raiding
force, it having escaped my notice that a battery of six-inch guns,
manned by Territorials, existed at Hartlepool. It occured to me
that the presence of this battery, which was of course known to
the enemy, might serve as an excuse to bombard Hartlepool,
particularly if the enemy had learnt from neutral ships using the
port, that we had no submarines stationed there. So, when the
new memorandum came into force, I suggested that a couple of
submarines might be taken from the Dover Patrol (which had
been strengthened by a number of French submarines), and
stationed at Hartlepool, with orders for one, if not both, to be to
seaward of the port before dawn every day. The Chief of Staff

138 NAVAL IvIEMOIRS, 1910-1915

concurred, but only one submarine could be spared to co-operate
with the local defence battery at Hartlepool.

When the new disposition was promulgated, the Commander-
in-Chief of the Grand Fleet asked me why there were six sub-
marines stationed in the Firth of Forth, where there were no
ships, and none at Cromarty which was used by valuable ships.
I replied that I had always considered submarines would prove
invaluable in co-operation with the gun defences of more or
less weakly defended harbours such as Cromarty. But the
Admiralty considered invasion, or a raid in force, was well within
the bounds of possibility, and that the most vital consideration
was the defence of certain important harbours, possessing quays,
which could be used for disembarkation of heavy artiller}%
transport, etc., without which decisive results could not be
achieved by the enemy. The present disposition was ordered by
the Admiralty to meet this possibility, the submarines being
divided equally between the Humber, Tyne and Forth areas,
which were considered the danger points for invasion or raid.
I sent a copy of my reply to the Chief of Staff, who
concurred and passed it on to the First Lord and First Sea Lord,
who endorsed it with W.S.C. in red and F. in green respectively.

On 14th November an incident occurred, which is hardly worth
mentioning except that it was typical of the absurd scares which
got about in the early days of the war, and of the extraordinary
moral effect submarines had upon those ignorant of their
capabilities and limitations. Several signals were received by the
Senior Naval Officer at Felixstowe, in the course of the evening,
to the effect that a submarine had been seen up the Blackwater, a
shallow estuary between Harwich and the Thames. At ten p.m.
I received a message from Admiral Sir Richard Poore, Com-
mander-in-Chief at the Nore, saying that there was reason to
believe that the three submarines reported to be in the Blackwater
were enemy. He directed me to send a party there in motors,
and told me to commandeer all suitable steamers, and sink
them across the entrance — this must be done before daylight.”
The military authorities, he said, had been asked to send guns.

As it would have required a great many ships to block the
entrance of the Blackwater at high water, and I did not think for
a moment that enemy submarines would venture into a shallow
estuary, I need hardly say I did nothing of the sort. But finding

A LOST OPPORTUNITY

139

some miles of anti-submarine net under construction, at Bright-
lingsea, I commandeered all the available boats and commenced
to lay it across the entrance during the night. At daylight I
motored round the coast interviewing all the people who claimed
to have seen submarines. Five more were sighted by natives
while I was in the neighbourhood ; one had been seen to chase, at
a speed of quite 20 knots, one of the destroyers which had been
sent to hunt for the enemy 1 The supposed submarines were
flights of wild geese or other wild fowl skinu^jing the surface.
A wild-goose chase indeed !

On the 23rd November, in very bad weather, Lieut.-Com-
mander Jameson, commanding Dz^ was washed overboard and
drowned. He had carried out many daring and valuable recon-
naissances, and his untimely death was a great loss to the sub-
marine service. The circumstances were reported to me by his
second in command, Lieut. F. E. Oakley, a brilliant Rugby half-
back, who played for England in 1913-14. I sent Lieut. -
Commander C. Head to command i?2; he had greatly dis-
tinguished himself in a C ” class submarine in pre-War exercises ;
he was an enterprising aviator in his leisure moments. Dz
sailed again the following day, but was never heard of again.
In addition to the three officers of great promise whom I have
mentioned, the third officer of Dz^ Lieut.-Commander F. L.
Copplestone, deserves a place in submarine records. He had
served in submarines some years before, but was invalided out of
the Navy in 1906. On rejoining for the war, he begged to be
appointed to a submarine in any capacity, and served in a sub-
ordinate position in £>2, though several years older than his
shipmates.

Early in October the French Government expressed a wish to
send the submarine Gustave Zede into the North Sea, and the
French Naval Attache and an officer who was sent over to arrange
details, offered to place the vessel under my orders at Harwich.
When they learnt, however, what submarines had to face in the
way of anti-submarine tactics in the Heligoland Bight, they
declared that the crew was not sufficiently trained. I told them
that when she was considered ready she would be very welcome
at Harwich, and could be maintained by the Maidstone. Some
time later the French Naval Attache told me that his Government

140 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

would like to repeat the original oflfer, and if our Admiralty agreed
they would place the Archimede under my orders. This was
approved and she arrived at Harwich on and December. After
she had practised rapid diving for some time under Waistell, I
decided to take her into the Heligoland Bight on the first
favourable opportunity, but none occurred until the 15 th
December.

We were going through one of the periodical invasion scares,
and I was told ^ keep the “ Oversea ” submarines in readiness to
proceed anywhere they might be required.

Thanks to our Intelligence Service, the Admiralty were aware,
on the evening of the 14th, that a force of enemy battle cruisers,
cruisers and destroyers were sailing from the Jade River early
on the 15 th, and returning on the night of the i6th. This was
taken to indicate, that the enemy ships might be on our coast
at daylight on the i6th ; warnings were sent out to the Senior
Officers of the Coast Patrols to this effect, and dispositions
were made to cut off the enemy’s retreat with the and Battle
Squadron, Beatty’s battle cruisers, an armoured cruiser squadron
commanded by Rear-Admiral Pakenham, and Goodenough’s
light cruisers.

The whole force was to operate under the orders of Vice-
Admiral Sir George Warrender, commanding the and Battle
Squadron ; at that time the most powerful unit of the Grand
Fleet. Tyrwhitt’s force, consisting of four light cruisers and z}
destroyers, was to wait for orders off Yarmouth.

The battle cruisers sailed from Cromarty, and the other vessels
of the Grand Fleet from Scapa Flow ; the latter in heavy weather,
which prevented their destroyers sailing with them; the
Commander-in-Chief therefore informed the Admiralty that he
considered the co-operation of Tyrwhitt’s destroyers of the
greatest importance, as the enemy would be accompanied by
strong destroyer forces. The Admiralty, however, considering
the defended ports of the Humber and Harwich as the most
likely objectives, awaited developments before giving Tyrwhitt
any further orders.

I was ordered to hold eight submarines of the “ Oversea ”
flotiUa in readiness to spread on a line 30 miles N.N.W. from the
ten-fathom line of Terschelling, through which it was thought
the enemy might pass next day. I did not like this disposition.

A LOST OPPORTUNITY

141

as I knew it would be very difficult to keep in touch with the
submarines once they were spread on such an extended front,
and I suggested that the line might be occupied by a few fast
surface craft, in a position to warn the submarines of the approach
of the enemy, and enable them to dive unseen and unsuspected.
I wanted to station the submarines in pairs at various strategic
points in echelon, so that the maximum number might be brought
into action as the enemy advanced. If he passed through a single
line at high speed, probably one, at the most two, would be able
to attack on the 30-mile front. *

Before my proposal reached the Admiralty, the submarines
were ordered to sea, and during the afternoon the Lurcher^ flyhig
my broad pennant, Firedrake^ Archimede and seven “ E ’’ class
submarines sailed. I suggested to Commandant Deville, who
commanded the Archimede^ that he might take Lieut.-Com-
mander G. Herbert (late of as a passenger ; he gladly
accepted the offer.

Unfortunately the Admiralty had not thought it necessary to
give me any information, except that enemy ships might pass
through the submarine patrol on the i6th. Through some
Staff oversight, I was not told, as the Commander-in-Chief and
Tyrwhitt were, that there was a possibility of German battle
cruisers, cruisers and destroyers being off our coast about day-
break on the 1 6th ; neither was I given the disposition or
composition of the British forces, which would be operating
in the waters I was about to enter. A request for information
on this latter point remained unanswered. I knew that Tyrwhitt
had been ordered to be off Yarmouth at daylight on the i6th,
otherwise I was in complete ignorance of lie situation, when
I sailed on the afternoon of the 15 th.

In order to reach their stations by daylight, the submarines had
to proceed independently, on diverging courses at full speed.
Dirty rainy weather was experienced on the Broad Fourteens ;
Ymuiden Light, the one aid to navigation, was obscured, and they
lost touch with one another during the night. The disposition
placed them out of sight of one another, and, with the exception
of the Archimede^ out of sight of land, and although the sub-
marines no doubt approximately covered the fine ordered by the
Admiralty, one could not expect to find them in accurate station
after 140 miles dead reckoning, run under such bad weather

142

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

conditions and in the strong tides prevailing. The Lurcher and
Firedrake scouted well to the eastward, but of course could not
cover the whole front.

Beatty joined Warrender before nightfall on the 15 th, and
the Grand Fleet Squadrons proceeded in company to a rendez-
vous at 7 a.m. (dawn) in Lat. 54-10' N., Long. 3-0' E. From
5.15 until 6 a.m., seven destroyers, which had accompanied
Beatty, and were stationed ten miles to the eastward of the Fleet,
were intermittently engaged with a superior force of enemy
destroyers and light cruisers, with which they managed to keep
in touch. At daylight, the armoured cruiser Roon and three
light cruisers were identified, and when the information reached
Beatty, he proceeded in pursuit, followed by Warrender’s
battleships.

We know now that the Roon and her consorts were the advance
screen of the whole German High Sea Fleet, and that the British
and German Fleets, approaching one another at high speed,
might have been in contact at about 9 a.m. However, Admiral
von Ingenohl, the Commander-in-Chief, learning that his screen
and our destroyers were in action, and remembering the strict
injunctions he had received — ^after the action of the Heligoland
Bight — to avoid the loss of ships, turned at about 5.45 a.m.
and made for home, leaving his raiding force to look after itself.

Meanwhile information was received at the Admiralty, that
enemy battle and light cruisers had appeared off the Yorkshire
coast, and were bombarding Hartlepool, Scarborough and
Whitby. The bombardment of open, undefended towns had
not been anticipated, but the Admiralty had the satisfaction of
feeling certain, that if the visibility only remained normal, there
was every prospect of the enemy raiding ships being annihilated
by the overwhelming force they had concentrated between them
and their home ports. When the enemy’s presence on our coast
was signalled to our squadrons, which were chasing the Roon
and her consorts to the eastward, they broke off the pursuit and
at 9 a.m. turned to the westward, to make for the gap between
the enemy’s minefields, through which the raiding force were
practically certain to retreat.

Tyrwhitt was ordered by the Admiralty at the same time,
first to get into touch with the enemy off Scarborough and
Hartlepool, and later to join Warrender with all dispatch.

A LOST OPPORTUNITY

143

At 10.34 a.m. a portion of a signal from the Monarch to the
Ambuscade^ to the effect that enemy vessels were off Scarborough,
was faintly heard on the Lurchers wireless. It was obvious to
me that the submarines as disposed, could not hope to intercept
the enemy on their return to the Bight ; and being out of wireless
sending range, without any information as to the movements of
our ships, or those of the enemy, I sent the Firedrake at full
speed towards Yarmouth to get into wireless touch with the
Adamanty submarine tender, which was in telephonic com-
munication with the Admiralty, and directed he^ to inform the
Qaief of Staff that I was collecting the submarines and waiting
for information and instructions.

Until about ii a.m. the Grand Fleet Squadrons had had a
calm sea and good visibility, then a breeze sprang up accompanied
by rain, and before long it was blowing hard from the westward,
with driving rain squalls, which reduced the visibility to under
2,000 yards at times, and it never again exceeded 3,000 to 4,000
yards. Farther south, the weather became even worse, and
Tyrwhitt sent his destroyers back to Yarmouth for shelter,
proceeding at reduced speed with his cruisers alone.

At 11.30 the two most southerly of Goodenough's four
cruisers, which were spread five miles ahead of Beatty, sighted
and engaged at 3,000 yards three German cruisers and some
destroyers. We know now that the former were the Stralsmdy
Strashurg and Grudenau^ which were in company, and acting as
a look-out ahead of the German Battle Cruiser Squadron,
consisting of the Derfflinger^ Molfke^ Von der Tann^ SejdliP:^ and
Bliicher^ under Admird Hipper.

Unfortunately, owing to a misinterpreted order, our cruisers
broke off the action, and resumed their places in the screen,
thus contact was lost. Meanwhile the German cruisers stood
away to the southward, as did Hipper, whom they had warned
that strong forces were probably ahead of him.

Half an hour later, Warrender’s flagship, the King George V^
sighted the same cruisers and destroyers on the starboard bow
steering to the eastward at high speed. On sighting our batde-
ships, they altered course at once to the northward ; Warrender
followed, and ordered Pakenham to chase, but they soon dis-
appeared in a rain squall, and contact was again lost. They
had in fact escaped between Warrender and Beatty, and at the

A LOST OPPORTUNITY

145

same time were able to warn nipper of the presence of battleships
ahead of his southward course. Hipper then altered course to
the northward, and escaped round Beatty's northern flank, unseen
in the mist, but actually within g\m range, had the visibility
been normal.

The Admiralty were able to give Kipper's position — from
intercepted German reports — ^from time to time, but of course
too late to be made use of by the Admirals afloat, under the
prevailing conditions. ^

Hipper was indeed fortunate, and but for the low visibility
must have been brought to action and cut off from his supports,
which at that time were 160 miles to the eastward, making for
home.

At about 1,50 p.m. the Admiralty learned that the High Sea
Fleet was at sea, and at 12.30 had signalled its position Lat.
59-58' N., Long. 5-55' E. Thinking that it was on its way out,
they warned Warrender and Beatty not to go too far to the east-
ward ; but by that time there was no prospect of our ships
gaining touch with the enemy before dark, and the Admiralty
realised that their well-laid plans had been frustrated by the
North Sea weather.

I had a most trying day endeavouring to collect the sub-
marines ; in the visibility prevailing, they had to dive the moment
they sighted a vessel, if they wished to remain unseen, and once
submerged, it was very diflScult to get them on to the surface
again in the absence of sound signalling, which we did not
possess in those days ; and by dusk I had only succeeded in
finding foxir.

At 3.3 5 p.m. I received the following signal from the Admiralty
through the Firedrake :

“ High Sea Fleet is at sea, and at 12.30 p.m. was in
Lat. 54-38' N., Long. 5 -5 5 ' E. They may return after dawn
tomorrow. Submarines should proceed to Heligoland
and intercept them ; they probably pass five miles W. of
Hehgoland, steering S, for Weser Light vessel (1410)."

After passing the Admiralty's message 1410, the Firedrake had
asked if the Staff had any other instructions for me, and was told
that the Chief of Staff would communicate with me later. I had
impressed on the Admiralty — ^after the signalling fiasco of the

146 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910--1915

28th August — ^that when I was more than 50 miles from a British
wireless station or linking ship (the limit of '' D (destroyer’s)
wave-length in those days) I would always have continuous watch
kept on S ” (ship) wave-length, and could be practically certain
of receiving, fhough not acknowledging messages. V^en the
Firedrake rejoined me I noticed that her funnels were white with
caked salt, and she reported that it was blowing very fresh farther
to the westward. This surprised me as there was hardly any
wind oS Terschelling, and I was able to send written instructions
by boat to the four submarines. They were to arrive at their
stations by 5 a.m., were to attack from the surface before daylight
if opportunity offered, and were warned that our destroyers would
probably be operating in the same area during the night. To
the Arcbimede^s orders I added a personal note to Deville, wishing
him the best of good luck.

It was pitch dark at 5 p.m. The submarines were under orders
from the Admiralty to return to Harwich at nightfall on i6th, and
I was tom between spending the night looking for the remaining
four submarines, in case they might be required the following day,
and lying off Heligoland waiting for the German Fleet, in the hope
that they would pass there before daylight. I was sorely tempted
to do the latter, but there werespme conflicting considerations.
I knew the Monarch (Second Battle Squadron) and the Am-
buscade's destroyer flotilla, were somewhere near Scarborough
that morning ; so concluded that the Grand Fleet with its
attendant cruisers and destroyers were at sea. I knew that
Tyrwhitt with four cruisers and about 23 destroyers was also
at sea. The Admiralty knew where I was, and that I was
collecting the submarines to carry out any instructions they
might give, and they alone knew the disposition of the 200 or
so British vessels which were acting on i^ormation which they
alone could impart.

It seemed to me certain that Tyrwhitt’s destroyers, and possibly
those of the Grand Fleet flotillas, would be sent to wait for the
enemy off Heligoland during the night, and I felt that I could not
butt into the area in which our destroyers were operating, except
by pre-arrangement ; but I failed to get into wireless touch with
any British vessel or station. I had been accused by the First
Lord of “ bush thwacking ” on one occasion, when he thought I
had penetrated farther than necessary into the Heligoland Bight. I

A LOST OPPORTUNITY

^47

felt I might well lay myself open to suc±l a charge, if I went off into
the blue with my two destroyers seeking adventure, while four
submarines were still at large, which might be required the next
day, if the enemy did not return during the night as anticipated.
So I reluctantly decided to send the Firedrake to the westward
again to pass the following signal and seek information :

“ Four submarines from Terschelling patrol will be in the
Bight at dawn, one of which will be off the Weser. Am
endeavouring to collect other four. When J have done so,
will keep them in company pending further orders.
Dispatched at 7. 5 p.m.”

Having dispatched the Firedrake^ I used every endeavour to
pick up the missing submarines by wireless and searchlight. At
8 p.m., having had no success and having received no com-
munication from the A dmir alty, I stood to the southward to
intercept the submarines at the West Hinder in the morning. At
1.20 a.m. when 200 miles away from Heligoland, I received the
following signal :

** Admiralty to Lurcher. We think Heligoland and Amrun
Light will be lit when ships are going in. Your destroyers
might get a chance to attack about 2 a.m. or later on the
line given you (2012).’’

Words fail me even now, after more than 19 years, to express
my feelings when I received this belated message. My signal,
dispatched at 7.5 p.m. through the Firedrake and Adamant^
reached the Admiralty before the latter’s 2012 (8.12 p.m.) was
dispatched, but instead of sending the message through the line
of communication I had been at such pains to open, it was sent
through the ordinary channels, and no effort was made to pass
it to me until I came within range on “ D ” wave-length five
hours later 1

During the night the westerly blow, which the Firedrake had
noticed when communicating with the Adamant^ spread across
the North Sea, and the submarines in the Bight encountered very
heavy weather before they returned on the 19th December.

I learnt, on my return to Harwich, that Tyrwhitt had been
ordered to join the *Second Battle Squadron under Sir George
Warrender, but the weather was so bad that he was only able

148 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

to take his cruisers, and left the destroyers anchored weather-
bound in Yarmouth Roads, so my fears of trespassing in his area
were quite unfounded.

Eight years later, when Winston Churchill published the first
volume of his ''World Crisis: 1911-14,” I read the following
account of the story I have just related :

" It was evident that the Germans had eluded our inter-
cepting force, and that even their light cruisers with whom
we had been in contact had escaped in the mist. . . .

It was now nearly 8 o’clock.

Was it then all over ? I enquired about our submarines.
They had already been collected by Commodore Keyes from
their first position and were now moving on to the German
line of retreat. But whether the enemy’s course would come
within their limited range was a matter of luck. Sir Arthur
Wilson then said, ' There is only one chance now. Keyes
with the Lurcher and Firedrake is with the submarines. He
could probably make certain of attacking the German Battle
Cruiser Squadron as it enters the Bight tonight. He may
torpedo one or even two.’ It seemed indeed a forlorn hope
to send these two frail destroyers with their brave Com-
modore and faithful crews far from home, close to the enemy’s
coast, utterly unsupported, into the jaws of this powerful
German force with its protecting vessels and flotillas.
There was a long silence. We all knew Keyes well. Then
someone said, ' It is sending him to his death.’ Someone
else said, ' He would be the last man to wish us to consider
that.’ There was another long pause. However, Sir
Arthur Wilson had already written the following message :

8.12 p.m.

' We think Heligoland and Amrun lights will be lit
when ships are going in. Your destroyers might get a
chance to attack about 2 a.m, or later on the line given
you.’

The First Sea Lord nodded assent. The Chief of Staff
took it, got up heavily and quitted the room. Then we
turned to the ordinary business of the day. . . .

Two days later when I received Admiral Keyes in my
room at the Admiralty I said, * We sent you a terrible

A LOST OPPORTUNITY

149

message the other night. I hardly expected to see you
again.’ ^ It was terrible/ he said, ‘ not getting it till I was
nearly home. I waited three hours in the hopes of such an
order, and I very nearly did it on my own responsibility,’
and he proceeded to reproach himself without need.”

This account, or the interpretation which a reviewer of the
book placed upon it, pricked the wound of a lost opportunity
afresh ! Commenting on the evil effect which Admiralty control
by wireless had on the initiative of the modeA naval officer,
he cited as an example that Keyes in an excellent position to
attack the enemy waited for instructions instead of acting on
his own initiative ” — or words to that effect I

The submarines were no less unfortunate. Eii passed close
to the westward of Heligoland, stood down the Channel towards
the Weser, and took up a position two miles to the northward of
the Weser Light vessel before daylight on the 17th. At 7.30 a.m.
a number of destroyers approached from the northward, zig-
zagging at high speed, and at 8 a.m. the leading ships of the
enemy’s Battle Fleet appeared, having evidently passed through
the channel to the eastward of Heligoland. The enemy ships
were about a mile apart, apparently zig-zagging independently,
which made them very difficult to attack. Nasmith got into a
favourable position to attack the leader, but she altered course
and brought Eii so fine on her bow, he was unable to use his
bow tube, so swung his vessel round and brought his starboard
beam tube to bear at a range of about 400 yards. Ei i was rolling
heavily, and unfortunately was heeling to starboard when the
torpedo left the tube, with the result that it passed under the ship.
The rough sea evidently hid the track of the torpedo, and the
attack apparently passed unnoticed.

Nasmith then turned his attention to the third ship, intending
to deliver a bow attack j but unfortunately at a critical moment,
when the position was very favourable, the enemy altered course
dkectly for when she was only about 500 yards off, and
would have rammed her at right angles had she not made a
very rapid dive, to accomplish which it was necessary to admit
a considerable quantity of water. The enemy passed im-
mediately overhead, when Eii was at 70 feet. The admission
of water altered her trim, and in the heavy sea she got somewhat

150 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

out of control, and broke surface when Nasmith rose to periscope
depth to seek another target. This time £'11 was undoubtedly
seen, and the ships scattered at high speed and steered courses
to take them well clear of Ei i^s danger circle. The Batde Fleet
was followed in the afternoon by a destroyer flotilla 2:ig-2:agging
at high speed, and four vessels passed directly over Eii.

Nasmida spent that night between the Weser and the Elbe, and
on the 1 8th watched all day for vessels passing through the
swept channel ];)etween the Jade, Weser and Elbe, but there was
no movement. While watching this channel, Eii got on shore
on the Nord Grunde and narrowly escaped being caught by
enemy sweepers. Although Nasmith missed a great opportunity,
he displayed gallant determination throughout two stormy days
ofiF the shallow entrances of the German rivers.

In sending £’11 into those waters I felt I was subjecting her
to considerable risk, as Di did not return from a similar mission,
and I had in mind a German report that their cruiser Yonk had
been lost on a German mine off the Jade. After receiving
Nasmith’s report of the proceedings of the enemy, it was evident
that a large area was kept free of mines, and I told the Admiralty
I would have no hesitation in occupying that area with sub-
marines in future, if occasion arose.

jBio, £'15 and Arcbimede missed the enemy, owing to their
passing to the east of Heligoland and not west as anticipated by
the Admiralty. Arcbimede had a terrible experience ; she was in
sight of Heligoland on the morning of the 17th December, and
remained off there all day. That evening she decided to return
owing to threatening weather. She had not gone far when a
heavy sea struck her funnel and bent it, consequently she was
unable to submerge, as it could not be lowered sufficiently to
close the water-tight hatch, and she was no longer a submarine.
Arcbimede was two days in the Bight in this condition, and would
have been an easy prey to the enemy. Fortunately, owing to
heavy weather, no enemy vessel was sufficiently far afield to
sight her.

M. D^viUe told me that the conditions of service in the Bight
and the steep nature of the seas there, were a revelation to him^
and he could now well appreciate what our gallant submariners
had been doiag. He was full of admiration for Herbert, who
was always cheerful, and took his turn in the queue of the crew.

A LOST OPPORTUNITY

151

who passed buckets from hand to hand, incessantly baling out the
water which surged through the funnel aperture at every plunge.
It seemed that one of the crew remarked to him : H fait tres
mauvais temps. Monsieur.’’ To which Herbert replied, in
execrable French, Oui, mais apres le mauvais temps vienne le
beau temps ! ” This immensely tickled the hitherto rather
depressed crew who shouted it in chorus, whenever a particularly
heavy rush of water entered the vessel. At one time Archimede
was in such a bad way that the question of interning in Holland
was seriously considered, much to Herbert’? consternation.
However, the gallant Deville was determined to bring her home
if possible, and she struggled on and arrived at Harwich, to my
intense relief, on the evening of 19th December.

After her defects had been made good, as far as possible, by
the Maids fone^ the Archimede returned to Cherbourg to be refitted,
and I did not meet Deville again until I was Commander-in-Chief
of the Mediterranean Fleet many years later. He, his officers
and men struck up a great entente with our submariners,” and
were given a tremendous send-off when they left us.

One more submarine story in connection with the enemy’s
raid on our coast towns. As I have mentioned, it never
occurred to me that they would perpetrate such an inexcusable
breach of the laws of maritime warfare as to bombard open
towns, but I feared the presence of guns at Hartlepool might
serve as an excuse. The enemy, however, needed no excuse, and
bombarded Scarborough and Whitby as well as Hartlepool.

In view of the very special warning issued the night prior to the
raid, it was deplorable that the submarine which was stationed
at Hartlepool, solely to meet the situation which arose, should
have been in harbour, in a position ftom which she could not dive
to attack. I was informed that the Senior Naval Officer at Harde-
pool, had ordered the submarine to remain inside the harbour
until she was required. When the enemy appeared, C9 (Lieut.
C. Dering) had to cross the bar on the surface, it being too shallow
for her to dive, during which time she was straddled by several
salvoes ; and when she eventually dived, the enemy withdrew
before she could get into a position to attack. Had she been
off the port at dawn as recommended, even if she had not brought
off a successful attack, her presence would have made it impossible
for the enemy to lie off Hartlepool and inflict about 500 casualties

152

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

and serious damage. The three six-inch guns defending the
harbour fought a spirited action with the Moltke^ Sejdlit^ and
BlUcher^ armed with 12-inch, 8.2-inch and six-inch guns, and the
Senior Naval Officer, in the light cruiser Patrol^ armed with four-
inch guns, followed by her sister ship the Forward, most gallantly
stood out across the bar and engaged the formidable foe —
suffering heavily in the course of the action. His gallant conduct,
I think, saved him from the worst of Lord Fisher’s wrath, but it
could not atone for the submarine’s failure and all it entailed.

The enemy certainly had all the good fortune on that day of
confusion and lost opportunities, and no one suffered more
tormenting disappointments than the submarines and their two
attendant destroyers.

However, in the light of our knowledge today, it might be
considered fortunate, that the restrictions imposed on the
German Admiral spared our 2nd Battle Squadron from being
overwhelmed by, or retreating from, the whole High Sea Fleet.

The First Lord had been anxious for some time to try to raid
the Zeppelin sheds at Cuxhaven with seaplanes of the young
Naval Air Service, to the development of which he had devoted
so much energy in the two years preceding the war. Three cross-
channel passenger steamers, the Engadine, Riviera and Empress,
were fitted with steel hangars capable of housing three seaplanes
each, and these were sent to Harwich, to await the favourable
weather conditions necessary for such an enterprise. The sea-
plane carriers, which could only maintain a speed of about 22
knots, were to be escorted by Tyrwhitt’s force to a position 15
miles N.N.E. of Heligoland, where the seaplanes were to be
hoisted out. After attacking Cuxhaven, they were to examine
the anchorages in the rivers, and fly westward along the coast
to Norderney Gat, and thence to seaward to rejoin their carriers,
which meanwhile were to move down to a position 20 miles
north of Norderney. Eleven submarines were to cover the
operation. “As before, it was hoped,” states the Official History,
“ that the enterprise might provoke a fleet action, and the whole
Grand Fleet was concentrated in the middle of the North Sea.”*

I think the Admiralty were optimistic if they imagined, which
I doubt, that the Grand Fleet, some 220 miles from Heligoland,
* ” Naval Operations,” VoL n, page 51, and plate opposite page 48.

A LOST OPPORTUNITY

153

could take part in any action that we might provoke, or afford
any support to Tyrwhitt, hampered as he was by slow, vulnerable
vessels. Anyhow, I considered that the responsibility for
providing support for Tyrwhitt rested on the submarine service,
and I issued a memorandum to my command, expressing pride
that the support of the expedition should have been confided to
us, and confidence that, if the opportunity offered, the Com-
manding Officers would drive home their attacks, proceed to
the assistance of seaplanes, or carry out any other service which
might arise, regardless of all other consideration!.

A smooth sea was essential, since the seaplanes were to take
off in open water, and this could hardly be coimted upon for long
in mid-winter. However, on 23 rd December the weather
forecast was very promising, and the Admiralty gave orders for
the raid to be carried out at dawn on Christmas Day. The Lurcher^
flying my broad pennant, the Firedrake^ Siy three D ” and six

E ” class submarines sailed during the night of 23rd“24th to
co-operate. E-j was already in a position between Heligoland
and the entrance of the Elbe, Weser and Jade rivers. My object
was to have submarines :

(1) On all possible lines of approach from the enemy^s
ports, both while the carriers were hoisting out their
seaplanes, and while proceeding to the position from which
they would pick them up after their attempt ;

(2) To lie in wait off the enemy's ports to attack his
vessels if they emerged ;

(5) In the seaplanes' line of retirement, to pick up any
pilots who might be xinable to reach their carriers ; and to
destroy any machines which might have to be abandoned.

I took up a position with the Lurcher and Firedrake ten miles to
the northward of Nordemey Gat, to give the retiring seaplanes a
direct line from the latter towards the carriers, and in the
event of enemy vessels appearing from the Jade or the Ems,
to be able to give Tyrwhitt good warning of their approach.

The weather was very fine and sunny with light variable
breezes, the sea was very smooth, and the visibility to seaward
was good, but hazy over the land. Everything went according
to plan, except that only seven of the nine seaplanes succeeded in
getting off the water.

154 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

At an early hour in the morning it -was evident, from the
agitated state of the German wireless, that our presence had been
discovered. Two Zeppelins and a Schutte-Lans airship were
in sight most of the time, and a number of German seaplanes
were on the wing, so I was very hopeful that heavy enemy ships
would be induced to come out to drive us off, and thus give
the submarines the chance they ardently sought.

At 9 a.m. when off Norderney Gat, a British seaplane
alighted alongside the Lurcher, and the pilot reported that he had
run out of petrol, so we took him on board and his seaplane in
tow. Curiously enough I had flown with this pilot just before
the war, to test the value of aircraft for observing submerged
submarines.

Two British seaplanes and one German passed close to the
Lurcher in the course of the next 50 minutes, all steericig in the
direction of the squadron’s approach from the northward. At
10.30 a.m. I stood out to the latter’s rendezvous, and turned oyer
the pilot and seaplane to the Engadine. Three seaplanes and their
pilots had been recovered, but four were still missing when at
.11.45 Tyrwhitt withdrew, as long before that time the seaplanes’
fuel must have been exhausted. I was much relieved to see the
last of the carriers, as it seemed incredible to me that strong enemy
forces were not on their way to attack them. I then stood in
again to Norderney ‘Gat, in hopes of finding the missing planes
and of drawing the enemy away from Tyrwhitt’s line of retirement
if any came out. However, there was not a sign of a German
vessel except submarines, of which several were sighted during
the day, but the calm sea made it easy to detect periscopes and
their attempts to attack were avoided.

At 2.20 p.m. I received a wireless signal from E\ i reporting
that she had picked up the pilots and mechanics of three seaplanes.
The story of thek rescue, and the proceedings of £’11 and Z>6
(Lieut.-Commander C. Halahan) make a brave tale. Incidentally
the reports of Nasmith and Halahan taken together, give some
explanation of the strange conduct of a German airship.

.Si I was diving off Norderney Gat when at 9.50 a.m. Nasmith
observed a British seaplane through his periscope, so he rose to
the surface. The seaplane alighted near him and the pilot
reported that he had only sufficient petrol for another five
minutes; Sii embarked him, took the seaplane in tow and

CHRISTMAS DAY AIR RAID
1-Mrcher towing seaplane back from Norderney Cat

S.I. TOWED HOME BY HER CAPTURED GERMAN TRAWLER

A LOST OPPORTUNITY

155

proceeded towards the carriers^ rendeizvous* At 10 a,m.
shortly after a hostile airship had been sighted, two more seaplanes
alighted alongside jEi i for the same reason* Soon after, Nasmith
reused that the airship was dosing rapidly, and to add to the
complications, a submarine approaching at full speed on the
surface was seen to dive, consequently it was considered hostile.
He then had the task of saving four more airmen, in the face of
opposition, apparently both from above and below. He cast
oflF the seaplane he was towing, ran alongside one of the others,
and hailing the pilot and mechanic of the third seaplane — ^which
had been damaged by enemy fire, and was standing on its head with
its tail in the air — ^told them to swim to jS*!!. He then opened
fire on the undamaged seaplane floats and petrol tanks, with the
object of sinking them to prevent them falling into the hands of
the enemy. Before the crew of the third seaplane had been
hauled on board, and whilst Eii was stiU firing at the other
seaplanes, the airship appeared to be about to pass overhead at a
height of 1,000 feet. Nasmith told me that a number of Germans
could be seen craning their heads out of the windows of the
gondolas. We had been told so much about the bombing we
should get from German aircraft, that he thought nothing he
could do would avert a discharge of bombs, which might or
might not hit him ; so to show he was not downhearted, he took
off his cap and waved it defiantly. This gesture was no doubt
his salvation, and must have given the Germans the impression
that Ell was a German submarine engaged in shooting at
disabled British seaplanes ; which was probably confirmed by
Z?6"s behaviour. She was evidently British, and had been seen
to dive, apparently to attack Eii, so the airship turned her
attention from the latter to £>6, which was approaching at peri-
scope depth, and proceeded to try to bomb her.

Hakhan was quite aware of jBii’s identity, as she was broad-
side on to him. When he saw her surrounded by disabled
seaplanes, and menaced from above by the airship, he approached
at full speed on the surface to help, but was forced to dive deep
as the airship passed over him on its way towards £'11 and the
seaplanes. Later when at periscope depth, Hakhan saw that the
airship had turned and was coming towards him again, so he dived
to 60 feet, which was fortunate, as two bombs fell very close.
The second was particularly heavy and shook D 6 very severely.

156 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Nasmith who first saw Z?6 two miles away end on, and then
saw him dive, apparently to attack him, began to get anxious, so
as soon as he had hauled the last man on board, and all the airman
had been got below, he hurriedly dived and turned towards the
direction from which he expected to be torpedoed, to present
as small a target as possible. Immediately after Ei i had dived,
and when she was at about 40 feet, a heavy explosion shook her
considerably, and later another. Nasmith thought the first was a
torpedo, and he told me he remembered wondering for a moment
why he was still alive so long after the torpedo had struck.

Although bombs from the air, having no propellant except
gravity, are unreliable missiles, when Nasmith and Halahan
compared notes in my cabin later, we came to the conclusion
that the bombs must have been intended for Z?6, as they evidently
fell so much closer to her than to Eii.

In spite of being heavily shaken by the bomb explosions,
Halahan rose to periscope depth, and seeing a seaplane apparently
undamaged, he came to the surface alongside it to save the pilot,
when to his astonishment he found that the airship was only 100
yards away at a height of about 50 feet. Her crew were busily
engaged in destroying the seaplane with machine guns, which
they then turned on to him. Seeing that the seaplane was
abandoned, Halahan promptly dived, and later, after satisfying
himself that all the seaplanes had sunk, he returned to his station,
but was hunted by the airship during the next four hours
whenever he came to periscope depth.

Nasmith remained submerged until well clear, and later took
El I to the bottom to rest in about 20 fathoms, where the crew
shared their Christmas dinner of turkey and plum pudding with
the five airmen, who can hardly have expected such an ending to
their adventurous flight. Actually it was not quite the last of
their crowded experiences, for while running back to Harwich
on the surface, Eii narrowly escaped being torpedoed by a
Gettnan submarine.

At that time we had no anti-aircraft guns, and repeated attacks
were made from a low altitude by airships and seaplanes on the
carriers and their escorts. While proceeding to the southern
rendezvous, the carrier Empress^ which was unable to maintain
her station and dropped a long way astern of the squadron, was
systematically attacked by two seaplanes and a Zeppelin ; she only

A LOST OPPORTUNITY 157

had a few rifles with which to defend herself, but by skilful use
of her helm was able to avoid the enemy^s bombs. On one
occasion a German seaplane came up astern of the Lurcher ^ so low
that the gunlayer of our after four-inch gun was able to get his
sights on with a few degrees of elevation in hand. I happened to
be standing near him and told him to give his gun a swing up as he
fired, as one does for a rocketing pheasant. The seaplane
twisted and turned like a pigeon when the gun fired, and like a
pigeon flew away.

I remained in those waters until nightfall, 2 nd then cruised
between the Ems and Terschelling, to look out for enemy craft
which might be sent out to mterfere with our submarines return-
ing home on the surface. However, nothing appeared, and at
8 p.m. I made for Harwich, and, as far as I was concerned, so
ended a most memorable Christmas Day. War in the air and under
the sea, but none on the surface, though we trailed the tails of our
coats off the enemy’s, ports from dawn until dark. Their
reluctance to come out may have been due to a very healthy
respect for our submarines — or to the Christmas holidays — ^but it
must have been very galling to the German Navy to be treated
so impertinently.

Owing to fog over the land, the seaplanes failed to find the
Zeppelin sheds at Cuxhaven, but bombs were dropped on
military objects, and are believed to have caused damage. The
appearance of our aircraft over Skellig Roads caused consterna-
tion amongst the ships of the High Sea Fleet; in then haste
to get under way, the batde cruiser Moltke and a cruiser collided,
both being severely damaged.

It was amazing that seven primitive seaplanes should have
flown from 1 5 miles north of Heligoland, roxmd the enemy’s
fortified bases, and back to the open sea, about 120 miles, without
the loss of a life. I have accounted for six, the seventh was
picked up by a Dutch fishing boat, which took it in tow ; when
the pilot, Lieut. Hewlett, lost aU hope of falling in with a British
vessel, he sank his seaplane. Some days later he was landed in
Holland, treated as a shipwrecked mariner, and allowed to
return to England. I saw him on his arrival, and in the course
of conversation, he told me that he could fly before he
volunteered for the R.N.A.S. I asked him who taught him, and
he told me that it was his mother 1

158 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

On returning to Harwich I heard of Li’s curious experience and
narrow escape. She arrived on her station off the Ems at 4
a.m. and was about to dive to the bottom to await daylight when
she struck something heavily at a depth of about 50 feet ; being
in ten fathoms the obstruction could only have been a submarine
or a wreck. The collision knocked off her detachable keel, she
came to the surface like a cork, was no longer a submarine, and
like the Archimede was a prey to any surface craft, so she made for
home at full speed. The next submarine to her was £>7, and
the next D% (Lieut.-Commander J. Foster). The latter saw an
enormous patch of oil and air bubbles rising the next morning,
and Foster reported that he was certain a vitally injured sub-
marine was lying on the bottom. When I received report,
I was very anxious on Dy’s account until she returned, 16 hours
after her consorts, having been delayed by a Zeppelin which
hunted her whenever she came to the surface. It seemed very
unlikely that a German submarine would have been lying on the
bottom, or diving off the Ems at 4 a.m., and it is possible that
Li struck the wreck of £'3, which we knew had been sunk off
the Ems ; the collision might well have disturbed an airlock and
oil tank, and thus account for what D% saw.

In the carrier squadron two people particularly impressed
me, the Squadron Commander, C. Le Strange Malone, a young
naval lieutenant who had been given the command over the heads
of many seniors, and Lieut. Erskine Childers, R.N.V.R., an
observer in one of the seaplanes. The latter was the author of
the “ Riddle of the Sands,” and had devoted his leisure for some
years, to cruising in a small yacht in the German estuaries. His
local knowledge was invaluable, and the seaplane in which he
took passage, was one of the two which returned unaided to
its carrier.

CHAPTER Vm

BATTLE OF THE DOGGER BANK

Loss of C^i; Loss of Eio; Genrnn ships reported at sea; Submarines
endeavour to intercept their return ; Battle of Dogger Bank ; Submarine
adventures ; I leave North Sea for Mediterranean.

The Admiralty were anxious to know what was going on off
Zeebrugge, where the enemy’s patrols had been active, and on
4th January C}i (Lieut. G. Pilkington) was sent from Dover
to cruise off there for two days and report at Harwich on 7th.
She was never heard of again. I was feeling very sore about the
loss of C31 and her promising young captain, and on the night of
the loth, sailed with the Lurcher and Firedraks to try and cut out
one or two of the Zeebrugge patrol craft, which were probably
responsible for her destraction. It seemed possible that if the
enemy knew Q i had been sunk in shoal water, we might be able
to surprise the salvage operations which would probably be in
progress. It was high water, 12 feet above Low Water Springs,
when we arrived off Zeebrugge at dawn on the nth, and the
destroyers, which only drew ii feet, could go safely over mines.
Unfortunately it came on to blow hard during the night, salvage
operations would have been impossible and no patrol craft were
out. As there was considerable sea and a falling tide, I thought
it inadvisable to remain in waters which might be mined, so
withdrew after an hour or so. I meant to return later under more
favourable conditions, and in the meantime suggested aerial
reconnaissance, on the first fine day, to see if salvage operations
were being undertaken. However, I had no opportunity of
visiting Zeebrugge again before I left the Narrow Seas for the
Mediterranean.

Our Christmas Day exploit encouraged the Admiralty to make
further efforts on similar lines, and a plan was prepared, to be put
into execution when weather conditions permitted. In the
meantime £10, £i 3 , and £5 went into the Bight on 1 8th January ;

i6o NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

the two latter returned on the 21st and reported very little move-
ment there ; they experienced very heavy weather on the Iasi
day. £10 did not return, she was last seen on the evening oi
1 8th by £'5, making for her station to the N.N.W. of Heligoland,
to watch the western channel. experienced an unexpected
set of six miles to the southward, on her passage to the N.E. oi
Heligoland, and it seems probable that £'10 was similarly set, and
ran foul of the minefield, located by £6 to the S.W. of the island.
Lieut-Commander W. Fraser had done excellent reconnaissance
work in the Kattegat and Heligoland Bight, and was a great loss ;
on one occasion he was away for ii days, seven of which he
spent in the Kattegat, bringing back much valuable information.

At I p.m. on 23 rd January, I sailed from Harwich in the
Lurcher, preceded by the Firedrake and eight submarines, to co-
operate with Tyrwhitt in the support of an air attack by seaplanes
on the enemy bases in the Heligoland Bight, but was recalled.
It took some time to collect the submarines, which at 2 p.m. had
all rounded the Sunk Light Vessel, and it was 4 p.m. before I
returned to Harwich, to find the following telegram, which I
suppose the Staff thought inadvisable to send by wireless.

“ Proceed with Lurcher, Firedrake and four submarines in
the direction of Borkum Riff Light Vessel, but do not get out
of wireless touch, and await any orders you may receive.
Four German battle cruisers, six light cruisers, and twenty-
two destroyers are sailing tonight to scout on Dogger Bank,
and will probably return to harbour tomorrow night. AH
our available force will be at sea tonight and tomorrow.
Acknowledge.”

I sailed again as soon as possible in the Lurcher, with Firedrake,
E.%, and £11, but a dense fog had come down, and as
Tyrwhitt s three cruisers and about 40 destroyers were also
under way, some delay occurred. At 7 p.m., however, when
again off the Sunk Light Vessel, the four submarines were in
touch, and the weather having cleared, we proceeded with all
dispatch. Before sailing I detailed the submarines, if detached,
to t^e up positions off the Weser, and south, east, and west of
Heligoland, to watch all the approaches to the enemy’s fleet
anchorages.

During the night I received a signal from the Admiralty to

BATTLE OF THE DOGGER BANK i6i

send the submarines into the Bight, one of -which was to watch
the south channel off Norderney Gat, and to report if they could
be in their stations by daylight on the 25 th.

I replied Yes and sent Eii to Norderney Gat at once, but
did not alter the positions of the others, as they would be well
placed to attack the enemy making for the Elbe and Jade rivers
from the north.

From fragments of wireless signals, which were intercepted
by the Lurcher on Sunday morning, 24th Januar3i^ it was evident
that an engagement was taking place to the northward. With
the submarines proceeding at their utmost speed, I made every
effort to get across the enemy’s line of retreat. Our only chance
of intervening lay in the possibility of an enemy ship being greatly
reduced in speed, but our luck was stiU out, the few hours lost
by our recall to Harwich, deprived my command of a share of the
Batde of the Dogger Bank.

For more than a year I had looked upon the Tiger as my ship,
and Tomkinson — Captain of the Lurcher — ^would have been her
Commander, had I been able to join her, so our feelings can be
better imagined than expressed, when we intercepted a signal
from the Southampton to the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Battle
Cruiser Squadron : Salvoes apparently from Tiger are going
consistently over.” Our Tiger well within effective range of
enemy battle cruisers — ^it was almost more than we could bear 1

At 10.55 Admiralty signalled : “ Send submarines to

Heligoland Bight, Pligh Sea Fleet are coming out, our battle
cruisers are chasing German battle cruisers towards Heligoland,
position of German battle cruisers at 9.23 a.m. Lat. 54'^39'' N.,
Long. 4 °i6' E. (1055).”

I had detached £"11 during the night to go by the shortest
route to the entrance of the channel off Norderney Gat, and was
scouting for the others, which were proceeding at full speed
towards Heligoland,

At about 4 p.m., when 22 miles north of Borkum, at least
four feet of a submarine’s periscope rose about 100 yards ahead,
moving from starboard to port. From the position of the object
glass she could not see the Lurcher^ but was evidently attacking
the Firedrake about 1,000 yards on our port quarter, and in a few
minutes would have been in a favourable position to fire. The
Lurcher increased to full speed to ram her and a collision seemed
K

i62 naval memoirs, 1910-1915

inevitable, but the submarine must have heard our propellers,
her periscope dipped right under our bows, and we went over
her without touching.

I scouted for the submarines until nightfall, and intended to
watch the southern channel with the Lurcher and Firedrake, as 1
thought Tyrwhitt’s destroyers would be operating off Heligoland ;
but having intercepted signals between Beatty and Tyrwhitt,
-which indicated that all the destroyers were otherwise engaged,
I went full speed to the northward of Heligoland, in the hope
that the enemy^s withdrawal was being delayed by cripples. At
8.30 p.m. Heligoland lights, which had been in sight, were
extinguished. I could find no patrolling craft off Heligoland or
the Ems during the night, and towards the morning withdrew
and returned to Harwich.

I learnt on the return of the submarines, that Eii arrived off
Nordemey Gat at 6,30 p.m. and the others off Heligoland at
8.30 p.m. nearly 12 hours before the Admiralty had asked for
them. They patrolled their stations on the surface during the
night, and submerged during the day, but, with the exception
of £8, sighted nothing but sweeping trawlers. At noon on 25th
58 sighted about 20 destroyers in three divisions, coming from
the southern end of the island and proceeding north-east. She
stood across into their wake, to be in a position to attack any large
vessels which might be following them. During the afternoon
the three divisions of destroyers returned independently ; one
division in close order, in quarter line, gave a continuous target,
and E% fired a torpedo, set at six feet, which was evidently seen,
as the vessels of this division, and of another which was in sight,
scattered and withdrew at full speed, without making any attempt
to hunt her. A number of men, considerably in excess of her
complement, were seen on the deck of the leading destroyer, so
apparendy one of their vessels had come to grief.

As soon as submarines were available, after covering the
transport of the Army, I had tried to maintain a few Oversea
submarines continuously in the Bight, but invasion scares and
heavy winter gales had sometimes interrupted this service. It
was a cruel misfortune that no submarines were there when the
Germans returned during daylight hours on the 24th, and it was
deplorable that it should have been thought necessary to recall
me, to give me fresh orders, when I was already on my way there

BATTLE OF THDE DOGGER BANK 165

with eight submarines, which, but for that delay, could have been .
in good time to intercept the enemy’s retirement.

If my disappointment was great, Beatty’s must have been
infinitely more so, and can best be expressed in the words of a
letter he wrote me a fortnight later.

Princess Rqyal^

10/2/15.

My dear Roger,

. . . The disappointment of that day»is mote than I
can bear to think of, everybody think s it was a great success,
when in reality it was a terrible failure. I had made up my
naind that we were going to get four, the lot, and four we
ought to have got. There is no blinking it, we had them
beat, another half-hour would have done it, when the old
Lion was done. My feelings when ‘ the merry hunt went
heedless sweeping by,’ and then swept in the wrong
direction, was more than words can describe.

However, they are still there for another day. It was a
thousand pities you had not our submarines waiting for
them. I sympathise with you and your fine feEows in the
submarines for all their disappointments. What has gone
wrong ? I hear the damned torpedoes dive too deep. . . .

Yours ever,

David Beatty.”

I have learnt from Beatty, Tyrwhitt and others, what was
occurring below the horizon, while my command was striving
to get athwart the track of the fleeing enemy, and the following
brief account is based on their evidence, and the British and
German Official Histories.

At 7.25 a.m. on 24th January, Beatty received the first intima-
tion of the presence of the enemy. Guns were heard and flashes
seen in the half light to the south-eastward of the Lion, followed
almost immediately by a signal from the light cruiser Aurora
(Captain Wilmot Nidiolson) repeated three times : “ Am in
action with German Fleet.”

Beatty at once turned to S.S.E. and the Lion (Captain A. E. M.
Chatfield*) and the four battle cruisers in company, worked up
to full speed. The Flag Lieutenant asked Beatty what si gnals he
* Now First Sea Lord.

i64 naval memoirs, 1910-1915

should pialfp to the light cruisers and destroyers, which were
spread on a wide front seeking for the enemy. He replied,
“ — ^Why ? — ^Look 1 ” A signal was, however, made :

“ Chase S.io.E.” hut to quote Beatty’s dispatch : “ My wishes
had already been forestalled.”

The Aurora's signal had acted hke a “ View-Holloa ” to the
scattered pack, and the light cruisers and destroyers, commanded
by the young bloods of the Navy, had turned, and were racing,
towards the sound of the guns — foaming at the bows, with
smoke and flames pouring from their funnels.

By 8.30 a.m. Admiral Hipper in the Seydlit^ having realised
that he was threatened by a superior force, was in fuU flight for
home, with the Moltke, Derflinger, Blucher, four light cruisers,
and 22 destroyers.

Beatty in the Lion, with Tiger, Princess Royal, New Zealand and
Indomitable, First Light Cruiser Squadron, and Tyrwhitt’s
Harwich Force, was in hot pursuit, ii miles astern with over
130 miles of sea room.

By 9.35 four of our battle cruisers were engaged with the
enemy’s four ships, the Indomitable was still out of range.

At 9.50, the S^dlit^ was hit aft by a shell from the Lion, with
terrible effect. The guns in the two after turrets were put out of
action, and their entire crews perished in the fierce fire which
resulted, and which necessitated the flooding of the after magazine.

The enemy were concentrating their fire on the Lion, and from
10.18 onwards, she suffered considerably. At 10.27 Beatty placed
his ships on a line of bearing, with orders to proceed at their
utmost speed. At 10.45 tbe Lion, which had been repeatedly
hit, could no longer keep the lead, owing to the damage she
had sustained, and the Tiger drew ahead.

At 10.47, Beatty, in his anxiety to close to decisive range,
signalled “ Close the enemy as rapidly as possible consistent with
keeping aU guns bearing.”

At 10.48 the which had dropped astern of her consorts

and was heavily on fire, broke away to the northward, and
Beatty ordered the Indomitable, which had just come into range,
to engage her.

Despite the Lion’s injuries, she was still putting up a great
fight, with only one gun out of action ; and she, the Tiger (with
one gun disabled, otherwise undamaged). Princess Royal, and New

BATTLE OF THE DOGGER BANK

165

Zealand (neither of which had been hit) were heavily engaged with
the Seydlif^^ Moltke and Derflinger, The Seydlit^ and Derflinger
ablaze, and the Moltke^ which owing to a misunder-
standing on the part of the Tiger ^ had not been fired at, was
alone uninjured. The Indomtabk was capable of speedily
dispatching the Blucher — ^and a decisive victory seemed assured.
At 10,50 the Lion was hit by a heavy shell, which drove in the
armour on the water line abreast of one of the boiler rooms, and
stopped one engine, all power and light faded, ^d she took a
list of 10° to port.

A few minutes later the periscope of a submarine was reported
on the starboard bow, and at 10.54 to avoid it, Beatty ordered an
alteration of eight points to port together,* but two minutes
after this signal had been hauled down, he hoisted “ Course N.E,”
again to close the enemy. The Lion^ however, had rapidly lost
way, and in order to ensure that the engagement would be
pressed, Beatty ordered a signal to be made to “ Engage the
enemy more closely,” but this age-old Naval battle cry had
disappeared from the modem signal book. Engage ” and
Close ” necessitated two signals : ‘‘ Attack the enemy at some
specified point” and ^^Keep closer to the enemy.” So
Attack the rear of the enemy ” and the latter, were hoisted in
the Lion as her consorts swept by. These in conjunction with the
signal Course N.E.” were either misinterpreted, misunderstood
or unseen by the individual ships, which then proceeded to assist
the Indomitable to destroy the poor tortured Blucher.

The LMs searchlights and wireless had been destroyed, and
in a few minutes Beatty had completely lost control, and although
he transferred to a destroyer as soon as possible, it was noon
before he could resume command, and in the meantime golden
opportunities had passed. He had had no means of projecting
his fierce offensive spirit, which could not rest content with
anything short of complete victory, and the beaten crippled
enemy, still 80 miles from home, were allowed to make good ikdx
escape unmolested, at a speed reduced by their injuries to 21 knots.

This narrow escape, following closely on that of the
1 6th December, made a profound impression on the German
High Command. Sixteen months were to pass before German
capital ships were encountered again in the North Sea.

* There was no German submarine within 60 miles.

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

166

Our casualties in this action were :

Lion . . • I killed 20 wounded

Ti^t* ,«»io ,, II „

Meteor. . • 4 „ i „

Total 15 killed 52 wounded

The Meteor (Captain the Hon. H. Meade*) suffered her losses,
and was severely damaged, when gallantly leading her division
of destroyers to torpedo the Blucher. No other British ship
was damaged or sustained casualties.

Of the enemy’s vessels which escaped, the Sejdlit^ alone had
159 killed, and 33 wounded. The Blucher which fought gallantly
until she sank, lost 792 killed, 45 wounded and 189 unwounded
prisoners. Many more would have been saved, had not a hostile
seaplane, with true German chivalry — thoroughly appreciated
by their luckless compatriots — ^bombed our boats which were
picking up men in the water — ^no doubt thinking that the Blucher
was a British ship.

Of the Tiger* s casualties, nine of the killed were young stokers
of the Fire Party, who contrary to orders, came out of their
sheltered position to watch the action.

I would like to leave one more record of the spirit of the youth
of our Navy. When the Lion took a heavy list, after being hit
below the water line, and all lights went out, and dynamos
ceased whirring, in the silence wMch ensued, a young officer’s
voice floated up the voice pipe to the conning tower, from the
control room 80 feet below, Well, I suppose this is Kingdom
Come — or three weeks leave ! ’’

The Lion was towed to Rosyth by the Indomitable and the
Meteor to the Humber by the Liberty. According to a German
official report, C/17, [733 and C/35 were sent out on the morning
of 24th towards the Humber, to look out for damaged British
ships. All three are reported to have unsuccessfully attacked
the Lurcher and Firedrake (we only noticed one attack), which
appears to have delayed them so much, that the Lion was well to

* Captain Meade co mm a n ded the Goshawk in the Heligoland Bight action on
aSth August, 1914 and led the division of destroyers which sank Vi%i, and
lowered boats to save the latter’s crew.

BATTLE OF THE DOGGER BANK

167

the northward, and the Meteor safely in the Humber, before a
German submarine arrived in the neighbourhood of the action.

Although the Blmher had been sunk, and the Dogger Bank
action was hailed as a great success, the Admiralty were of course
very disappointed, that their well-laid plans had failed to achieve
an overwhelming victory. Lord Fisher, who was furious, was
determined to find a victim or two, and expressed his opinion of
certain officers very freely, and in scathing terms. I had known
for some time that, in spite of the friendly gesture he made, after
receiving my letter of loth November, Lord Fisher was deter-
mined to get rid of me out of his neighbourhood, but I was amused
to learn, quite by chance, that I was one of his Dogger Bank

suspects.” I have mentioned that, at 10.55 ^4^ February,

the Admiralty signalled to me that the High Sea Fleet was coming
out. This signal was apparently intercepted by the Nen^ Zealand^
but reported as ^i:Q!m2Xmg from me, to her Admiral — Sir Archibald
Moore — on whom the command of liie battle cruisers devolved,
when the Lion was disabled and Beatty lost control.

A few days later I was reading the official reports in the War
Staff room at the Admiralty, and came across the following
signal :

From Rear-Admiral, Zealand to Commander-in-
Chief, Grand Fleet. 1200. My position 212.F.60, Course
N.N.W., speed 20 knots. Commodore (S) reports High
Sea Fleet coming out. Am retiring.”

I remarked, haJf in chaff, to one of Lord Fisher’s Naval
Secretaries who was present, I suppose your Chief holds me
responsible for the failure of the Battle Cruiser Squadron to
continue the pursuit, after Beatty fell out of the line.” He
admitted that the point had not escaped Lord Fisher’s notice,
and advised me, if I had not made the signal, to write oflScially
and say so, I wrote to the Secretary of the Admiralty : “ With
reference to the report of my proceedings 25rd-25th January,
I understand that a signal to the effect that the ‘ German High
Sea Fleet was at sea ’ was intercepted as emanating &om Com-
modore (S). I have the honour to report that I made no such
signal.”

About this time, I had a conversation with the First Lord,
who was well aware of what was going on. I told him that I

i68 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

had hoped eventually to operate the “ Oversea ” submarines from
the Grand Fleet, under the Commander-in-Chief, as was originally
intended in the War Orders ; but as this had proved impractic-
able, and they were operated under the direction of the Admiralty,
I felt that in view of Lord Fisher’s hostility, I was no longer of
much value to them. Moreover, it would ease the situation in
other respects, if he could find employment for me elsewhere.
I mentioned that I had consulted my wise and good friend, Rear-
Admiral H. Oliver, the Chief of Staff, who agreed with
me. I concluded by saying, that I would have suggested this
long ago, but hated the thought of deserting the submarines,
while I could be of any use to them.

It was a great relief to me to get this off my mind, and I think
the First Lord was relieved too, for he had expended a good deal
of timft and energy in fighting my battles, which was all wrong, at
a moment when all our efforts should have been concentrated on
fighting the King’s enemies.

I was sent for by the First Lord on 8th February, and was told
that I was to go out to the Mediterranean the next morning, to
be Chief of Staff to Rear-Admiral Carden, who was to command
an Allied Squadron, which was to force the Dardanelles. There
was much to be arranged in the few hours left to me, and no time
even to say good-bye to my children at Fareham, or to my splendid
submariners and good friends at Harwich.

I learnt later, that some submarine officers thought I had
deserted them to better myself, on the other hand I have several
letters which I greatly prize, from officers who knew the circum-
stances of my departure, including a charming one from Sic John
Jellicoe, the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet. Later
when my friends heard of the fierce fighting and great events in
which I was involved, many, including Tyrwhitt, wrote again to
tell me that they were not in the least sorry for me — only very
envious, as there was nothing doing in the North Sea.

Before parting company with the Harwich “ Oversea ” sub-
naarines, I must record a few incidents which occurred not long
after I left, and were reported to me by Captain Waistell, who
took over the direction of the “ Oversea ” submarines after my
departure, when Captain S. S. Hall became Commodore (S).

Lieut.-Commander G. Kellett in i"! was cruising off Horn Reef,

BATTLE OF THE DOGGER BANK 169

when his engines completely broke down, and he was unable to
come home on the surface, or recharge his batteries, and there
seemed to be no alternatiye to sinking his submarine in the vicinity
of a vessel which would save his crew. Kellett, however, quite
undismayed, lay on the bottom till dusk, and then rose alongside
a German trawler, which he captured by boarding, having no
arms. He then manned the trawler with some of his men, took
the latter’s crew on board Si^ and proceeded home about 300
miles in tow of his prize, though they had to stop frequently to
repair the trawler’s engines. Incidentally, on aAival at Harwich,
the trawler’s large supply of fish was much appreciated. Kellett
sent the trawler’s ensign to my wife, as she had launched
saying that the motto Win by Valour ”) she had given them
had brought them luck.

Talbot in E6 got into a net off Borkum Riff, and was fast for
an hour, with a Zeppelin overhead watching him. He kept his
head and finally got clear, and the next day torpedoed a destroyer.

Leic in E4 got into the middle of a fleet of German fishing
vessels, and annoyed them very much by coming up at intervals
to get supplies of fish. Eventually two armed trawlers were sent
out to attack him. He torpedoed one, which sank, the other one
dropped a boat amongst the swimmers and made off at full
speed. Leir put all the survivors into the boat and towed it to a
German Light Vessel, only taking three of the most intelligent
looking ” prisoners.

When the War started my wife prepared our house as a hospital,
and when I left for the Mediterranean she had a house full of
wounded men, but came up to London for a few hours to speed
me on my way. Except for a flying visit to England for a few
days in November, 1915 , 1 did not see her again until June, 1916.
Fortunately I kept a diary for her, and the following account of
my part in the Gallipoli Campaign is based on this day-to-day
record of events.

I shall always feel grateful to Winston Churchill — and to Lord
Fisher, who was indirectly responsible ! — for giving me this
wonderful, although tormentingly disappoiuting experience.

On the mornkig of 9th February, 1915 , 1 left to be Chief of
Staff to the Naval forces engaged in the greatest amphibian enter-
prise in the History of the World.

PART ni

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN: GALLIPOLI

FOREWORD

Before telling the story of the Fleet’s attempt to force a passage
through the Dardanelles in 1915, let us examiye the history of
Duckworth’s campaign in 1807, since we are often told that
his lack of success should have warned us of the futility of
entering the Marmora with ships alone.*

In the autumn of 1806, under the influence of France, Turkey
had closed the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to Russian ships, and
on 22nd October, the Admiralty ordered Vice-Admiral Lord
Collingwood, Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean station,
“ to detach three ships of the line to reconnoitre the situation of
the forts of the Dardanelles and fortifications adjacent as a
measure of prudence, in case circunostances should call for an
attack upon them by a British force.”

On 2ist November, Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Louis, to
whom the mission had been confided, flying his flag in the
Canopus, anchored off Tenedos with his small squadron.

On 27th November, the wind being favourable. Admiral
Louis entered the Straits ; after leaving two of his ships and a
frigate in Azire Bay,! he exchanged salutes with the Castle at
the Narrows, and taking careful note of the fortifications as he
passed, sailed on in the Canopus to Constantinople.

On 28th the Campus anchored off Seraglio Point and remained
there for a month, in company with the frigate Endjmion, which
had brought out our Ambassador, Mr. Arbuthnot.

On 28th December, Louis embarked the Russian Ambassador,
who had broken off relations wifli Turkey, and rejoined his
squadron in Azire Bay, leaving the Endymion to attend on Mr.
Arbuthnot.

Our Ambassador and the British residents at Constantinople,
seem to have been seized with a panic on the 29th December.

* The following is based on “ The Naval Histoiy of Great Britain, *’ VoL IV,
page 213, et seq., by William James. The quotations and references are taken
from that account.

t Sari Siglar Bay on plan.

173

174

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Under the impression that they and the Endymion would be
captured and held as hostages, in case a British force should
commence hostilities, they embarked hurriedly during the night
in the Endymion^ which cut her cables, and sailed for Azire Bay
and thence, in company with Louis’ squadron, on 3 ist December
to Tenedqs.

Meanwhile on 22nd November, 1806, the Admiralty had
ordered Lord Collingwood “ to detach a force to the Dardanelles,
to be ready in pse of necessity to act offensively against the
Turks . . . ‘ as the service pointed out will require much ability
and firmness in the officer who is to command it, you are to
entrust the execution thereof to Vice-Admiral Sir John Thomas
Duckworth.’ ”*

These orders reached Collingwood off Cadiz on 12th January,
and on the 15 th, Sir John, flying his flag in the Rs>yal George,
parted company with his chief, carrying instructions “ to proceed
with hi's command as expeditiously as possible, to the Straits
of Constantinople, and there take up such position as would
enable him to bombard the town, in case of refusal to give up
the Turkish Fleet.” He was, however, to consult' the
Ambassador .on the “ measures proper to be pursued,” and it
was only when the Ambassador was of the opinion that hostilities
should commence, that the Admiral was to make a peremptory
demand for the surrender of the Turkish Fleet. Lord Colling-
wood stated “At this crisis, should any negotiations on the
subject be proposed by the Turkish Government, as such
proposition will probably be to gain time for preparing their
resistance or securing their ships, I would recommend that no
negotiations should continue more than half an hour, and in
the event of an absolute refusal you are either to cannonade the
town, or attack the Fleet wherever it may be, holding it in mind,
that the getting possession, and next to that the destruction of
the Turkish Fleet is the object of the first consideration.”

Duckworth anchored off Tenedos on 10th February with eight
sail of the line, including the Canopus flying the flag of Rear-
Admiral Sir Thomas Louis, and the Pompe, that of Rear-Admiral
Sir Sydney S m i th, two firigates and two bombships. Duckworth
now learnt &om Louis that some of the batteries in the Dar-
danelles were dilapidated, others partially mounted and poorly
* Parliamentary papers ordered March 23rd, 1808.

FOREWORD

175

manned ; and that the bulk of the Turkish Fleet lay moored in
the port of Constantinople, practically unequipped, except for a
small squadron at anchor above the Narrows.

On nth he weighed and stood towards the entrance of the
Dardanelles but the wind being unfavourable for the passage,
he anchored off Cape Janiza^.*

While waiting for the wind to change, Duckworth appears
to have reflected on the hazardous nature of the undertaking,
and on the 14th February, he wrote to ColUng^ood, pointing
out “that our Minister, having left Constantinople 16 days
since, and the Turks employed French engineers to erect batteries
to flank every turn in our passage through the Dardanelles, I
conceive the service pointed out in my instruction has completely
altered. ... Of the hazard which attends such an enterprise
I am fully aware. We are to enter a sea environed with enemies,
without a possible resource but in ourselves ; and when we are
to return there cannot remain a doubt but that the passage will
be rendered as formidable as efforts of the Turkish Empire,
directed and assisted by their Allies the French can make it.
I entreat your Lordship, however, to believe, that, as I am aware
of the difficulties we have to encounter, so I am resolved that
nothing on my part (shall) be left undone that can ensure the
means of surmounting them.”|

During the night of 14th, the Ajax^ one of the ships of the
line, was accidentally destroyed by fire, and about 250 of her
crew perished.

On 19th February, 1807, the wind having shifted to south-west,
Duckworth sailed up the Dardanelles, his squadron being led
by Rear-Admiral Louis in the Canopus^ the Royal George flying
Duckworth’s flag, being the third ship in the line. The forts
at the entrance opened fire, this was not replied to by the ships,
at the suggestion of the Ambassador; however, as it was
obvious that the Turks meant to resist the passage of the
squadron, the forts at the Narrows were hotly engaged as the
ships sailed by. The latter sustained only trifling damage and
their casualties amounted to no more than six killed and 51
wounded.

The Turkish squadron, reported by Louis, consisting of a

* Yeni Shehr. C. on plan.

t Patliament papets ordered March 23rd, 1808.

176 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

64-gtin ship, four frigates, four corvettes, some brigs and gun-
boats, was anchored above Nagara Point on the Asiatic shore,
and rashly opened fire on the ships as they passed, otherwise it
seems probable that Duckworth would have spared it. One
brig was allowed to escape, without being pursued, and thus
Constantinople received warning of the successful passage of
the Fleet. The remainder of the Turkish vessels, except one
corvette which was captured, were destroyed under the guns of
a redoubt mounting 31 heavy pieces, by the three ships in the
rear of the line, and two frigates under command of Sir Sydney
Smith; the redoubt was most gallantly carried by a landing
party of bluejackets and marines, who spiked the guns before
withdrawing. Our losses in this engagement amounted to
ten killed and 77 wounded.

Sir Sydney Smith, having detached the frigate Active and some
of the boats of his ships to take possession of the prize and
complete the destruction of the Turkish ships, rejoined Duck-
wor&, who had anchored the remainder of Ids squadron about
three miles above Nagara Poiot. Duckworth then weighed,
and running up the Straits before a strong southerly breeze,
entered the Marmora at 8 p.m. He reduced sail to such an
extent during the night that httle progress was made, and the
wind falling Hght the next day, he did not arrive off Constanti-
nople until 10 p.m. on the 20th February, and then anchored
off Prince’s Island, eight miles from the town.

On 2 1 St the wind was favourable for carrying out Colling-
wood’s instructions, but Duckworth considered that he was still
bound to act as dkected by the Ambassador, in spite of the
hostile reception he had received from the forts and ships in
the Dardanelles.

The Ambassador then started a warfare of notes, conveying
threats which were not carried into effect, and demands which
were treated with utter contempt by the Turks. On the 22nd
the Ambassador fell sick and the Admiral carried on the paper
war singlehanded.

Meanwhile the Turks were busily engaged equipping their
ships, and, under the direction of French engineers, energetically
erecting batteries at every assailable point. On 27th February,
it was discovered that Ae Turks’ had occupied Prota Island,
one of the Prince’s Islands, and were erecting a battery abreast

FOREWORD

177

of ouf squadron. Rear-Admiral Louis asked permission to
drive the Turks out of the island ; Duckworth agreed, subject
to the proviso, that no risks whatever were to be run, if it
could be effected without hazarding the people, it might/^ The
Canopus landing party was inadequate and suffered a check, and
reinforcements were not permitted by Duckworth to do more
than extricate their comrades. The casualties in this sorry affair
were seven killed and 19 wounded.

The wind on 17th to 28 th was favourable f«>r finishing the
business, in accordance with CoUingwood’s instructions, but
the Fleet remained at anchor.

On ist March, the wind shifted to north-east, and Duckworth
weighed and formed line of battle. The temper of the Rear-
Admirals, and of the Fleet generally by this time, can well be
imagined ; everyone must have been spoiling to wipe out the
humiliations of the past ten days. However, Duckworth had
no intention of fighting, despite his threats, and after standing off
and on all day, as he reported, to give the Turkish Fleet ” (five
ships of the line and four frigates) which were lying in the
Roads, an opportunity to come out and attack him, he withdrew
at nightfall and stood towards the Dardanelles, anchoring in
the afternoon of the 2nd March six miles above the Narrows.
He was joined there by the Active and her prize, the latter by
Duckworth’s orders was restored to the prisoners.

On the morning of 3rd March, Duckworth weighed and
proceeded down channel ; on approaching the Casde at the
Narrows, hoping no doubt further to propitiate the Turks, Sir
John fired a salute of 13 guns. The salute was returned with
shot and shell as the ships again led by the Canopus^ sailed by.
The casualties in the course of the withdrawal amounted to
29 killed and 138 wounded.

There are no doubt lessons to be learned from this somewhat
inglorious episode, but those lessons are certainly not that it
was impossible to force the Straits of the Dardanelles, or return
through them. Nor are Duckworth’s experiences conclusive
evidence against entering the Marmora with ships alone, but only
against a misuse of opportunities when there.

Drake, Hawke, Nelson — ^to mention no other British Admirals
— ^would have carried the Dardanelles enterprise to a victorious
issue.

CHAPTER IX

DSrimTION OF THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

The initiation of the Gallipoli Campaign is a subject which will
no doubt — ^in this generation at any rate — continue to give rise
to ill-informed criticism and argument, so I propose to relate
the events which led up to the situation I found when I arrived
at Malta in February, 1915.

The following account is based on the Report of the
Dardanelles Commission in 1917, and the Official History,
“Military Operations, Gallipoli, Vol. I” (published in 1929),
The author* of the latter has also had access to every kind of
British, Allied, Neutral and Enemy document on the subject
published since the War.

It is clear that it was most fully appreciated from the first,
both at the War Office and Admiralty, and by the First Lord,
that in the event of war with Turkey the best way of bringing
pressure to bear on her lay in a combined naval and military
operation— a surprise landing by a large army in Gallipoli,
supported by ships’ guns, and the capture of the defences at the
Narrows, with the object of opening the Straits for the Fleet.

On 3rd November, 1914, two days after Turkey’s declaration
of war, the Allied British and French Fleets carried out a brief
bombardment of the Outer Forts.

On 27th December, Russia appealed to her Allies for help
against Turkey. While promising that steps would be taken
to make a demonstration against the Turks, Lord Kitchener
declared that no troops were available, and on 2nd January
^ked the First Lord ^ the Navy could make a demonstration
against the Dardanelles.

On 3rd January, 191J, Lord Fisher wrote to the First Lord
and strongly urged an attack on Turkey, if it could be carried

* Brigadier-General C. Aspinall-Oglander.

INITIATION OF THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN 179

out at once ; after allocating various military operations to
British, Indian, Greek, Bulgarian, Roumanian, Russian and
Serbian troops, he concluded: ^'Finally, Admiral Sturdee
should at the same time force the Dardanelles 'with ships of
the ‘ Majestic ’ and " Canopus ’ class.” Lord Fisher followed this
letter up with an official minute, stating that the naval advantages
of the possession of Constantinople were so overwhelming
that a plan for operations against Turkey as outlined by Colonel
Hankey was Vital, imperative, and very pressiag.”

The military historian remarks that : *

This grandiose proposal, in many respects a mixture of
the recent suggestions of Colonel Hankey and Mr. Lloyd
George, was undoubtedly a counsel of perfection. Put
into force in its entirety, had this been possible, the plan
might have brought not only victory but peace. But at
least three of the premises were false. ... It is a fair
assumption that when assigning to Admiral Sturdee the
task of forcing the Straits, Lord Fisher had no intention that
this part of his scheme should be read without its»^ context.
To force the Straits while 100,000 British and Indian troops
were landing in Besika Bay, the Bulgarians marching on
Adrianople, and a Greek army attacking the Gallipoli
Peninsula, was a very different proposition to an unaided
attack by the Fleet.

Nevertheless, this was the first time in the present war that
the forcing of the Straits by fleet action had even been
mentioned by a responsible sailor, and the words attracted
the earnest attention of the Minister to whom it was
addressed. Hitherto the matter had been looked upon as a
military problem, and a difficult one at that, and discussion
had ranged on the possibility of capturing the shores of
the Straits with a view to admitting the Fleet. But here
was the First Sea Lord, with an intimate knowledge of the
Dardanelles, plainly suggesting that the Straits might be
forced by vessels of the ^ Majestic ’ and ‘ Canopus ’ class,
both of which came under the category of ‘ His Majesty’s
least valuable ships.’ To be content with a demonstration
off the mouth of the Dardanelles, if the same ships could
force their way unaided into the Marmora, was unthinkable.

i8o NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

An achievement of this nature might well be expected
break the vicious circle which was at once preventiug t
adherence of Bulgaria for lack of a military success, anc
military success for lack of BrJgarian help. Hithei
Mr. Churchill had been convinced that the capture of t
Straits was an affair for soldiers. But as no troops w«
available, the question raised by Lord Fisher’s plan was
least worthy of further investigation. Later in the day, w;
the full concurrence of Lord Fisher, he telegraphed to t
Admiral at the Dardanelles, with a view to eliciting t
views of the man on the spot : ‘ 3rd January, 1915. I
you consider the forcing of the Straits by ships alone
practicable operation ? It is assumed older battlesh:
fitted with mine-bumpers would be used, preceded
colliers as mine-bumpers and sweepers. Importance
result would justify severe loss. Let me know yc
Views*

On 5th January Admiral Carden replied that he did not consic
the Dardanelles could be rushed. They might be forced
extended operations with a large number of ships.

He was then asked to telegraph his proposals in detail, a
the force he needed.

On iith January he replied with a detailed plan for ford
the Dardanelles by ships alone. The scheme was divided ii
four stages.

A. Total reduction of the forts at the entrance.

B. Qear defences inside Straits up to and includi
Battery No. 8.

C. Reduction of defences at the Narrows, Chanak.

D. Clearing the minefield, advancing through Narrow
reducing forts above the Narrows and final advance ii
the Marmora.

He asked for iz battleships, four to be fitted with mi
bumpers. Three battle cruisers, two to be available on enteri
Marmora. Three light cruisers, one flotilla leader, i6 destroye
six submarines, four seaplanes, 12 minesweepers, including fc
fleet sweepers, one hospital ship, six colliers, and two sup]
ammunition ships. The duration of the operation would depe

INITIATION OF THE GALUPOLI CAMPAIGN i8i

on the weather, gales being frequent, and on the morale of the
enemy tmder bombardment ; it might be done in about a month.

This plan was generally accepted at the Admiralty, and on
i2th January Lord Fisher suggested the addition of the Queen
Elie^abeth to Carden’s squadron and concurred in the following
minute, which the First Lord addressed to the Chief of Staff
through the First Sea Lord :

“ The forcing of the Dardanelles as proposed and the
arrival of a squadron strong enough to defeat the Turkish
fleet in the Sea of Marmora would be a victory of first
importance and change to our advantage the whole situation
of the War in the East. It would appear possible to provide
the force required by Admiral Carden without weakening
the margin necessary in home waters.”

The minute then gave full details of the ships to be employed
and concluded by saying :

“All arrangements should be secretly concerted for
carrying the plan through, the seaplanes and auxiliary
craft being provided. Admiral Carden to command . . .
definite plans should be worked out accordingly.”*

On 13 th January the First Lord explained Admiral Carden’s
plan to the War Cabinet, and though the operation was not
finally approved, it was decided that “ The A dmir alty should
prepare for a Naval expedition in February, to bombard and
take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Constantinople as its
objective.”f

On ijth January Admiral Sir Henry Jackson submitted a
Staff memorandum on Admiral Carden’s plan. It began with
the words “ Concur generally in his [i.e. Carden’s] plan. Our
previous appreciations of the situation differed only in small
details.” Admiral Carden was then informed that lus scheme
was approved in principle, that he was to have command, and
that the Queen EUe^abeth would join his flag.

With the full concurrence of the Prime Minister, Lord
Kitchener, Sk Edward Grey, Lord Fisher and the Naval Chief
of Staff, Mr. Churchill informed the French Government of

* Dardanelles Commission First Report, page 51,

t Dardanelles Commission First Report, page 21.

i82 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Admiral Carden’s scheme ; they promised to provide a squadron
to co-operate, and agreed that the Allied Fleet should be under
Admiral Carden’s command.

On 19th January the Russian Government was informed of
our intention to try to force the Dardanelles, and asked to assist
the operation by simultaneously attacking the Bosphorus with
ships and troops.

Meanwhile tjie plans for the naval attack were maturing,
but as the time Strived for definite action. Lord Fisher weakened,
and on 25 th January he submitted a memorandum to the
War Council, giving his views on naval policy generally, and
on the folly of subsidiary operations. “ Even the older ships
shn nid not be risked, for they cannot be lost without losing
mpn^ and they form the only reserve behind the Grand Fleet.”
This and the concluding sentence, which follows, sum up his
whole outlook and that of the Materiel school which flourished
under his long peace-time administration. “ Being already in
possession of all that a powerful fleet can give a cormtry, we
should continue quietly to enjoy the advantage without dissipat-
ing our strength in operations which cannot improve matters.”

Mr. Churchill replied on 27th January, “ The main principle
of the First Sea Lord’s paper is indisputable. The foundation
of our naval policy is the maintenance in a secure position of a
Battie Fleet with all ancillary vessels capable at any time of
defeating the German High Sea Fleet in battle, and reserved
for that purpose above and before all other duties. This
principle has been and will be fuUy and strictly observed.”
Then followed a complete analysis of the comparative strength
of the British and German Fleets, which showed that the margin
of our superiority over the German Fleet in modern fighting
ships was overwhelming, and that in addition to the eight
“ King Edwards,” three “ Lord Nelsons ” and six “ Formidables,”
which could certainly destroy the whole of the German pre-
“ Dreadnought ” battle fleet, we had 21 old battleships, com-
pletely manned and supplied with thek own ammunition and its
reserve. In conclusion he declared : “ Not to use them where
necessary, because of some fear that there would be an outcry
if a ship is lost, would be wrong, and if a certain proportion
of loK of life among officers and men of the Royal Navy in
these ships can achieve important objects of the War, and save a

INITIATEON OF THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN 183

very much greater loss of life among our comrades and Allies
on shore, we ought certainly not to shrink from it.”

The Dardanelles Commission dealt at great length with Lord
Fisher’s attitude towards a purely naval attack, which may be
summed up in the following quotation from page 20 of their
‘‘ First Report ” :

“ All the evidence we have received, including that of
Lord Fisher himself, tends to confirm the perfect accuracy
of the following statement made to us by Ms. Asquith. . . .
‘ It is quite true, that, I think throughout, he thought the
best chance of success for such an operation would have
been a combined operation in which both land and sea
forces were engaged ; but Lord Fisher’s main objection,
at least the one he always impressed on me, was not based
in any degree upon the technical or naval merits or demerits
of the Dardanelles operations, but upon the fact that he
preferred another objective.’ ”

Lord Fisher’s other objective was the entry of the British
Fleet into the Baltic, to land a Russian army on the unprotected
northern seaboard of Germany. For this great project he was
building a considerable flotilla of specially designed vessels for
landing on open beaches, and he proposed to use the heavily
armed monitors which were coming into service for this
operation.

His Baltic scheme was dependent on one of the Russian armies,
which might or might not be available, and in any case it could
not be put into operation while the German Fleet was in being,
with free access to the North Sea and Baltic through the Kiel
Canal, a condition which prevailed until the end of the War.

Lord Fisher’s Turkish scheme had been dependent on the
employment of British and Indian troops, which could not be
spared from France and Flanders, Allied Armies, and the Armies
of Neutral Powers whose war intentions were not yet declared.

Neither scheme therefore was very helpful at a moment when
we and our Allies were at a deadlock, Russia calling for help,
no troops available, neutrals waiting on events ; on the other
hand we had a great fleet of old battleships, heavily armed and
well protected for action at moderate ranges lying idle since
they were unfit to meet the enemy’s modem ships, and in

i 84 naval memoirs, 1910-1915

consequence had to be kept out of the main naval theatre
of operations.

On 28th January, the First Lord and First Sea Lord met in
the Prime Minister’s room. Mr. Churchill advocated the naval
attack on the DardaneEes. Lord Fisher did not criticise the
latter on its merits but spoke in favour of his Baltic scheme.
The Prime Minis ter, after hearing both sides, expressed his
concurrence in Mr. Oiurchill’s views. Immediately after this
interview the War Council met.

Mr. Churchifi asked if the War Council attached importance
to this operation, which undoubtedly involved some risk.

There was no hostile criticism.

Lord Kitchener considered the naval attack to be vitally
important. E successful, its effect would be equivalent to that
of a successful campaign fought with the new armies. One
merit of the scheme was that if satisfactory progress was not
made, the attack could be broken off.

Mr. Balfour then dwelt on the advantages which would
accrue ftom a successful attack on the Dardanelles, and concluded
by saying that “it was difficult to imagine a more helpful
operation.”

Sir Edward Grey said it would also finally settle the attitude
of Bulgaria and the whole of the Balkans.

Mr. Churchill said that the Naval Commander-in-Chief of
the Mediterranean had expressed his belief that it could be done.
He required from three weeks to a month to accomplish it.
The necessary ships were already on their way to the Dardanelles.

The War Council then decided that the naval operation was
to be carried out as soon as possible, and adjourned until the
afternoon.

Lord Fisher apparently intended to resign, but after an inter-
view with the First Lord he definitely consented to carry out
the task with which the Admiralty had been charged, and the
War Council were so informed, in his presence, by the First
Lord that afternoon.

The military historian concludes his account of the initiation
of the naval attack thus :

“The decision thus arrived at on the 28th January
marks the first great landmark in the history of the

INITIATION OF THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN 185

Dardanelles campaign. In an effort to satisfy the urgent
needs of diplomacy, Britain’s Fleet was to attempt, without
the aid of a single soldier, an enterprise which in the earlier
days of the War both the Admiralty and the War Office
had regarded as a military task. The operation would,
moreover, be many times more difficult than in the early
days of the War. The Germans had already had six
months in which to improve the defences of die Straits,
and the minefields were continually growing. The enter-
prise was perhaps still capable of accomplishment, if the
Government were ready to face the inevitable loss of ships.
This was the opinion of the German Admiral von Usedom,
who knew better than anyone the strength and the weakness
of the fortress and the capacity of its defenders. But there
must be no indecision, no faltering and no delay. Nothing
but iron will and grim determination, both at home and on
the spot, could snatch the hazardous victory.”*

There is overwhelming proof that our enemies were under
no illusion as to the menace of this great strategic turning
movement, which was initiated and pressed so vigorously by
Winston Churchill — to his temporary undoing — and that
Neutral Powers, in their anxiety to be on the winning side,
watched with intense interest and anxiety the progress of our
effort, which if successful, they knew would bring about the
downfall of the Central Powers.

It is so easy to say that the bombardment on the 3rd November
was folly — ^that the purely naval attack added enormously to
the difficulties of the military attack — ^that we made this mistake
or that — ^but a moment arrived when brave decisions had to
be made, in order to carry the enterprise to a victorious issue,
and then those with whom the responsibility lay faltered. As
Winston Churchill said, “ Not to persevere, that was the crime.”!

I was present when the first shot of the campaign was fired
in February, 1915, and the last in January, 1916, and during
all the intermediate fighting, serving as Chief of Staff to the
three Admirals who successively commanded the naval opera-
tions. I spent many hours in the Dardanelles under fire from

* “ Military Operations, Gallipoli,” Vol. 1.

t ** World Gisis, 1915,” page 169.

i86

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 19 10-19 15

the forts and concealed howitzers — ^a greatly exaggerated
menace. I saw ships sink by mine and torpedo, watched the
Homeric fighting on the beaches, and the great battles which
followed, in the course of which thousands of soldiers perished.

I lived in close association with the administrative officers at
the advanced bases and the fighting soldiers in Gallipoli. I
watched, and helped in the organisation of the three unopposed
evacuations. I wish to place on record that I had no doubt
then, and have none now — and nothing wiU ever shake my
opinion — ^that fPom the 4th April, 1915, onwards, the Fleet could
have forced the Straits, and with losses trifling in comparison
with those the Army suffered, could have entered the Marmora
with suJB&cient force to destroy the Turco-German fleet. This
operation would have cut the communications — ^which were
sea-borne — of any Turkish armies either in Gallipoli or on the
Asiatic side, and would have led immediately to a victory decisive
upon the whole course of the War.

CHAPTER X

DESTRUCTION OF OUTER DEFENCB6

I join Admiral Carden at Malta ; Proceed to Tenedos ; Admiral Carden takes
command of Allied Fleet off Dardanelles ; Attack on Outer Defences ; Bad
weather delays ; Outer Defences destroyed by bombardment and landing
parties ; Generd Birdwood arrives,

I CROSSED the Channel in half a gale on the afternoon of 9th
February, 1915, travelled across France to Marseilles, and
embarked in the 24-year-old Messageries Maritime • steamer
Australie for Malta, where she arrived on the 14th February,
after breaking down on three occasions and drifting about for
several hours at a time. Fortunately there were no submarines
about in the Mediterranean in those days.

Among the passengers were General Pau, a one-armed veteran
of the Franco-Prussian War, and his Staff, who were going on a
mission to Russia, and two French naval officers. I had made
friends with one of the latter — Capitaine de Fregate Herr — ^in
Paris in 1904. At that time he was naval aide-de-camp to
Admiral Fournier, who presided over an International Com-
mission of Admirals, appointed to enquire into the attack of the
Russian Baltic Fleet on British fishing vessels off Hull, and I
was naval adviser to the British delegation of lawyers and
diplomats who presented our case.

Captain Herr was the bearer of a despatch to the French
Commander-in-Chief----Adrnital Boue de Lapeyrere — command-
ing the Allied Fleet in the Mediterranean, telling him of the
Dardanelles project, and directing him to place four French
battleships and some destroyers under the command of Rear-
Admiral Carden. Captain Herr had been told the nature of
my appointment, and I asked him if he would care to join my
Admiral’s Staff as liaison officer, if I could arrange it. He said
he only wished he could do so, but as he had been appointed
to the staff of his Admiral, he knew he would not be spared,

187

i88 naval memoirs, 1910-1915

Eventually, when I had obtained Admiral Carden’s approval, I
arranged for the other French officer who took passage with
me in the Australie — ^Lieut. de Vaisseau C. Millot — to join our
staff, and for the nest 16 months he proved a charming com-
panion and messmate, and a very valuable link between the French
and British squadrons.

My Admiral — ^who had been Admiral Superintendent of
Malta Dockyard at the commencement of the War — ^was
appointed in September to command the squadron which had
been blockading the Dardanelles since the entry of the Goebett
and Breslau into the Marmora ; his appointment at Malta being
filled by Rear-Admiral Limpus, who had been head of the British
naval mission at Constantinople, until our relations with Turkey
became strained.

When I arrived at hlalta. Admiral Carden had been there a
few days, having left Admiral de Robeck — ^who I was surprised
and delighted to find had arrived on the Station — ^in command
of the ships off the Dardanelles.

Admiral Carden was living in Admiralty House, Valetta, and
his small staff were using the offices, the appointment of Com-
mander-in-Chief being in abeyance, owing to the arrangement
which placed the Allied ships in Home Waters under a British,
and those in the Mediterranean under a French admiral. The
staff included Commander the Hon. Alexander Ramsay, Gunnery
officer, and Captain W. W. Godfrey, Royal Marines, War Staff
officer, with both of whom I was to be closely associated through-
out the campaign. They were responsible for working out the
details of the plan, which had been submitted by Admird Carden,
approved fay the Admiralty, and which we were about to
carry out.

A number of old battleships and cruisers had assembled at
Malta, and I found the Qub crowded with British and French
naval officers. Our enterprise was still a dosely guarded secret,
but there was an atmosphere of exdtement and antidpation in
the air and, when I walked into the Qub before dinner the
evening I arrived, I was greeted by the captain of one of our old
battleships with " Halloa you stormy petrd, what’s in the wind
out here ? ” Within five weeks his was the first of the five
British battleships which were to sink off Gallipoli with their
colours flying.

DESTRUCTION OF OUTER DEFENCES 189

The submarines of the local defence flotillas at Malta and
Gibraltar were taking part in the blockade of the Straits. As
each flotilla was commanded by a senior submarine officer, I
arranged for one — Lieut.-Commander C. G. Brodie, from
Gibraltar — ^to join the staff, leaving Lieut.-Commander Pownall,
the commanding officer at Malta, to take charge of both flotillas.
There were three submarines at Malta, refitting or resting,
mcluding -Bii, whose captain — ^Lieut.-Commander Norman
Holbrook — ^had won the V.C. for his gallant^ attack on the
Turkish cruiser Messoudiehy which was lying in Sari Siglar Bay,
below the Narrows, protected by four lines of mines, when he
torpedoed and sank her.

I invited the submarine officers to dinner at the Club, and told
them of the exploits of our submarines in Home Waters, and
listened to their experiences.

On the 1 6th February, the Admiral and his staff embarked
in the Albion (Captain A. Heneage) and sailed for the Dardanelles.
It was given out that we were going to Naples and Gibraltar,
but when clear of Malta, we stood to the eastward, and by
nightfall were well started on our great adventure. A young
moon and Orion ablaze in a starry sky, seemed to me portents
of good fortune, and I recorded that night that I had never felt
more buoyant and confident.

When I was a midshipman in the Raleigh^ her chaplain, a most
enthusiastic lover of the Heavens, often spent an hour or two
of a night watch telling me its story, which I used to know by
heart, but when Orion was aloft, I never had eyes for any other
constellation, and I always looked upon him as my champion.
One day I happened to remark to the First Lord that Orion
contained my lucky star, and how pleased I was to see his warlike
figure blazing in the sky, on the eve of one of our actions in the
Heligoland Bight. Whereupon Winston Churchill said : Your
star, why he is my star,” and I was amused to read many years
later, in his My Early Life ” a reference to his faith in Orion,
Well I don’t mind sharing even Orion wili such a fearless fighter,
who, if he had been sustained by his First Sea Lord, and supported
by his colleagues in the Government, would have carried his
great strategical enterprise to a victorious conclusion.

We arrived off Tenedos on the i8th February, and transferred
to the Infle:>cible^ commanded by Captain R. Phillimore. After

190 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

the Battle of Coronel the Inflexible had proceeded with the
Invincible in pursuit of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, to avenge
the sinking of the Good Hope and Monmouth ; after which she
relieved the Indefatigable in the Mediterranean as flagship of the
Dardanelles Squadron.

It was very interesting to hear at first hand all about the Battle
of the Falkland Islands. The Inpxible had only been hit two
or three times, and had one man killed and three wounded.
The Invincible ^suffered some damage, but not one casualty ;
and they had had no more difficulty in destroying the Scharnhorst
and Gneisenau than the latter had had in sinking the obsolete
Good Hope and weakly-armed Monmouth.

The squadron oif the Dardanelles anchored during the day
north or south of Tenedos, according to the wind and weather,
and cruised at night to minimise the risk of torpedo attack, from
the Turkish torpedo-boats and destroyers in the Marmora. In
accordance with this practice, we got under way for the night,
and arrived off the Dardanelles at daylight on 19th February,
to take up our positions for the attack on the outer forts, the
first phase of Admiral Carden’s plan.

A number of battleships, cruisers, destroyers and minesweepers
had been ordered to join his flag {see Appendix i), but some of
them did not arrive off the Dardanelles in time to take part in
the early engagements. Nevertheless, on the 19th February,
those present had an overwhelming superiority of heavy long
range guns to oppose to the Outer Defences. These consisted
of two old masonry forts mounting i i-inch, 10.2-inch and 9.4-inch
guns, whose range was limited to 8,000 yards ; and two fairly
modern earthworks, each containing two 9.4-iach guns, with a
range of about 11,000 yards.*

The attack was to open with a deliberate long range bombard-
ment, either out of range, or out of bearing of the enemy’s guns ;
followed by a direct bombardment at medium range, using
secondary armament ; and finally an overwhelming fire at very
close range — 2,000 to 4,000 yards.

5rd November, 1914, a short bombardment had been
carried out by the batde cruisers Indefatigable and Indomitable,

indicated by their numbers, are
^pmdk a.^ opposite. Detaiis of their armament will be found in

DESTRUCTION OF OUTER DEFENCES

191

192 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

and the French battleships Suffren and Verite. They ran past
the forts at a range of about 13,000 yards. The enemy replied
almost at once, although their guns were out of range, and they
Troin totfiPfi r hpir fire until the squadron had completed their
run ; only a few 9.4-inch projectiles from Forts i and 4 fell
anywhere near the ships. On the other hand the latter made
good practice, and a heavy magazine explosion resulted in Fort 3.
Information received later indicated that the casualties to the
personnel of the forts had been high.

The enemy had evidently learnt a lesson from this premature
attack, and on 19th February kept the garrison under cover,
rrmVing no reply until our ships came weE within range.

Conditions of light were very difficult until the sun had
risen to a certain height, and, on this account, the engagement
did not open until nearly 10 a.m.

The Cornwallis engaged Fort 4 by direct fire from a position
in which she could not be fired at by Fort 6.

The Triumph engaged Fort i by indirect fire, screened by the
high land of Tekke Bumu.

The Suffren, spotted for by the Bouvet, engaged Fort 6 by
indirect fire, from a position close inshore OS’ Yeni Kreui village,
outside die arc of fire of Forts 6 and 4. The Gaulois remained
in her vicinity to drive off any mobffe artillery which might be
brought down to the coast to annoy her.

After half an hour, all the firing ships were ordered to
anchor ; and the Vengeance, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral de
Robeck, took the place of the Cornwallis, as the latter had some
defect in her capstan which prevented her anchoring in deep
water.

At 11.43, Triumph having failed to hit Fort i, the Inflexible
engaged it at a range of 13,000 yards, and by i p.m. appeared to
have made such good practice that she shifted her fire to Fort 3
and repeatedly hit it.

A slow deliberate fire was maintained until 2 p.m., when the
Admiral considered that the effect produced by the long range
bombardment was great enough to allow ships to close, and the
engagement continued at medium range, the ships remaining
under way, as they were well within the range of i and 4, but
the latter did not reply.

At 4.10 p.m., there still being no reply from the forts, the

DESTRUCTION OF OUTER DEFENCES

193

Admiral ordered the Vengeance and Cornwallis to go into close
range, and engage them •with secondary armament.

By 4.40 p.m. the forts were enveloped in clouds of dust
and smoke and showing no signs of life, and the Admiral
ordered the Vengeance and Suffren to cease fire and examine the
forts.

At 4.45 when the Vengeance was standing in to the entrance
of the Straits, Forts i and 4 opened a heavy fire, mainly on
the Vengeance^ and she was fortunate to escape serious damage.
Whereupon the Inflexible^ Agamemnon (which had just arrived with
Queen Elizabeth from Malta) and the three French ships assisted
the Vengeance and Cornwallis to retaliate. The fire from the forts
at once became very erratic and died away, and at 5.20 as the
light was failing and the forts were indistinguishable in the dust
and smoke, the Admiral signalled a general recall. De Robeck
asked to be allowed to continue the action, but as the visibility
towards the land was bad, the ships were silhouetted against
the setting sun, and it was obviously impossible to finish the
business before nightfall, the Admiral decided to wait until we
had a few hours of good visibility in hand.

The result of the day's action showed that the effect of long
range bombardment on modem earthworks was slight. Forts
I and 4 appeared to have been hit by 12-inch shells on many
occasions, but when the ships closed, all four guns in those two
forts were intact. NeverAeless, I felt absolutely confident
that Admiral Carden’s plan was the solution of the problem
and could be carried to a successful issue ; that the enemy’s
forts and batteries could be dominated by heavy fire, from ships
which were themselves out of range, while other ships could
close to decisive range or pass by unmolested by gunfire.

When I was Navd Attache at Constantinople, 1906-07 , 1 spent
hours with a powerful telescope, looking into the rear of the
forts, both in the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. In the
latter I was much assisted by the captain of a salvage steamer
working from Chanak, who took me in his ship to points of
vantage, from which I was able to make a close study of the
forts. I had not a doubt that once the ships were past, the forts
taken in reverse, could be dominated and destroyed. “ Never-
theless,” as I recorded at the time, very early in the proceedings
I made up my mind that the military occupation of GalHpoli

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1515

would become a necessity, even if, as the Government anticipated,
the whole Turkish opposition collapsed with the arrival of a
fleet off Q)nstantinople. I felt strongly that in any case the
Government should be prepared for a military operation on a
large scale to ensure the Straits being kept open for further
operations in the Marmora, if the appearance of the Fleet off
Constantinople did not have the expected effect. Between 20th
and a4th February I discussed this with Admiral de Robeck,
Captain Phillinjore, and Captain Godfrey, who shared my views,
and of course with Admiral Carden, who had spent the whole
winter off the Dardanelles, and was able thoroughly to appreciate
the great difficulties of supplying an army under the prevailing
weather conditions ; on this account he was averse to under-
taking military operations unless essential.”

The Admiral had every intention of continuing the operation
on the 20th, but it came on to blow heavily from the southward,
and weather and light conditions were unfavourable for gunnery
or seaplane observation, and we could not afford to spend
ammunition on indecisive action.

On the 2ist, the Admiral telegraphed to the Admiralty, that
owing to the south-westerly gale and low visibility, operations
were impossible, but he considered that the old battleships
could now approach and engage at close range, under cover of
long range bombardment.

On zand February, we learnt that the General in Egypt had
been ordered to hold 10,000 troops in readiness for service in
the Dardanelles. After an exchange of telegrams with the
General, the Admiral telegraphed to the Admiralty on the 24th
that if only 10,000 troops were sent he proposed at first to base
them on Mudros, making occasional feints in the Gulf of Xeros,
without actually landing them. If it became necessary to
prevent serious interference with the Fleet by concealed guns,
the force could be landed at Sedd cl Bahr to occupy the Peninsula
up to the line of the Suan Dere River-Chana Ovasi, supported
on both flanks by ships. A landing at Sedd el Bahr and the
maintenance of troops after landing being so dependent on the
weather, he did not propose to take this step unless it was
fssc nr jal . He reported that he had asked for the troops to be
sent to Mudros as soon as possible, and suggested that if
Royal Marine Brigade was to be employed in conjunction wi

DESTRUCTION OF OUTER DEFENCES

^95

this force, the Portsmouth and Deal battalions should be
sent out to complete the Brigade.

Rear-Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss arrived that afternoon in the
Dartmouth to take up his appointment as senior naval officer at
Mudros, which was to be the principal base for the Allied naval
and military forces engaged in the operations.

The First Lord having launched his great enterprise was
naturally impatient and anxious for news, indeed it was very
evident, from telegrams, that our apparent inactipn was causing
concern. My Admiral was rather troubled, so I suggested the
following telegram, which I had no doubt the First Lord would
understand and appreciate :

128. Dispatched 11.44 February.

Weather same as yesterday. I do not intend to
commence in bad weather, leaving result undecided, as
from experience on first day I am convinced, given favour-
able weather conditions, that the reduction of the forts at
the entrance can be completed in one day, on the lines
indicated in telegram of 21st instant.”

Towards the evening the weather improved, and by the
morning of the 25 th it was favourable for good gunnery, but
still too rough for seaplane reconnaissance. At 10 a.m. the
attack was reopened by the Queen Elizabeth ^ Agamemnon^ Irresist-
ible and Gaulois anchoring and commencing a deliberate long
range bombardment at Forts 3, i, 4 and 6 respectively. Un-
fortunately, the Agamemnon anchored 1,000 yards closer than
was intended, and Fort i got her range in a few minutes, and she
was hit seven times before she could weigh and take up her proper
position. The shooting from the ships was excellent, and at

1 o’clock the Vengeance and Cornwallis went in and engaged Forts i
and 4 at close range. They did not reply, but 3 and 6 fired a few
ill-directed rounds. De Robeck reported that both guns in Fort i
appeared to be out of action and Fort 4 was not manned. At

2 p.m. the Suffren and Charkma^ ran into close range and
engaged Forts 5, 4 and 6.

By .3 p.m. it was evident that the forts were incapable of
further resistance; minesweepers and destroyers were ordered
to the entrance, to be ready to carry out the prearranged
sweeping operations, the Albion and Triumph to cover them.

ic)6 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

by closing the forts to within 2,000 yards on south and north
shores respectively.

Forts I, 4 and 6 each fired one more gun, but were promptly
silenced, and by 4 p.m. all the forts appeared to be completely
deserted. Sweeping operations were then commenced, covered
by the Vengeance^ Albion^ Triumph and six destroyers under the
direction of Admiral de Robeck. The remainder of the fleet
returned to Tenedos, where they were now able to remain at
night without gsk of attack.

When the engagement ceased. Admiral Guepratte, standing
at the salute in a prominent position on the bridge of the Suffren,
led his squadron past our flagship, his bands playing God save
the King ’’ and Tipperary.’’ We responded with the “ Mar-
seillaise ” and hearty cheers for our gallant Allies, whose excellent
gunnery had greatly contributed to our success.

From our safe position in the flagship, outside the enemy’s
range, we had watched de Robeck and Guepratte with admira-
tion — and some anxiety — ^when they laid their divisions right
alongside the enemy’s forts, for we knew, after the Vengeance^ s
experience on the 19th, that very few of the guns in the forts
could have been actually destroyed. Our fire on that occasion
had been checked too soon ; on the 25th, however, it so com-
pletely dominated that of the enemy, tiaat the reply was, as we
had hoped, quite ineffective, and the only casualties we suffered
during the two days were in the Agamemnon^ when she anchored
well inside her assigned position.

After the Inflexible anchored off Tenedos, I returned to the
entrance of the Straits in a destroyer, to make arrangements with
de Robeck for the subsequent operations, which were to be
carried out under his command. I spent the night with him
on board the Vengeance^ and at daylight on the 26th visited the
sweeping flotillas in the destroyer Grasshopper^ and watched
the Majestic move in behind them, to be in a position to fire into
the rear of the forts if necessary. Then back to the Vengeance to
suggest to de Robeck that we should land demolition parties,
supported by the two battalions of Marines, under cover of the
ships, to destroy all the guns and searchlights at the entrance
of the Straits. He fully concurred, and I went back to Tenedos
in the Grasshopper to tell Admiral Carden how things were
going, and to suggest an immediate landing operation.

DESTRUCTION OF OUTER DEFENCES

197

We had been expecting seaplanes all the morning ; none had
appeared, but on the way back to Tenedos, I saw two taxi-ing
round the Ark RojaL lliey had not been able to fly since the
19th, on account of rough weather, and on this occasion it was
too calm for them to rise off the water. When they eventually
did so, they could not rise to any great height, with the result
that their very gallant pilots were continually shot up by rifle
fire.

In the meantime de Robeck had signalled to Admiral Carden,
asking permission to land demolition parties at once, but he did
not wish to land anybody until seaplane reconnaissance had
been carried out, and when the report eventually came, it was
too late to disembark the Marines from the transports, which
were still at anchor oflF Tenedos. So he decided to postpone
the landing until next morning.

I returned to the Grasshopper with Ramsay (the gunnery
commander) and went up the Dardanelles, to select a position
for a ship to observe the Queen Elizabeth* s indirect fire, over the
Peninsula, at the forts in the Narrows. When we arrived, we
foimd the Majestic and Albion^ preceded by sweepers, four miles
up the Straits, the latter engaging Fort 8 at a range of 12,000
yards. They were being fired at by concealed guns and howitzers
from the high land ; these were annoying, but not formidable
or very dangerous to armoured ships.

At the entrance, the Vengeance and Irresistible were covering
parties which de Robeck had landed from those two ships at
Kum Kale and Sedd el Bahr respectively just before I returned.
He had decided to do this without waiting for Admiral Carden’s
reply, in order to take advantage of the probably only temporary
absence of the enemy from the vicinity of the forts, from which
they had been seen streaming, when the Majestic and Triumph
had thrown a few shells into them firom the rear. This widi-
drawal was mentioned in the seaplanes’ report I have referred to,
and had decided Admiral Carden to land the next day. After
Ramsay had selected a position from which to observe the
Queen Elizabeth's indirect fire, I ordered the Grasshopper to close
the Vengeance \ as we passed the Majestic she was hit two or
three times, and we were straddled by two six-inch shells, which
were probably intended for her. One carried away our wireless,
and the other wrecked the whaler, which was about to be manned

ijiS NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

to take Ramsay and me to the Vengeance.^ By this time the
enemy were dropping shells among the minesweepers, and as
we could not afford to lose any at this early stage, they were
withdrawn until dusk. They had swept a wide channel to four
fviilpR above the entrance without finding any mines.

I t hen went on board the Vengeance and through my excellent
telescope watched the proceedings on the Asiatic shore.
One could clearly distinguish small bodies of Turks disputing
the advance ofi-our little force, which kept in good signal com-
munication, and diterted the Vengeance exactly where to fire.
Lieut.-Commander Robinson, who was in charge of the
demolition party, in full view of his Admiral and ship’s company,
was seen to place his men under cover, run forward alone with a
demolition charge and disappear into Fort 4. An explosion
followed, after which he returned for another charge, with which
he destroyed the other gun.*

The Vengeance's party destroyed a new battery, well concealed
in the vicinity of Achilles’ tomb, which had been annoying us,
and several pom-poms and light guns ; and they entered Forts
4 and 6, and blew up several guns which appeared to have been
only partially disabled by our bombardment. ■[■

The Irresistible’s landing party did equally well at Sedd el Bahr,
but could not reach Fort i, as they were held up by a Turkish
post, which could not be reached by the ship’s guns. Several
guns were destroyed in Fort 3 and a maga2dne was blown up.
These two enterprising and successful expeditions, consisting
of only about 50 marines and 30 bluejackets in each party,
succeeded in destroying a number of guns, and withdrawing
to their ships, with a loss of one killed and three wounded in
the Vengeance and three wounded in Irresistible. The Dublin,
Basilisk and Bncoon also gave valuable support to the landing
parties, and contributed to the success of the operation.

Owing to the late hour of the landing, it had been impossible
to make a thorough examination of the two fortified areas before
dark, and Admiral Girden decided to repeat the operation the
next morning, supported by the Royal Marine battalion.

* For this and other gallant actions which will be recorded later, Robinson
eventually received the V^ictoria Cross.

t From Turkish information, obtdned after the Armistice, it appears that all
the guns in Forts i, 5, 4 and 6 were smashed or put out of action on 25th
February — ^"Official History, Naval Operations,” VoL IE, page 160,

DESTRUCTION OF OUTER DEFENCES

199

During the night o£ zfith-zyth the sweepers, covered by
destroyers, continued to sweep the Straits ; they sank a number
of range buoys, but found no mines. Unfortunately, the weather
broke on 27th, and a north-easterly gale with heavy rain and
low visibility much impeded our operations until ist March,
when the weather moderated, and the operations inside the
Straits were resumed.

On^26th February a telegram was received from the Admiralty,
in reply to the Admiral’s telegram of 24th (see page 194), stating
that the War Office considered the occupation of the southern
end of the Peninsffia to the line Suan Dere-Chana Ovasi was not
an obligatory operation for ensuring success of first main object,
which was to destroy the permanent batteries ; though
troops should always be held in readiness to assist in
minor operations on both sides of the Straits, to destroy
masked batteries and engage enemy forces covering them.
Our main army could remain in camp at Lemnos, till the passage
of the Straits was within our hands, when it might be necessary
to occupy the Bulair Lines in order to stop all supplies reaching
the Peninsula. If, however, our operations were successful, they
considered it necessary that ample military forces should be
available to reap the fruits.

The Royal Naval Division of 8,500, two Australian Divisions
of 30,000 and a French Division of 18,000 were being moved
or held in readiness to move within striking distance ; and it was
possible that the 29th Division of 18,000 would be sent out
firom England. The telegram also confirmed that 10,000 troops
would be sent firom Egypt to Mudros for unexpected contin-
gencies, should our operations proceed more rapidly than had
been estimated. It was not intended that they should be
employed in present circumstances to assist naval operations,
which were independent and self-contained. General Birdwood,
who would command the Army, was on his way from Egypt
in the Swiftsure^ to discuss the matter with the Admiral, who was
enjoined to make recommendations if he thought the Army
could help our operations.

This telegram was dispatched before the Admiralty knew of
the success of our attack on the outer forts, and was received at
a moment when less than a couple of hundred bluejackets and
marines had taken almost undisputed possession of most of the

200 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

forts on both sides of the entrance to the Dardanelles and with-
drawn with trifling loss.

Major-General William Birdwood arrived oS Tenedos in
the Swiftsure on the ist March, but was weatherbound until
the next day, when, accompanied by Wemyss, he had an inter-
view with the Admiral. I was engaged elsewhere, but I under-
stood that, in the event of it being necessary to land troops,
Birdwood was in favour of landing at Bulair ; but when it was
pointed out to him that he would be 30 miles from the Narrows,
with formidable Turkish defences barring his way to them, and
with a hostile fleet on his eastern flank, he decided on landing
at HeUes, as the Admiral had suggested, and we knew that he
had reported to Lord Kitchener to that effect.

I did not know, however, until I read the official history,
that Bicdwood’s interview with the Admiral had left him with such
a gloomy impression of our prospects, or that he had reported
on the 5 th March “ that he did not believe the Fleet alone could
force the Dardanelles. In any event the operations must
take a considerable time. The outer forts had been an easy
prey; the Fleet could stand off and shoot from an3rwhere.
Inside the Straits it was another story, and the ships were
hampered by unlocated fire. The weather was atrocious, only
one day in several being fine, and operations were continually
delayed in consequence. * Before troops could be landed,*
he added, ‘it is absolutely necessary to have settled weather,
the landing sites are indifferent, and a small force cannot be
safely landed, for fear of being cut off by a gale.’ ”

However, Lord Kitchener at that time had no intention of
undertaking any considerable landing operation, and telegraphed
to Birdwood to this effect on the 4th March. “From the
Ad mir al’s estimate he expected the Fleet to reach the Marmora
by the 20th. The Anzac corps, the French Division and the
Royal Naval Division would be assembled at Mudros by the
iSfli, but there was no intention of using these troops to take
the Gallipoli Peninsula unless die Admiral subsequendy found
it impossible to get through without them. Their concentration
was principally intended for operations in the neighbourhood
of Cons tantin ople. While the Admiral continued to silence the
forts successfully, he would require nothing but small bodies of
troops for subsidiary operations, and Birdwood could find these

DESTRUCTION OF OUTER DEFENCES 201

from the brigade already at Mudros. Extensive operations on
the Peninsula were not to be undertaken without further orders
ftom home, and in this case more troops would probably be
sent out from England.” Lord Kitchener did not anticipate
that any such large landing would be required. It will most
probably only be necessary,” he said, “ to leave a force large
enough to hold the Bulair Lines, as it is anticipated that the Turks
will evacuate the Peninsula.”

Birdwood replied : I consider the AdmiraPs forecast too
sanguine and I doubt his ability to force the passage unaided.
... I have no intention of rushing blindly into the Gallipoli
Peninsula, and I quite realise that my movements must depend
entirely on the Navy’s progress.” He added that even if the
Fleet did get through without the Army’s help, transports would
be unable to follow without being exposed to fire from the
hidden guns, which the Navy could not destroy. It was this
difficulty which had prompted his suggestion of a landing in
force at Helles.”*

We knew nothing of this at the time, but it explains a telegram
which the Admkal received on the 6th March from the General
OflEcer Commanding in Egypt : On further consideration
it has been decided to change the plan originally suggested by
Birdwood, and force will now land near Bulair Lines, for attack
on position there. A feint will be made by part of force at
Cape Helles, in hopes of deceiving enemy that real attack
will be made there. Birdwood will explain fully when next he
sees you.”

We could only picture our Army landing under great
difficulties in the vicinity of Bulair, between the Turkish armies
in Europe and Gallipoli — ^with a heavily fortified zone guarding
the 30-mile approach to the Narrows — ^and a Turco-German Fleet
on its eastern flank, covering the sea communications of both
Turkish armies and transporting reinforcements from one to
the other at will.

If that was the Army’s plan, it was essential that the Fleet
should force the Straits before any attempt was made to land
troops. This view was shared by Admirals Carden and de
Robeck and governed all their actions and decisions during the
next fortnight.

* “Military Operations, Gallipoli,” VoL I, pages 84 and 85.

CHAPTER XI

DISAPPOD^TING DELAYS

Bad weather intei^eres with operations; Direct and indirect bombardments;
Progress held up by inefficiency of minesweepers ; Admiral Carden resigns
owing to illness ; Succeeded by Admiral de Robeck ; British and French
troops ordered to Dardanelles ; General Sir Ian Hamilton appointed to
command Allied Army.

For a few years before the war, we had a Naval Mission at
Constantinople, and possessed accurate knowledge about the
Turkish defences at the Dardanelles. We knew that five lines
of mines had been laid in the Straits when Turkey came into
the war ; we also knew that several batteries and lines of mines
were added to the defences after the bombardment of 3rd
November, 1914, and before our attack in February, 1915.

After the Armistice we obtained detailed information of these
batteries and min efields, and learnt that another new line of
mines had been laid on the 8th March, 1915.*

The northerly gale, which was bitterly cold and accompanied
by snow, was followed, as is usual at that season, by a southerly
blow, rmld and balmy, but very disturbihg to our undertaking,
as we seldom had more than one or two calm days at several
days interval.

When it was possible to resume operations, on ist March,
the Vengeance^ Ocean^ Albion^ Triumph^ Irresistible and Majestic
entered the Straits and engaged Battery 8, the guns near Erenkeui
village, and those on the European shore. These latter proved
extremely hard to locate, and when seen great difficulty was
experienced in obtaining points of aim — ^the guns being well
concealed — ^but their fire was inaccurate and ineffective and
inflicted neither casualties nor damage.

During die afternoon a demolition party, covered by marines,
was landed by the Irresistible at Sedd el Bahr. It was attacked

* These and the forts and batteries, indicated by their numbers, are shown
on the plan facing page 228. Details of their armaments will be found in
Appendft z.

202

DISAPPOINTING DELAYS

203

during the operation, but the fire from the covering ships and
destroyers in Morto Bay dispersed the enemy, and the party
re-embarked without loss, having completed the destruction of
all the guns in Fort 3.

During the night of ist-znd March minesweepers, covered
by destroyers, entered the Straits and swept to within 3,000 yards
of Kephez Point, When abreast of Suan Dere River, the enemy
opened fire, and the sweepers retired, destroyers covering the
withdrawal. No vessel was hit. ^

On 2nd March, the Canopus^ Swiftsure and Cornwallis engaged
Batteries 7 (the new defences in the vicinity of Suan Dere River)
and 8. They were again much annoyed by concealed guns,
but they had no casualties and suffered very little damage.

On ist and and March the French squadron reconnoitred
the Gulf of Xeros, bombarding the forts and earthworks of the
Bulair Lines and the bridge over Kavak. French minesweepers
swept along the coast, but discovered no mines.

During the night of 2nd March our destroyers and mine-
sweepers continued the attack on the Kephez minefield, but
made no progress in the face of heavy fire, although no vessel
was hit.

On 3rd March the Albion^ Prince George and Triumph attacked
Batteries 7 and 8, and during the night sweeping operations con-
tinued. Very little progress was made in the face of the enemy’s
fire, but again we sustained neither casualties nor damage.

The landing operation to destroy all the guns in the fortified
areas at the entrance to the Straits was postponed firom day to
day, as the Admiral did not wish it to take place without a
preliminary seaplane reconnaissance, and in the meantime the
enemy, who no doubt anticipated an attack, had ample time to
make preparations to meet it

On the morning of the 4th, seaplanes were able to examine
the vicinity of the forts and the villages near them, and reported
no movement of troops. At 10 a.m. demolition parties were
landed at Sedd el Bahr and Kum Kale, supported by 250 men of
the Royal Marine Brigade on either side.

Both parties met with opposition. At Sedd el Bahr no
progress could be made, and die party withdrew at 3 p.m. At
Kum Kale an attempt was made to reach Fort 4, but without
success, the enemy b^g in some force in well-concealed trenches,

204 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

•which could not be commanded by the ships. Two seaplanes
attempted to locate the trenches without success. One was hit
eight and the other twenty-eight times.

Great difficulty was experienced in withdrawing the attacking
force, the enemy having gained possession of a cemetery np ^r
Mendere Bridge, commanding the ground over which our mpn
had to fall back after their repulse. Eventually destroyers went
close in and covered the retirement. At dusk the destroyers
Scorpion and 'Wolverine ran in and landed parties to search the
beach from Kum Kale to the cliffs below Fort 4 for wounded
stragglers. The former brought off two officers and five men
who had been imable to reach the boats.

The Inflexible lay off Kum Kale aU day watching this un-
fortunate affair — an object lesson of the foUy of procrastination
in war.

It was the first time I had watched men being killed and
wounded — ^from a position of perfect safety — ^unable to do
anything to help — ^and it was a most distressing experience.
Our actual casualties were 20 killed, 27 wounded, and 3 missing.

On 5 th March ih& Queen Eli^ahetb anchored close to the shore,
in a berth two and a half miles south-west of Gaba Tepe, and
commenced the attack on the forts at the Narrows by indirect
fire over the Peninsula. The value of this method of attack,
of course, depended entirely on the spotting of observers.
On accoimt of the concealed guns it was considered necessary
for the observing ships in the Straits to keep under way, and
on this account the observation from the ships was very un-
satisfactory. That from the seaplanes was abortive. One of
the latter had engine trouble and fell into the sea, the pilot and
observer being seriously injured. Another was forced to
return, her observer being wounded by a buUet, and the third
only succeeded in giving one spotting correction.

Ths.Qfaen Elizabeth engaged Forts 13, 17 and 16 ; a magawnp
blew up in the latter, but only 29 rounds were fired, and it was
impossible to say what damage had been done to the guns in
the^ forts. There can be little doubt, however, that given
u nlimi ted a mmuniti on, and aeroplane spotting, such as t-hat
developed later in the War, the eight 15-inch guns of the
Queen Elh^abetb could have wrecked the forts at the Narrows.
As her expenditure was strictly limited by the Admiralty— at

DISAPPOINTING DELAYS

205

that time — and our seaplanes could not rise clear of tiSe fire,
and were quite ineffective for spotting, it is not surprising ’tfcat-
the great hopes which had been placed on her magnificent
armament, were not realised.

The Inflexible and Prince George attended on Queen Elizabeth
to keep down the fire from the shore, but were quite unable to
do anything to prevent a light field gun battery, which was
brought down abreast of the ship, firing at her from a position
in which it could not be attacked from seawards. It hit her
17 times, and although it caused neither casualties nor damage
to her military qualities, it was most annoying, and among
other minor injuries wrecked her bakery and the engine of a
motor launch.

The ships in the Straits, thanks to keeping under way, were
not hit ; on the other hand, as I have mentioned, their spotting
was of little value.

On 6th March Queen Eli^heth continued her indirect bom-
bardment from the same position, but the enemy had brought
down a heavy mobile howitzer, which hit her three times on
the armour below the water line, and caused her to shift berth
twice and eventually to anchor outside its range, 21,000 yards
from her objective ; with the result that she had only fired seven
rounds by 4 p.m. As these could not be satisfactorily spotted
owing to the howitzer fire directed at the observing ship in
the Straits, de Robeck ordered her to cease fire. He then
engaged the four 9.4-inch guns in Fort 13 at a range of 12,000 to
15,000 yards, with the Vengeance^ Albion^ Majestic^ Prince George^
and Suffren^ whose gallant Admiral came in to look on, and
could not resist the temptation of joining in. They were
occasionally hit by the howitzers, but again suffered neither
casualties nor serious damage.

I spent that day on board the^^^ Eli^beth ; it was obviously
waste of time and ammunition to persevere with indirect bom-
bardment without observation, and — since this was not forth-
coming — ^it was evident that if we were to make any use of the
Queen Elizabeth she must go into the Straits and engage the forts
with direct fire. In the Admiral’s original orders this was not
permitted, but on ist March he asked to be allowed to take
her in, if he wished to do so, and the Admiralty had approved
the previous day — subject to due precautions.”

2o6 naval memoirs, 1910-1915

On the night of 6th March the minesweepers went in, sup-
ported by destroyers, and the Amethjst^ Ocean and Majestic.
When the sweepers came into the glare of the searchlights,
the ships and destroyers fired heavily at the latter, but did not
succeed in extinguishing them for more than a few minutes at
a time. When the enemy opened fire on the sweepers they
withdrew unscathed, having accomplished nothing.

On 7th March the four French battleships entered the Straits
to cover a bombardment of the defences at the Narrows by
the Agamemnon and Lord Nelson, The former attacked the
intermediate defences, and our two sister ships engaged Forts 13
and 19, steaming to and fro across the Straits, at ranges from
12,000 to 14,000 yards. The forts replied, but were silenced
after a heavy engagement, in the course of which explosions
occurred in both forts. Our ships then went on until the
light faded, slogging them from well within the effective range
of the forts, without provoking reply.

This was the first real engagement between forts which had
not been dominated and ships, and to my mind was most
encouraging, for although both ships were hit by heavy pro-
jectiles, their fighting efficient was in no way impaired, and
our only casualties were three slightly wounded in the conning
tower of the Lord Nelson, She also had a blow on her armour
just below her water line, which caused leaks in two bunkers.
The Agamemnon* s most serious injuries were a hole 16 feet in
diameter in the quarter deck which wrecked the wardroom,
and another which wrecked the men’s sanitary arrangements.

It was, of course, a waste of ammunition because, judging
by our previous experience it was unlikely that we had inflicted
much permanent damage, and while the forts were dominated
we had not attempted decisive action — e.g. swept a way through
the minefields, to enable the old battleships to close the inter-
mediate defences to within secondary armament range. How-
ever, it strengthened me in my opinion that we could silence the
forts whenever we wished to do so.

0 n the night of yth March the French minesweepers went
into the minefields, with seven of our destroyers, to fire
at the searchlights ; however, nothing was achieved, the
French trawlers finding it impossible to sweep against the
current.

DISAPPOINTING DELAYS

207

On 8th March the Admiral and his StaflF embarked in the
Queen Elizabeth to carry out a direct bombardment of the forts
at the Narrows, covered by the Vengeance, Cormallis and
Irresistible, the object being to try to knock out the heavy long-
range guns in Forts 13,16 and 19. (As she had those in Fort i
on 25 th February.) Unfortunately the visibility became very
bad, which made observation impossible, and xhs. Queen Elizabeth
withdrew without having achieved anything,

I wrote in the evening of that most disappointing day : “ it
is so annoying being fired at by guns one can’t see, and can
only very approximately locate — and can’t attack,” and my
thoughts turned to France and Flanders, and the desperate
fighting which had been, raging there for several months — and
here were we, held up from day to day, reporting with painful
reiteration our failure to make progress in the face of heavy
fire — ^which inflicted neither casualties to the personnel nor
damage to the ships.

It would of course have been foUy to risk ships and personnel
unless decisive results could be achieved, but it was a hopeless
proposition to go on “looking at” our difficulties — ^we had
got to set our teeth and overcome them — or admit failure anrl
withdraw, and that would have been unthinkable.

We could not go on expending ammunition on these futile
bombardments. The ammunition question was serious, as
was the wear and tear of the old guns, which only had a limited
life. Ramsay never ceased reminding us of this. The
Admiralty, too, had stressed this point in their original orders
to Admiral Carden : “ Wasteful expenditure of ammunition
may result in the operation having to be abandoned before a
successful conclusion is arrived at.” But their view as to future
operations after the forts at the entrance of the Straits had been
put out of action, bore little relation to realities. “ The opera-
tions will probably develop into a slow, methodical progress of
perhaps a mile a day, sUencing fire of concealed guns, and
keeping down fire from trenches or machine gun pits, which
win inconvenience minesweepers. The slow, relentiess sweep-
ing forward of the attacking force, mile by tnile, will tend to
shake the morale of the garrison, etc., etc.”

My record written that evening runs on : “ We are going
to get through, but it is a much bigger thiug than the Admiralty

2 o 8 naval memoirs, 1910-1915

or anyone out here realised, and I am insisting on the absolute
necessity of telling the Admiralty the exact position and all it
means. Godfrey, our invaluable War Staff Officer, and I spent
hours drci firin g an appreciation. . . But it was very difficult
to get it off.

On the afternoon of the 9th March the Admiral decided to
go to Mudros the following morning with the Queen Elizabeth
and Inflexible to inspect the Base, which was developing apace,
the vigorous and tactful direction of Admiral Wemyss.
The Inflexible had to go to Malta to change two guns, and the
Admiral proposed to transfer his flag to the Queen Blir(abeth
during her absence. I felt I would be of more use off the
Straits, where so much had to be done, and asked the Admiral
to leave me behind in the Vengeance with de Robeck. He
approved, but later I learnt that he had given de Robeck per-
mission to reconnoitre the Bulair Isthmus, leaving the Force at
the entrance of the Straits under the command of the captain
of the Ocean.

This fille d me with consternation ; it was vital and essential
to clear the minefields without further delay. How could the
captain of the Ocean be expected to initiate new and perhaps
rather desperate methods in the absence of the two Admirals.
The Admiral was exceedingly kind to me and allowed me to
express my views very freely. My record of the 9th shows
that “ I had a battle royal with the Admiral that night. I said
I simply could not understand his going and sending de Robeck
away to the Bulair Lines, leaving no one with any real responsi-
bility off the DardaneEes to run the sweeping of the minefields.
I was aware that he had a high opinion of the officers in charge
of the sweeping, but five or six days had passed in which they
had done nothing, and had made nothing but difficulties. That
was not the right spirit — ^we attack the min efields vigorously,

and I wished to satisfy myself that we were going to do so.
For instance that night all that was proposed was a reconnaissance
by two picket boats — ^when we had 35 sweepers — ^that was not
acting vigorously. . . . The captains of the Ocean and Canopus,
one of whom would be in co mman d at the entrance of the
Straits each night, were both senior to me, so I could not take
com mand , and could hardly expect them to take the responsibility
of taking their battleships into the Straits at night, for instance.

DISAPPOINTING DELAYS

209

if I asked them to do so.* Either he or de Robeck must stay.
We discussed this and the terms of a long telegram to the
Admiralty. Eventually at ii p.m. the Admiral signalled to
de Robeck telling him I would join him in the morning, and
that he was to stay off the Dardanelles. Then a telegram was
sent to the Admiralty giving the Admiral’s appreciation of the
situation.” After a very fair summary of our operations after
the fall of the outer forts, it (194) concluded thus :

The risks run by the bombarding ship are not
excessive from the forts, providing she does not close
inside 14,000 yards or anchor, but she is under iire from
the howitzers. The effect of indirect fire has not yet
been confirmed, as seaplanes have not been able to
observe. Both methods of attack may be employed
simultaneously. Queen Elizabeth bombarding from Gaba
Tepe and Lord Nelson and Agamemnon from inside Straits,
wiih old battleships ready to close and take advantage of
results of long-range fire.

By this means the attack would be pushed more
vigorously. The methodical reduction of the forts is not
feasible, without expenditure of ammunition out of all
proportion to that available.

Ships inside Straits are constantly exposed to the fibre
from concealed guns, with which it has been found im-
possible to deal effectively; their plunging fibre is very
destructive, but up to the present its accuracy has been
poor, though that is improving.

To sum up the situation. We are for the present
checked by absence of efficient air reconnaissance, the
necessity of clearing the minefield, and the presence of a
large number of movable howitzers on both sides of the
Straits, whose positions up to the present we have not
been able to locate. Meanwhile, every effort will be
made to clear the minefield by night, with two battle-
ships in support. Two battleships watch the shore on
both sides of the entrance by day and prevent the enemy
from collecting in that locality or bringing up guns.

♦ A Commodore cannot take command over the head of a Captain senior
to him.

lio NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Until it is considered advantageous to resume bombard-
ment on a large scale, it is not desirable to send battleships
far inside by day, as it only affords practice to the enemy’s
howitzers. . . .

Our experience show’s that gunfire alone will not render
forts innocuous ; most of the guns must be destroyed
individually by demolition.”

Personally I thought we exaggerated the danger of gunfire.
Against moving ships it was very inaccurate and not really
d^gerous. The protection of even the older armoured batde-
ships was so good that direct gunfire, particularly at short range,
was unlikely to inflict vital damage, and, while the personnel
remained in their action stations behind armour, casualties
would be very slight. Indirect fire over the hills from fixed
and mobile howitzers and guns was most inaccurate, and when
projectiles hit they caused little damage. Armoured ships
certainly had nothing to fear from this indirect fire, and the
odds against moving ships being hit were considerable.
Hundreds of rounds had been fired at us by the heavy guns
of the forts and concealed howitzers and gxins, and up to date,
beyond a little temporary inconvenience to the Agamemnon and
a leak in the Lord Nelson^ speedily made good, which were caused
by the forts at the Narrows, and a little superficial damage in
other ships, we had suflFered neither casualties nor damage.”

I felt it was time to get on with the business, and that the
minefields must be swept at all costs.

My record continues ; Finally I got to bed at z a.m, and
joined the Vengeance when the Inflexible sailed, early on loth
March. I gathered that de Robeck was annoyed at having his
plans altered at the last moment, but he was very nice to me,
though I am afraid he thought I was very interfering. However,
when I put forward all my arguments for a vigorous attack on
the minefield, he warmed to it and quite agreed that we must
organise it. So he ordered a meeting of aU concerned, about
15 oflflcers, to learn what they had done the night before — ^and
what they proposed to do next. The answer to the first question
no th i ng , and to the second, another reconnaissance by two
picket boats. The Admiral said that we must get on, there
was not time to arrange for that night, but we must do better

DISAPPOINUNG DELAYS

2II

the next. Then, I began * Why not time ? It could be arranged.
We must not waste another night. . To cut it short — ^the
Admiral decided that seven sweepers (there was not room for
more in the channel below Chanak) should go into the Dar-
danelles after dark, supported by the Campus (Captain Heathcote
Grant), Amethyst and destroyers, attended by picket boats.
The Canopus to go in first and bombard the searchlights from
just below the minefields, then the sweepers were to steam
up against the current, through the minefield, and when above
it, get out their sweeps and sweep down with the current.”

Hitherto the sweepers had been able to make very little progress
with sweeps out, against the current, which runs out of the
Narrows in varying strength. After a northerly blow the
current is very strong — sometimes up to four knots ; after a
southerly gale it does not exceed one knot. I asked Grant,
who was senior to me, if he would mind my going as a passenger,
as I wished to see the operation carried out. He said he would
be delighted to take me.

After hearing the views of the officer in charge of the sweepers
I sent a wireless message to the Admiral at Mudros, suggesting
that the Admiralty should be asked to give the sweepers’ crews
a bonus if successful. I was told that they recognised sweeping
risks, and did not mind being blown up, but they hated gunfire,
and pointed out that they were not supposed to sweep under
fire, and had not joined for that.

The Admiralty replied that the Admiral could give them
an3rthing he thought fit. I also suggested that young officers
should be invited to volunteer for service in sweepers, as their
crews needed a lead. The Admiral signalled his concurrence,
but the reply did not come in time to collect them for that
night or the nth.

When we got into the Dardanelles we found five brilliant
searchlights working — ^there are none more powerful in the
world. When the Canopus got close she opened fire on the
lights. They kept on going out, but only for a few minutes,
and it seemed impossible to put ihem out of action, though we
often thought we had succeeded. We were fired on from all
directions. One saw stabs of light in the hills and in the
direction of the six-inch batteries covering the minefield, on
both sides of the Straits, followed by the whine of litde shells.

212

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

the bursting of shrapnel, and the scream of heavy projectiles,
which threw up fountains of water. It was a pretty sight.
The fire was very wild, and the Canopus was not hit, and for
all the good we did towards dowsing the searchlights we might
just as well have been firing at the moon.

When the sweepers went in they got above the minefield
without loss, but they were so agitated that four out of the
six — the seventh is a leader — did not get their kites down, and
so swept the ^surface. The third pair exploded two mines in
their sweep, and then one of them struck a mine and blew up ;
the other saved aU the crew. A tremendous fire was opened
on them as they came down, and they and some of the destroyers
in support were hit ; but our only casualties were one trawler
sunk by a mine and two men wounded. The picket boats did
splendid service, creeping with grapnels for the cables across the
Straits, to which the mine-sinkers were attached and blowing
them up with explosive charges. This caused a great many
mines to break away, and they were destroyed in the morning
as they floated out of the Straits. At any rate this was a move
in the right direction. It was something, but not good enough.

On the morning of nth March Admiral de Robeck arrived
from Tenedos in a destroyer, and we had another meeting, at
which he presided. It was agreed to do it again that night
without a battleship — some thought the battleship only woke
the enemy up, and that it would be better to go up stealthily
without warning them. The less said about that night the
better. To put it briefly, the sweepers turned tail and fled
directly they were fired upon. ' I was furious and told the
oSicers in charge that they had had their opportunity, there
were many others only too keen to try. It did not matter if
we lost all seven sweepers, there were 28 more, and the mines
had got to be swept up. How could they talk about being
stopped by a heavy fire if they were not hit. The Admiralty
were prepared for losses, but we had chucked our hand in and
started squealing before we had any.

On the morning of the 12th the Vengeance intercepted a
signal from the Admiralty which I thought so important that,
after discussing it with de Robeck, I went at once in a destroyer
to Mudros to see the Admiral. Before I sailed, de Robeck
arranged for the French to try that night and our people the

DISAPPOINTING DELAYS

213

next. He gave orders that every trawler was to have a com-
missioned officer in command, and a midshipman, mate or warrant
officer, a petty officer, and a signalman, to stiffen the sweeper's
crew. The picket boats were to be commanded by officers, and
a battleship was to go into the Straits in support. The sweeping
must be carried out regardless of cost. Any number of volun-
teers begged to be allowed to take part, but we could not afford
to risk those essential to the fighting efficiency of the ships, and
when the selection was made, a number of officers and men were
rejected, much to their disgust.

When I arrived at Mudros, the Inflexible had already sailed for
Malta, to change two guns, and the Admiral was on board the
Queen Elizabeth.

The telegram which drew me away from the Straits, and took
me full speed to Mudros was as follows :

Admiralty to Vice-Admiral.

loi. Your 194. Your original instructions laid stress
on caution and deliberate methods, and we approve highly
the skill and patience with which you have advanced
hitherto without loss. Results to be gained are, however,
great enough to justify loss of ships and men if success
cannot be obtained without. The turn of the comer at
Chanak may decide the whole operations and produce
consequently a decisive character upon the war, and we
suggest for your consideration that a point has now been
reached when it is necessary to choose favourable weather
conditions to overwhelm the forts at the Narrows at
decisive range by the fire of the largest number of guns
great and small that can be brought to bear on them. . . ,
Under cover of this fire the guns at the forts might be
destroyed by landing parties and as many as possible of the
min efields swept up. This operation may have to be
repeated until the forts at the Narrows have been des-
troyed and the approaches cleared of mines. We do not
wish to hurry you and urge you beyond your judgment
but we recognise clearly that at a certain period in your
operations you will have to press hard for a decision and
we desire to know whether you consider that point has now
been reached. We will support you in well-conceived

zi 4 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

action for forcing a decision even if regrettable losses
entailed. We wish to hear your views before you take any
decisive departure from the present policy.”

I was not surprised that the Admiralty were getting restless.
This, as we know now, was the First Lord’s drafting, concurred
in by Lord Fisher and the Chief of the Staff. The Admiral’s
telegram Z03 reporting our proceedings on iith-izth could not
have been very reassuring :

“ Operations inside Dardanelles during daylight confined
to destroying floating mines and preventing enemy moving
guns. Svreeping operations last night not satisfactory
owing to heavy fire — ^no casualties. Volunteer officers and
men have been called to assist in each sweeper ; large number
have responded.”

The Ad m i r al decided to go to the Dardanelles and he and his
Staff embarked in the destroyer Wear the following morning.
When we arrived we found that the French had failed to maW
any impression on the nunefield during the night, and the Admiral
decided to try one more night attack, our sweepers being com-
manded and manned as arranged by de Robeck. He then
returned to Mudros and dispatiicd the following telegram :

209. “ Fully concur with the view of Admiralty telegram
loi. It is considered that stage reached when vigorous
sustained action necessary for success. In my opinion
military operations on large scale should be commenced
imm ediately in order to ensure my communication line
immediately Fleet enters Sea of Marmora. The losses in
passage through Narrows may be great therefore submit
that further ships be held in readiness at short notice <»nd
additional ammunition be dispatched as soon as possible.

Position with regard to minefields as follows. In order
to immediately follow up silencing of forts at Narrows
with dose range bombardment it is necessary to r]e-ar the
minefield at Kephez. In order to economise ammunition
the attempt being made to dear it at night. This so far has
be^ unsuccessful. A final attempt is to be maHp tonight;
if it fails also it will be necessary to destroy fixed and mobile
light guns de&nding m i n efield before continuing sweeping.

DISAPPOINTING DELAYS

215

Destroying these guns will bring ships under fire from the
forts at the Narrows and will therefore entail silencing the
latter which must now go on irrespective of air recon-
naissance. This accomplished sweeping will be carried
out working day and night but as minefield is extensive
operations may occupy some time and expenditure of
ammunition will be great as the forts will require repeated
silencing. Request further half outfit may be sent at once
for all ships except Queen Elk^aheth,^^

•

I remained off the Dardanelles tha,t night to watch the attack,
which is described in my diary as follows :

“ The Cornwallis bombarded the lights and batteries for
an hour, then the sweepers went in, covered by the Amsthyst
and destroyers, attended by picket boats, tibe latter with
explosive creeps. The enemy were very much on the alert.
They let the seven sweepers and five picket boats get right
into the middle of the minefield on the way up, oiffy firing
a single gun occasionally — ^then aU the searchlights went
out — ^a minute later they all flashed on again, and con-
centrated on the sweeping flotilla. The enemy then opened
a heavy fire which followed them up to the tu rnin g point,
after they had turned, and while they were sweeping down.
All except two were so damaged that they could not get
their sweeps out, kites were smashed, wires cut, and winches
destroyed by gunfire. They were hit by projectiles ranging
firom six-inch to shrapnel firom field guns. One pair swept
the whole way down. Two of the picket boats commanded
by midshipmen stuck to it most gallantly and exploded four
creeps. This had a great effect and the mines have been
coming down to the entrance to be destroyed ever since.
Six battleships and the Blenheim provided the volunteers
— 2. trawler to eadh ship. The Vengeance's trawler (com-
manded by the gallant Robinson) had 84 hits, her kites and
winches were damaged, but she had no casualties, thanks
to the most ejBfident steel plate protection, fitted to the
trawlers by Malta Dockyard, which saved many lives. The
Ametlyst remained on the edge of the minefield throughout
the operations to fire on the lights and cover the retreat.
Her casualties would have been slight, but for one heavy

zi 6 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

shell which happened to burst in the yidnity of the stokers’
mess deck and bath room at 4 a.m. when all the stokers who
had the middle watch were washing before turning in.
She had 24 killed and 36 wounded. The trawlers only had
nine casualties, five killed and four wounded, including one
Yolunteer officer killed and one wounded. The trawlers
and picket boats really had charmed lives. They were all
drenched by spray from shells and had innumerable hits.
Four trawlers and one picket boat were put out of action,
but none*sank. It was a gallant enterprise.”

I concluded my record of our attempt to clear the minefield
by night thus :

“ We had hoped to knock out the searchlights and
sweep more or less unmolested in darkness, but an
enormous volume of fire from battleships, cruisers and
destroyers had failed to make any appreciable impression
on the searchlights, so we must now sweep by day under
cover of the Fleet.

I have had a very busy time and spent the night of the
9th in the Inflexible^ loth in the Canopus^ nth in the
Vengeance y 12 th in the Queen Elizabeth y 13 th in the Blenheim y
and 14th in the Queen Eliv^abeth again.

My poor Admiral is very seedy, which is most
unfortunate, ...”

During the nights of 14th, 15 th, i6th and 17th the trawlers
were engaged in sweeping the area in which tiie ships would
manoeuvre while covering the attack on the Kephez minefield.
No further bombardments were carried out, but the ships were
completed with fuel and ammunition, and every preparation
was made for the onslaught on the forts and minefield at the
Narrows, which we hoped to deliver on 17th or i8th March.

On the 14th March the following telegram was received from
the First Lord of the Admiralty to Admiral Carden :

105. ‘‘Your 203 gives the impression of your being
brought to a standstill both by night and day during 12th
and makes me anxious to receive your reply with reference
to Admiralty message No. loi. I do not understand why
minesweepers should be interfered with by firing which
causes no casualties. Two or three hundred casualties

DISAPPOINllNG DELAYS

217

would be moderate price to pay for sweeping up as fat as
Narrows. I highly approve your proposal to obtain
volunteers from the Fleet for minesweeping. This work
has to be done whatever the loss of life and small craft and
the sooner it is done the better.

Secondly, we have information that the Turkish forts are
short of ammunition, that the German officers have made
despondent reports and have appealed to Germany for more.
Every conceivable effort is being made to supply ammu-
nition, it is being seriously considered to seAd a German or
an Austrian submarine, but apparently they have not
started yet. Above is absolutely secret. AH this makes it
clear that the operation should now be pressed forward
methodically and resolutely at night and day. The
unavoidable losses must be accepted. The enemy is
harassed and anxious now. The time is precious as the
interference of submarines is a very serious complication.

Thirdly, Sir Ian Hamilton leaves tonight to command the
Army and will be with you on Tuesday, 16th. Take him
fully into your confidence and let there be the most cordial
co-operation but do not delay your operations on this
account. The First Sea Lord has ordered Queen and
Implacable to sail tonight to strengthen your fleet and
provide further reserve for casualties.”

To which the Admiral replied :

To the First Lord of the Admiralty.

21 1. “ Your 105. I fully appreciate the situation and

intend as stated in my 209 to vigorously attack the forts at
the Narrows clearing the minefield under cover of the attack.
Good visibility is essential and I will take the first favourable
opportunity. I am requesting C.-in-C. East Indies to hold
Triumph and Swiftsure in readiness to join me at short
notice. . .

Then followed a reference to the inefficiency of the mine-
sweepers against the strong current, and our unsuccessful
effort to sweep down stream.

“ Our sweepers which were driven back on night of nth
behaved splendidly on 13th led by volunteer officers who
testify to ffie excellent behaviour of the crews. . . .

2I8

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Fleet sweepers urgently needed, meantime am fitting
some destroyers for this purpose with light sweeps.”

On the 15 th March the Admiralty’s reply to Admiral Carden’s
209 was received.

From Admiralty to Vice-Admiral.

109. “ You must concert any military operations on a
large seals which you consider necessary with General
Hamilton when he arrives on Tuesday night, meantime we
are asking War Office to send the rest of the two Australian
divisions to Mudros Bay at once, thus giving with the French
approximately 39,000 men available after i8th, this will be
confirmed later. 29th Division 18,000 additional cannot
arrive until 2nd April. Secondly we understand it is your
intention to sweep a good clear passage through the mine-
field in order to enable the forts at the Narrows eventually
to be attacked at close range, and to cover this operation
whether against the forts or light movable armament, by
whatever firing is necessary ftom the batde fleet, and that
this task wiU probably take several days. After this is
completed we understand that you intend to engage forts
at Narrows at decisive range and put them effectually out
of action. You will then proceed again at your convenience
with attack on the forts beyond, and any further sweeping
which may be necessary. If this is your intention we
cordially approve it. We wish it to be pressed forward
without hurry but without losing time. We do not gather
at this stage you contemplate any attempt to rush the
passage without having previously cleared a channel
through the mines and destroyed the primary armament of
the forts.

We wish to be consulted before any operation of such a
nature is decided on and, before undertaking it, the part
to be played by the Army and Navy in close co-operation
would require careful study and it might then be found that
decisive military action to take the Kilid Bahr Plateau would
be less costly than a naval rush. You will be informed
later about ammunition, aeroplanes and minesweepers.”

DISAPPOINTING DELAYS

219

The Admiral replied :

1 5 th March. From Vice-Admiral to Admiralty.

217. ^^Your 109. I will meet General Hamilton in
consultation as soon as possible after he arrives.

Your secondly expresses my intentions exactly, hope to
commence operations, plans for which are practically
complete, on 17th inst., but as good visibility and a wind
which will prevent smoke interference are essential, the
start may have to be delayed. In the metotime the area
in which ships will have to manoeuvre is being carefully
searched for mines. . . . There is no intention of rushing
the passage without first clearing a channel.'’’

This telegram was of course sent with de Robeck’s full
concurrence.

The Admiral’s health had been causing us a good deal of
anxiety, he worried terribly, ever5rthing he ate gave him a severe
pain, and he was not eating enough to keep him going in such
strenuous times. On the 1 5 th he told me he thought he would
have to go on the sick list, and that he did not feel well enough to
meet the Rear-Admirals and Captains, who had been summoned
to be given orders for the attack on the Narrows. So de Robeck
presided, but he told me he was determined to persuade Carden
not to give up his command. After the meeting, de Robeck
and I saw the Admiral, and begged him to rest for a few days,
and not worry, but after we left him, he sent for the Fleet Surgeon,
who told him that he ought to go on the sick list for at least a
fortnight, whereupon he told his Flag-Lieutenant to signal that
he had transferred his flag to the Blenheim^ and the command to
de Robeck.

This, of course, meant the end of Carden’s career, so I held
up the signal, and went to the Admiral, who told me that he
must give up the command, it was only fair to de Robeck, who
was much too nice to object but must feel that it was wrong, that
I should practically run the Fleet, making signals in his —
Carden’s — name, etc., etc. I said de Robeck was quite in-
capable of thinking any such thing, his one object was to support
him m his command, and serve him loyally, I begged him to
see a first-class Harley Street physician, who was serving in the
Hospital ship Soudan, He agreed to do this the next morning.

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

and to let the matter stand over until then, so I cancelled all the
arrangements he had made, and ■wrote to de Robeck, to tell
him what had happened, and he replied as follows :

H.M.S. Vengeance.

“ My dear Commodore,

It is good news to hear that you have averted what
would have been nothing less than a catastrophe, had V .A.
sent a wire or carried out his idea. Please impress on him
that nothing would upset me more than his going sick ;
I am proud to serve under him and will continue to do
my level best ; at the same time I would view with the
gravest misgivings any other A dm i r al being sent out to
relieve him at this period of the operations, which are now
ready to be taken to a successful issue ! Nothing pleases
me more tkan to be the Second in Command under him.
I can see no earthly reason why he should not rest for a
day or two and we can carry on the work such as it is ;
everything being now arranged I only wait the day !

Please teU him the whole Fleet would be upset if he carried
out his proposal and we will all loyally see him through to
the end of his work.

In haste.

Yours ever,

J. DE Robeck.”

That night, Wemyss signalled that he was coming from
Mudros next morning, with a telegram from the Admiralty,
which had arrived by land wire from Malta, with instructions
that it was not to be transmitted by wireless. This was very
fortunate, as Wemyss was senior to de Robeck and the co mman d
devolved on him, if Carden hauled down his flag.

After thoroughly overhauling the Admiral, the fleet surgeon
and the doctor from the Soudan reported very unfavourably,
they declared that he would completely break down, unless he
had three or four weeks’ thorough test and freedom from anxiety.
So the die was cast.

I was in the confidence of aU three Admirals, and my task that
day was a difficult one. Carden’s one idea was to efe.ce himself
and do what was best for the Service. De Robeck was in full
agreement with all the orders whidi had been prepared for the

DISAPPOINTING DELAYS

221

attack on the Narrows, and had been consulted at every step,
since the close fighting was to be carried out under his leadership.
It was so important that this should be made clear to the Admir-
alty, in order that the First Lord might have some guidance in
making his selection of a successor. Admiral Carden thoroughly
appreciated this, and in telegraphing his resignation to the
Admiralty, he said that de Robeck was in full touch with ail the
arrangements, present and future, and had been of the greatest
assistance in their preparation; he had the fullest confidence
in his judgment and determination. He added a very nice
reference to me, which touched me deeply, for I was very
conscious that I had been a great trial to him.

Admiral Carden had sustained the long and trying blockade
of the Dardanelles throughout the winter months, he was respon-
sible for the plan we were carrying out, and for its initial success.
It seemed so hard that he should be denied the credit for the
great achievement, which we felt confident was within reach,
and de Robeck made every effort to persuade him to retain the
command.

At that time I only knew Wemyss as a cheery forceful person-
ality, possessed of unbounded energy and tact, and admirably
fitted to tackle the many difficulties which lay before him, in
organising the Allied naval and military bases at Mudros. I
admired and applauded his helpful telegram to the Admiralty :

I am quite prepared to act under the orders of de Robeck, if
you think it desirable to promote him. De Robeck and I are
in perfect accord, and can loyally co-operate, whichever way
you decide.’^

I concluded my record of that trying day, from which the
foregoing is extracted, after expressing my admiration for the
bearing of the three Admirals who had honoured me with their
confidence, ^^I went to bed very weary, and was woken in
the morning by the arrival of a telegram from the Admiralty,
appointing de Robeck Acting Vice-Admiral in command of the
operations. It was written.”

Commenting on the change of command, and his reasons for
the appointment he made, Winston Churchill wrote : “ The
decision was virtually inevitable. Thus carefully did destiny
pick her footsteps at die Dardanelles.”^

* “ The Wotld Crisis, 1915,” page 221,

CHAPTER Xn

yREPARATIONS FOR NAVAL ATTACK

Sir Ian Hamilton and General d’Amade confer ■with Admiral ; Lord Kitchener’s
instructions to Sir Ian ; Plan of Naval Attack.

Admiral de Robeck and I had started die War hundreds of miles
apart — ^he in command of a squadron of old cruisers in the
Atlantic, I in the Narrow Seas — ^without apparently the remotest
<hance of serving together ; and yet here was I, on the eve of
what promised to be a great battle, in the Quim Elh(ahtth^ the
finest ship in the world. Chief of Staff to de Robeck, the Admiral
who had helped me so much in my efforts to prepare the sub-
marines for war, and for whom I had a great admiration and
affection.

My brother-in-law, Hugh Bowlby, happened to be his Flag-
Lieutenant, which was very pleasant, and I looked to the future
with contentment and great confidence.

In appointing Admiral de Robeck to the command of the
Eastern Mediterranean Squadron, the First Lord asked him, on
17th March, if he was in full accord with Admiralty telegrams
loi and 109, and Carden’s answers to ihem ; and if he considered
“ After separate and independent judgment that the immediate
operations proposed were wise and practicable.” If not he was
not to hesitate to say so. If so, he was to execute them at the
first fiivourable opportunity, working in close harmony with
General Hamilton.

The Admiral* replied on the same day, that he was fully in
agreement with the telegrams mentioned, and that operations
would proceed on i8tib March, weather permitting. He
expressed the view that everything depended on our ability to
dear the minefidd before forcing the Narrows, and that this
necessitated silendng the forts during the process of sweeping.

Later he reported that he had met and discussed the situation

2Z2

PREPARATIONS FOR NAVAL ATTACK 223

with Generals Hamilton and d’Amade, the French general, but
pending the result of our attack on the Narrows, no joint naval
and military action would be decided upon. In the event of his
enteriug the Sea of Marmora, Wemyss would take command of
the ships that remained behind.

Vice-Admiral de Robeck’s flag was transferred to the Queen
Elizabeth on the 17th, when Admiral Carden sailed for Malta in
the Minerva and all was ready for the attack on the morrow, A
memorandum giving the plan of attack on the Najrrows had been
issued on the 15 th, and though signed by Admiral Carden, it
was prepared in close co-operation with Admiral de Robeck,
and, as he had reported, was fully in accord with his views.

The meeting referred to in the Admiral's telegram, took place
on board the Queen Elit(ahefh that afternoon, and in addition to
Generals Sir Ian Hamilton and d'Amade, it was attended by
Major-General Walter Braithwaite, Sir Ian's Chief of General
Staff, and Captain PoUen, his military secretary, Admirals Wemyss
and Gu6pratte and myself.

Admiral de Robeck told the soldiers that he could silence the
fortress guns, but the mobile artillery was his chief difSculty,
as it interfered with the clearing of the minefield ; he expressed,
however, confidence in his ability to force a passage through
the Straits without military assistance on a large scale, and he
intended to do so. If our army could then land at Bulair, the
Turks on the Peninsula would be cut off. He said the Turks
were working like beavers every night, none were seen during
the day, but new trenches and wire appeared every morning.
All possible landing places were being protected by trenches and
wire, and ships' guns would not be able to give the troops much
support — ^an opinion which he based on their failure to help the
Marines on the 4th March.

The Admiral then asked if he might see Sir Ian's instructions.
General Braithwaite read them, and when he had finished, I
asked if that was all ; their recital acted on us rather like a cold
douche — ^there seemed to be so many reservations. Great stress
had been laid in the Admiral's telegram 209 on the importance
of military operations on a large scale, in order to ensure our
communications immediately the Fleet entered the Marmora.
Lord Kitchener's iastructions to the General — dated it is true,
a few hours before the Admiral's telegram could have reached

2Z4

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

London — ^laid down that once the Dardanelles had been forced,
the security of the passage was a matter for the Fleet. However,
before many days passed. Lord Kitchener, Sir Ian, and the Army
were to prove that they had no reservations in their determination
to see the Fleet through the Straits.

Lord Kitchener’s instructions are given fully in Appendix I of
Vol. I, “ Militar y Operations, Gallipoli.” The following
paragraphs are of particular interest from the naval point of
view, and in thf light of subsequent history.

“ I. The Fleet have undertaken to force the passage of
the Dardanelles. The employment of military forces on
any large scale for land operations at this juncture is only
contemplated in the event of the Fleet failing to get through
after every effort has been exhausted.

3. Having entered on the project of forcing the Straits
there can be no idea of abandoning the scheme. It will
require time, patience, and methodical plans of co-operation
between the naval and military commanders. The essential
point is to avoid a check, which will jeopardise our chances
of strategical and political success.

4. This does not preclude the probability of minor
operations being engaged upon to clear areas occupied by
the Turks with guns annoying the Fleet, or for the demolition
of forts already silenced by the Fleet. But such minor
operations should be as much as possible restricted to the
forces necessary to achieve the object in view, and should
as far as practicable not entail permanent occupation of
positions on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

6. Under present conditions it seems undesirable to
land any permanent garrison or hold any lines on the
Gallipoli Peninsula. Probably an entrenched force will
be required to retain the Turkish forces in the Peninsula
and prevent reinforcements arriving at Bulair, and this
force would naturally be supported on both flanks by gun-
fire from the Fleet. Troops employed on the minor
operations mentioned above (paragraph 4) should be with-
drawn as soon as their mission is fulfilled.

7. In order not to reduce forces advancing on Con-
stantinople, the security of the Dardanelles passage, once

PREPARATIONS FOR NAVAL ATTACK 225

it has been forced, is a matter for the Fleet, except as in
paragraph 6 with regard to Bulair.

The occupation of the Asiatic side by military forces is
to be strongly deprecated.”

Paragraph 5 made a deep impression on me at the time — and
remained fixed in my memory — ^being in harmony with my own
faith that our race could be relied upon to carry through anything
we undertook. This belief sustained me in the^blackest hours
— until December, 1915, when it was shattered by a shameful
decision, for which politicians cannot alone be held responsible,
in view of the conRicting advice they received from soldiers
and sailors.

So far, my record of the meeting is in close agreement with
that given in the official history, but Admiral de Robeck noted
at the time that when Sir Ian was asked if he proposed to land
at Bulair, he replied that he did not think he coifid land anywhere
else, as he had no transport for a longer fine of communications.
This was no doubt qualified by a remark that he would like to
look at the Peninsula, as far as it was possible to do so, before
making any decision. Nevertheless the Admiral and I both
formed the impression that, if the Army landed, it would be at
Bulair, and I mention this because it had a very definite influence
on the Admiral’s actions during the next few days.

I had not previously met Sir Ian, but he had served under my
father on the Indian Frontier, was a friend of my mother’s, and
from the first he was exceedingly kind, and discussed matters
freely with me. In addition to having seen much service on
the Indian Frontier, and in both Boer Wars, he had been military
attache with the Japanese army in the Russo-Japanese war, and
had watched many great battles, including tiie taking of Port
Arthur. As I have already mentioned, I was in charge of the
section of the Admiralty Intelligence Department which dealt
with the naval side of this war, and I had studied Sir Ian’s graphic
dispatches with great interest, so knew that he had probably
seen more of modem warfare and desperate fighting than any
living soldier, prior to the Great War.

I had met Braithwaite a few years before, and during the eight
months we worked together as Chiefs of the Military and Naval
Staffs respectively, we became fast friends. Besides the Admiral
o

226 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

and I finding Sir Ian and Braithwaite charming people to work
with, it would be impossible to exaggerate the good comradeship
which existed between Sir Ian’s General StaflF and the Admiral’s
Naval Staff throughout our co-operation. After all we were
united by a mutual determination to see the matter through,
whatever it might cost — and any conduct that fell short of that
was unthinkable.

Before parting with the General on the 17th March, the
Admiral arranged that he and his staff should be taken round
the Gallipoli Peninsula as far as the Gulf of Xeros in the Phaeton^
the fast light cruiser which had brought him full speed from
Marseilles. Later he was to look at the Peninsula inside the
Straits from the conning tower of a battleship.

Before going into action, I will quote the opening paragraph
of Admiral Carden’s memorandum, on which Admiral de
Robeck’s operation orders were based :

The general idea is to silence the defences of the
Narrows and of the minefield simultaneously, so as to
enable sweepers to clear a passage through the Kephez
minefield ; if this is successful the attack to be at once
continued on the remaining defences until the Fleet has
passed through the Dardanelles.”

This was intended to make it clear — and I think it definitely
does so, that the only object we sailors had in view at that time
was to get into the Marmora with sufficient force to defeat the
Turco-German fleet if it came out of the Bosphorus to fight us.

That was the task with which we were charged by the Govern-
ment, What happened afterwards was not our concern. We
presumed that the Government had good reason for their belief
that our arrival off Constantinople would greatly affect the
political situation, help Russia, bring Neutrals in on our side,
bring about the downfall of Turkey in Europe, and cut off
Turkey in Asia from its munitions and supplies.

Such success as we had achieved up to date, we knew, had
already had remarkable reactions, and there can be little doubt,
in the light of our knowledge today, that if we had succeeded,
the Government’s anticipations would have been fully justified.*

* ** Militar y Operations, Gallipoli,” Vol. I, pages 82 and 83.

PREPARATEONS FOR NAVAL ATTACK 227

The Military Historian states :

The eflFect produced throughout Europe by the fall of
the outer forts had exceeded expectations. From a trust-
worthy source in Bucharest the news arrived that there was
now great hope of Italy joining the Entente, Bulgaria was
already visibly influenced Russia offered to send an army
corps of 40,000 men to co-operate at the Black Sea entrance
to the Bosphorus. Most important of all, Venizelos
proposed on the ist March that three Greek divisions
should be landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula, and it was
reported that the Greek King was now ready for war. But
the latter hope was doomed to disappointment. On and
March, 1915, the Russian Minister for Foreign Afiairs
telegraphed to the Russian Minister in Athens : ‘ In no
circumstances can we allow Greek forces to participate in
the Allied attack on Constantinople.’ On 5rd March, the
Greek General Staff declared that the moment for successful
military action on the Peninsula had passed, and the King
refused to consent to Veniaelos’ proposal.”

After our experience on 4th March it was obviously impossible
to land demolition parties, as we had done with such ease on
26th February and ist March, and we knew we could not destroy
the forts without military aid, so if the Government wished to
transport troops and munitions through the Straits, it would be
necessary to occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula. Hence Admiral
Carden’s telegram 209.

If we succeeded in getting into the Marmora, we knew we
could greatly assist military operations by cutting the sea
communications of the Turkish armies in Gallipoli and Asia
Minor — which were dependent on sea transport — and seriously
interfere with reinforcements and transport which might
attempt to cross the Bulair Isthmus into Gallipoli.

If, on the other hand, the Government’s anticipations were
not realised, and the Fleet was at a deadlock in the Marmora
with dwindling ammunition and fuel ; without British or Russian
troops or those of potential Allies to exploit the situation, and
we were forced to withdraw ; we knew we could do so without
undue risk, whenever we wished. The concealed howitzers and
guns were very inaccurate against moving ships and no menace

228 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

to the passage of warships, neither would the forts be any obstacle
to our withdrawal if hammered in reverse for a short time before
passing them.

These views were fully shared by Admiral de Robeck on the
17th March, and he accepted the command knowing what was
expected of him.

The Allied Fleet consisted of three modern and ten old British
batdeships, one battle cruiser, and four old French battleships.

The plan of ^ttack was as follows :

The Inflexible^ Lord Nelson^ Agamemnon and Queen Elizabeth
were to form line “ A,” and were to open the engagement with
a long range bombardment of Forts 16, 17, 18 and 19 respectively ;
the Queen Elizabeth was also to silence Fort 20.

The Suffren^ Bouvet y Charlemagne and Gaulois were to form line

B ” one mile astern of A,” ready when ordered, to pass
through the intervals between the ships of A ” to engage the
forts at closer range ; their advance was to be gradual until a
range of 8,000 yards from Fort 13 was reached. During their
advance the Gaulois was to destroy the torpedo tubes at Suan
Dere, and the Suffren that at Kephez Point,* Line B was
to be supported by line “A,” which was to dose to within
12,000 yards of Fort 13.

The Triumph and Prince George^ advancing in the rear of line

B ” were to move to the flanks, and engage the permanent
Batteries 8, and White Cliffs, on the Asiatic shore, and Batteries
7 and 9 on the European side respectively. The Suffren
and Gaulois were to assist the Triumph and Prince George if
necessary.

When B line reached a position 8,000 yards from Fort 13,
the Queen Elizabeth was to silence Fort 24, advancing to dose
the range if necessary.

The area to the southward of the 8,000 yards line was con-
sidered to be absolutely free of mines, and no ship was to go to
the northward of that line without sweepers ahead.

Light gun defences of the minefield at Kephez and on the
European shore were to be engaged by the Bouvet and Charlemagne

* We knew that the enemy had two barges each carrying on its upper deck an
i8~inch torpedo tube ; and it was thought that these might be brought down and
mc^red on either side of the channel. However they were not brought into
action, with good reason, for they could have been easily destroyed, in daylight,
by gunfire.

PREPARATIONS FOR NAVAL ATTACK 229

respectively ; howil:2ers and field guns which could be lociated,
were to be engaged by the flank ships of the two lines.

In the event of line B being subjected to too heavy a fire,
the senior officer present was to turn the line to starboard, and
lead round behind line ^‘A,” the Triumph and Prince George
forming up in rear of line “ B.” The attack was then to be
continued by line B ” and the Triumph and Prince George circling
round line "'A,” and running past the forts at gradually de-
creasing ranges, until the 8,000 yards line was igached. These
ships were to be prepared to resume the first method of attack
when ordered to do so.

The four ships of line “ A ” were to remain in the Straits
ready for action throughout daylight hours on the first day.
The other 12 battleships were to relieve one another in line '' B ”
and on the flanks, at four-hour intervals.

Three groups of British sweepers and two of French were to
sweep continuously, one group at a time, in four-hour reliefs.
The fixst group was to be ready to move into the Straits two
hours after the bombardment commenced.

Directly the forts and guns defending the minefield were
silenced and dominated by the guns of the fleet, the mine-
sweepers would be ordered to commence sweeping a passage
along the Asiatic shore 900 yards wide, to enable ships to enter
Sari Siglar Bay and reduce Forts 15, 16, 17,' 19, and 20 at close
range. As long as the guns bearing on the minefield remained
silent, sweeping was to proceed during the night, the Cornwallis
and Canopus covering the sweepers — one on duty at a time.
Four destroyers were to protect the sweepers, and they were also
responsible for preventing enemy destroyers attacking the
battleship supporting the minesweepers inside the Straits.

Detailed instructions were laid down in the operation orders
for the exact conduct of the reliefs, in order to ensure a vigorous
continuity of eflbrt throughout the operation; and for the
continuation of the attack at daylight on ffie second day.

A pair of destroyers fitted with a light mine-seeking sweep was
to proceed ahead of the battleships while taking up theic stations
for bombarding. Each ship had orders to provide a picket boat
carrying a three-pounder gun, to work just ahead of its ship and
destroy floating mines ; and the destroyer Wear was detailed
to attend on the Queen Elizabeth and act as a dispatch vessel,

230 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

in case the Admiral \dshed to send me to ascertain and report
on the progress of the detached squadrons, in course of the
engagement.

Since the 26th February, British and French ships and mine-
sweepers, the latter with their sweeps out, had continuously
passed through the waters in which we were to operate, and
during the four previous nights the whole area had been
regularly swept. During this latter period four moored mines
were discovered and destroyed, and on each occasion, a careful
search was made to the eastward and westward of the mine in
case it might be one of a line laid across the Straits, similar to
the lines whose existence was known — ^but none were found.
It will be remembered that when the picket boats’ creeps blew
up the cables stretched across the Kephes; minefield, a number
of mines were released which, some towing their moorings,
others floating free, drifted down to the entrance of the Straits,
there to be destroyed by gunfire. It was concluded that these
four mines were stray ones, which had tripped their moorings,
when the cables to which they had been attached were destroyed,
and had drifted down in the strong current until their moorings
brought them to ” again in the slack backwater of Erenkeui
Bay.*

Seaplanes which had carried out experiments off Tenedos,
claimed to be able to see mines at a dcpih of 18 feet in the clear
water of the Mediterranean, and to have located mines in the
Kephez minefield, including a line running out ficom Suan Dere
Point. (I will refer to this line later.)

As they had been unable to find any mines in the area in which
the ships were to operate, their negative report was taken as
corroboration of the sweepers’ report, that the area was clear of
mines on the morning of the i8th March.

I have related on page 206 that on the afternoon of 7th March,
the Agamemnon and Lord Nelson^ steaming to and fro across the
Straits, had heavily engaged and silenced the forts at the Narrows,
while the four French ships covered them by silencing the
batteries in the intermediate defences. We know now, from a
Turkish report, that during the night of yth-Sth — ^in anticipation
of the attack being repeated — ^the small Turkish steamer Nousref,

* This opinion “was beld until after the War, and the presence of the xnines^
which caused the losses on i8th March, was attributed to the same cause.

PREPARATIONS FOR NAVAL ATTACK 231

kid a new line of 20 mines parallel to the shore, just inside the
slack water in Erenkeui Bay, right across the track our ships
had taken during the attack of the previous afternoon. If these
mines were laid on the night of yth-Sth, they must have been
just missed over and over again, between two parallel sweeps,
sweeping down stream. The Military Historian mentions
another Turkish report which states that this line of mines was
laid on the night of lyth-iSth March.* I think the later date is
very improbable. On the night of the yth-Sth, French sweepers,
supported by seven British destroyers, attempted to sweep the
Kephez minefield, but gave up the attack and reported that they
were unable to sweep against the current, so the whole force
withdrew. On the night of lyth-iSth, British and French
sweepers, supported by four British destroyers, were in the
Straits aU night, moreover the four mines which were destroyed
were discovered prior to the lyth.

The plan which I have outlined was based on a month’s
experience, and, I think, provided for every possible contingency,
except the unsuspected presence of a line of moored mines, in
the actual position in which the ships, working on the starboard
flank of our attack, were to manoeuvre throughout the
engagement.

For this oversight we were to pay bitterly on the morrow.

* ** Military Operations, Gallipoli,” Vol. I, page 96,

CHAPTER Xni

ACTION OF THE i8tH MARCH

Action of 1 8th h^ch; Boml, Irresistibk and Ocean sunk by mines; Fleet

withdraws.

The 1 8 th March broke under ideal weather conditions for our
attack, and I felt elated. A considerable army was assembling
to co-operate with us, the restrictions in Carden’s original
instructions had been withdrawn, de Robeck had been given
practically a free hand, and the real business was about to begin.

At this season the light for engaging the forts at the Narrows
was not favourable until even a later hour than it had been for
attacking the Outer Forts. As we could not afford to waste
ammunition, and had neither aerial nor flank observation, it was
necessary to wait until the forts were clearly distinguishable to
the firing ships, and we knew from experience that this would
not occur until ii a.m. at the earliest.

At 10.30 a.m. ten battleships entered the Straits, attended by
their picket boats, and the Wear, and preceded by the Colne and
Chelmer towing a light mine-seeking sweep.

Howitzers and field guns opened fire from both sides on the
destroyers and battleships, directly they came within range, and
the latter replied with their secondary armament, as they steamed
by, whenever they could see anything to fire at. The angle of
descent of the enemy’s indirect fee was very steep, there was so
much more water than ship for them to hit, and while we were
steaming up the Straits, though scores of rounds were feed, I
think the only hit they made was on the whaler at tiae davits of
the Chelmer.

On arriving at the 14,000 yards line, the Queen Elif^aheth,
Agamemnon, Lord Nelson and Inflexible took up their positions
(see plan facing page az8); Prince George mA. Triumph took station
on either flank on the 15,000 yards line — about 8,000 yards from
dife targets in the Intermediate Defences; and tiie French

Z32

ACTION OF MARCH i8

235

Squadron waited on the 16,000 yards line for further orders. The
Wear took station ahead of the Queen Elizabeth and the picket
boats moved out ahead of their parent ships, to destroy floating
mines. The Colne and Chelmer withdrew out of the Straits,
their sweep had failed to pick up any of the mines in the new
minefield, though they steamed at right angles through it, and
they must have passed through the gap made by the explosion
of one or more of the four mines we had foimd and destroyed.

The remaining six battleships, destroyers and minesweepers
waited outside the Straits. The Dublin watched "?"eni Shehr and
Besika Bay ; the Dartmouth the northern side of Gallipoli, with
orders to engage any batteries she might locate firing at the ships
inside the Straits ; and the Phaeton was making a reconnaissance
for Sir Ian Hamilton along the northern coasts of the Peninsula.

It was considered inadvisable to anchor — as we had done in
our attack on the Outer Forts — on account of the six-inch and
eight-inch howitzers and field guns of medium calibre, which were
capable of inflicting considerable damage to unarmoured super-
structure. The ships, however, found no difficulty in keeping
in a stationary position when stemming the current, and were
able to promptly fix a new position accurately, by cross bearing
on shore objects, when forced to move a little to throw off the
enemy’s iadirect fire.

The Queen Eli^beth could not get a good view of her targets
until 11.25, when she opened fire on Forts 19 and 20 ; shortly
afterwards the Agamemnon^ Lord Nelson and Inflexible engaged
Forts 13, 17 and 16, the Triumph and Prince George Batteries 8
and 7 respectively.

The forts replied, but the range was evidently too great, and
they ceased fire after a few shots. On the other hand our fire
was very accurate, the forts were repeatedly hit, and at 11.50 a
very heavy explosion occurred in Fort 20.

All the battleships were now under a heavy indirect fire from
howitzers and field gims ; the only people actually exposed to any
danger from it were the officers and men in the fighting tops
employed in fire control, and the crews of the Wear and picket
boats, which were often surrounded by fountains of spray,
which must have been a very trying experience for them, but
no one seemed to be in the least disturbed by it.

At 12.6, Admiral de Robeck ordered the French Squadron to

234

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

dose the forts. Admiral Guepratte had begged to be allowed to
lead the van in this attack, as Admiral de Robeck had done so
in the attack on the Outer Forts. The old French battleships
made a brave show as they passed through our line to engage
the forts at closer range ; the Suffren and Bouvet then drew out
towards the Asiatic, and the Charlemaffte and Gaulois towards
the European shore to leave a clear field of fire to “ A ” line.

Their approach woke up the enemy, who had been silent for
about 20 minutes, and a tremendous cannonade ensued.

At this timd a light breeze was blowing our smoke up the
Straits towards Chanak, which made observation of fire some-
times rather difficult. It could be seen, however, that Fort 13
was firing four guns, and that some of the guns in 19 and 16 were
in action. Batteries 7 and 8 in the Intermediate Defences were
also firing heavily, as were the howitzers and field guns from
both shores, the latter fired a good deal of shrapnel, apparently
directed against our fighting tops, which fortunately afforded
fairly good protection against shrapnel bullets.

A battery of four sk-inch howitzers on the Asiatic shore found
the Agamemnon’s range and hit her 12 times in 23 minutes —
without, it is true, causing casioalties or seriously affecting her
military qualities, but one of her 9.2-inch guns and two of her
12-pounder guns were damaged, and so she turned through 52
points to throw it off.

The Inflexible was very unlucky that day. A shell from a
sk-inch or eight-inch howitzer put one of her 12-inch guns out of
action at 12.16, and at 12.29 ^ four-inch projectile fired firom a
field gun near Erenkeui, hit a signal yard and burst on the roof of
her fighting top, ki ll in g three men and wounding two officers and
three men, the two former mortally ; only one man escaped.
At 12.47 one of the forts at the Narrows found the Inflexible^ s
range. A heavy shell, probably 14-inch, fell close alongside her,
and though it did not strike her, it burst just below the surface
and caused a leak in a couple of compartments on the port side
aft. Almost simultaneously a 9.4-inch shell made a jagged hole
in her starboard side above the water line, and a few minutes
later a 9.4-inch shell went through her foremast, and bursting in
the Navigator’s deck cabin, caused a severe fire which destroyed
all communication with the foretop. Her picket boat was also
hit at the same time by a heavy shell, but the crew managed to

(2UEEN ELIZABETH UNDER HRE IN DARDANELLES
I 8th IvIarch, 1915

IMPLACABLE AND TRAWLER LANDING TROOPS,
DARDANELLES

25TH April, 1915

ACTION OF MARCH i8

235

bring her alongside and escape unscathed before she sank.
The flames from the fire shot up all round the foremast and
scorched and smoked the wounded, and prevented their removal
for some time.

In xh& Queen Elizabeth we could probably see what was happen-
ing, better than those in the Infle>:ible*s conning tower, and the
Admiral ordered her to open the range. At that time the French
ships were closing the forts, and wanted all the support we could
give them, so Captain Phillimore, still heavily eng^^ging Fort 16,
turned the Inflexible until the smoke and flames were blowing
dear of the foremast, and remained in action until his fort was
silenced. He then withdrew a mile for a short time, to extinguish
the fire and restore communications.

Meanwhile, covered by the ships of A ” line, and reinforced
by the Triumph and Prince George — ^which moved up to support
them — ^the French ships were having a tremendous battle with
the forts at the Narrows, at ranges closing from 10,000 to 9,000
yards, engaging at the same time with their secondary armaments,
the batteries in the Intermediate Defences. The latter were soon
silenced, and the forts at the Narrows were smothered with
bursting shells and douds of debris — ^nevertheless they managed
to keep a certain number of guns in action, and heavy shells
dropped all round, and occasionally on the ships in the inner
line.

At 1.45 all the forts were practically silenced, and the only
ship which had suffered any serious damage was the Gaulois^
which had been badly holed below the water line by a heavy
shell. When the French ships first dosed, and the forts opened
fire after their long silence, apparently undamaged by the ham-
mering they had received from the ships in A ” line, I must
confess I fdt a bit anxious, as the old French ships were not well
protected. However, they put up a most valiant fight, and we
proved once again, after a terrific exchange of fire, that we could
silence and dominate the forts whenever we wished.

I fdt also, at that time, that concealed howitzers and fidd
guns would never be a dedsive factor. Up to 1,45, after more
than two and a half hours ceasdess fire, and the expenditure of an
enormous amount of ammunition, they had damaged one gun
in the primary armament of two ships, and caused less than a
dozen casualties in the Fleet. By that time, even the howitzer

236 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

fite had subsided to a great extent, and the Admiral ordered the
French Squadron, Prince George and Triumph to withdraw, and
the six battleships waiting outside, to come in and take i-bfir
places, accompanied by the first division of minesweepers. A
Turkish General Staff account of the situation at this moment
is as follows ;

“ By 2 p.m. the situation had become very critiral. All
telephone wires were cut, all communications with the forts
were interrupted, some of the guns had been knocked out,
others were half buried, others again were out of action
with their breech mechanism jammed ; in consequence the
artillery fire of the defence had slackened considerably.”*

So the enemy were in a worse plight than even I imagined —
and I was always regarded as an optinaist.

At 1.34 the Suffren was leading “ B ” line out, the Bouvet being
immediately astern of her. I happened to be looking at i-bpm ^ to
sec if they had been much knocked about, the Suffren bati just
passed, and the Bouvet 'Wis almost abreast of us, when I saw a great
column of smoke shoot up, which I thought was the burst of a
heavy shell striking her, followed by a tremendous explosion,
which looked as if her magazine had blown up, she heeled over,
still going very fast, capsized and plunged out of sight, with
incredible swjfeess. Within a minute of the explosion there
was nothing to be seen but a few heads in the water. Five officers
and about 30 men, who were engaged in the fire control and
upper deck batteries, were picked up by the Wear and our picket
boats ; 639 of her company, and her gallant Captain

Rageot, lie entombed in her.

I well remember being struck with Captain Rageot’s eager
bea^g when our plans were explained to his Admiral and the
Alhed Captains by Admiral de Robeck on the 15 th March, he
and his heroic Admiral were simply spoiling for battle, and m-xAe-
no seaet of their joy at being given an opportunity of proving
to their soldier brethren that the French Navy was also taking its
part in the great struggle in which their country was involved.
Indeed that was the spirit which animated the Allied Fleet
throughout the Gallipoli Campaign. The Bouvet had fought a
gallant fight and, in the few seconds left to him after he realised
* “Militaty Operations, GalEpoIi,” Vol. I. page 97.

ACTION OF MARCH i8

237

that his ship was doomed, I am quite sxire Rageot felt content to
pass with her.

It never occurred to the Admiral, or to me at the time, that the
Bouvet had struck a moored mine, but after her survivors had
been interviewed, it was decided that a mine and not a heavy shell
had blown up her magazine. We know now that she was the
first victim of the Nousrefs minefield.

In peace time, a loss like that of the Bouvet^ in full view of her
consorts, would have made a tremendous impression, but in the
heat of action such things are soon forgotten, and in a few minutes
I was intent in watching our old battleships taking up the gage.
The loss of the Bouvet had encouraged the enemy to bring such
guns as they could into action again, and the Ocean and Irresistible
on the Asiatic, and Albion and Vengeance on the European flank,
supported by the Swiftsure and Majestic respectively, opened fire
at 12,000 yards, and closed the range to 10,000 yards. The only
fort which was making any effective reply was Fort 19, though
other guns were firing wildly. At 3.15 Fort 19 dropped one or
two heavy shells alongside the Irresistible^ and the Queen Elizabeth
treated the fort to a few salvoes, which silenced it again.

At 4 p.m. the forts at the Narrows were practically
silenced, batteries guarding the minefields were contained,
and the situation appeared to be most favourable for clear-
ing the minefield. . . . The personnel of the trawlers, with
a few notable exceptions, is not satisfactory for sweeping
under fire.”*

It only remained for the sweepers to play their part, and had
they done so we would have been spared two of the losses we
were about to suffer.

Before 2 p.m., as I have said, I did not think the fire ftom
concealed howitzers and field guns would ever be a decisive
factor. I was wrong. The/^^7r of their fire was actually the
deciding factor of the fortunes of that day. For five hours
the Wear and picket boats had experienced, quite unperturbed
and without any loss,’]’ a far more intense fire from them than
the sweepers encountered when they entered the Straits, but

* Admiral de Robeck’s telegram 237, March 19th, 1915-

t The InjkxtbUs picket boat was sunk by a shell from the Narrows.

238 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

tlie latter could not be induced to face it, and sweep ahead of
the ships in “ B ” line.

Two pairs of trawlers got out their sweeps itnmediately ahead
of “ A ” line and commenced to sweep up stream ; they exploded
three mines,* which were evidently in the Nousret line, but
coming under fire abreast of WhitecMs, they turned and ran out
of the Straits, in spite of all the efforts of the Commander in the
picket boat leading them to drive them back. The other pair
left earlier in, the proceedings -without sweeping.

At 4. 1 1 p.m. the Inflexible reported having struck a mine on
the starboard side; she quitted the line with a considerable
list to starboard and down by the bows and steamed out of the
Straits towards Tenedos.

At 4.14 it was noticed that the Irresistible was listing and flying
a green flag at her starboard yard arm, which in^cated that
she had been torpedoed on her starboard side. As we could
not get any reply to our signals and she was apparently unable ,
to move, the Admiral ordered the Wear to close her and finH
out what was the matter. At the same time he signalled to
the Irresistible to proceed out of the Straits if able to do so,
and to the Ocean to prepare to take her in tow if necessary.

We watched the Wear go alongside, and to our consternation
saw her returning crowded with men. At 4.50 she came
alongside the Queen Elie^betb -with 28 officers and 582 men;
the only executive officer was a s^or lieut.-commander, who
reported that the Irresistible had struck a tnine , and th<ir the
captain and aU the other executive officers had remained on
board with ten selected volunteers, to assist the officers to
prepare the ship for towing and to tend the hawsers.

When the enemy saw her pHght, the batteries in the Inter-
mediate Area, which had been silent for a long opened
fire on her, and there were several dead and 18 wounded
on board the Wear. While the latter were being removed,
the Admiral and I discussed the situation, and agreed that there
was nothing more to be done that day. A number of floating
mines had been destroyed by the picket boats, and it seemed
to us that the Bouvet’s loss might possibly have been caused by
one, and that the mines struck by the Inflexible and Irresistible
might be floating mines, or some form of L6on mines telexed

* This was not teportcd to the A dmir al until the next day.

ACTION OF MARCH i8

239

from the Narrows, where four vessels were sighted when we
first entered the Straits.* Anyhow there was nothing to be
done until we had devised some means of dealing with drifting
mines, whatever their type, and had organised a sweeping force
that would sweep under fire. We still thought that the whole
area in which we were operating was clear of moored mines
when we entered it.

In the meantime the Irresistible had to be salved, and the
Admiral gave me permission to go to her in the Wear to see
what could be done, and authorised me to direct the captain
of the Ocean to take the Irresistible in tow without further delay.
Directly the wounded had been removed, I went on board the
Wear^ which returned to the Irresistible at full speed. Before
I left the Queen Elizabeth the Admiral had signalled that all
ships were to withdraw from the Straits except the Ocean and
the Swiftsure^ which were to cover the salvage of the Irresistible.
He also signalled for a division of destroyers to enter the Straits
and place themselves “ under the orders of the Chief of Staff
in Wearr

It was always pleasant to have destroyers about in a tight
place ; the training and spirit of the captains fit them to deal
with emergencies.

As we approached the Irresistible we could see that she was
being hit by salvo after salvo of four six-inch shells, fired in
rapid succession by Battery 8, which appeared to have only
one of its five guns out of action ; three six-inch guns in the
new battery at Whitecliffs were also making good practice at
almost point-blank range ; Battery 7, consisting of three modem
sis-inch guns, salved from the Messoudieby was firing at the
OceaUy and she and the Swiftsure were hotly engaged. The
Vengeance^ Albion and Majestic were withdrawing in obedience
to the Admiral's general recall. The forts at the Narrows
remained silent, although we were well within range.

I could see no sign of Hfe on board the Irresistible when the
Wear ran alongside her at 5,20 p.m. and concluded that the

* A Leon mine is a drifting mine which oscillates between certain set depths.
We know from information furnished by the Turks after the Armistice that they
had no Leon mines, but had manufactured about 40 drifting mines attached to
floats. Some of these had been released during previous attacks without effect ;
on 1 8th March the Bulair was ready below Nagara with 20 of them, but the Turks
state that none was dropped. “ Naval Operations,” Vol. 11 , page 225.

240

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

captain had decided to abandon her and go on board the
as an hour had passed since she was disabled, and the O^ea/i
seemed to have no intention of taking her in tow. This was
shortly afterwards confirmed. Under the circumstances, I think
the captain of the Irresistible was justified, since nothing was
to be gained by exposing his officers and men to the enemy’s
fire, at a range at which they could hardly fail to hit so large a
target at rest.

The Irresistible was then heading towards the Asiatic shore,
in the backwater of Erenkeui Bay, drifting slowly towards
Kephez Point, only a few hundred yards inshore of the current
setting swiftly down the Straits in the opposite direction. At
the same time a light southerly breeze was drifting her towards
the shore. I felt it was imperative, if she was to be salved, to
tow her those few hundred yards into the current as soon as
possible. So I signalled to the Ocean : The Admitral directs
you to take Irresistible in tow.” To which the Ocean replied
that there was insufficient water to do so.

It was obvious that the Irresistible would eventually drift
on shore, unless she foundered first, and I made up my mind
to torpedo her ; the possibility of her falling into the hands
of the enemy was simply unthinkable. I told Metcalfe (captain
of the Wear) to have two torpedoes ready, but first to sound
towards the shore, as I felt certain that she was much farther
out than the captain of the Ocean imagined. I was soon able
to signal to the Ocean that there was more than 15 fathoms of
water for half a mile inshore of the Irresistible^ and I repeated
the Admiral’s signal, directing the Ocean to take the Irresistible
in tow, but received no reply. Meanwhile the Ocean was
steaming to and fro at a good speed, engaging Batteries 7 and 8
with primary and secondary armament, and the Swiftsure was
lying still in Erenkeui Bay plastering the Asiatic hillsides, from
which much indirect fire from howitzers and field guns was
coming ; WhitecHffs seemed to be screened from her. Battery 7
was firing at the Ocean^ and 8 and WhitecHffs transferred their
attention to the Wear^ when she drew out clear of the Irresistible
on her sounding expedition. The fire from the sk-inch guns
at WhitecHffs was particularly unpleasant ; the battery was in
the hills above us, sufficiently close to clearly distinguish men
at the guns ; and the flash of the guns and the arrival of the

ACTION OF MARCH i8

241

projectiles seemed almost simultaneous. However, we steamed
about while we were sounding and were only hit by fragments
of shell which burst close to us, and wetted by the spray they
threw up.

When the division of destroyers outside the Straits received
the Admiral^s signal directing them to join me, the Racoon^
Mosquito^ Kenneth Jed^ Colne and Chelmer came rushing in at
full speed and gathered round the Wear and Irresistible. As
they could do no good at that stage, and were under considerable
fire, I hoisted a signal to them to Open,” i.e. extend their
distance from me, and they withdrew a mile or so down the
Straits to wait for further orders.

As it was evident the captain of the Ocean still did not think
it possible to take the Irresistible in tow, and she was steaming
about firing rapidly to no purpose, since there was nothing to
be gained by e:qpending ammunition except for a definite object,
I signalled : If you do not propose to take Irresistible in tow,
the Admiral wishes you to withdraw.” At the same time I
ordered the Smjtsure to go. (Her captain was junior to me.)
I did not feel justified in ordering her to close the Irresistible^
as she was poorly armoured in comparison with our old battle-
ships, and might have suffered heavily at such close range, if
the forts at the Narrows opened fire, as I expected them to do
at any moment. The Admiral had intended to leave the Triumph
and Swijtsure behind on that account when he went into the
Marmora.*

As the result of our survey, Metcalfe and I came to the
conclusion that the Irresistible would not drift ashore for some
time, and I was loath to torpedo her if there was any possibility
of salving her. She had lost her Hst, was practically on an
even keel, and though down by the stern, she seemed still to
have plenty of buoyancy and was apparently no lower in the
water than when I arrived nearly an hour previously. So I
decided to leave her and go full speed to the Admiral to suggest
that trawlers might try and tow her into the current after dark.

The Ocean was stiH steaming about blazing away at the forts,
much to my anxiety, as it was obvious that the enemy had some

* Triumph and Swiftsure were being built in England for Turkey at the time of
the Russo-Japanese War, and we bought them from her, though they were not
quite up to our standard at the time, to prevent Russia buying them.

242 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

unpleasant form of mine about, and it seemed only a question
of time before she hit one.

I had just told Metcalfe to close the Ocean^ in order that I
might repeat the Admiral^s directions to her to withdraw,
when at 6.5 p.m. (nearly two hours after the Irresistible was
disabled) there was a tremendous explosion alongside the Ocean^
and she took an ugly list, having struck a UGOne. Metcalfe
wanted to go alongside her at once, but I thought the Ocean* s
crew had better try and save the ship, so told him to lay off in
a position to run alongside if necessary.

I learnt later from the captain’s report that when she struck
the mine a shell hit her steering gear almost simultaneously,
jammed the helm hard over, and she could only steam in circles,
which accounted for her remaining stopped instead of steaming
out of the Straits. Thinking that she was in danger of sinking
and too badly damaged by the mine to salve, the captain decided
to abandon her at once and hoisted a signal for all destroyers
to close the Ocean. They all raced towards her ; the Colne^
Chelmer^ Kennet and Jed^ which were the first to arrive, ran
alongside, and she was abandoned in a few minutes.*

By this time the batteries in the Intermediate Defences and
the howitzers and field guns were firing from both shores at
the Ocean and destroyers, and shells were fallin g all round us ;
however, they caused no casualties and the Chelmer was the
only vessel that received any damage, a six-inch shell flooding
one of her stokeholds while she was lying alongside the Ocean.

When I felt quite certain that she was well in the stream
and that there was no risk of her going ashore before she reached
the entrance of the Straits, I went to the Queen Eli^abethy
which was lying just outside. The captains of the Irresistible
and Ocean were already on board her. I told the Admiral
exactly what I thought about the proceedings of the last two
hours and our failure to salve the Irresistible. I feared it was
now too late, as we had been much delayed by the Ocean* s
misfortune, but I proposed to go back at once, and if there
was no chance of getting the Irresistible into the current I would
toj^edo her. If the Ocean remained afloat as long as the
Irresistible had done, there was no reason why we should not

Acc^xiing to the Turkish Account, she did not sink until about 10.30 p.m.
“ Naval Operations,” VoL H, page zzz. ^

ACTION OF MARCH i8

243

tow her out, and ground her if necessary in shoal water off
Tenedos or Rabbit Island. I suggested that a battleship should
stand by at the entrance to take her in tow, and that some
trawlers should come in and assist to keep her in the current.

I could well imagine the Admiral's feelings, but he was
apparently undismayed ; his chief concern seemed to be that I
should get something to eat before I returned into the Straits,
and that I should have definite written orders to cover me if
I decided to torpedo the Irresistible. I considered the latter
absurd, and told him so, saying I had nearly torpedoed her two
hours earlier, and the thought had not troubled me. He insisted,
however, saying that I had no idea what a fuss the Admiralty
would make about sinking one of his Majesty's ships ; anyhow,
the responsibility was his, and he meant to take it.

While his secretary was preparing my orders for his signature,
he sat beside me while I had a hurried meal and then gave me
my orders, which were as follows :

“ Chief of Staff. I request the following :

1. Salve Ocean if possible. Vengeance is to stand by
at the entrance and take Ocean in tow if she drifts out of
the Dardanelles, Minesweepers should try and tow Ocean
and keep her in the current.

2. Irresistible is to be destroyed if she goes ashore. If
she looks like drifting ashore she is to be torpedoed or
blown up."

He explained that he did not wish vessels to be risked so
close to the forts, in the full glare of the searchlights, attempting
to salve the Irresistible. Meanwhile Hope had arranged for a
cutter from the Vengeance and the Canopus* steam pinnace, to
accompany me, and I left at once to return to the Wear^ but
it was pitch dark and I could not find her. However, I ran
across the Jed and went on board her. I was very sorry to
miss my Wear^ as I knew how disappointed Metcalfe and his
admirable crew would be, but time was passing and I had none
to waste. However, I found the Jed*s captain (Mulock) and
his ship's company spoiling to acquire merit.

Mulock told me of his experiences during the day. The
Jed waited outside the Straits with the other destroyers of her
division until the Bouvet foundered, when they ran in to try

244 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

and save life, but were too late to pick up anyone. A little
later, seeing die Gaulois with a heavy fist and down by the bows,
apparently sinkin g, they closed her and the Jed’s boats assisted
to pick up some of her crew, who, alarmed by the sudden fate
of the Bouvet^ had jumped overboard. When the Injiexibh
was mined the destroyers kept her in company until she was
well on her way to Tenedos.

On receiving the Ocean’s signal to close, the Jed ran alongside
her and embarked the captain, 12 officers and 48 men, and was
the last destroyer to leave. She was steaming down the Straits
when the captain decided to go back and have another look at
his ship. The Jed’s return was fortunate, as they found three
men still on board and one swimming close to her. The Jed
then took the Ocean! s people to the Queen Elit(abeth, and was
lying off waiting for orders when I fortunately fell in with her
about 8 p.m.

I found Mulock, like Metcalfe of the Wear, a good companion
for such an enterprise, and during the hours I spent on the
bridges of those two small craft I had plenty of time for
reflection.

I felt that the Ocean could take care of herself until the mine-
sweepers arrived. The salvage or sinking of the Irresistible
was of imm ediate importance, and the Jed with all dispatch
went to the position in which I had last seen her, keeping a
good look out for the Ocean as we ran up the Straits. If she
was still afloat we missed her in the darkness.

The next four hours which I spent in the Dardanelles were
intensely interesting and made a lasting impression on me.
Indeed, I t hink they were to a great extent responsible for my
feeling of absolute certainty — which has never wavered — ^that
our Fleet, with a flotilla of efficient minesweepers, would have
had no difficulty in forcing a passage into the Marmora.

It can hardly be said that the events of the afternoon had
been very encouraging, but I found the atmosphere of the
Dardanelles very exhilarating when I got back there that evening.

The Jed ran up to the spot in which I had left the Irresistible
and followed the drift of the current and southerly bree2e in
the direction I thought she would take, but there was no sign
of her. So we slowly followed the coast up to Kephez Point,
and thanks to the powerful searchlights which steadily swept

ACnON OF MARCH i8

245

the approaches to the Narrows, and occasionally lit up the
shore, we were able to make quite certain that the IrnsistihU
was not aground on the Asiatic side. It was just possible that
she might have been caught in an eddy as she approached
Kephez Point and have been carried into the current ; so we
stood over to Suan Dere Point, where we ran into aline of buoys
awash which looked like old observation mine cases ; they were
probably supporting some kind of anti-submarine net. These
buoys had been reported by a seaplane as a line of mines.

We followed the European shore for a while, and at length
I felt quite certain that the Irresistible had sunk in deep water.
We then searched very thoroughly for the Ocean until I satisfied
myself that she also had sunk. We often had to wait for a
long time for a particular reach of the shore to be lit up by the
enemy’s searchlights; this delayed our search, which occupied
us until after midnight, and in the course of it we were con-
tinually illuminated by one searchlight or another, and were
sometimes within a couple of thousand yards of the enemy’s
batteries.

About midnight the Admiral sent the captains of the Ocean
and Irresistible in the Colne to see how their ships had fared,
but as they were entering the Dardanelles they intercepted a
signal from me to the Admiral, telling him that I could find no
trace of either ship ; so they returned to Tenedos.

Except for the searchlights there seemed to be no sign of life,
and I had a most indelible impression that we were in the
presence of a beaten foe. I thought he was beaten at 2 p.m.
I knew he was beaten at 4 p.m. — ^and at midnight I knew with
still greater certainty that he was absolutely beaten ; and it only
remained for us to organise a proper sweeping force and devise
some means of dealing with drifting mines to reap the fruits
of our efforts.

I felt that the guns of the forts and batteries and the concealed
howitzers and mobile field guns were no longer a menace.
Mines moored and drifting must, and could, be overcome.

This is not a case of knowledge after the event ; there is
plenty of contemporary evidence that I held this view strongly,
apart from my own records. Sir Ian Hamilton mentions it
in his Gallipoli Diary,” page 51. I swore it on oath before
the Dardanelles Q)mmis$ion two years later and have reiterated

246 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910—1515

my belief ever since. Somehow I must have sensed what was
happening a few miles away, but it was some years before I
received confirmation that my view of the situation was the
correct one.

The enemy were at great pains to put about that the forts
were practically undamaged ; only one or two guns were put
out of action, their casualties were slight, etc., etc. These
reports reached us and were believed by some and later were
quoted in the Admiral’s telegram, as an argument against deliver-
ing anodier attack. The Naval LUstorian (Sir Julian Corbett),
writing in 1921, dwells on the magnitude of our defeat. He
states, however, that : “ Long afterwards, reports which were
received from Constantinople went to show that the day’s
work had had as serious an eifect on the Turks as on the Allies.
So terrible was said to have been the havoc of the heavy ships’
guns, and so far spent the morale and ammunition of the garrison,
that further resistance seemed hopeless. The impression
prevailed that, had the attack been renewed, nothing would
have induced the men to stand to their guns, and all the forts
must have been abandoned.” He then goes on thoroughly to
discredit this story, but there is abundant proof now to bear
out its accuracy. He tells us that : “ It must be borne in mind
that only one of the fort guns was permanently damaged.”
Later he says : “ It is true the Nagara group of forts was obsolete
and practically negligible, but the chances against getting so
far through the unswept minefields, which in all contained
nearly 350 mines, are calculated to have been 15 to i — ^that is,
out of sixteen ships only one could have hoped to reach die
Marmora.”* In fact he blows hot and cold and is rather
difficult to follow ; besides, there was never any question of
taking battleships through unswept minefields.

I have recorded the Turkish General Staff’s account of the
situation at 2 p.th. The Military Historian, writing in 1929,
tells us that :

“ On the evening of the 1 8th March the Turkish command
at the Dardanelles was weighed down by the premonition
of defeat. More than half the ammunition had been
expended, and it could not be replaced. The antiquated
* “ Naval Opeiations,” Vol. n, page 224.

ACTION OF MARCH i8

247

means of fire control had been seriously interrupted. The
Turkish gun crews were demoralked and even the German
officers present had, apparently, little hope of successful
resistance if the Fleet attacked next day. Of the nine rows
of mines many had been in position for six months, and a
large proportion of these were believed either to have been
carried away by the current, or to such a depth that ships
would not have touched them. For the rest, many were
of old pattern and not too trustworthy, and owing to
the shortage of numbers they were, on an average, 90 yards
apart, more than three times the beam of a ship. A German
journalist describes the great astonishment of the defenders
of the coast forts when the attack suddenly ceased. He
records that the German naval gunners who were manning
the batteries at Chanak told him later that they had made
up their minds the Fleet would win, and they themselves
could not have held out much longer.^^*

The above statement is based on Der Kampf um die Dar-
danellen, 1915,” page 74, the German official account written
by Muhlmann, a Staff Officer of General Liman von Sanders ;
also Zwei Kriegsjahre in Konstantinopel,” by Stuermer, and
the Turkish official account, which says : In Fort Hamidieh
[19] there were but five to ten rounds left, and the batteries
on the European side were equally low.”

The Jed was one of the destroyers fitted with a light mine-
seeking sweep, and her River ”) class had proved theic ability
to work them efficiently. These sweeps were not strong enough
to dear mines, but they were valuable for giving warning of
their presence. The River ” class had no room to handle a
proper minesweeping outfit, but I felt that something could be
improvised to enable these to be worked from the eight Beagle ”
class destroyers.

We now had two whole ships^ companies to draw on to
man the sweepers, whose crews coxild be sent home. I knew
that some of ffie latter and a great number of officers and men
of the ships would volunteer for service in sweepers, some of
which could lay tunny nets to protect bombarding ships ; others
could assist the destroyers to dear the minefields.

* “Military Operations,” VoL I, pages 105 and 106.

248 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

The utter contempt for danger displayed by the destroyers
and picket boats throughout that day was an inspiration, and I
knew that directly our new sweeping force was organised and
trained, it would simply tear a way through the minefields, and
enable the ships to dose to a range from which they would
pulverize the forts and batteries, as they did the Outer Forts.

If I fdt elated on the morning of the i8th March, I felt coldly
confident before the next dawn broke that in spite of our
misfortunes of that day success was now within our reach.

It was in that frame of mind I went into my Admiral’s cabin,
to tell him that the Ocean and Imsistihh were safdy at the bottom
in deep water, and our anxiety that the latter might have drifted
into the enemy’s hands was at an end.

I was distressed to find him very unhappy. He told me he
fdt sure that he would be superseded the next day. I told him
there could be no question of that. The First Lord would not
be discouraged by our check, and I knew that he would rely
on us to see the matter through— which we would do in the
course of a few days. The Queen and Implacable would be with
us shortly; they were more than a match for the Ocean and
Irresistible, and though we had no battle cruiser for the Goeben,
the Lord Nelson and Agamemnon could overwhelm her— even
if we were not allowed to take the Queen Elizabeth into mined
waters again.

We discussed the new mine “ destroying ” force, and since
it was the only thing that mattered, I begged him to allow me
to lead it. He would not hear of this, but gave me a free hand
to organise a minesweeping and net protection force.

In the meantime some of the exhilarating atmosphere of the
lower reaches of the Dardanelles must have drifted down to
Tenedos, for when the 19th broke we were all full of confident
hope, and determination to overcome all opposition.

After two or three hours’ rest I was shaving to Rudyard
Kipling’s “ If,” as is my wont. “ If” has always sustained me
when &e Fates have been unkind.

CHAPTER XIV

REORGANISATION

Review of damage sustamed by ships ; Reorganisation of minesweeping force ;
Preparation for renewal of attack; Admiral postpones Naval attack until
Army is ready for combmed operation.

During the forenoon of 19th March I went on board the
Inflexible and found the indomitable Phillimore confident of
his ability to take his ship to Malta to be docked, as soon as
temporary repairs had been effected. As my Admiral reported :
“ He displayed high qualities as a seaman and leader of men,
and it was due to the admirable conduct and devotion to duty
of all ranks, that the Inflexible was saved to the Navy.”

Sir Ian Hamilton describes, in his “Gallipoli Diary,” the
scene he witnessed when the Phaeton arrived off the entrance of
the Straits, as the Inflexible steamed slowly out, listing to starboard
and down by the bows, her ship’s company standing strictly
to attention on the upper deck. “ A spectacle of great virtue,”
to use his words. I wish I had his graphic pen to describe
what was going on down below. The explosion of the mine
flooded the fore submerged torpedo flat, and killed one officer
and 26 men stationed there ; flmes and poisonous fumes rose
through the escape trunk, rendering several men in the vicinity
unconscious. The electric ring main was cut, thus extinguishing
all electric lights, and stopping the ventilation fans. The shock
of the raplosion extinguished almost all the oil lamps, which
are kept alight during an action in case of electric failure. The
two steaming watches behaved with great coolness, and when
the captam ordered one watch on deck— considering the
condition of the ship critical, and one watch sufficient to steam
her — ^both watches claimed the right to stop below in the
darkness and great heat, disdaining the comparative safety of
the upper deck.

249

250 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

The Inflexible, like all our ships at that date, was a long way
behind contemporary ships of the enemy in protection against
under-water explosion, and she was undoubtedly saved by the
devoted bravery of officers and men, who worked in the fore
magazine, shell room and other compartments in complete
darkness, ami d poisonous fumes and rising water, until aU
valves, ventilators and watertight doors were secured. Indeed
the Inflexible well upheld the fighting traditions which the batde
cruisers had already established, and to which they were yet to
add glorious pages.

The Inflexible was certainly unlucky, but except for the damage
and loss of life for which the mine was responsible, she only
had one casualty from gunfire, other than the officers and men
who were killed and wounded in her fighting top by a small
shell from a field gun fired from the Asiatic shore. The only
damage she suffered was, as I have mentioned, one 12-inch gun
out of action.

Of the other ships engaged the Gaulois was the most seriously
damaged by gunffie, a heavy shell having penetrated below
the water line. Flooding spread, due to faulty ventilating
trunks, and she came out of the Straits m a sinking condition.
At one time it seemed doubtful whether she would reach
Rabbit Island, on which she was eventually beached.
So critiral was her state, that her captain decided to disembark
her crew, with the exception of those necessary to steam and
navigate her, and our destroyers ran alongside and took about
400 men off her.

The old French ships were even less able to compete with
under-water damage than ours, and the Suffren was also leaking
from the effects of a plunging shell, which exploded below her
water line. The French ships carried no skilled divers, and our
divers put patches on both vessels, and when the Gaulois had
been pumped out and refloated, she and the Suffren proceeded
in company to Malta, to be docked and repaired. This only left
the Charlemagne, which was not hit during the action, and Admiral
Gudpratte transferred his flag to her.

Except for under-water damage, the Gaulois was ready for
action, and her casualties were only ii slightly wounded. The
Siffren was hit in one of her six-inch turrets by a heavy shell,
which killed 12 men, put a gun out of action, and necessitated

REORGANISATION

251

the flooding of a magazine. She had no other casualties nor
serious damage, other than a leaky compartment.

Of the British ships engaged, the Ocean^ up to the moment
when she struck a mine, had only been hit two or three times,
and had suffered neither damage nor casualty. Three men were
wounded when abandoning the ship, one man was scalded by
an escape of steam when the explosion occurred, and nine men
were injured jumping on board the destroyers when the ship
was abandoned. One man was missing.

The Irresistible^ up to the time she struck a mine, had not been
hit to any extent by howitzers, and not at all by the heavy guns
at the Narrows. While she was being abandoned, the six-inch
guns in the Intermediate Defences, which had been silent for
a long time, opened fire, and 10 were killed and 17 wounded
while embarking in the Wear^ and one was wounded later when
the remainder were taken off. The Vengenace was not hit, and
the Albion was hit by one shell which did little damage. These
two ships, like the Ocean and Irresistible^ were well within range
of the forts at the Narrows, and within very dose range of the
six-inch batteries of the Intermediate Defences for nearly three
hours, and the two latter for an hour longer, unprotected by
their consorts of “ B ” line, or the ships in A ” line.

Of the flanking ships, the Swiftsure was not hit, the Triumph
was slightly damaged on the upper deck and in a cabin by one
howitzer shell, and had no casualties. The Prince George had
three slightly wounded and no damage. The Majestic was hit
by two shells, which did no material damage but wounded eight
men, one of whom died. Of the ships in “ A ” line, the Queen
Eli^abeth^ which was nearest the Exiropean shore and was a
target for howitzer and fidd guns for six hours, was hit three
times ; the most serious damage was from a howitzer shell,
which blew a hole in the deck above the gunroom (Junior
Officers’ Mess). She had no casualties. The Lord Nelson
reported that she had been hit four or five times by howitzers
and field guns ” ; one 9.2-inch gun was put out of action,
otherwise she suffered neither damage nor casualties. The
Agamemnon was hit 12 times, five hits on her armour which had
no effect, seven others damaged superstructure and funnels, and
put a 12-inch gun (temporarily) and two 12-pounders out of
action. She had no casualties.

252 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

To sum up the losses and damage suffered by the 16 ships
engaged :

By Mines. Three ships were simk and one severely damaged
by the Nousret min es, with the loss of 666 officers and men.

By Concealed Howitv(ers and Mobile Artillery. During an
engagement lasting nearly seven hours, in the course of which
hundreds of rounds were fired by howitzers and field guns at
practically stationary ships and destroyers, minesweepers and
picket boats, the damage they inflicted was simply negligible.
The casualties for which they were responsible amounted to
no more than sk killed or died of wounds, and less than a
dozen seriously and a few slightly woimded ; the losses being
confined to three ships.

By the six-inch Batteries in the Intermediate Defences. The guns
in &ese batteries were silenced early in the action, but when
the Irresistible was in trouble and inadequately supported, they
certainly hit her repeatedly at very short range, and were respon-
sible for the casualties she and the Ocean suffered when they
were being abandoned.

By the Forts at the Narrows. The heavy gims at the Narrows
fired scores of rounds during the five hours in which the old
battleships of “ B ” line were well within effective range, and
those in “ A ” line at extreme range, and they were responsible
for the damage and losses sustained by the French ships, but
they only succeeded in hitting the Ocean once and the Inflexible
in “ A ” line three times, killing one man in the latter — and yet
we are told over and over again that it was foUy for ships to
try and engage forts, and that the concealed guns and howitzers
were a serious menace to the passage of ships through the Straits.

It is true that the latter had been regarded as such by my
Admirals, and that reports to this effect had been made to the
A dmir alty ; furtiher, that General Birdwood had endorsed this
view in the appreciations he sent to Lord Kitchener, but our
experience on the i8th March, and the fiicts I have stated, surely
conclusively dispose of any idea that fortress guns, concealed
howitzers and mobile artillery could have prevented the Fleet
fiom forcing the Straits.

The Nousret minefield had been responsible for all our
troubles, and other writers have recorded their belief that this
line of mines altered the whole course of history. Those

REORGANISATION

^53

mines, and the inefficiency of out sweepers at that time, were
the sole cause of the failure of the Fleet on i8th March to carry
out the task with which the Admiralty had been charged. But
the responsibility for the ultimate failure of the Fleet to force
a passage through the Dardanelles, lies on the shoulders of those
who would not allow us to accomplish our task, after the cause
of our check had been discovered, and efficient minesweepers
had been provided.

The thought that the Fleet had shot its bolt and was never to
fight again of course did not enter into my head for a moment.
Mines, moored and drifting, had to be conquered, and to the
solution of this problem I immediately concentrated all my
efforts.

The crews of the trawler sweepers were given the option of
returning to England at once; 115 did so, but some brave
stalwarts insisted on staying to wipe out the past, and they
seized every opportunity of most gallantly doing so. Officers
and men of the Ocean and Irresistible volxmteered in great
numbers for minesweeping duties and service in trawlers, as
did all who could be spared from the Inflexible during her lengthy
refit. Nximbers far in excess of those required were available,
and splendid crews were selected for the trawlers. Kites and
large quantities of wire were ordered up ftom Malta with all
dispatch. Greek fishermen were engaged at Tenedos to make
and fit tunny nets, and the organisation of a thoroughly
belligerent minesweeping and netting force was pressed on
with feverish haste. No- one worked less than 18 hours a
day, but we were much hampered by bad weather ; on the 19th
it blew a gale ftom the southward, on the 20th the wind switched
round and blew a gale ftom the northward. The vessels under-
going repairs and fitting out under the lee of Tenedos had to
shift berth ftom one side to another at short notice. Meanwhile
the Queen Elix^^betb remained off Tenedos, generally superin-
tending the repairs of damaged ships and preparations for an
overwhelming onslaught on the Narrows.

On the 19th the Admiral heard ftom Sir Ian Hamilton that
he proposed to take his army to Alexandria and Port Said, to
reorganise it in shape for landing, and he asked for the AdmiraFs
concurrence. The troops had been embarked in transports,
irrespective of any tacticd requirements, and were quite tinready

254 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

for action until they could be landed, resorted and re-embarked,*
There were no facilities at Mudros, hence the General's wish
to use the well-equipped Egyptian ports as a preliminary base.

The Admiral replied on 20th March :

“ As a military measure I concur with your proposal to
make Egypt the headquarters, but submit that political
result of withdrawing troops from Mudros at the moment
requires the gravest consideration. If Governments of
Balkan States take it to mean failure, or abandonment of
attack on Dardanelles, result might be far reaching. To
prevent the wrong interpretation being placed on the
movement of the troops, I suggest that their departure be
delayed until our attack is renewed in a few days' time ;
in the meantime feints of landing on a large scale on several
points of the coast of Gallipoli might tend to draw off
field gxms from Dardanelles, where they are likely to
seriously hamper our sweeping operations.”

Our preparations were advancing apace, and on the 20th the
Admiral was able to telegraph to fhe Admiralty that eight
“ Beagle ” class destroyers were being fitted as minesweepers ;
six “ River ” class and four torpedo boats — ^the latter from the
Suez Canal — ^were being fitted with light sweeps as mine seekers,
and a flotilla of picket boats with explosive creeps. Eighteen
British minesweepers, manned entirely by volunteers, and 12
French were ready for action.

The whole area in which the ships would manoeuvre, in order
to dominate the forts at the Narrows, and the batteries protecting
the Kephez minefield, would be thoroughly swept by day.
[With a regular naval sweeping force the howitzers and more
mobile artillery could be disregarded.] No night minesweeping
would be carried out. Tunny nets and indicator nets would be
kid across the Straits during the night, before the attack was
renewed. The Admiral said he hoped to be in a position to
commence operations in three or four days ; the delay was
inevitable, as the new crews and destroyers would need pre-
liminary practice, and this was being held up by heavy weather.
He concluded by saying that no ships would enter the Straits
until everything was ready for a sustained attack. This kst
* ** Military Operations, Gallipoli,” Vol. I, page 108.

REORGANISATION 255

because it was important to make the Admiralty ^der^and
that it was futile to go into the Straits unless one had a definite
object in view. It was quite easy to dominate Ae forts, and
carry out an operation within their range, while they^ were
dominated ; but unless our object was attained before it was
necessary to break off the action, the whole business had to be
started afresh. Until we had an efficient- naval sweeping force
it would have been folly to go in and engage the forts ; we
simply had not the ammunition to spare, and could not afford
to wear out our old guns in engagements which could not be

carried to a decisive issue. j. 1, 4

This telegram crossed one from the Admiralty, dispatched
about midnight on 19 th, which was appreciative and encouraging
and informed the Admiral that in addition to the Qmen and
Implacable, which would join him in a few days, the London
and Prince of Wales had sailed that night. So it w^ evident
that the Admiralty were supporting us and were not discourage
by our check. This is confirmed by a statement made by Mr.
Churchill to the Dardanelles Commission :

“ I regarded it as only the first of several days’ fighting,
though ffie loss in ships sunk or disabled was unpleasant.
It never occurred to me for a moment that we should not
go on, within the limits of what we had decided to risk,
till we reached a decision one way or the other. I found
Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson in ffie same mood.
Both met me ffiat morning (ffie i^ffi) with expressions of
firm determination to fight it out.”*

The Admiralty telegram (120) concluded : “ It seems important
not to let ffie forts be repaired, or to encourage enemy by any
apparent suspension of ffie operations, .^ple suppuK oi
15-inch ammunition are available for indirect fee of Queen
Elkaheth across ffie Peninsula.” We took ffiis to m^,
perhaps wrongly, that ffie Queen Elizabeth should not be taken

into min ed waters again.

To this ffie Admiral replied (246) :

“ 21st March.

"From experience gained on 18th, I consider that the
forts at ffie Narrows, and the batteries guarding ffie

* Dardanelles Commission,” First Report, page 58.

256 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

minefields, can be dominated, after a few hours’ ^^igage-
ment, sufficiendy to enable minesweepers to clear Kephes:
minefield. The howitzers and concealed gunfire must be
faced, as it is impossible for the ships to deal with them.

Our first consideration must be the organisation of a
strong military sweeping force, with which to first clear
the area in which the Squadron will manoeuvre, to cover
the minesweepers operating in the Kephez minefield.
Until preparations for this are thoroughly complete, I do
not propose to engage the forts by direct attack.

For the Queen Elizabeth to fire by indirect laying from
Gaba Tepe, it is essential she should have a seaplane up
to spot; strong southerly gale and low visibility have
prevented flying since i8th. It is hoped to continue this
form of attack direedy weather moderates.”

The Admiral concluded by saying that he would confer with
General Hamilton as soon as possible.

Sir Ian replied on 21st to the Admiral’s telegram of 20th, to
the effect that he thought the political question raised was a
matter for the Cabinet, and that he was personally a sceptic as
to the value of feints without landing, but agreed, as he was
anxious to meet the Admiral’s wishes, that the transfer to the
new base should be gradual. On receipt of this the Admiral
decided to go to Mudros on the following day.

It is important to note that at this time there was no question
of any action other than a renewed attack by the Fleet on the
Narrows, with the object of forcing a passage into the Marmora,
direedy the reorganised minesweeping force was ready. The
Admiral’s telegrams to the Admiralty and the General are ample
proof of this.

I was very much occupied with the preparations which were
being made to renew our attack, and was away from the ship
in this connection when Generals Hamilton, Birdwood and
Braidiwaite, and Admirals de Robeck and Wemyss met on board
the Queen Elizabeth on the morning of 22nd March to discuss —
as I thought— future military movements. On my return I
learnt with dismay from Captain Godfrey that the Admiral had
abandoned aU idea of renewing the naval attack, until the Army
was landed and suificiently in occupation of the Gallipoli

REORGANISATION

257

Peninsula to ensure an easy passage for the Fleet through the
Straits. As there was no prospect of the Army being able to
undertake operations for some weeks, it seemed folly to wait
and give the enemy time to organise his defence, if our arrival
in the Marmora was likely to have the effect the Government
anticipated, Godfrey, who had spent the i8th March in the
foretop of the Queen Eli^abeth^ which was a target for scores of
shells all day, and had had a good view of all that was going on,
was entirely in agreement with me, and has never wavered
from this opinion.

I lost no time in having it out with the Admiral, and learnt
from him that Sir Ian Hamilton had told him that a landing
at Bulair, which was now a veritable fortress, was out of the
question, and he had expressed his intention of landing at the
toe of the Peninsula, and advancing to the Kilid Bahr Plateau
with the Fleet on either flank. I am sure that the Admiral
would have renewed his attack if the General had decided to
land at Bulair, or had made it clear (in accordance with No. i
of Lord Kitchener’s instructions) that there would be no question
of a landing in force until the Fleet was in the Marmora, or had
finally failed. {See page 224.) But the General’s readiness to
land at the toe of the Peninsula of course entirely altered the
situation from the point of view of the Admiral, who was not
as sanguine of a naval success as I was.

Later in the day I accompanied the Admiral to the Franconia^
on board which the General and his Staff were living, and he
told Sir Ian that I was very anxious to go on, without waiting
for the Army, directly the reinforcements arriving from England
and the new sweeping force were ready for action. Then,
turning to me, he asked me when I expected to be ready with
the latter, I said that the weather and difficulties experienced
in fitting the destroyers to work heavy sweep wires were causing
delay, but we would be ready in all respects to renew the attack
by 3rd or 4th April. The Admiral then remarked that as the
General expected to be ready to land by 14th April, it only
entailed a wait of ten days. So the matter was finally settled.
I returned to the Franconia that evening with the draft of his tele-
gram to the Admiralty, reporting his change of plan, and a
message from him asking for the General’s concurrence. Sir
Ian raised no objection and actually suggested the wording of

2j8 naval memoirs, 1910-1915

the kst paragraph. The following telegram was then sent to
the Admiralty :

256. “ At a meeting today with Generals Hamilton and
Birdwood, the former told me the Army would not be in
a position to undertake any military operations before
14th April.

In order to maintain my communications, when the
Fleet penetrates into the Marmora, it is necessary to destroy
all guns of position guarding the Straits ; these are numerous
and only a small percentage can be rendered useless by
gunfire.

The landing of demolition parties on 26th February
evidently surprised the enemy. From our experience on
the 4th instant, it seems that in future the destruction
of guns will have to be carried out in face of strenuous
and well-prepared opposition; I do not consider it a
practicable operation to land a force, adequate to undertake
this service, inside the Dardanelles. General Hamilton
concurs in this opinion.

If the guns are not destroyed, any success by the Fleet
may be nullified by the Straits dosing up after the ships
have passed through, and as the loss of material will possibly
be heavy, ships may not be available to keep the Dardanelles
open.

The mine menace will continue till the Marmora is
reached, being much greater than was antidpated ; it must
be carefully and thoroughly dealt with, both as regards
minefields and floating mines.

This will take time to accomplish, but our arrangements
wiU be ready by the time the Army can act.

It appears, tiierefore, better to prepare for a decisive
effort about the middle of April, rather than risk a great
deal, for what may possibly be only a partial solution.”

I was not aware until I read the Dardanelles Commission’s
Fkal Report several years later, that Admiral de Robeck had
added the following to the foregoing telegram :

“It now appears to me that there may, possibly, be
above the Narrows minefields of which we have very little
information.

REORGANISATION

259

Obstacles may be sunk in the Channel by the Germans,
and submerged hulks and pontoons placed there. I have
in mind particularly the very large pontoons in the Golden
Horn, on which the old Road Bridge firom Stamboul to
Pera was laid.*

The howitzers, which it is difficult to spot from the sea,
will, of course remain.

I think it will be necessary to take and occupy the
Gallipoli Peninsula by land forces before it will be possible
for first-rate ships, capable of dealing with the Goeben,
to be certain of getting through and for colliers and other
vessels, upon which the usefulness of the big ships largely
depends, to get through.”

I must confess that I was fearfully disappointed and unhappy,
but the Admiral contended that since the General was prepared
to seize the Gallipoli Peninsula below the Narrows, it would
be far better to make a certainty of it, with a big combined
operation, than to risk another naval attack alone, only ten
days before the Army was ready to co-operate. I had seen him,
when he was Second in Command, gallantly leading his old
ships into the fray, and laying them almost alongside the Outer
Forts — ^had watched him showing a stiff upper lip on the
18th March, when all his hopes were being shattered, and I
had a great admiration for him and unbounded confidence in
him. Moreover, the Chief of Staff, having done his best to
place bis views and those of the Staff before his Admiral, is
bound in all loyalty — ^while he holds the appointment — ^to do
all in his power to carry out the policy his Admiral decides upon.

At the time, of course, one did not know what was going
on behind the scenes, but “The Dardanelles Commission
Report ” (published 1917), Sir Ian’s “ Gallipoli Diary ” (published
1920), Winston Churchill’s “World Crisis,” Vol. U (pubHshed
1923), Admiral Wemyss’ “ The Navy in the Dardanelles Cam-
paign ” (published 1924), and the “ Military Operations,
Gallipoli” (pubHshed 1929) fill in a great many gaps in my
records.

* Here ate over 40 fathoms of water from shore to shore in the Narrows, and
abreast of Nagara Point, and the blocking of the channel in the manner suggested
wotild have been a physical impossibility.

260

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

It appears that on the 19th March, Sir Ian, under the influence
of the spectacle of the Inflexible and Gauhis limping out of the
Straits, apparently in a sinking condition, telegraphed to Lord
Kitchener :

“ I am being most reluctantly driven to the conclusion
that the Straits are not likely to be forced by battleships,
as at one time seemed probable, and that if my troops
are to take part, it will not take the subsidiary form an-
ticipated. The Army’s part will be more than mere
landing parties to destroy the forts ; it must be a deliberate
and prepared military operation, carried out at full strength,
so as to open a passage for the Navy.”

Sir Ian goes on to refer to the telegram he sent to the Admiral
regarding the transfer of troops to Alexandria : “ so as to
shake them out there and re-ship them ready for anythiug,”
and he quotes from the Admiral’s reply : “ Until our attack is
renewed in a few days’ time ” — ^and comments, “ Bravo the
Admiral.”

On 20th March Sir Ian records :

“An answer came from K., straight, strong and to
the point. He says : ‘ You know my view, that the
Dardanelles passage must be forced, and that if large
military operations on the Gallipoli Peninsula by your
troops are necessary to clear the way, those operations
must be undertaken, after careful consideration of the local
defences, and must be carried through.’ — ^Very well ; all
hinges on the Admiral.”

On 2 1 St March Sir Ian quotes from a letter he received ftom
the Admiral : “ We are all getting ready for another ‘ go,’
and not in the least beaten or downhearted.” And continues :

“Although the confidence of the sailors seems quite
unshaken by the events of the 18 th, Birdie* seems to have
made up his mind that the Navy have shot their bolt for
the time being, and we have no time to lose in getting
ready for a landing. But then he did not see the battle,
and cannot therefore gauge the extent to which the Turkish
forts were beaten.

* Majot-Geuetal Sir William Birdwood.

REORGANISATION

261

On the 22nd March at 10 a.m. we had another conference
on board the ^ueen Eli^aheth. . . . The moment we sat
down de Robeck told us that he was now quite clear
he could not get through without the help of all my troops. [Sir
Ian’s italics.] Before ever we went on board, Braithwaite,
Birdwood and I agreed that, whatever we landsmen might
think, we must leave the seamen to setde their own job,
saying nothing for or against the land operations or am-
phibious operations xmtil the sailors themselves turned to
us and said that they abandoned the idea of forcing the
Straits by 3aaval operations alone. They have done so.
The fat (that is us) is fairly in the fire. . . . During the
battle I had cabled that the chances of the Navy pushing
through on tiieir own were hardly fair fighting chances,
but since then de Robeck, the man who should know,
had said twice that he did think there was a fighting chance
— ^had he stuck to that opinion at the conference. . . .
But once the Admiral had said that his battleships coiild
not fight through without help, there was no foo&old left
for the view of a landsman.”

I seem td have had misgivings I could not hide. Sir Ian
says on 24th March :

“ Roger Keyes from the flagship came shortly afterwards.
He is sick as a she bear robbed of her cubs, that his pets —
battleships, T.B.’s, destroyers, submarines, etc. — should
have to wait for the Army. Well, we are not to blame !
Keyes has been shown my cables to K. and is pleased with
them. ... He said one illuminating and encouraging
thing to Braithwaite, viz., that he never felt so possessed
of the power of the Navy to force a passage through the
Narrows as in the small hours of the 19 th, when he got
back to the flagship after trying in vain to salve the Ocean
and Irresistible”*

I have only recently read Admiral Wemyss’ book and was
astonished to find the following account of his share in those
fateful decisions :

“ On the following day (the 19th) I again visited de
Robeck at Tenedos and found him naturally enough
* “ Gallipoli Diaty,” Vol. I, pages 33-51.

2^2 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

somewhat depressed at the turn of events. He spoke of
disaster, a term I begged him not to use, and after con-
ferring with him on the steps necessary to take as a conse-
quence of the battle of the day before, I left him more
cheerful than I had found him.

The experience that we had undergone pointed to the
following argument: the battleships could not force the
Straits until the minefields had been cleared — ^the mine-
fields could not be cleared until the concealed guns which
defended them were destroyed — ^they could not be destroyed
until the Peninsula was in our hands, hence we should
have to seize it with the Army. Any main operations
must therefore be postponed until such time as preparations
for a combined attack could be made.”

Commenting on the meeting of Generals and Admirals on
the 22nd March, Wemyss says :

“ The decision of the conference confirmed the con-
clusion de Robeck and I had come to on the 19th, viz.
that combined action must be postponed tintil plans had
been developed and perfected. In the meantime the
Vice-Admiral would keep the enemy busy with constant
bombardments.”*

It is difficult to reconcile this account with Admiral de Robeck’s
telegrams of 20th and 21st ; nevertheless, I still think that if
the Army had decided to land at Bulair, de Robeck would have
renewed the naval attack, as his telegrams to the General and
the Admiralty so definitely stated.

The First Lord teUs us in “ The World Crisis ” that he read
the Admiral’s telegram 256 with consternation, and en-
deavoured to persuade Lord Fisher to concur in sending the
following telegram to Admiral de Robeck :

"In view of the dangers of delay through submarine
attack and of heavy cost of Army operation, and possibility
that it will fiail or be only partly effective ia opening the

- Strdts, and that the danger of mines will not be relieved
by it, we consider that you ought to persevere methodically
but resolutely with the plan contained in your instructions

* “The Navy in the Daidaneiles Campaign,” by Wester Wemyss, pages 41-4}.

REORGANISATION

263

and in Admiralty telegram 109, and that you should make
all preparations to renew the attack begun on i8th at the
first favourable opportunity. You should dominate the
forts at the Narrows and sweep the minefield and then
batter the forts at close range^ taking your time, using
your aeroplanes and all your improved methods of guarding
against mines. The destruction of the forts at the Narrows
may open the way for a further advance. The entry into
the Marmora of a Fleet strong enough to beat the Turkish
Fleet would produce decisive results on the whole situation,
and you need not be anxious about your subsequent line
of communications. We know the forts are short of
ammunition and supply of mines is limited. We do not
think the time has yet come to give up the plan of forcing
Dardanelles by a purely Naval operation,”

This was painfully prophetic and admirably sums up the
situation which came to pass. If it had been sent and acted
upon courageously, who can doubt the result in the light of
our knowledge today?

Mr. Churchill gave the following evidence before the
Dardanelles Commission :

I proposed that we should direct the Admiral to renew
the Naval attack, according to his previous intention. The
First Sea Lord, however, did not agree ; nor did Sir Arthur
Wilson ; nor did Sir Henry Jackson. Lord Fisher took
the line that hitherto he had been willing to carry the
enterprise forward, because it was supported and recom-
mended by the Commander on the spot. But now that
Admiral de Robeck and Sir Ian Hamilton had decided
upon a joint operation, we were bound to accept their
view. I do not at all blame Lord Fisher for this decision.
The arguments for it were very strong indeed. But so
were the arguments against it. Both the Prime Minister
and Mr, Balfour, with whom I discussed the matter, were
inclined to my view, but as our professional advisers and
the Admiral on the spot were against it, it was impossible
to go further, and I bowed to their decision. But with
regret and anxiety.”*

* ‘‘Dardanelles Commission,” First Report, page 58.

264 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Instead of the First Lord’s fighting instructions, which were
entirely in accord with my instincts and towards which we had
all been working for the last few days, the Admiral received
the following telegram on the 25 th March ;

140. “ Your 256. It is dear that the Army should at

once prepare for attack on Kilid Bahr Plateau at earliest
opportunity, and Lord Kitchener hopes April 14th can be
antedated. This is a matter for the War Office. But the
question now to be dedded by the Admiralty is whether
time has come to abandon the naval plans of forcing
Dardanelles without the aid of a large army. It may be
necessary to accept check of ihe i8th instant as dedsive,
and to admit that it is beyond our power, and if you think
this you should not fail to say so. But, before dedding,
certain facts must be weighed : ist. The delay and con-
sequent danger of submarines coming and ruining all;
2nd, the heavy losses, at least 5,000, which the Army would
suffer ; 3rd, the possibility of a check in the land operations
far more serious than the loss of a few old surplus ships ;
4th, the fact that even when Kilid Bahr Plateau has been
taken by the Army and the Kilid Bahr group of forts
rendered untenable, the Asiatic forts will stiU be effective,
and most of the mine danger which is now your prindpal
difficulty will menace you in the long reach above the
Narrows.

These must be balanced against risks and hopes of purdy
naval undertakings. You must not under-rate supreme
moral effect of a British Fleet with suffident fuel and
ammunition entering the Marmora, provided it is strong
enough to destroy Turco-German vessds. Gallipoli
Peninsula would be completely cut off if our ships were
on both sides of Bukir Isthmus. It seems very probable
that as soon as it is apparent that forts at the Narrows are
not going to stop the Fleet, a general evacuation of the
Peninsula will take place ; but anyhow, all troops remain-
ing upon it would be doomed to starvation or surrender.
Besides this there is the political effect of the arrival of the
Fleet before Constantinople, which is incalculable, and may
weU. be absolutdy dedsive.

REORGANISATION

265

Assuming only the minimum good results follow the
successful passage of the Fleet into the Marmora, viz.,
that the Turkish Army on Gallipoli continues to hold out,
and with forts and field guns close up the Straits, and
that no revolution occurs at Constantinople, then perhaps
in the last resort the Army would have to storm Kilid
Bahr Plateau, and secure a permanent reopening of the
Straits. It would be possible with the ships left behind
at the entrance, and with those in Egypt, to give the
necessary support to the military operations, so that at
the worst the Army would only have to do, after you
had got through, what they will have to do anyhow if
your telegram is accepted ; while, on the other hand, the
probability is that your getting through would decide
everything in our favour. Further, once through the
Dardanelles the current would be with you in any return
attack on the forts, and the mining danger would be
practically over. Therefore, danger to your line of com-
munications is not serious or incurable.

What has happened since the 21st to make you alter
your intentions of renewing the attack as soon as the weather
is favourable ? We have never contemplated a reckless
rush over minefields and past undamaged primary guns.
But the original Admiralty instructions and telegram
No. 109 prescribe a careful and deliberate method of
advance, and I should like to know what are the reasons
which, in your opinion, render this no longer possible, in
spite of your new aircraft and improved methods of mine-
sweeping. We know the forts are short of ammunition.
It is probable that they have not got many mines. You
should be able to feel your way while at the same time
pressing hard.

I cannot understand why, as a preliminary step, forts
like 7 and 8 should not be demolished by heavy gunfire,
first at long range, afterwards at short range, now that you
have good aeroplane observation.

I wish to hear further from you before any official reply
is sent. You may discuss this telegram with General
Hamilton if he is with you, and then telegraph fully.
Admiralty will then give you their decision.

266 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

You must of course understand that this telegram is not
an executive order, but is sent because it is most important
that there should be no misunderstanding.”

With the exception of the First Lord’s suggestion to attack
“ forts like 7 and 8 ” as a preliminary step — ^the objection to
which I have already sUted— I think his telegram is a very
fair and far-seeing appreciation of the situation, and in the light
of our experience in the next few weeks, and our knowledge
today, it seems almost incredible that his reasoned appeal should
have fallen on deaf ears.

Winston Qhurchill’s enquiring, adventurous spirit had taken
Tiitn into the front line trenches in France and Flanders, and he
had already seen more of the conditions under which men
fought in modem war than many senior soldiers. Although
his suggestion that the Army would lose at least 5,000 in its
attack on the KHid Baht Plateau greatly underestimated the
losses it was soon to suffer, his telegrams clearly show that he
visualised the formidable nature of the Army’s task, and feared
the risks it would run, in an attack on a now fully prepared
enemy. On the other hand, the Fleet had proved its ability
to master the forts with trifling loss, and was rapidly developing
a sweeping force to clear the minefields.

However, the Admiral was unmoved in his determination to
wait for the Army to land, before attempting to force the Straits,
and on 26th he replied ;

278. “Your 140. I do nothold check on i8lii decisive, but,
having met General Hamilton on 22nd and heard his pro-
posals, I now consider a combined operation essential to
obtain great results and object of campaign. Therefore my
considered opinion is that Fleet should prepare way and act
as indicated in my 268. To attack Narrows now with Fleet
would be a mistake, as it would jeopardise the execution
of a better and bigger scheme. A full appreciation of the
situation in the Dardanelles is being prepared and will be
wired.”

During these last anxious days I was much engaged at Mudros,
and saw a great deal of Sir Ian and Braithwaite, until they sailed
for Egypt on 24th. On that date Rear-Admiral C. Tliursby

REORGANISATION

267

arrived in the Queen^ accompanied by the Implacable. He was
actually senior to de Robeck, but subordinate to him in view of
the latter's acting rank. I had served with Thursby when I
commanded a destroyer flotilla in 1903, and knew him to be a
seaman, possessed of great energy, so I suggested to my Admiral
that he should superintend the training of the sweeping force
at Tenedos. He approved, and the Queen went there; this
was a great relief to me, as Mudros and Tenedos are 40 miles
apart, and the preparation for a great combined operation
overwhelmed the Admiral's small staff with work.

On the 25 th the Admiral telegraphed to the Admiralty asking
if it would be possible to spare one or two E ” class sub-
marines, AEiy our only modem submarine, being under repair
at Malta. He also pointed out that it was essential to use the
“ Beagle " class destroyers as fleet sweepers during our advance
through the Dardanelles, the minesweepers proper being too
slow to precede the Fleet. The losses might well be heavy,
and he submitted that more destroyers should be sent out
at once.

On 26th Match the Admiral and I went to Tenedos for the
day in the Doris. I was very anxious to see how the sweepers
were getting on. We also inspected the aerodrome, which we
had been making for some days with the assistance of Greek
refugees, in preparation for the aeroplanes which the First Lord
had hurried out, on receipt of our complaints as to the in-
efficiency of our seaplanes. An excellent aerodrome had been
made by the removal of vineyards and crops, stones and rocks,
and rolling out a flat surfece with oil drums filled with cement.

On 27th. the Admiral sent off his ftiil appreciation of the
situation :

282. ‘‘I do not consider the check on the i8th was
decisive, and I am still of the opinion that a portion of
the Fleet would succeed in entering the Marmora. Nothing
has occurred since the 21st to alter my intention to press
the enemy hard until I am in a position to deliver a decisive
attack.

On 2ist I was prepared to go forward irrespective of
the Army, as I fully realised that this matter must be carried
through to a successful issue regardless of cost, and also

268 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

because, in view of the military opinion expressed in your
70* and which, if persisted in, would in no wise assist the
Navy in their task. I did not anticipate the possibility of
military co-operation in the forcing of the Straits, though
I have always been of opinion that decisive results would
be best obtained by a combined operation rather than by
either a naval or rnilitary force acting alone.

On aand, having conferred with General Hamilton and
heard his proposals, I learnt that the co-operation of the
Army and Navy was considered by him a sound operation
of war, and that he was fully prepared to work with the
Navy in the forcing of the Dardanelles, but that he could
not act before the 14th April. The plan discussed with
General Hamilton, and now in course of preparation
pending your approval of my 256, will effect, in my opinion,
decisive and overwhelming results.

The original approved plan for forcing the Dardanelles
by ships was drawn up on the assumption that gunfire
alone was capable of destroying forts.”

After a lengthy reiteration of his previous statements, as to
the impossibility of destroying guns by gunfire, and landing
demolition parties to destroy forts within the Straits, an opinion
shared by General Hamilton; and a reference to the great
menace of mines and torpedo tubes, the Admiral continued :

“ The results of Naval action alone might, in my opinion,
be brilliantly successful or quite indecisive. Success
depends largely on the effect that the appearance of the
Fleet off Constantinople would produce on the Turkish
Army, which appears to control the situation in Turkey
at present, and which is itself dominated by the Germans.
But if the Turkish Army is undismayed by the advent of
the Fleet in the Marmora, and the Straits are closed behind
it, the length of time which ships can operate, as indicated
in your 86 and 88,1 and noaintain themselves in that sea,
depends almost entirely on the number of colliers and
ammunition ships which can accompany the Fleet and,

* Admiralty telegtam of 26th February. See page 199.

t These telegrams gave instructions as to the conduct of the Fleet in the Marmora
and the reduction of the forts in the Bosphorus respectively.

REORGANISATION

269

as the passage will be contesteda the percentage of large
unprotected ships which can be expected to get through is
small. The passage of supply ships to the Fleet through
the Dardanelles with the Forts still intact is a problem to
which I can find no practical solution.

In such a case it would be vital for the Army to occupy
the Peninsula, which would open the Straits, as guns on
the Asiatic side can be dominated from the European
shore sufficiently to permit ships to pass through. The
landing of an army of the size contemplated in the face
of strenuous opposition is, in my opiaion, an operation
requiring the assistance of all the naval forces available.
A landing at Bulair would not of necessity cause the Turks
to abandon the Peninsula, and there can be no two opinions
that a fleet intact outside the Dardanelles can do this better
than the remains of a fleet inside with little ammunition.
With the Gallipoli Peninsula held by our Army, and a
Squadron through Dardanelles, our success would be
assured. The delay, possibly of a fortnight, will allow of
co-operation, which should really prove factor that will
reduce length of time necessary to complete the campaign
in Marmora and occupy Constantinople.’^

While waiting for the Admiralty’s reply, I went back to
Tenedos to see our splendid new sweeping force at work.
The difficulty of handling the heavy wires in the destroyers had
been overcome by fitting, as winches, some of the ammunition
hoists for supplying the secondary armament of the old battle-
ships. I spent that night on board the Queen, as Admiral
Thursby’s guest, and after a long forenoon with the sweepers
I met Admiral de Robeck, who had come over for the day, on
the aerodrome. We watched the gallant Samson, who had
just arrived in charge of the new aeroplanes, pull his machine
out of its packing cases, get it put together in an incredibly short
time, and fly off to reconnoitre the Dardanelles.

The Admiral showed me the First Lord’s reply to his
appreciation :

148. "^With reference to your telegram number 282.
I had hoped it would have been possible to achieve the
result according to original plan without involving the

270 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Army, but the reasons you give make it clear a combined
operation is now indispensable. Time also has passed and
thus date is not distant. All your proposals will therefore
be approved by Admiralty telegram. I intend you to
retain the command irrespective of Admiral Carden’s
recovery.

H.M.S. Goliath has been ordered to join you and the
three cruisers in Eg5rpt will come to Lemnos on the eve
of the attack. Eight more “ Beagles ” and three of our
best submarines have started.”

We returned to Mudros in the Minerva that evening, and found
another telegram from the First Lord :

1 5 1. "'With reference to your telegram number 282
and my telegram number 148. What will Fleet do if
Army is checked ? Suppose, for instance, that the Army
is brought to a standstill against the ICilid Bahr Plateau ;
do you intend to push through separately, leaving only
sufficient ships supporting the Army, or do you consider
your decisive attack can only be delivered if the Army has
already succeeded. Secondly my desire is to sustain you
in aU action necessary for our success, and therefore it is
important I shall know exactly what you have in mind.
Do not be vexed at these enquiries. The only thing is to
win.”

The Admiral replied :

292. "" Thanks for your telegrams numbers 148 and 151,
which I much appreciate. There is only one idea here, and
that is to win.

The additional reinforcements will place us in a strong
position for attack and co-operation with the Army and
should prove adequate. Directly the Army is landed in
the Gallipoli Peninsula the Fleet will commence its attack
on the Narrows. To make this attack decisive the co-
operation of the Army is necessary in order to utterly
destroy the forts at I^d Bahr. No matter where the
Army effects its landing the first objective of both Services
must be the above forts, and the intention is to attack them
simultaneously with all our forces. Until the passage

REORGANISATION

271

through the Narrows is secured it would be militarily
unsound to operate with the Fleet in the Marmora.

If the Army is checked in its advance on Kilid Bahr,
the question as to whether the Navy should or should not
force the Narrows, leaving the forts intact, would depend
entirely on whether the Fleet could assist the Army in
their advance to the Narrows best from below Chanak, with
communications intact, or from above cut off from its
base. So many military considerations enter into the
question that it is impossible to lay down anything definite,
but, if the forcing of the Narrows by ships alone is found
to be expedient, the Fleet would do so.

There has really been no delay ; the training of the
personnel of minesweepers and mine-netting craft was
necessary, and has proceeded during recent bad weather
under lee of Tenedos, and is still proceeding.

As the Fleet wiU be engaged, besides being occupied in
minesweeping — covering the landing of the Army, few
officers can be spared from the ships to assist in these
important duties, I am therefore asking officially for certain
officers whom I know are well qualified for these services,
and, if approved, I request they may be sent at once via
Marseilles or Toulon with all dispatch.”

Then followed an exchange of telegrams with the Admiralty,
with reference to the provision of more officers for the numerous
duties in connection with the transport and landing of the
Army. I had taken part in a big Naval and Military Staff ride
which worked out a combined landing operation on a far smaller
scale, and I knew that after we had taken every officer and
man of the sunken battleships, and those who could be spared
from the Inflexible and the vessels which would not take part
in the forcing of the Straits, we would still be far short of the
number required. The Admiral and I looked through the
Navy List and suggested a number of 'officers who we thought
might possibly be spared. This was not at all well received,
and the A dniir al was curtly told that none could be sent.
Although there was opposition at the Admiralty, it was obvious
to us t]^t the First Lord was making every effort in liis power
to help us ; the Admiral had only to express a wish and he

272 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

complied with it, or went one better, at once, so the following
telegram was sent to him personally :

I am making further representations to Admiralty
regarding the necessity for more officers — ^the matter is
urgent and time passes.”

We heard later that on receipt of this the First I.ord personally
scorned the Admiralty, raked up every suitable officer, and sent
a number off at a few hours’ notice by the fastest possible route.
I was delighted to find iticluded among these my brother Adrian
(retired Lieut.-Commander), who had just returned from Canada,
and had begged for a sea-going appointment, but had been told
that none was available.

CHAPTER XV

THE CHANGE OF PLAN
Change of Plan accepted ; Enemy reports.

It will be seen that the evidence I have quoted in the previous
chapter is conflicting as to who was really responsible for
initiating the change &om a naval to a military attack. I have
related the chain of circumstances which led to this unhappy
decision, and I will leave it at that.

As the Admiral has been severely criticised for his change of
plan, I think I cannot do better than quote from the evidence
I gave before the Dardanelles Commission in 1917, in order to
make his point of view clear :

“ When the Admiral was faced with the alternative of
landing an army — ^as we thought — ^sufficiently strong to
occupy Gallipoli and keep our communications open, or
of embarking on what he regarded as a hazardous enterprise,
with a doubtful issue — doubtful since success was dependent
on the collapse of the Turkish opposition after his arrival
in the Marmora — ^how could he, having the responsibility,
decide otberwise than as he did ? If, for instance, he had
rejected the offer of the General to co-operate in a combined
operation, and our second attack had failed, what would
have been the verdict on the action of an Admiral who
had listened to file urgent appeal of the First Lord agamst
his considered judgment ? ”

Admiral de Robeck has also been criticised for not renewing
his attack on the day following our check on the 18 th March.
It was so difficult to make the Admiralty understand then —
and ofiiers even today — ^that in order to clear the minefields,
our only real obstacle, it was necessary to master the forts at
the Narrows, and continue to master them, until our task was
R 27}

274

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

accomplished. In fact, nothing short of another major engage-
ment, on the lines of the i8th March, could have served any
military purpose. But of our 16 battleships, six vrere sunk or
out of action, and our sweeping force was useless. It would
have been foUy to have gone on without an efficient sweeping
force, and the reinforcements which were about to join us, if we
were to achieve decisive results, and avoid useless expenditure
of ammunition. By 4th April, however, the minesweeping
net-laying force was in all respects ready, and the Prince of Wales
and London had joined Thursby’s Squadron, which, with the
Queen and Implacable^ made a powerful reinforcement to
the Fleet, whidi was now strong enough to master the forts at
the Narrows, as it had done on i8th March.

Godfrey and I were very unhappy at the delay which the
change of plan entailed, because we both felt, after our experience
on the 1 8 th March, that the enemy was beaten, that the Fleet
could enter the Marmora without serious loss, and that we
ought to go there as soon as possible. The political issues and
what happened after we arrived in the Marmora were the
Government’s concern — and if the Government were wrong,
we did not regard the withdrawal from the Marmora as a very
dangerous operation, as the minefields would have been swept,
the ships would have a strong favourable current, and would be
able to attack the forts in reverse at short range. We felt,
therefore, that a naval attack alone was worth the risk to win so
great a prize.

It is easy, however, for Staff officers, without direct responsi-
bility, to recommend great imdertakings, particularly if, as in
the Navy, they share in aU the bodily risks that attend their
execution. Had de Robeck still been Second in Command, I
am sure he would have led the van in an attack on the Narrows
as gallantly as he did that on the Outer Forts in February, but
when he had the responsibility of the Supreme Command, he
never really wished to risk his ships again in anotiaer naval
attack, after the losses of tiie i8tih March, and he welcomed the
opportunity of combining with, the Army in an operation which
promised success without hazard to the Fleet.

Winston Churchill has been almost universally condemned
for the miscarriage of the Dardanelles Campaign. The following
appears in the Australian official history, and is typical : “ So,

THE CHANGE OF PLAN

^75

through a Churchill’s excess of imagination, a layman’s
ignorance of artillery, and the fatal power of a young enthusiasm
to convince older and slower brains, the tragedy of Gallipoli
was born.”

An American Staff Officer concludes his account of the
Dardanelles Campaign : “ It is doubtful if even Great
Britain could sxirvive another World War and another
ChurchiU.”

Personally I think Winston Churchill’s name will always be
honoured in history for his great strategic effort, long after
his critics are forgotten, and I believe that this view is accepted
now, by all who know the facts I have recorded.

At a moment when, in the opinion of the Secretary of State
for War, no troops were available to make war on Turkey,
Churchill saw the possibility of winning Allies, and removing a
formidable foe, by accepting the plan of the Admiral on the
spot and making use of a number of old ships, of no value in
the main theatre, to force a passage through the Straits into the
Marmora. In the face of considerable opposition he carried his
policy into action. Encouraged by the ease with which the
Fleet overwhelmed the Outer Forts, the Secretary of State for
War then found troops to exploit the success of the naval
operations, which seemed assured. But the Fleet was checked
by the inefficiency of its minesweepers. Then when the losses
were about to be made good by a powerful reinforcement, and
a splendid sweeping force was nearly ready, the Admiral decided
to wait until the Army had captured Gallipoli, because he
thought the Government was optimistic in its estimate of the
effect that a fleet in the Marmora would have on Turkey, and
feared for his communications.

Qiurchill, alive to the menace of submarines, and having the
vision to foresee the tremendous risks and immense liabilities
involved in the new plan, after the enemy had had time to
organise his defences, made every conceivable effort to spare
the Army the ordeal it was to suffer — ^first by trying to insist
on a renewal of the naval attack, and when he could get no
support firom his naval advisers, by pleading with the Admital
to adhere to the original plan.

That Churchill was right, in the light of our knowledge today,
can surely no longer be contested. If he had been given the

2-76 NAVAL IvIEMOIRS, 1910-1915

power to insist, de Robeck, relieved of his responsibility, would
have renewed his attack, and, without a doubt, would have
forced a passage into the Marmora.

But the opportunity was allowed to pass, and once again we
were to Iparn — only this time on an infinitely larger scale — ^the
folly of procrastination in war.

Before passing on to watch the Army’s glorious effort and
tragic failure, I will turn to the Official Military History for
the evidence, which is overwhelming, that the Fleet’s arrival
off Constantinople would have been decisive.

“ It is now known that Sir Edward Grey’s anticipations
of the effect of the British Fleet’s arrival at the capital were
justified. T.iman von Sanders and the American Am-
bassador at Constantinople, as also the latter’s special
agent at his Embassy, have placed on record that the fall
of the Outer Forts caused consternation in Turkey. Every-
one in Constantinople believed that the success of the Allied
Fleets was inevitable. The Germans were apprehensive
that a revolution would follow the Fleet’s arrival at the
Golden Horn, and that Turkey would sign a separate peace.
The credit of the Turkish Government was at its lowest
ebb. Their military plans had everywhere ended in
failure ; their treasury was empty ; their country was on
the b rink of ruin ; and another reverse was expected to
dhange the prevailing dissatisfaction to open revolt. liman
von Sanders has stated that at the end of February the
Turkish Headquarters firmly believed that the Straits would
be forced. Everything had been prepared for the departure
of the Sultan and his court, as well as civil and military
authorities, to the interior of Asia Minor. These pre-
cautions, he significantly adds, were justified.*

It is important to realise that had Constantinople been
abandoned, the Turks would have been unable to continue
the war. Their only arms and munition factories were at
the capital and woiild have been destroyed by the Fleet,
and the supply of material from Germany would have been
impossible.

According to die German Official Account, written by

* “Fuuf Jahre Turkei,” page 72,

THE CHANGE OF PLAN

277

Miihlman, a staff officer of Liman von Sanders, in ‘ Der
Kampf urn die Dardanellen, 1915,’ page 74 :

‘ Most of the Turkish ammunition had been expended.
The medium howitzers and minefield batteries had fired
half of their supply ... for the five 35.5 cm. guns there
were only 271 rounds, say 50 each ; for the eleven 23 cm.
between 30 to 50 rounds per gun. . . . Particularly serious
was the fact that the long range H.E. shells, which alone
were effective against armour, were nearly used up.
Fort Hamidieh had only 17 of them, Kilid’ Bahr but 10.
Also there was no reserve of mines. What, then, was to
happen if the battle was renewed on the 19th and following
days with undiminished violence ?’ ” *

We now had to prepare the stage, as we thought, for a com-
bined naval and military attack on the Narrows. We had
broken off the naval attack at a moment when success seemed
assured, in order not to “ jeopardise the execution of a better
and bigger scheme,” i.e. the landing of an army to apture the
Gallipoli Peninsula, in order to safeguard the Fleet’s com-
munications after it had entered the Marmora.

The combined attack was not delivered. The Fleet was never
allowed to attack again. Yet if every ship in de Robeck’s
Squadron had been sunk with all hands in the Dardanelles, the
naval losses would still have been less than half those about to
be suffered, in killed alone, by the Army in Gallipoli, in its effort
to help the Navy through.

* “ MiUtaty Operations, Gallipoli,” Vd. I, pages 104, 105 and footnote. See
also further quotations on pages 246-7 aiU,

CHAPTER XVI

PREPARATION FOR COMBINED ATTACK

Naval and Military plans and orders ; £15 attempting passage of Straits runs
ashore ; Finally torpedoed to prevent capture ; AEz enters Marmora ;
Expedition sails.

I THINK it ■would be almost impossible for anyone who was not
at Mudros during the next few crowded weeks, or with Sir Ian
Hamilton completing his plans in Alexandria, to conceive the
immensity of the undertaking, and the amount of staff work
entailed, in preparing for the disembarkation on open hostile
beaches, of an army, 6o miles from its base — a. wind-swept
harbour, possessing no facilities whatever in the way of piers
and jetties.

The magnitude of the task before us was never appreciated
by the Admiralty, nor indeed by ourselves, until we commenced
to work out the plan, but it soon became evident that -witii an
impro'Tised and very inadequate transport the landing would
monopolise the whole resources of the Fleet, and that every
ship, officer, man and boat would be required to cover, land,
support and supply the Army, until a good reserve of ammuni tion
and stores had been built up on shore.

This strengthened the Admiral’s contention that we must first
establish the Army on shore, before we passed on to carry out
the naval part of the programme. Nevertheless, the ships
which were to force the Straits were maintained, at that timp^
in a state of readiness to renew the naval attack at a few hours’
notice, directly the Army was securely established on shore.

On and April the Admiral issued a memorandum to the Flag
and Senior officers giving a general outline of the plan of
campaign, pending the receipt of the Army’s definite require-
ments. In this he stated that he would fly his flag in the
Elizabeth during the disembarkation of the Army, and transfer
it to the Lord Nelson on the Fleet proceeding through the
Narrows, when he would take command of the Squadron in

ayS

PREPARATION FOR COMBINED ATTACK 279

the Marmora, The Queen Elk^abethy with some of the cruisers
and torpedo boats, under the orders of Rear-Admiral Wemyss,
would remain outside to support and supply the Army*

Admiral Gu^pratte would follow the Admiral into the Marmora
with two of his battleships and the Russian cruiser Askold^
which had just arrived to join the Allied Fleet. She was abroad
when war broke out and so was unable to return to a Russian
port. One or two French battleships would remain outside,
under the command of Admiral Wemyss.

The maintenance, training and leadership of the minesweepers
being of the greatest importance. Captain Algernon Heneage,
of the Albion^ was placed in charge of aU minesweepers (including
destroyers), minesweeping operations, and mine defence prepara-
tions. His ship, acting as parent to all minesweepers, was
berthed dose inshore, either north or south of Tenedos according
to the wind, and was relieved of all other duties until operations
commenced in the Dardanelles. The light cruiser Sapphire was
also placed under Heneage’s orders for duty with the mine-
sweepers.

Among others appointed to assist Captain Heneage was
Lieutenant Frauds Sandford, who was Torpedo Lieutenant of
the Irresistible and had commanded the demolition party of
that ship in the two successful enterprises which destroyed the
guns at Sedd el Bahr. He was also a volunteer in the attack on
the minefields on the 13 th March, and led the pair of mine-
sweepers which alone succeeded in sweeping the whole length of
the minefield. (See pages 198, 202 and 215 ante.) I saw him on
the morning of 19th March, almost in rags, with clothes and
skin discoloured by the fumes of a high explosive shell, and
was immensely impressed by his gallant, Ught-hearted bearing.

Sir Ian and his Staff returned from Egypt on the loth April,
which was a great relief to us, as there was so much to be
arranged between the two staffs. By this time it was evident
that the landiug could not take place until several days later than
14th April, the date we had hoped for ; which was very dis-
appointing, and in view of the enemy’s active preparations to
receive us, a matter for serious concern. As it turned out,
however, the weather was unsettled between the 14th and 25 th,
and the latter, the actual day of the landing, was the first really
favourable day for the undertaking.

28o naval memoirs, 1910-1915

On the 1 2th the General and about 40 officers, including the
Brigadiers, Colonels and Adjutants of the Battalions, embarked
in the Queen EUt^aheth and were taken down the coast to eyaminp
the selected landing places through their glasses. Parties of
naval and military officers were also sent round the coast in
patrolling destroyers to study the possible landing places.

On the 1 2th April the Admiral issued his “ Orders for the
Combined Operations,” and these were added to from tim<>
to time. Part i dealt with the disembarkation of the Army ;
the preamble ran thus :

“ To ensure destruction of the forts at the Narrows, and
secure the command of the Dardanelles, a combined attack
by the Navy and Army will be delivered on the GaiHpoli
Peninsula at an early date.

The efforts of the Navy will primarily be directed to
landing the Army and supporting it unffi its position is
secure : after which the Navy will attack the fortifications
of the Narrows, assisted by the Army.”

Then followed the composition of the Squadrons.

There were to be two main landings, one conducted by the
1st Squadron under Rear-Admiral Wemyss, flying his flag in
the Euryalus, who would also have under his orders a subsicSary
landing conducted by the 4th Squadron, the other by the
and Squadron under Rear-Admiral Thursby, flying his flag in
the Queen.

The 3rd Squadron, under Captain H. Grant in the Canopus,
was to make a feint to land troops elsewhere.

The 5 th Squadron, under Captain Fyler in the Agamemnon,
was to cover the minesweeping operations under Captain
Heneage, which were to clear the area inside the Straits, in which
ships would manoeuvre in support of the Army.

The 6th Squadron, under Contre-Amiral Gu6pratte, was to
convoy and cover the French Army.

The 7th Squadron, stationed in the Gulf of Smyrna, was to
watch that port and contain the enemy torpedo vessels which
had been located in the harbour by our aircraft.

Aeroplanes under Samson were to spot for the covering ships
of the ist Squadron, which were under Rear-Admiral Nicholson,
flying his flag in the Swiftsure, and to carry out reconnaissance

COMMODORE R. KEYES, VICE-ADMIRAL J. DE ROBECK, GENER.AL
SIR IAN HAMILTON, MA]OR-GENERAL \X’. BRAITHWAITE,
DARDANELLES

PREPARATION FOR COMBINED ATTACK 281

for the General coromanding the troops in the landing operations
conducted by the ist Squadron.

The Ark R^aVs seaplanes and the Manica^s kite balloon
were to work with the 2nd Squadron under* Rear-Admiral
Thursby.

The Queen Eli^abeth^ flying the Admiral's flag, with Sir Ian
and his General Staff on board, was to be left free to move about
as required.

Although the actual landing places were not made public
until the last moment, the naval officers who would be in Aarge
of transport and beach work were given precise and clearly
defined information as to what would be expected of them.
As the transports arrived from Egypt, the naval officers con-
cerned at once got into touch with the units they were to work
with, and training in rapid and silent disembarkation, handling
boats quietly under oars, landing on the beach, etc., etc., was
energetically proceeded with night and day.

The Admiral's orders prior to the landing covered 30 pages
of printed foolscap, and gave information or instruction on
every conceivable subject, such as control of gunfire in support
of the Army ; minesweeping ; conduct of the various units if
submarines appeared in the neighbourhood ; the nature of the
enemy's gun, torpedo and mine defences ; signal arrangements,
visual and wireless ; etc., etc. The control of wireless was a
very important matter, since it provided inter-communication
between the Army and the Navy and between a couple of
hundred vessels, including men-of-war of three, and transports
of two nationalities, all sorts of auxiliary vessels, aircraft and
shore stations,

James Somerville, the young Lieut.-Commander attached to
the Staff for wireless duties, by tact, blarney and force of
character, simply ruled the ether and brought its many con-
flicting waves into regular channels.

The Admiral was a great believer in decentralisation, and
having given his instructions and made his wishes clear, he
left the conduct of the operations to the individual to whom
he had confided it, who knew that he would be supported
loyally and not be interfered with if he did his job properly.

On the 15th April the ^‘Military Force Order No. i " was
issued. After giving the strength of the enemy, as estimated.

282 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

at 34,000, and stating that information pointed to a landing
being opposed, it went on to say that :

‘‘ The object of the expedition is to assist the Fleet to
force the Dardanelles by capturing the Kilid Bahr Plateau
and dominating the forts at the Narrows. The general
plan to achieve this object is :

1. A bombardment of the Bulair Lines at daybreak,
followed by a feint of landing on the mainland north of
Xeros Islands, by the transport fleet of the Royal Naval
Division.

2. Simultaneously with the above a bombardment of the
heights commanding the beach Gaba Tepe-Nibrunesi
Point; accompanied by a landing of the Australian and
New Zealand Army Corps.

3. Simultaneously with the above, a bombardment of
the southern end of the Peninsula; accompanied by a
landing of the 29th Division, in the neighbourhood of
Cape Helles.

4. Simultaneously with the foregoing, the French will
make a demonstration in Besika Bay, in combination with
which a landing will be effected by a portion of the French
expeditionary force near Kum Kale.”

During the next few days details of the landings were worked
out. The covering forces allocated to the various beaches, and
the first reinforcements, were to be transferred from the trans-
ports to battleships, cruisers, destroyers or fleet sweepers on
the afternoon, or during the night preceding the landing ; and
carried in them to the vicinity of their objectives. Thence in
boats towed by steamboats or trawlers, manned by naval ratings,
to the beaches.

The landing arrangements of the ist Squadron at Helles
included the use of the River Cljde^ a collier, which was to run
herself ashore on the beach to the westward of Sedd el Bahr.
With a thought of the wooden horse of Troy in his mind.
Captain Unwin of the Hussar had suggested using the River
Clyde as a means of rapidly reinforcing the first flight of boats,
and had begged to be given command of the ship, which was
most ingeniously prepared under his direction for the speedy
disembarkation of troops.

PREPAEATION FOR COMBINED ATTACK 283

It was found impossible to provide enough bluejackets for
all the beach parties without drawing too many from the ships,
which we hoped would themselves be heavily engaged in a
day or two, so the Anson battalion of the Naval Division
reinforced the naval beach parties at Helles.

The main landings at Helles were to take place at
"" W ” and V,” with a subsidiary landing at S ” in
Morto Bay. (See plan, page 293.) The diagram, which was
issued with the operation orders, shows the allocation of the
troops forming the covering force, with which it was hoped
to seize a sufficiently advanced position to cover the disembarka-
tion of the main force, whose immediate objective would be
Achi Baba, and ultimate, the Kilid Bahr Plateau.

The first flight of 72 boats, towed by 18 picket boats to X,”

W ” and V ” Beaches, was to carry 2,150 men, the maximum
number which could be disembarked simultaneously on the
limited beach space. X,” W and “ V ’’ Beaches were to
be reinforced, as shown on the diagram, by 2,100 troops carried
in the River Clyde and 1,200 in the fleet sweepers.

Twenty-four boats were to land 750 men at S ” Beach,
but as there were no more picket boats available they were to
be transferred outside the Straits from the Cornwallis to four
trawlers, which would tow the boats close to the beach; the
troops, with the assistance of a few bluejackets, would then
pull themselves on shore.

There was to be another subsidiary landing on the western
flank of the Peninsula at Y Beach by the Scottish Borderers,
the Plymouth Division of Royal Marines — ^borrowed from the
Naval Division — ^and a company of the South Wales Borderers
— ^for whom there was not sufficient room on S ” Beach —
2,000 in all. These troops were to be carried in the Sapphire
and Amethyst and the Marines’ transport to within four miles
of the coast, and then transferred to eight trawlers, each towing
six boats, in which they were to land themselves. This landing
was to be conducted by my brother Adrian, who had trained
the troops to a high state of efficiency in boat work and speedy,
silent landing.

The Y ” Beach landing was to start at dawn, simultaneously
with the bombardment of the Helles area, and those at S,”
cc y » <c ^ « X ” half an hour later.

284 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

In the northern area an advanced force of 1,500 of the
Australian Division carried in the Queen^ Prince of Wales and
London^ was to be landed in 36 boats, towed by 12 picket boats,
followed immediately by eight destroyers carrying 2,500 men
and towing a number of transports’ lifeboats. All the boats
were to assist to land troops from the destroyers directly they
had discharged their first load. In this way it was hoped to
land a covering force of 4,000 men rapidly, and to seize the Sari
Bahr Ridge overlooking the beach.

The objective of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps
was to be the ridge over which the Gallipoli-Maidos and
Boghali-Kojadere roads run, and especially Mai Tepe.”

Sir Ian informed General d’Amade that in order to assist the
preli m i na ry operations of the troops landing in the Gallipoli
Peninsula, he had assigned to the force under his command,
the task of effecting a landing near Kum Kale, with the object
of engaging the attention of any hostile troops, which
might be near the entrance to the Dardanelles on the Asiatic
shore.

The landing near Kum Kale was intended to be in the nature
of a diversion, and he considered that it would only be necessary
to employ one infantry regiment (three battalions) and one
battery of artillery. He did not wish to land any larger number
of troops on the Asiatic side, as he intended, as soon as a secure
footing was gained in Galhpoli, to re-embark the landing party
and land the whole French army on the European side of the
Straits, preparatory to the generd advance of the Allied Forces
against the enemy’s army in the Gallipoli Peninsula.

By the 22nd April the whole Expeditionary Force, embarked
m 106 transports, was ready for action, but owing to the con-
gestion in Mudros, 12 transports of the Naval Division and
18 of the French transports were berthed at Trebuki in the
Island of Skyros.

On the 23 rd April the Admiral issued the following memor-
andum to the Fleet :

This memorandum is issued as a guide to the operations
of the Fleet in the near fiiture.

Nothing defimte can be laid down for each day, everything
being dependent on the progress of the Army and the

PREPARATION FOR COMBINED ATTACK 285

HW-S CourtwAtLre

DIAGRAM ISSUED WITH INSTRUCTIONS FOR HELLES
COVERING FORCE

z86

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

amount of support it will require from the gunfire of the
Fleet.

The preliminary attack on the Narrows will be carried
out as indicated herein and detailed orders will be issued
to ships in due course.

It is expected that once the Army is established on land,
the cruisers, with the addition of one or two battleships,
will be sufficient for its support in the advance on Kilid
Bahr.

During the attack on the Narrows the Vice-Admiral,
Rear-Admiral and Division and Rear-Admiral 3rd Division
will direct operations inside the Straits. Rear-Admiral
ist Squadron will be in command of the covering ships
outside the Straits and superintend the landing of the
remainder of the Army.

n. 1ST Day

Ships wiU cover the landing of the Army and support
its advance.

During the night minesweeping trawlers supported by
destroyers will make a feint attack on the Kephez minefield.

The objects of this attack are :

(a) To compel the enemy to retain the guns protecting

the minefields in position and thus prevent him placing

them to oppose the advance of the Army.

(b) To prevent the enemy’s destroyers issuing from

the Straits to attack the transports.

Lord Nelson and Agamemnon will complete with
ammunition at Rabbit Island.

rn. atsTD Day

The anti-floating mine net will be laid off Soghon Dere
as directed by Captain (S)*, either at dawn or at such other
time as may be ordered.

Queen Eli^eth will bombard the defences at the Narrows
by indirect fice from Gaba Tepe, aeroplanes and kite balloon
spotting.

* Captain A, Heneagc.

PREPARATION FOR COMBINED ATTACK 287

In the morning Lord Nelson and Agamemnon, supported
by two ships of the 3rd Division, are to be ready to bombard
Forts 7, 8 and 19 and cover sweeping operations. Forts
8 and 19 are specially important, as from their position
they can seriously interfere with the advance of the Army
towards the Soghon Dere.

The second phase of the minesweeping will be com-
menced as laid down by Captain (S), an area being swept
up to the line of the anti-floating mine net.

In the afternoon, if the position of the Army has per-
mitted, Rear-Admiral 2nd Division to assemble his ships,
the 2nd Division will bombard certain specified forts and
the field guns protecting Kephez minefield.

Ships operating inside the Straits will remain under
weigh in rear of the net off Soghon Dere.

At night picket boats and sweepers, supported by
destroyers, will remove obstacles in the minefield below
the Narrows.

rv. 5RD Day

It is hoped to commence the general bombardment of
the forts at the Narrows on this day.

The general lines on which the bombardment is to be
carried out will be similar to the plan employed on i8th
March, except that H.M.S. Queen Elizabeth will continue
the attack on the Narrows by indirect fire from Gaba Tepc,
the supporting ships inside the Straits being in consequence
reduced to Lord Nelson and Agamemnon.

The 3td Division ships will assist in this bombardment.

Dkecdy the forts are silenced the sweeping of the Kephez
minefield will be commenced, covered by the fire of the
battleships.

This provides good evidence that the Fleet’s intentions were
definitely belligerent, prior to the Army’s landing.

While preparations for combined operations were proceeding,
Ei^, the first of the “E” class submarines from England,
arrived at Mudros. After I had discussed the prospects of
success with her Captain, Lieut.-Commander T. S. Brodie,

288 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

and his twin brother, Lieut.-Conimander C. G. Brodie, on the
Admiral’s Staff— two submarine officers of great merit — and
other officers with local experience in submarines, the Admiral
consented to £15 attempting a passage into the Marmora, with
the object of operating on the enemy’s seaborne communications.
The late Vice-Consul at Chanak, Mr. Palmer, who was attached
to the A dmir al’s Staff as Intelligence Officer with the rank of
Lieutenant R.N.V.R., begged to be allowed to serve in that
capacity with Brodie in the subtnarine. It was arranged that
£■15 should be watched by aeroplanes, which would try to
distract attention from her, if opportunity offered. T. Brodie
left at daylight on 17th, his brother flying with Samson, to
follow £i5’s progress. Samson and Brodie returned at 10 a.m.
and reported that £15 was ashore on Kephex Point, with a
Turkish torpedo boat lying alongside her.

Submarine £6 was sent at once to try and torpedo £15 to
prevent her being salved by the enemy. £6 fired a torpedo
which missed, according to the report of her commanding
officer, a fact which was verified later by the torpedo being
picked up floating out of the Straits. Curiously enough the
Vengeance, which was in the Straits, reported that £6 had tor-
pedoed a tug, which was seen to capsixe and sink alongside £15.
I have never heard any explanation of the Vengeance’s report, £6
knew nothing about it.

That night the destroyers Scorpion and Grampus attempted to
attack £15, but the enemy managed to screen her with search-
lights, and the destroyers being themselves brilliantly illuminated
and unable to locate her, withdrew under a heavy fire.

The following morning £ii tried to torpedo £15, but it
was foggy and she was unable to find her. When the fog lifted,
the Majestic and Triumph attempted to destroy her by gunfire
without success. A number of attacks were made by aeroplanes
with bombs ; they did not succeed in hitting £15, but they
prevented tugs working alongside her.

It was essential to destroy her, and on the night of the i8th
volunteers were called for to man two picket boats, each fitted
with two 14-inch torpedoes in dropping gear. The Majestic
and Triumph were on duty inside the Straits, and claimed the
right to provide the picket boats, for which great numbers
had volunteered. The Admiral consented but directed that

PREPARATION FOR COMBINED ATTACK 289

Lieut.-Commander E. Robinson — ^who had so greatly dis-
tinguished himself in the first landing at Kum Kale and on
13 th March — should lead the cutting-out expedition, and he
embarked in the TrhmipVs boat. The picket boats did not
succeed in effecting a surprise as was hoped ; they were lit up
by searchlights at a considerable distance, and were greeted by
a heavy fire. A searchlight was also worked, as on the previous
night, to screen £'15, and the Triumph's boat, which led, was
unable to get a clear view of her and the first torpedo missed.
She was running in to fire another at very close range, when
£15 was lit up for a few seconds, at a moment when the Majestic's
boat was in a favourable position to fire, at a range of about
200 yards. Lieut. Claude Godson, who commanded her,
promptly fired both torpedoes, one of which struck her with
a great explosion. A few minutes later the Majestic'' s boat was
hit by a shell, her crew being saved by the Triumph's boat before
she sank. Fortunately the enemy concentrated their fire on
the sinking boat, and the Triumph's boat escaped without
damage. The only casualty was an armourer in the Majestic's
boat who died of wounds.

During the whole of this very gallant enterprise — ^akin to
the cutting-out expeditions of old — ^the boats were lit up by
brilliant searchlights, and were under heavy fire from the six-inch
guns in Battery 8, and from field guns which had evidently
been brought down to cover -Si 5. Robinson was promoted
to Commander and later received the V.C, for his earlier exploit,
and the young officers and men who manned the boats were
decorated for their cool gallantry.

It was necessary to make sure that -Si 5 was really destroyed,
so Brodie embarked as a passenger in the following morning
to examine her at close range, aeroplanes being unable to fly
low enough to do so satisfactorily without great risk. -S6
narrowly escaped S'i5’s fate, and her experience provided an
explanation for the loss of the latter. 56 was caught in a
violent eddy off Kephez Point and was driven ashore within
100 yards of Si 5 ; her conning tower and superstructure broke
surface and she came under a heavy fire. Had she lightened
herself by blowing water ballast she would certainly have been
driven further up the beach by the current, but her captain
gave her negative buoyancy, and working his engines at full
s

290

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

speed, managed to drive her bumping along the bottom into
deep water. During their hairbreadth escape Brodie and
MacArthur (the captain of BG) satisfied themselves through the
periscope that £*15 was on her beam ends and a total wreck —
and so ended our first unsuccessful effort to attack the enemy’s
sea commxanications by submarines.

We know now that when Ei 5 broke surface a shell penetrated
her conning tower and killed Brodie and six men. Palmer
and the remainder of the crew were taken prisoners.

The Australian submarine AEz^ which had been refitting
at Malta for some weeks, arrived at Mudros, and was the next
to attempt the passage into the Marmora. She left on the
morning of the 24th, but had to return the same day owing to
a slight temporary defect. However, she sailed again the
following day, and her report that she had arrived safely in the
Marmora could not have been received at a more opportune
moment.

It had been intended to deliver the attack on Gallipoli on
the 23rd April — St. George’s Day — ^but the preceding days
were very unsettled and a postponement was necessary. On
23 rd the weather looked promising, and the preliminary move-
ments were started. On 24th, Sir Ian and 12 officers of his
Staff joined the Queen Eli':(abeth, Sir William Birdwood and
his Staff embarked in the Queen with Admiral Thursby, and
Major-General A. Hunter-Weston, commanding the 29th
Division, joined Admiral Wemyss in the Eurjalus,

By nightfall on the 24th April the great armada of over
200 vessels was under way.

CHAPTER XVn

CAPTURE OF THE BEACHES

The Storming and Gtpture of the Beaches : 25th and 26th April.

After calling at Tenedos to drop her boats and their crews,
who were to take part in the Helles landing, the Qmen Eliv(ab$th
anchored off Imbros until 4 a.m. ; when she weighed and stood
in towards Gaba Tepe to watch the Australian landing, which
was to take place at lie first streak of dawn. General Birdwood
had wished to land the covering force in darkness, but the
actual time was governed by the moon, which, on the 25 th April,
would have silhouetted the vessels, had they approached the
coast at an earlier hour.

As the Queen Elizabeth steamed in, heavy gunfire broke out
off Helles, and we could hear rifle and machine-gun fire to the
northward of Gaba Tepe. When it was sufficiently light, we
could see boatloads of men landing on the beach, which the
first flight of the covering force had secured. We learnt later
that in the pitch darkness which preceded dawn, the boats
were carried by the northerly current a mile or so to the north-
ward of the selected beach. This at the time was thought very
unfortunate, as the initial fighting took place in very difficult
country, and was different to that which the troops had been
led to expect. It is a fact, however, that the actual landing
place was “ the only spot on that part of the coast, in any way
suitable as a permanent landing place,”* otherwise everything
went according to plan.

The 48 boats of ffie first flight reached the beach at 4.20 a.m.
and were not observed until ffiey were within 50 yards. They
were quickly followed by the destroyers, which ran close in
to the shore and landed their troops in two trips very speedily,

* “ RCIitary Operations, Gallipoli,” Vd. I, page 175 f.n.

291

292

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

The whole covering force of 4,000 men was landed by 5 a.m.,
in spite of the fact that they were vigorously opposed.

By 5.30 a.m. the firing had died down to a great extent, and
the General was informed that the covering force had landed
without serious opposition and was a mile inland. By 6 a.m.
the landing of the main force of Australians and New Zealanders
was in full swing, and the Queen Elizabeth steamed down the
coast towards Helles. We all felt much relieved at the success
we had witnessed, and when we passed close to “ Y ” Beach,
and saw a large body of troops sitting about on the cliffs, smoking
and quite unconcerned, our good fortune seemed almost in-
credible. This landing had proceeded exactly as arranged.
The trawlers in line abreast, with their boats alongside, the
Sapphire and Amethyst on either flank, supported by the Dublin
and Goliathy steamed in until the stems of the trawlers grounded ;
the troops rapidly transferred to the boats, and by 5.15 a.m.
the Scottish Borderers and South Wales Borderers, having
clambered up the steep hill paths, w-ere in possession of the high
chffs overlooking the beach. The Marines followed within an
hour, and at the time we passed, the 2,000 men of the landing
had secured their first objective without loss.

We then steamed on towards Helles, where, judging by the
sound, there was a tremendous battle in progress.

Admiral de Robeck suggested to the General that he should
recall the Naval Division from Xeros and land it at the un-
opposed Beach, We undertook to improvise transport
and land the Division before nightfall. The General, however,
said that the Naval Division was his only reserve, they were
inexperienced and not fully trained, and anyhow he must keep
them in reserve for the present, until he saw how the main
battle developed.

At Helles, in view of the preparation the enemy had made, the
attack was preceded by a heavy bombardment, commencing
at 5 a.m., and, somewhat delayed by various causes, the landing
took place an hour later in broad (^ylight. As we approached
Tekke Bumu we learnt from Captain H. E. Lockyer, of the
Implacable^ that the l an d in g at X Beach was also unopposed.
He had approached, the coast with his anchor veered to one
and a half shackles, in case of shallow water being met with,
and slowly steamed in, with the troops in boats abreast of the

PO Approximate viev point. Surveyed and drawn by Commander H. P. Douglas, R.N.

TURKISH DEFENCES ON “ V ” AND “ W ” BEACHES, 25TH APRIL, 1915-

294

NAVAL IvlEMOIRS, 1910-1915

ship, to within 450 yards of the beach, before the anchor brought
her to. The enemy had not made any preparation for a landing
at that spot, and under cover of every gun in the Implacable the
Royal FusiUers had dashed in and landed without opposition.
By 7 a.m. the whole battalion was on shore without a casualty.
The nature of this beach was certainly favourable for covering
fire from ships, but the conduct of the landing was admirable.

When the Royal Fusiliers advanced over the tops of the cliffs
they met with stiff opposition, and their progress was watched
with intense admiration and cheers of encouragement by the
men of the Implacable^ which was sufficiently close to the fighting
to suffer a few casualties, including her Fleet Surgeon, who
was killed by a rifle bullet on the quarter deck.

At Tekke Burnu we saw some boats landing men on the rocks
right under the cliff. These were carrying the Lancashire
Fusiliers, who had embarked in the Implacable and were making
for W ” Beach. We learnt later that Brigadier-General Hare,
the indomitable commander of the covering force, who had
also taken passage in the Implacable and was following the first
flight, seeing that the Lancashire Fusiliers from the Eurjalus
were being met by a heavy rifle and machine-gun fire from the
trenches defending “ W ” Beach, had diverted the Implacable's
boats in the hope of being able to effect a landing on the rocks
and out fla nk the enemy. As a noatter of fact the possibility
of landing there, if the sea was sufficiently calm, was suggested
by us two days earlier, but the ioformation never reached General
Hare, who acted on his own initiative.

This manoeuvre was entirely successful, and enfiladed the
enemy’s trenches, which were carried with the bayonet by the
frontal attack of the Lancashire Fusiliers, who would not be
denied their objective, despite wire entanglements, obstructions
and land mines, which inflicted devastating losses.

As we steamed slowly past "" W ” Beach, we could see that
the Lancashire Fusiliers were in possession, but it was difficult
to make out what was happening in the haze of smoke and the
glare of the rising sun.

At V ” Beach we could see that the River Clyde was approxi-
mately in her assigned position, and that a fierce fight was in
progress, but it was impossible in the trying conditions of
visibility to see what was occurring on shore.

CAPTURE OF THE BEACHES 295

The Queen Elizabeth ran past Sedd el Baht in order to get a
clear view of the landing in Motto Bay. We could see that the
South Wales Borderers had captured the old de Tott’s Battery,
which we learned they had stornaed with great dash, suffering
comparatively trifling losses.

The Cornwallis was still lying off Morto Bay and was ordered
by the Admiral to go at once to her proper station off V
Beach, as she had discharged her mission, and the Morto Bay
area was covered by the Eord Nelson. There was considerable
delay on the part of the Cornwallis in obeying the Admiral’s
signal, but the Admiral and I did not learn the reason until
some time later, fortunately perhaps for her captain, who, in
his ardent but misguided zeal, had landed in his galley to see,
so he said, that the naval arrangements were satisfactory. He
had, in fact, on his own initiative, landed a party of bluejackets
and the marines of his ship, and with them had taken part in
the assault on de Tott’s. His commander did not like to leave
without him, hence the delay, which at the time seemed
inexplicable.

Meanwhile the Queen Elizabeth had returned to V ” Beach,
which seemed to be the storm centre. While passing Sedd el
Bahr, where two platoons of the Dublin Fusiliers had landed
in the Camber, we picked up a boat drifting out of the Straits,
containing wounded from “ S ” Beach. The Lord Nelson
reported that our men could be seen in Sedd el Bahr village
and it seemed that the Camber landing was proceeding
satisfactorily.

As the visibility improved we could clearly see that the attack
on Beach was being most bloodily held up. It was a

ghastly sight to watch from a position of absolute safety. The
foreshore was strewn with dead bodies and wreckage of stranded
boats. The sea was whipped up by bullets. Between the
River Clyde and the shore we could see men struggling up to
their shoulders in the sea ; others lying under the shelter of a
ridge in the sand, to move from which meant certain death
from machine guns, which could not be located from the covering
ships. As soon as we learnt from the River Clyde that there had
been no advance, we simply blasted the village, fort and whole
hillside commanding the beach with high explosive shell.
When the clouds of dust and smoke drifted away, and the men

256 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

rose from the shelter of the ridge of sand to attack, that dreadful
tat-tat-tat of machine-gun fire burst out afresh, and dead and
wounded continued to pile up on the threshold of the position
they were striving so bravely to storm.

De Robeck remarked to me : “ Gallant fellows, these soldiers ;
they always go for the thickest place in the fence.”

It was almost more than I could bear and I begged him to
insist on diverting the reinforcements to one of the beaches we
had secured. He said he could not interfere, this was a military
affair. However, I felt justified in having a signal made to hold
up the boats carrying the reinforcements — ^which were standing
in to certain destruction — ^until “ V ” Beach was seaired ; this
was a naval matter.

It had been hoped that an hour’s heavy bombardment would
make the defences of the beach untenable, and that a frontal
attack, assisted by a flanking movement from the troops landed
at the Camber, would be able to carry the position. When the
fire lifted and the River Clyde ran in, and the boats were only a
few yards from the shore, a terrific rifle and machine-gun fire
opened ; the latter included two small pom-poms. The Dublin
Fusiliers and the boats’ crews suffered heavily ; very few boats
were able to get off again to fetch the second flight, as was
intended ; the majority were destroyed on the beach and their
crews perished ; one sank with all hands in deep water. The
Dublins, who escaped, were the people we could see Ijing under
cover of the sandbank.

It was intended, directly the River Clyde grounded, that the
Munster Fusiliers should disembark through large sally ports
cut in her sides, on to staging, and thence along a hopper which
was to go ahead and form a bridge to the shore, reinforced if
necessary by three lighters, which were towed alongside the
River Clyde in case of accidents. Unfortunately the hopper
went adrift, grounded out of reach, and was useless.

Commander Unwin, deter min ed that his scheme should not
fail, proceeded, assisted by Able-Scaman Williams, to make a
bri<%e of the lighters to connect the ship with the shore.
Swimming ashore, and working up to their waists in the sea,
under a very hot fire, after superhuman efforts they succeeded
in getting two lighters into place and held them there. Unwin
then shouted for the disembarkation to commence. The

LIGHTER AND MEN SHELTERING UNDER BANK ON “ V BEACH
AND SEDD-EL-B.\HR FORT

Taken from Clyde^ 8 a.m., 25th April, 1915

CAiMBER AT SEDD-EL-BAHR

Naval demolition party landed here on 26th Februar}% 1915, and Dublin Fusiliers

25th April, 1915

CAPTURE OF THE BEACHES

297

Munster Fusiliers rushed across the floating bridge, but very
few survived to reach the shore and the shelter of the sandbank
beyond it. Williams was killed shortly afterwards and Unwin
was unable to hold the bridge in place single-handed, with the
result that the lighters, crowded with dead and wounded,
swung round into deep water. The few survivors of Dublin
and Mimster Fusiliers on shore, thus cut off firom reinforcement,
were in a precarious position, and but for the machine guns on
the bridge of the Biver Clyde, which pinned the enemy to their
trenches, they might have been overwhelmed.

Unwin was quite undefeated, and assisted by Lieut. Morse,
Sub-Lieut. Tisdall, Midshipmen Drewry and Malleson, and
Able-Seaman Samson, all of whom seemed, to the onlookers
in the River Clyde, to bear charmed lives, worked incessantly
imder a murderous fire to restore communication with the shore ;
the midshipmen swimming to and fro with lines to connect
the lighters and haul them into position. After an hour or so
Unwin collapsed, suffering from the effects of cold and immersion.
After a short rest he went overboard again and continued to
direct the proceedings until about 9 a.m., when the bridge was
completed.* A company of Munsters then charged along it,
but their losses were so heavy that the senior officer on shore
sent a message to the River Clyde suggesting that no more
troops should be landed rmtil dark. The senior officer in the
River Clyde, Lieut.-Colonel Carrington Smith, commanding the
Hampshire Regiment, agreed.

Shordy afterwards Brigadier-General Napier, commanding
the 88th Brigade, arrived with the first flight of the
reinforcements, which had been delayed owing to the destruction
of the boats on “V” Beach, which should have returned
to land them; “seeing the lighters choked with men,
and not realising that they were dead, he sprang on board the
nearest lighter, meaning to lead them ashore. A warning voice
from the collier [River Clyde\ shouted, ‘You can’t possibly
land ! ’ but Napier shouted back, ‘ FU have a damned good try ! *

* Unwin was awarded a Victoria Gross, the recommendation for which must be
unique in the annals of the decoration. The General told me t^t at least half a
dozen dirty scraps of paper readied him from comparatively junior officers which
bore testimony to Unwin’s devoted heroism, some written in the heat of action by
officers who ffid not survive it. Drewry, Malleson, Samson and Williams also
received Victoria Gosses, the latter posthumously.

298 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

At once there was a renewed burst of Turkish fire. General
Napier and his Staff reached the hopper, but coidd get no
further, and there a quarter of an hour later he and his Brigade-
Major were killed. Thus died the very man who by his ranV
his nerve and his knowledge, would have been of priceless value
to the troops in the southern area during the rest of that vital
day.”*

Similarly, at an early hour, the troops of the Covering Force
were deprived of their Brigadier, General Hare having been
severely wounded in the forefront of the action between “ W ”
and “ X ” Beaches, and his Brigade-Major was killed a couple
of hours later.

Meanwhile the landing at the Camber (where the Irresistible’s
demoHtion party landed in February) had failed in its object ;
all the officers were killed, but a few men managed to join their
comrades takiag cover under the walls of the fort latpt in the
day ; and others, mosdy wounded, succeeded in returning to
the Camber, where they found a sheltered position from which
they signalled to the Queen Elie^aheth for help. They were
rescued, under a heavy fire, by volunteers in boats towed by
the Queen Elie(aheth’s picket boat.

The whole attack on “ V ” Beach was thus definitely held up
soon after 9 a.m., and an hour later Sir Ian signalled to General
Hunter-Weston that it was inadvisable to send more men to
“ V ” Beach, where 200 men were on shore unable to progress.
Later the re mainin g infantry were then diverted to “ W ” Beach
to reinforce the troops from “ W ” and “ X ” who were held up
not far from their beaches.

In Sir Ian’s Gallipoli Diary he says (pages 152-134) :

“ Roger Keyes started the notion that these troops might
well be diverted to “ Y ” where they could land unopposed
and whence they might be able to help their advance
guard at “ V ” more effectively than by direct reinforcement
if they threatened to cut the Turkish line of retreat from
Sedd el Bahr. Braithwaite was rather dubious from the
orthodox General Staff point of view as to whether it
was sound for G.H.Q. to barge into Hunter-Weston’s
plans, seeing he was executive commander of the whole

* M i li ta r y Opetadons, Gallipoli,** Vol. I, pages 239 aad 240.

CAPTURE OF THE BEACHES 299

of this southern invasion. But to me the idea seemed
simple common sense. If it did not suit Hunter-Weston's
book, he had only to say so. Certainly Hunter-Weston
was in closer touch with all these landings than we were ;
it was not for me to force his hands ; there was no question
of that, so at 9.15 I wirelessed as follows :

‘ Would you like to get some more men ashore on
Y ” Beach ? If so, trawlers are available.’

Three-quarters of an hour passed; the state of affairs
at Sedd el Bahr was no better, and in an attack if you
don’t get better you get worse ; the supports were not
being landed ; no answer had come to hand. So repeated
my signal to Hunter-Weston, making it this time personal
from me to him and ordering him to acknowledge receipt.

‘ Do you want any more men landed at Y ” ?
There are trawlers available. Acknowledge the
signal.’

At 1 1 a.m. I got this answer :

* Admiral Wemyss and Principal Naval Transport
Officer state that to interfere with present arrange-
ments and try to land men at Y ” Beach would
delay disembarkation.’ ”

I did not see Hunter-Weston’s reply at the time and only
knew that he had rejected the suggestion, and for years I cursed
his blindness, in my thoughts. It was not until I read Sir Ian’s
Diary that I learnt that his refusal was made on the advice of
two sailors, and this is confirmed by Wemyss in “ The Navy
in the Dardanelles.” Nevertheless, had Hunter-Weston ex-
pressed any definite wish I am sure all difficulties would have
been overcome by these two officers.

It is difficult for a sailor to understand the self-imposed
limitations which a military commander-in-chief places on his
interference in the conduct of an operation he has confided to
a subordinate. Sir Ian had had the advantage of seeing for
himself that both flank landings were secured, but that the
frontal attack was being held up. Sea power gave us freedom
to transport reinforcements rapidly from one point to another ;

300

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

it seemed to me folly not to make use of this priceless possession
to exploit a local success.

General Aspinall-Oglander, the Military Historian, com-
menting on Hunter-Weston's reply to Sir Ian's suggestions,
remarks that :

‘‘A golden opportiinity was allowed to escape. Had
the suggestion been acted upon, the whole story of the
Gallipoli Campaign might well have been different. But
it is fair to remember that at this moment General Hunter-
Weston still expected that the enemy's opposition in
the south would shordy be broken down, and that the
Commander-in-Chief did not know enough about the
situation on shore to justify him in interfering with his
subordinate's battle."

But surely it was an occasion for intervention on the part of
the General and the Admiral, who had had the unique oppor-
tunity of viewing the whole battle area, and bore the supreme
responsibility for the plan, its execution, its success, or its failure ;
and yet so vital a decision was left to two subordinates lying
off “ W " Beach, who were obviously completely out of touch
with the proceedings elsewhere.

This was clear to us at the time from signals which passed
between the Eurjalus and the River Clyde, and is confirmed by
by the Military Historian : General Hunter-Weston, in the
Eurjalus, was still unaware of the desperate situation at “ V,"
and about 9 a,m. he had signalled to the River Clyde, urging the
troops to move left-handed to join up with the Lancashire
Fusiliers."

About noon Morse came on board the Queen Elizabeth for
more ammunition for the naval machine guns of the River Clyde,
which had been provided and manned by the Royal Naval
Division ; and we learnt from him of the desperate nature of the
fighting round the River Clyde and the severity of the losses.

He told us that the naval casualties included among the killed
Lieut.-Commander Pownall, the commander of the Malta
submarme flotilla and Depot ship, who had begged me to get
him a billet on one of the beaches. We were aU much struck
by the bearing of Morse during the recital of his tale, and when
he left us to return to the inferno round the River Clyde I must

CAPTURE OF THE BEACHES

301

confess I never expected to see him again, but I am glad to
record that he survived to win a D.S.O.

We stayed off V ” Beach for the rest of the day — quite the
unhappiest day of my life — ^xmtil then. The Queen Eliv^aheth^
Albion^ and Cornwallis smothered the enemy’s defences with
high-explosive shells at intervals, from varying ranges, but were
never able to silence the few well sited machine gims and the
rifle fire from the deep trenches, which broke out again and
again directly our fire was lifted to allow of an advance — ^and
so it went on all day.

General Hunter-Weston, not realising how impossible it was
for any further movement to take place from Beach,

continued to urge the capture of the western defences of the
beach, in order to assist the troops from W ” Beach in their
advance on Hill 138. At 2.30 Colonel Carrington Smith sent
Morse on board the Eurjalus with a message which must have
made the situation clear, and definitely stated that unless the
high ground to the north-westward was taken by other troops,
he intended to wait until dark and then attack Hill 141. Half
an hour later Carrington Smith was killed on the bridge of the
River Clydel^

An advance was then made from W ” Beach, and we watched
the gallant effort of the Worcestershire Regiment to fight a way
past the redoubt which divided “ W ” from “ V ” Beach. Much
of the fighting was in full view of the ship ; we watched men
vralk deliberately up to the high ma2:e of wire entanglements
which ran from the redoubt to the cliff, and hack and cut until
they fell, their places being filled by others with an equal contempt
of death. Eventually they got through and entrenched in the
vicinity of Fort i.

Behind us there was a batde going on at Kum Kale. Here,
with the experience we had gained on the 25 th February and
3rd March, the Prince George and the French ships were able to
make the villages of Kum Kale and Yeni Shehr untenable, and
at 6 a.m. Admiral Guepratte ordered the disembarkation to
commence, but, owing to various causes, mainly the inability
of the French steamboats to tow the heavily laden boats against
the strong current, the troops did not reach the beach until
four hours later. This delay was probably an advantage, as
* “ Military Operations, Gallipoli,’’ Vol. I, page 247.

302

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

it enabled the ships to bombard the villages and low land to
such an extent that the enemy fled to the opposite side of the
Mendere River, and the Senegalese troops, forming the covering
force, met with little resistance and established themselves
securely at Kum Kale before nightfall.

Just before dark the three ships off “ V Beach opened a
savage bombardment on the Turkish defences. The enemy’s
position was obliterated in sheets of flame and clouds of yellow
smoke and dust from our high explosive, and under its cover
we could see men rise from behind the sandbank and take
shelter under the seaward face of the fort. It seemed incredible
that anyone could be left alive in the enemy’s position, but when
the fire was lifted that ghastly tat-tat-tat of machine-gun fire
broke out again, and took toll of anyone who moved.

When night fell on the 25 th, the Australians and New
Zealanders held a position on the sea front of nearly two miles,
extending inland a mile at its greatest depth.

At ‘‘ Y ” Beach, the troops who had been left undisturbed
for nearly 12 hours, were being attacked.

‘‘ W ” and “ X ” had joined forces, and the remnants of five
battalions, two of which had suffered very heavily, held a
defensive line from ‘"X” Beach to the shore, a little to the
westward of Fort i.

At “ V ” Beach the Hampshire Regiment was stiU in the
River Clyde, but the Dublin and Munster Fusiliers, who had
lost nearly all their officers — ^including the Colonel of tiie DubUns
— and 70 per cent, of their men, were clinging to the shelter of
the sandy bank, and under cover of the seaward face of Sedd el
Bahr Fort.

At ** S ” Beach the South Wales Borderers had consolidated
the position at de Tott’s and were firmly entrenched. They
had been shelled from the Asiatic shore, but this did little damage.

This was the actual situation when General. Hunter-Weston
came on board the Queen Elizabeth at about 8 p.m. to confer
with Sir Ian — cheery and stouthearted,” to quote the latter’s
diary. At that time he thought Hill 141 had been captured,
and when asked about our troops at ""Y” Beach, the only
landing within his command with which we had not been able
to keep touch in the he replied that he thought

CAPTURE OF THE BEACHES

505

they were now in touch with our troops at but they

had been through some hard fighting to get there ; which, as it
turned out later was not the case. But he was always an optimist.

After Hunter-Weston had left we steamed up to Gaba Tepe,
and a few minutes after midnight Admiral Thursby came on
board, with two Brigadier-Generals of the Anzac Corps, bringing
a letter he had just received from General Birdwood. The
General, Braithwaite, the two Brigadier-Generals, Admirals de
Robeck and Thursby and I gathered in the fore cabin round the
table. Sir Ian read Birdwood’s letter to Thursby aloud, as follows;

“ Both my Divisional Generals and Brigadiers have
represented to me that they fear their men are thoroughly
demoralised by shrapnel fire, to which they have been
subjected all day after exhaustion and gallant work in
morning. Numbers have dribbled back from firing line
and cannot be collected in this difficult country. Even
New Zealand Brigade, which has been only recently en-
gaged, lost heavily and is to some extent demoralised.
If troops are subjected to shell fire again tomorrow morning
there is likely to be a fiasco, as I have no fresh troops with
which to replace those in firing line. I know my repre-
sentation is most serious, but if we are to re-embark it
must be at once.”

It was difficult to believe that those splendid people we had
watched training for their ordeal, who had justified aU that had
been expected of them in the assault of the morning, could
have been reduced to such a state. Sir Ian asked Thursby for
his opinion, and he replied that under the existing conditions it
would take two to three days to re-embark the whole force,
which amounted to over 15,000 men. There were over 2,000
casualties, only a small proportion of whom had been evacuated.
Many of the boats were smashed, others stranded in exposed
positions in full view of the enemy. He used some very strong
language about evacuation, and said that if it was put to them
they would stick it ; an opinion I warmly supported. At that
moment a signal was handed to me from Lieut.-Commander
Stoker, commanding AEz^ reporting that she was in the
Marmora and had torpedoed a gun vessel off Qaanak. I read
it aloud, and added : Tell them this. It is an omen — ^an

304 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Australian submarine has done the finest feat in submarine history
and is going to torpedo all the ships bringing reinforcements,
supplies and ammunition into Gallipoli.” It is true that AEz
was commanded and officered by our submarine officers, and
only about half her crew were Australians, but she belonged to
the Australian Government.

Sir Ian, who had started to write directly Thursby had given
his opinion, looked up, nodded and went on writing, and a
few minutes later read his reply to Birdwood, which the resolute
Thursby at once took ashore. The reply ran :

Your news is indeed serious. But there is nothing for
it but to dig yourselves right in and stick it out. It would
take at least two days to re-embark you, as Admiral Thursby
win explain to you. Meanwhile die Australian submarine
has got up through the Narrows and has torpedoed a
gunboat oiSF Chanak. Hunter-Weston, despite his heavy
losses, will be advancing to-morrow, which should divert
pressure from you. Make a personal appeal to your men
and Godley's to make a supreme effort to hold their ground.
P.S. — ^You have got through the difficult business ; now
you have only to dig, dig, dig until you are safe.”

Sir Ian concluded his record of that midnight meeting :

de Robeck and Keyes were aghast ; they pat me on the back ;
I hope they wiH go on doing so if things go horribly wrong.”
I was certainly not aghast, but I do remember thinking Sir Ian
a stouthearted fellow with the warrior spirit, a priceless
possession in war ; and I could never understand why he could
not have taken control of the battle in the southern area. I have
no doubt he would have done so had Hunter-Weston faltered,
but the latter was always confident and optimistic, and I suppose
Sir Ian credited him with a knowledge of the situation which
he certainly did not possess, when he came on board the Queen
Elizabeth on the evening of the 25 th April.

There was much for me to do that night, as of course the
Admiral was determined to be prepared in every way for the
worst, in the event of a debacle on shore. Two of the three
ships and the destroyers of the Naval Division off Bulair, were
ordered to come south at once ; trawlers and boats were collected
and ships were given instructions for covering fire at daylight.

CAPTURE OF THE BEACHES

505

There was, however, no need to worry ; the Military liistorian
tells us :

The eflFect of this resolute and definite order, quickly
taken ashore by Admiral Thursby, was electrical. All the
vague doubts which had spread round the beach were
settled. From that moment there was no farther talk of
evacuation at Anzac, and all ranks were soon filled with
the same determination as the men in the front line, none of
whom had had any idea that a retirement was under
discussion."’*

like a certain British Regiment in one of Rudyard Kipling’s
stories, the Anzacs had something to wipe off the slate, and
most thoroughly they did it, to the great discomfort of the
enemy for the rest of the campaign.

At daylight, under diflScult conditions of light, we started to
plaster the hillside with high-explosive and shrapnel shell of
all calibres, at any point indicated by our observation officers
ashore, and watched the Australians and New Zealanders
making magnificent progress, retaldng all the positions they
v/ere driven out of the night before.

Comment on the ineffectiveness of naval gunfire to assist land
operations, which was painfully evident to us off “ V ” Beach
on the 25 th, is still so general that it is satisfactory to learn
from Turkish sources :

“ Two Turkish guns were in one instance knocked out
by one of the Qmen EU^abeth^s 15-inch H.E. shells.

The material damage inflicted by the naval artillery
during the landing certainly fell short of expectations, but
Turkish official documents all agree as to its shattering
moral effect during the first days. * The effect of ship’s
guns,’ writes Liman von Sanders, ^ was to give a support
to their land forces which was quite out of the ordinary.’ ”*)*

Soon after 9 a.m., it being clear that the position at Anzac
was satisfactory re-established. Sir Ian y^as anxious to go back
to Helles, where, according to the latest information from

* “ Military Operations, Gallipoli/’ VoL I, page 270.

t “ Military Operations, Gallipoli/’ Vol. I, page 272.

3o6 naval memoirs, 1910-1915

Hunter-Weston, the situation was unchanged, and to call at
“ Y ” Beach, from which rather an ominous message had been
intercepted. As we approached the latter, we saw to our dismay
a great many men on the beach, men being embarked, others
coming down the cliff paths, and a few on the ridge, presumably
covering an evacuation, though there was no sign of fighting.
It seemed to us that we were giving up a wonderful flanking
position without a fight, but the General did not feel justified
in taking a hand, as he had no information on which to base
a decision.

When we arrived off Helles, General d’Amade came on
board and told us of the gallant capture of Kum Kale, of
desperate counter-attacks during the night, repulsed with great
loss to the enemy, and of prisoners taken — a brave story.

In view of Lord Kitchener’s very definite orders to Sir Ian,
on no account to embark on a campaign in Asia, the occupation
of Kum Kale was only intended to be a temporary diversion,
to prevent interference from there with the landing at Sedd el
Bahr ; and d’Amade was very anxious to clear out, as he said
he could not remain at Kum Kale without capturing Yeni
Shehr, and that would need a whole division. Sir Ian, being
anxious to land as many French troops as possible in Gallipoli,
concurred in the evacuation.

Without waiting to see General Hunter-Weston, who con-
fiirmed by signal that the situation at Helles was unchanged, or
hearing the cause of the apparent debacle at Y,” we steamed
north again to Gaba Tepe, Passing ‘‘ Y ” we could see the
withdrawal proceeding. I felt very sorry for Sir Ian, who
was terribly disappointed, but it did not seem to me too late,
even then, for him to interfere ; however, he did not do so,
Godfrey and I felt too sick for words ; in his account of the
proceedings on the 25 th, opposite his record of de Robeck’s
suggestion to land the Naval Division at Y,” and Sir Ian’s
refusal, he had made a note which was cruelly prophetic.

We arrived off Gaba Tepe in time to watch the greatly feared
Turkish counter-attack, and to assist in repulsing it. We
listened to the rattle of rifle fire and the tat-tat-tat of machine
guns in the intervals between the roar of our guns. It was all
very thrilling ; we could often see friend and foe, and saw two
battalions of New Zealanders charge with bayonets fixed.

<‘Y” Beach, the Scottish Borderer cried.
While panting up the steep

To caU this thing a beach is stiff.
It’s nothing but a bloody ch|

From ‘‘ The Dardanelles Military Times ^

CAPTURE OF THE BEACHES

307

One could sense that our splendid people were on top and
confident. They were certainly appreciative of our efforts,
and an Australian morsing with a flag signalled “ The boys
won’t forget the Qmen Eli^aheth^^

Meanwhile, at about ^ p.m, we heard to our immense relief
that the Dublin and Munster Fusiliers and Hampshire Regiment
had captured Sedd el Bahr village and fort and the old castle
that dominated “ V ” Beach, which was now in our possession.
At 4.30 we went south again, feeling confident that An^ac had
made good, and much happier about HeUes.

When we passed “ Y ” we heard from the Goliath that the
evacuation of that beach was completed by 4 p.m. Not quite,
for a little later a boat was seen to land on the beach and, leaving
his crew in the boat, a naval officer was seen to climb the cliff
and spend an hour or so on the scene of the action. It was
my brother Adrian, miserably unhappy, making sure that no
wounded had been left behind.

We heard later that so peaceful was that area during the first
day that the commanding officer, attended only by his adjutant,
had walked to within 500 yards of Krithia without sighting
an enemy, and it was not until 3 p.m. that any steps were taken
to entrench. At about 4 p.m. the enemy brought a gun to
bear on them, and at 5.40 p.m. the first attack was delivered,
which was broken up by the fire of the ships. When the ships
could no longer see where to fire, the attacks were renewed
and continued at intervals all night. The Turks displayed the
utmost bravery, and our troops, resisting most stubbornly, were
subjected to fierce attacks with bomb and bayonet and rifle
and machine-gun fire, during which the casualties they suffered,
protected only by shallow trenches, amounted to just under 700,
including among the killed the colonel and ii officers of the
Scottish Borderers, and the commanding officer of the South
Wales Borderers detachment. The ships opened fire at day-
light, ♦when they could see anything to fire at; the line was
intact and the enemy had withdrawn, much to the relief of our
sorely tried troops, which included among the Marines a large
proportion of young recruits. The enemy, however, attacked
again about 7 a.m. and succeeded in penetrating our line, but
“ the position was restored with the bayonet. The Turks fled
in disorder and from that moment not another shot was fired

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

308

at “ Y ” Beach troops ; the landing had been made good ! ”*
By 8 o’clock our -withdrawal had commenced.

We know now that the total strength of the enemy was
one and a half battalions, that their casualties amounted to
50 per cent, of the numbers engaged — a higher percentage
t han our own — and that they were thoroughly demoralised and
in full retreat.

The Military Historian, commenting on this heartbreaking
tale, remarks : “ Qeverly conceived, happily opened, hesitatingly
conducted, miserably ended — such is the story of the landing
at ‘ Y ’ Beach.”

It is only fair, however, to the harassed Commander to
record that he was not given any instructions as to his conduct
in the event of the advance from the south not materialising ;
and a request for instructions signalled about noon, remained
unanswered. “ Throughout the 29 hours’ tenure of his position
no word of any kind had reached him from Divisional Head-
quarters. No reply had been sent to his urgent appeals for
reinforcements. Though ‘ Y ’ Beach was only twenty minutes’
distance in a destroyer from Di-visional Headquarters, no officer
of the Divisional Staff had been sent to gain a personal knowledge
of his position. Not even a situation report had been dispatched,
to tell him what was happening at the southern end of the
Peninsula. To all intents and purposes he had been forgotten.”'}'

When we arrived off HeUes we found that our line was
established firom “ X ” Beach to the southern end of Morto
Bay. The troops had spent a sleepless, anxious night, but
although fimall parties of Turks occasionally approached our
line, the enemy, greatly inferior in numbers and equally dis-
tressed and worn out, ffid not attempt to counter-attack.

“ During the night, when every available fighting man had
been sent into the line, midshipmen and even captains R.N.
were carrying boxes of ammunition up to the troops.”| One
of the latter was PhiUimore, the principal Beachmaster,*who,
true to the fighting traditions of the battle cruisers, had volun-
teered -with all his officers who could be spared, for service on
the beach, while the Inflexible was being repaired.

* “Military Operations, Gallipoli,’* VoL I, page 209.

Military Operations, Gallipoli,” VoL I, page 21 1.

X “ Military Operations, Gallipoli,” Vol. I, page 250.

CAPTURE OF THE BEACHES 509

The troops ^’ho h^d been held up on board the Biver Clyde
throughout the 25th were disembarked during the mght, and
at daylight the attack was renewed under cover of the ship s hre ,
but, worn out by their trying ordeal and shaken by their heavy
losses, thetired troops made no progress throughout the forenoon.

Colonel C. Doughty-Wyllie, principal Intelligence Officer on
Sir Ian’s Staff, who with two other Staff officers had Uken
passage in the River Clyde, then organised an attack wiffi the
object of clearing Sedd elBahr village and capturing HiU 141,
which was the key of the enemy’s defensive position. Att^
desperate house-to-house fighting and fierce resis^« the
village was captured by the Hampshire Regiment, and ffie Dubto
and Munster Fusiliers carried the old castle on IM 141 y
assault. Doughty-Wyllie, gallantly leading die charge tell
mortally wounded on the sumimt.* By 3 p.m. the whole of
“ V ” Beach was in our possession.

At 7 p.m. Admiral Guepratte came on board and told us
that some hundreds of Turks who had been cut off from retreat
by the fire of the ships and the French 75s, had surrmdered.
As the situation of Kum Kale was so favourable, and that at
Helles still somewhat precarious. Sir Ian, with Admm^ Gue-
pratte’s concurrence, asked General d’Amade to defer the
withdrawal, which was to take place that night, for more
day. But it was too late, and the evacuation of the whole French
force with 450 prisoners was completed before daybreak.

The total French casualties at Kum Kale were 778. The
Turkish account admits to the loss of 1,730 officers and men,

including 500 missing. , 1. j

By nightfall on the 26th the Army was established on the
Gallipoli Peninsula, and though we went through some very
anxious moments during the next few days, the Tur s were
never again in a position to dnve us out.

Before passing to the next phase it would be as well to review
the operations, in company with the Military Historian, who,
as an officer on Sir Ian Hamilton’s Staff, watched the battles, as
I did, from the bridge of the Queen Eli%aheth, and has since had

* Colonel C Doughty-WyUie and Captain G. N. also on Sir Ian’s Staff,

received nosthumous Victoria Crosses for their devoted bravery.

‘“i trSy due to the initiative, skill and great

that die attack was a complete success. Both were killed m the momen
of victory .” — Lottdon June, I9^5*

310 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

the opportunity of closely studying the Peninsula and examining
every conceivable document, British, Allied and enemy, on the
subject.

General Aspinall-Oglander affirms that a careful study of
events leads to the conclusion that the plan of capturing Achi
Baba on 25th April had a reasonable prospect of success. He
places the abnormal number of casualties among the senior officers
on shore, and the consequent lack of leadership at critical moments,
in some of the units, as the first among the causes of failure.

The only failure he mentions which concerns the Navy, was
that of the arrangements for inter-communication, and the
great difficulty experienced by the 29th Divisional Headquarters
in exercising adequate control over the operations, from the
deck of a man-of-war. However, wireless and visual signals
between the ships lying off the scattered fighting areas, provided
some means of communication between units and the Divisional
and General Headquarters, otherwise cut off from one another ;
there being no communication by land wire during the first
two days’ fighting.

As he states, it certainly was a great disadvantage — ^not
anticipated beforehand — ^for General and Divisional Head-
quarters to be located on board ships which, by force of cir-
cumstances, had to use their armaments in order to assist the
hard-pressed troops.

With regard to the failture to e^loit the success at “ Y ”
and “ S,” he establishes the fact that the troops of those two
landings, who found themselves tonmolested all day, were alone
stronger than all the Turks at the southern end of the Peninsula ;
and shows that throughout the 25 th, the Turks had been unable
to array more than two battalions, against twelve and a half
British battalions on shore by i p.m. As at “ Y ” Beach, the
Colonel commanding at “ S ” Beach had no instructions as to
his conduct if the Imding at Helles was held up. His task
was to seize de Tort’s and await the advance from the south.
The troops here were opposed by two platoons (50 men), one
of which was killed or taken prisoners at the outset and the
other overwhelmed and put to flight.

The Turkish force which held up the three battalions at
“ V ” Beach consisted of one company, reinforced later in the
day by two more companies. There can be no doubt that the

CAPTURE OF THE BEACHES

3 ”

dogged defence of this small detachment, despite the ordeal
they suffered from the tremendous explosions of heavy shells,
was the main cause of the collapse of the British pkn.

The Turkish machine guns which took such toll of our
troops were four old maxims, two of which were destroyed
by the naval bombardment, and two pom-poms at “ V ”
Beach ; and at “ W ” Beach two maxims enfilading the main
wire entrenchment.

No Turkish artillery was brought to bear on the Helles
landings, except at “ V ” Beach, from the batteries on the Asiatic
shore. This was desultory and negligible, thanks to the fire
of the covering ships.

Although 4,000 men were landed at Anxac by 5 a.m., 8,000 by
8 a.m. and 15,000 by the late afternoon ; and against these the
Turks could only oppose 500 troops up to 9.30 a.m. and from
that hour until dusk a gradually increasing number, which at no
time exceeded 5,000 men; yet so strong is the power of the
defence against maritime invasion that the enemy held their ground.

Studied in the light of knowledge after the event, tiie situation
at Anzac on the night of the 25th was far from unsatisfactory.
Despite the extraordinary panic in the vicinity of the beaches,
the troops in the front line, though tired out with the strain
of the day, were still in good heart and knew they held the
measure of the Turks. In fact, though we did not know it,
the Turks were thoroughly disorganised and had suffered
2,000 casualties, a much higher percentage of loss than that of
the Anzac Corps.

He concludes his review thus :

“Fortunate indeed must it be considered that Sir I^
Hamilton had decided against the landing near Bulair.
If the 29th Division, using five landing places, three of
which were practically unprepared for defence, could effect
so little against a total force of two battalions, an attempt
to land at the northern isthmus, where only one small
beach was available, where an attack was confidently
expected, and where two divisions were waiting to oppose
it, must surely have ended in failure.”*

An opinion I most fully share.

* “ Military Operations, Gallipoli,” Vol. I, pages 255 and 256.

CHAPTER XVin

BATTLES FOR KRITHIA

French land at “ V ” Beach ; j2«f Elit^abeib’s efifectiye fire ; Inspection of Helles
and Anzac ; Heavy Turkish attacks repulsed ; Raids from Anzac ;

Battle of Krithia.

During the night of the 26th-27th ^ Queen Elizabeth remained
at anchor off Helles. In the western area the troops seemed to
be having a fairly peaceful night, but to the eastward we could
hear tremendous outbursts of firing from time to time. The
Turks had withdrawn, as a matter of fact, but our weary troops
did not know this, and fearing a counter-attack, were firing
heavily at anything they saw moving in front of them. De
Tott’s was still isolated, but was supplied with all its wants
through “ S ” Beach, and was left severely alone by the enemy.
During the night, two French battalions landed at “ V ” Beach,
and French troops continued to land there throughout the day.

At 4 p.m. on the 27th, the 29th Division, reinforced by two
French battahons on the right, advanced with the object of
taking up a line extending from the high ground above “ S”
Beach to the neighbourhood of Gully Ravine. A couple of
Turkish Field Batteries, which had been brought south and were
in action on the afternoon of the 26th, had evidently been with-
drawn out of range, and the advance proceeded without any
opposition.

The French joined the South Wales Borderers at de Tott’s,
which became the right flank, and by 5.30 p.m. the new line had
been taken up, the left flank resting on the coast about 300 yards
short of Gully Ravine. Our troops dug themselves in during
tile night; Turkish patrols were active, but no attack was
delivered, and by daybreak the new line was securely established.
Meanwhile artillery, ammunition, stores, mules and horses, were
landed at “ V ’’ and “ W ” Beaches incessantly, night and day.

512

BATTLES FOR KRITHIA

313

After completing with ammunition on the morning of the
27th, the Eli^heth steamed up the coast to An2ac, where
she arrived about 8 a.m. Anzac beach was being severely
shelled, but thanks to the conformation of the hills, it could
not be brought under direct fire. The shrapnel bursting over-
head was annoying, but very few of the projectiles fell anywhere
but in the sea, through which our boats and lighters plied to
and fro, day and night, landing mules, guns, ammunition, etc.,
and water — ^the latter a vital necessity, since practically none
appeared to exist within the positions we held. At about
10 a,m. a Turkish ship commenced to drop heavy shells over the
Peninsula, into the water occupied by the covering battleships
and transports, some fell close to the Queen Elizabeth. Our
seaplanes reported that both the Turgoid Reis^ and the Goeben
were firing. The former had fired into the anchorage on the
2^ thy but was forced to move by the Triumph which drove her off
by indirect fire, spotted for by the Manila's kite balloon. The
balloon at once went up, and gave the Queen Elizabeth the spot
on a squared chart, in which the Goeben was lying. The first
1 5 -inch shell, fired at a range of 1 5,000 yards, fell close to her, and
she promptly moved off out of sight under cover of the cliffs.
The observer then reported the position of some transports, and
gave the position on the squared chart of the largest one, a vessel
of about 8,000 tons, Tht Queen Elio^abetb opened fire again, the
first shot was signalled over, the second 20 yards short, and the
tiiird O.K,” ; a few minutes later the observer reported that
the vessel had sunk stem first. After that, directly the balloon
went up, enemy ships hurriedly moved under shelter of the cliff.

During the afternoon the Turks advanced in considerable
force over Battleship Hill, clearly visible to the ships, which
opened a devastating fire, under which they fled in confusion.
The historian records that: ‘^For over three months the
Turks made no further attempt at Anzac to attack by daylight
over ground that was in direct view of the supporting ships,*^!

At nightfall we returned to HeUes, having heard in the mean-
time of the successful advance of our troops in the southern area.

General Hunter-Weston came on board that evening, and it

* The old German battleship Wdssenbtrgy which bad been sold to the Turks
before the war,

t “ Military Operations, Gallipoli,” Vol. I, page 297.

}i 4 NAVAL MEMOER.S, 1910-1915

■was decided to attack on the morrow, with the object of capturing
Krithia and Achi Baba before Turkish reinforcements arrived.
Although the attack on Kum Kale and the feints at Bulair and
in Besika Bay, had undoubtedly had the effect of holding a
considerable force of the enemy in those areas, the arrival of
strong reinforcements could not be long delayed.

General Hunter-Weston took command of a corps, consisting
of the French Division and the 29th Division, and Brigadier-
General Marshall was placed in command of the latter; the
three brigades being given to the three senior colonels. It was
hoped to land three or four fresh French battalions in timp for
the advance. The 29th Division had suffered grievous losses,
the four battalions of the 86th Brigade had lost half their officers
and a third of their men, and the other Brigades had lost heavily ;
the majority of the troops had been fighting for three days and
four nights, with very Uttle sleep ; as yet both the British and
French were very short of artillery, and we had a very small
allowance of ammunition. It was not an encouraging outlook
for our weary troops, with no reiaforcements behind them, and
in front a brave determined foe with the whole Turkish Arm y
behind them.

The advance on the 27th had been in the nature of a wheel
pivoting on the left flank. The attack on the 28th had as its
first object an advance of the left flank and centre, pivoting on
the French line above “S” Beach. The Allied line at its
starting point was only two miles; the frontage of the final
objective was five and a half miles. It would be impossible to
imagine a more difficult manoeuvre in the broken country,
against an enemy whose strength, and the position of whose
defences, were unknown.

On the morning of the 28 th April, General d’Amade, and
General Paris — commanding the Naval Division — came on
board the Queen Eli^aietb ; the former to tell Sir Ian about the
evacuation of Kum Kale, and to express his regret at being
unable to stop the -withdrawal as requested ; the latter to report
details of his feint off B'ulair. These interviews were cut short
by the distant roar of battle, which broke out from shore to
shore at about 10 a.m.

Before relating what we saw from the Queen Elh(abeth, I will
turn to the official history for a brief account of what actually

BATTLES FOR KRITHIA

315

took place on shore as the reports we received at the time were
confusing and indefinite.

The action opened at 8 a.m. by a naval bombardment of
Krithia and the Achi Baba slopes. “ At the same time the 29th
Division climbed wearily out of their trenches, and plodded
forward in the direction of Krithia. ... At first all went well
on the 29th Division front, no opposition was encountered,
there was little or no Turkish shelling, and by 9 a.m. the capture
of Krithia seemed imminent. According to Turkish accounts,
some of their forward troops began to give ground directly the
British advanced, and one battalion bolted.” As the line
advanced through the difficult broken country, units lost touch,
and before long our line was in considerable confusion, practically
every Company Commander fighting an independent battle.
The Turkish official account admits tlat their centre broke, and
an order was issued for a general retirement to Achi Baba, but
at II a.m. reinforcements restored their line.

Thus the battle ebbed and flowed all day, at one time to within
a few hundred yards of Krithia, but when night fell the Allied
troops were practically back in their original trenches. The
29th Division started the day with between 8,000 and 9,000 men,
and had 2,000 casualties, including a high proportion of
officers ; the French had 5,000 engaged, and had lost 27 officers
and 974 men.

The whole of another sleepless night was spent in re-sorting
units, and filling gaps in the line. The Turks made no attempt
to counter-attack during the night. It is now known that their
losses were as heavy as ours, and that throughout the day the
situation was regarded by them as critical. The historian
concludes : “ But though the 29th Division was badly bent,
it was to prove that night, as on countless future occasions, that
its spirit could not be broken.”

To this testimony, I would like to add the unbounded
admiration I recorded at the time, for the heroic, unbeaten
bearing, of that worn-out but most glorious Division.

When it was apparent that our troops were heavily engaged,
the Quern Eli^ahetb weighed at once, and proceeded up the west
coast, and was manoeuvred to cover, as far as possible, the troops
working along the left flank. Some of her guns we re reserved
for shrapnel, in the event of the enemy giving 'opportunities.

5i6 naval memoirs, 1910-1915

similar to those at Anzac, where shrapnel was used with deadly
eifect. About i o’clock, we saw a large body of men, estimated
at about 2,000 by Sir Ian, alongside whom I was standing. I felt
sure they were Turks, their heavy bullock-like jog-trot seemed
so unlike the double of our infantry, moreover they were mo ving
south in formation, which seemed too regular for troops in
retreat. However, no one could be absolutely certain of tVipjr
identity, and they were only in sight of the ship for a few minutes
before they disappeared behind a slope. By that timp -we were
agreed that they were Turks, and we were ready for them with
six-inch and 1 5 -inch shrapnel, timed to burst just short of them, if
they appeared again. We saw them a few minu tes later, now
advancing in loose formation ; our sk-inch shrapnel burst well
amongst them, and caused a number of casualties, but they
pressed on unchecked and disappeared again. Then a company
of about 200 appeared, extended in a line at right angles to the
ship, led by an ofBcer waving his sword, charging witE bayonets
fixed towards a party of our men, who were marching forward
on the other side of a slope, apparently quite unaware of thpjr
approach. It was a moment of tense excitement. I fixed my
powerful telescope on the Turks, and it brought them close
enough to distinguish whether a man had a moustache or a
beard. I heard George Hope (Captain of Queen Elh^aheth) give
an order — ^ages later so it seemed to me — ^and one of the 15-inch
guns in one of the after turrets fired. The discharge of a heavy
gun in a battleship causes the smoke to belch out of the funnels.
At that time, the top of the foremost funnel of Hat Queen Elh^ahetb
was level with the fore bridge and almost touching it, and a cloud
of oily smoke shot across my view, but I saw through the smoke,
shining bayonets flung up in all directions, and when the smoke
cleared away, the whole Turkish line was obliterated. I do not
think one man was left alive. A 1 5-inch shrapnel contains 1 5,000
bullets and the timing of the shell must have been perfect.
It certainly saved a party of the Border Regiment from
annihilation.

The main body of Turks who had narrowly escaped the
Queen Elh^etVs shrapnel when they were in massed formation,
undctabtedly exercised a considerable influence on the situation,
for it was evident to us that our troops were fellin g back, and
to our dismay, a litde later, we saw a party on the left flank in full

BATTLES FOR KRITHIA

3^7

retreat. Aspinall,^ a young major on Sir Ian’s StaflF^ who was
on the bridge, begged to be allowed to go on shore, to report
on the situation, and check the withdrawal of men, who were
retiring along the beach at the foot of the cliffs. He had made a
similar request on the morning of the 26th April when we were
off « Y ” Beach, but was refused. This time his request was
granted, and I watched him through my telescope, tally the
party, which included a young ofl&cer, and lead them over the
cUff into the thick of the action again. Aspinall told me later
how well they had behaved — ^they too had something to wipe
off the slate, and most gallantly they did it.

We spent that night off Helles. Living in safety and comfort
on board the Queen Eli^aheth^ it was hateful to think of the
sufferings our people were enduring on shore, and I was anxious
to land at the earliest possible moment, to see if there was
anything we could do, or anything the Army lacked, that the
Navy could provide.

On the morning of the 29th, Sir Ian and some of his Staff,
Godfrey, Ranasay and I embarked in the destroyer Kenneth
attached to iiiQ Queen Eh^abetb, and landed at W ” Beach.

The naval and military beach parties were working with
feverish energy and landing animals, guns, ammxinition and
stores ; a considerable swell, which had risen during the night,
did not lighten their labours. Crowds of wounded were
limping down to the beach, or being carried in stretchers to
await transhipment to the transports for passage to Egypt or
Malta, or to fleet sweepers, to be carried to the field hospilils at
Mudros. The hospital ships had already sailed, crowded far
beyond their normal capacity. The patience, fortitude and
endurance of the wounded, under conditions of incredible
hardship and suffering, is a lasting memory

The following extract from my diary gives some idea of my
impressions at the time : We were amazed at the strength of

the defences which our troops had stormed. In addition to
the deep concealed trenches, two caves had been dug into the
cliffs, and it was from these that their maxims had enfiladed the
main wire entanglement. We were told that the first rush of
four officers and 75 men fell against it in a straight line.

Our boats’ crews had had a good many casualties when the

* Now Brigadier-General Aspinall-Oglander, the Military Historian.

jiS NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

boats were beached, but without exception they had succeeded
in getting off and pulling back for reinforcements, in some cases
with only two or three survivors, in a boat full of Villpd and
wounded. Directly the latter had been removed, and the
casualties made good, they started back again. When the flanU
was turned, and the main defences were captured, the situation
was, of course, much improved, but casualties were suffered all
day from the fire of snipers, until the advance on the 26th freed
the beach from rifle fire.

“ From ‘ W ’ Beach we walked over the hill to Sedd el Bahr,
only a mile away, but a bloody mile if ever there was
intersected by trenches and wired redoubts, the latter like the
maze at Hampton Court. We went to the place where we had
watched the men of the Worcestershire Regiment cutting wire,
and found that they had been working within a few yards of
the Turkish trenches. Then down to ‘ V ’ Beach, it was here
the Dublins lost most of their people. We were told that after
the action of the previous day they were reduced to one officer
and about 300 men, and had joined up with the re mnan t of the
Munster Fusiliers and called themselves the ‘ Dubsters.’ We
came across one grave with 3 50 in it, and many others. Of the
naval party employed here 63 were killed or wounded out of
the 80 engaged. The position is aptly described in our oflicial
telegram as an amphitheatre with the beach as a stage. The
whole circumference of the beach had been honeycombed like a
rabbit warren with trenches, tunnels and caves, convergiag on
the landing place, and protected by the most appalling barbed
wire, far more formidable than ours at that date, and practically
uncutable by our wire cutters. ‘V’ Beach was impregnable
to frontal attack, and there is nothing else to be said about it.”

After three hours on shore, we returned to ^ Queen Elizabeth
with much to reflect on. The appalling nature of military
operations under modem conditions, and the magnitude of the
Army’s task was now only too apparent, and I felt that the
sooner we took a hand the better, an opinion most fully shared
by Godfrey. We felt that a naval attack could not fail to turn
the position for the Army, and signals were prepared for dispatch
to the commanding officers of units, directing them to complete
with fuel, stores, and ammunition to the full capacity of their
ships.

BATTLES FOR KRITHIA

319

“ The Queen Eli^^abeth then steamed up the coast to Anzac.
The firing was incessant, but no one seemed to be paying much
attention to it, and work was proceeding on the beaches without
check. I was very anxious to go on shore, and see if anything
was wanted, and Sir Ian whispered to me, ‘ Don’t you think we
might land and look at it.’ A good deal of cold water was
thrown on the suggestion. It seems that in modern war, the
Staff consider that the Commander-in-Chief should not be
subjected to any risk; they may be right, though I think
otherwise myself. In any case the idea can be overdone, as
there must be occasions when the personal touch and leadership
are nine-tenths of the batde.

“ We embarked in the Colne and steamed in towards Anzac
Cove, transferring to a picket boat when about a mile from the
beach. The enemy burst shrapnel over Anzac aU day, but the
position we hold is now wonderfully protected by tunnels,
trenches, dug-outs, etc. The only direct fire one meets is in the
front line trenches and at sea, otherwise the fire is aU indirect
and not very dangerous. But for the firing, we might have
been landing on Margate beach on a warm sunny day ; 2,000 to
5,000 men were about, many bathing, others all over the hillsides
and in the gullies in small parties making tea. They have made
wonderful roads and galleries, have got guns up into apparently
inaccessible positions, and seem very happy and contented.
The bathing and picnic parties occasionally have casualties, but
no one seems to mind. General Bkdwood took us up to the
front line trenches ; most of the way we were under cover,
every now and then we were told to keep our heads down, and
the bullets zipped overhead ; we seemed to draw a lot of fire,
and they attributed this to our white cap covers, so after that I
wore khaki when I landed.

“ The Anzacs were full of appreciation of the fleet’s gunnery
practice, the Queen EUs^abetb’s shrapnel taking the palm, with the
result that Brady (my coxswain) who wore a Queen Elizabeth
cap ribbon, was an object of particularly friendly interest. An
Australian Colonel declared that one of our 1 5-indi shrapnel ‘ had
wiped out a whole Turkish Regiment.’ I think the Bacchante
came a good second. On the morning of the 23 th April, when
Anzac was having a particukrly bad time from shrapnel, fired
from concealed guns near Gaba Tepe, Captain Boyle stood in

320 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

to the shore until the Baccbantis stem grounded, and with her
broadside of 9.2-inch and six-inch, she simply blasted the whole
area, and ejBFectively kept the fire under. Subsequently the guns
seem to have been moved to a position in which they could not
be reached from seaward.

‘‘ We were told a good deal about the extraordinary situation
during the first two or three days. There was a great deal of
sniping from within our lines, but one by one the snipers were
caught ; one man was found dug in, in a bush, with 15 days’
provisions, a large can of water, and 1,000 rounds of ammunition.
Five Turks were caught amongst our men, in uniform taken
off our dead — ^they died. One dead man had a flashing lamp,
and a card giving all our morse signals on it, with the equiva-
lents in Turkish, many false signals no doubt were made by him ;
wireless signals such as ' Cease firing ’ were often made, the
procedure of our wireless shore stations being closely copied.

We left before nightfall, having enjoyed our outing very
much, the whole atmosphere was exhilarating, one inhaled
confidence and optimism, and I am sure it did the Anzacs a lot
of good to see Sir Ian in their trenches. Admiral Thursby joined
us for our walk. The Amzcs owe a good deal to him, for his
confidence in them on the night of the 25 th. It would have
been an awful tragedy if Sir Ian had acted on the message Bird-
wood sent on board that night.”

During my absence ashore, Godfrey, who had not accompanied
me, submitted the signal we had prepared to the Admiral, and
asked permission to make it to Admiral Thursby ; but the Admiral
tore up the signal, replying that the Army was not yet firmly
established on shore, and until it was, he would not attack.

The captain of the destroyer Wolverine was killed on the
morning of the 28th ; she was a sister ship to the Basilisk^ which
my brother Adrian had commanded just before he retired, so
the Admiral gave him the vacancy. Adrian could not be found
until the following day, as after his “ Y ” Beach had been given
up, he attached himself to the troops which were to assault Achi
Baba, where he was to establish a naval observation station
directly it was captured. He came on board to report himself on
the 29th. I think his feelings were mixed ; he said he could
hardly bear to tear himself away from the Army. We could
get very little out of him, except his intense admiration for the

CAP'JXIRBO TURKISH SNIIPKR
7\n5^fic, 26th April, 1915

BATTLES FOR KRITHIA

3ZI

29th Division and his sorrow at seeing most of the officers of
the Scottish Borderers, with whom he had made great friends,
killed alongside him. We gathered from him that Brigadier-
General Marshall, who was wounded on the 2 5 th^ but remained
in action, like the other two Brigadiers of the Division, was
always in the thick of every action. I think my brother’s
condition was typical of that of the 29th Division— dead dog-
tired. He had been fighting incessandy since the 25 th, and had
hardly slept since the night of the 23rd. His new ship was
imdergoing repairs, half her bridge having been shot away,
when her captain was killed, so I made him lie on my bed, where
he lay like a log for several hours.*

AEzh cruise ia the Marmora was shortlived. We knew
from her signals that she was being severely hunted by the
enemy patrol craft, and on the night of 30th April, the German
cruiser Breslau signalled in English that AEz had been sunk
and her entire crew captured.

In the meantime Iieut.-Cocamander E. C. Boyle in £14 had
succeeded in entering the Marmora on the 27th, and reported
that night that he had sunk a torpedo gimboat off Chanak.
Boyle managed to signal most nights ; like AEz^ E14,
was incessandy hunted, but it was clear from Boyle’s signals
that he was not in the least perturbed, which did not surprise
me, as in the whole of my long submarine experience, I never
came across anyone more completely oblivious of danger. We
soon learnt, from enemy sources, that £’i4’s presence in the
Marmora was causing intense concern, but it was some time
before we knew the extent of the losses she inflicted on the
enemy.

On 30th April and ist May, the Allied troops dug, wired,
improved and consolidated their position, and by nightfall on
the I St May, they were entrenched m a practically continuous
line, extending from a quarter of a mile south of “ Y ” Beach to
Hill 236 on the Dardanelles side of the Peninsula.

Meanwhile half the effective troops were employed in helping

* Commander Adrian Keyes was awarded a D.S.O. for Hs work with the Army.
Three distent senior military officers, writing to congratulate him, each remark^
that they were glad to have been able to get the decoration for him.

322

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1913

the beach parties to build up a reserve of stores and ammunition,
and in carrying a supply of the latter, and water, to the vicinity
of the front line. Five battalions of the Naval Division, the
whole of the French Division, and all the British and French
artillery were on shore, and an Indian Brigade, consisting of one
Gurkha, one Sikh, and two Punjabi battalions had arrived
from Egypt.

Sir Ian had intended to renew his attack on Achi Baba, as
soon as the latter and the French were ready, and the preliminary
moves were to take place during the night of ist-and May.

While we were preparing to renew our attack, such success as
we had achieved to date, appears to have caused intense alarm in
Constantinople. We know now that : “ On the 30th April,
Marshal Liman von Sanders received a peremptory order from
Enver Pasha ‘ to drive the invaders into the sea.’ The British
fleet was sweeping the southern end of the Peninsula from three
sides . . . and the Turks had only field guns to oppose this fire,
and a very limited supply of ammunition.”* The Marshal then
ordered Colonel Sodenstern, who commanded the Turkish
troops in the southern area, to assault the Allied line with every
available man on the night of the ist-and May. The Turkish
force consisted of 2 1 battalions of infantry with 5 6 guns. Orders
were given that rifles were not to be loaded ; the order ran :
“ Attack the enemy with the bayonet and utterly destroy him.
We shall not retire one step ; for if we do, our religion, our
country, and our nation will perish.”’|' Special parties were told
off to carry infl amm able material to bum our boats on the beaches.

My diary records that on the night of ist May the Turks
attacked desperately all night ; it was hateful to listen to — a. roar
of rifle and gunfire. I went to bed at 12.30 as there was nothing
one could do. About 4 a.m. Bowlby woke me to say that there
were rather desperate signals ftom the ships on the right flank.
Apparently the French had broken badly and boats were
wanted. It did not sound at dl nice, so I went on
board the Kennet (Lt.-Commander F. Russel) at once and
steamed full speed to the right flank, taking Brodie with
me. Day was breaking when I arrived and found four trawlers
with a number of boats in Morto Bay, under a heavy shrapnel

* “ Fflaf Jahre Tfirkri,” page 9 j.

t Military Operations, Gallipoli,” Vol. n, pages 317 and } 18 .

BATTLES FOR KRITHIA

523

fire, and the Vengeance oS the flank firing towards the Gallipoli
shore. At first it was impossible to distinguish between French
and Turks, the fighting seemed very confused, so I ordered the
Kennet to go as close to the shore as possible, to try and assist
the French with her fire ; but we could only see some French
on one hill top firing in front of them, and on the next hill behind
them a lot of French soldiers running from Turks who appeared
to have got between the two detachments. The situation was
all too confused for the Kennet to engage in the action, and as we
were under considerable shrapnel fire from Gallipoli, and a gun
was firing at us from the Asiatic shore, I ordered all the men
under cover, only Brodie, the Captain, two men and I remaining
on the bridge. This was fortunate as a six-inch shell fired from the
Asiatic gun, burst against the pedestal of the gun on the fore-
castle just below where we were standing. If the crew had been
round the gun, as they were a few minutes earlier, they must
have all been killed or wounded. The shell threw about a
number of lyddite projectiles that were in the ready racks,
without exploding them. Soon after this we saw the French
advance, make a gallant counter-attack, retake the trenches from
which they had retired, and advance about 1,000 yards. I had
ordered the four trawlers out of Morto Bay, on my arrival, as
they were running unnecessary risks from the enemy fire, and
could not possibly help the situation. As I was withdrawing,
all being now well on the French front, Lieut.-Commander Hardy,
in charge of the four trawlers, begged to be allowed to return to
Morto Bay to embark the French wounded, who were being
brought down in great numbers to S ” Beach. So I sent him
Brodie and four men in the Kennefs whaler, to assist his boats to
bring the wounded off to the trawlers. I learnt later that the
trawlers had transported about 1,000 wounded in the course of
two days. Millot, our French liaison officer, told me that on
one occasion, when a number of Senegalese had retired hastily
to the beach. Hardy, finding a trumpeter among them, had
rallied them and led them back to their battalion in the trenches.*
We heard later in the day that our line had withstood a
tremendous onslaught ; the Turks in dense masses had crept
close up to our trenches and with shouts of Allah, had tried to

* Hardy was awarded the Croix de Guerre by the French General for his services
n Morto Bay,

324 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

rush them with the bayonet. They broke through once or
twice, but were speedily ejected, and hundreds were mown
down by our fire. The Turks’ principal effort seems to have
been directed against the French front, and on their left a battalion
of Senegalese broke, leaving a British battery which was support-
ing them uncovered ; a party of gunners and a company of the
Worcestershire Regiment, however, occupied their trench.
The French were so hard pressed that at 2 a.m. they asked for
help, and in the course of the morning two battalions of the Naval
Division were sent to assist them. By 8 a.m. the Allied line was
intact everywhere, and at 10 a.m. it advanced to counter-attack,
and a number of prisoners were taken, but it was held up by a
cross fire from concealed machine guns, which could not be
located, and by ii a.m. it fell back again to its defensive position.

The French losses amounted to 58 officers and 2,064 other
ranks, ours to 37 officers and 641 men. The Turkish official
account admits to very heavy losses — ^nevertheless the Turks
delivered another determined attack against the French sector
during the night of 3rd-4th, which after some anxious moments,
was repulsed again with great loss to the indomitable enemy.

These attacks by the Turks held up Sir Ian’s projected advance,
but he was determined to start it as soon as possible, before the
Turks had had time to reorganise after the heavy repulse they had
suffered. The date for out attack was fixed for the 6th May, by
which time the Indian Brigade would be ready to take part in
the battle. General Birdwood, having declared himself satisfied
with the position at Anzac, Sir Ian decided to withdraw an
Australian and New Zealand brigade from there, and employ
them and aH the artillery, for which room had not yet been found
at Anzac, in his batde for Krithia and Achi Baba.

The British losses to date, in killed and wounded, amounted
to 432 officers and 9 j 3 ^^ other ranks; and the French losses
were 3,902. The Allied Army had a secure foothold on the
Peninsula, and had repulsed with great slaughter, every effort
of the enemy to drive it into die sea. Surely the moment had
arrived to deliver the combined attack, for which we had broken
off the naval attack, on the very threshold of victory ; after
suffering losses considerably less than those sustained at “ V ”
Beach by the naval boats’ crews alone.

The Admiral, however, now decided that we must wait until

BATTLES FOR KRITHIA 525

Achi Baba had been captured by the Army, in order to give us an
observation station for our attack on the Narrows ; akin to 203
Metre Hill, which was considered essential for the capture of
Port Arthur ; and Prince Henry Hill for that of Tsingtau ; but
by the ist May we had kite balloon and aeroplane observation of
far greater value to us for fire control, than the possession of an
observation station on Achi Baba ; an opinion I definitely
confirmed some years later, when I visited the latter in company
with Sir Ian and Aspinall. It was an unpleasant shock to us to
find that the forts we had hoped to destroy, with the assistance
of observation from Achi Baba, were not even visible from that
gigantic fraud. Nevertheless, the obsession that Achi Baba was
necessary to the Navy persisted to the end, and even finds a
place in the official naval history.

The Naval Historian remarks, in the course of a somewhat
irrelevant reference to the use made by the Japanese of these
two hills :

“ As is well known, the fate of Port Arthur turned on
the capture of 205 Metre Hill. From the first Admiral
Togo had pointed out that this indispensable observing
station was the decisive primary objective for the army,
but the army, ignoring the exigencies of naval gunners, tried
tvtry other means before its chiefs were convinced. Yet
in our service the cardinal lesson appears to have been
missed. The experience of the Japanese was taken as
showing the great diEculty of destroying modern forts by
ship fire, but the only means of overcoming the difficulty
was ignored.”*

The study of history is invaluable to soldiers and sailors, if
its lessons can only be read aright. There are lessons to be
learnt from the capture of Port Arthur from the Russians, and
Tsingtau &om the Germans, but they do not lie in the possession
of this or that hill, but rather in the pursuit of an objective with
steady and ruthless determination, whatever the cost, in declining
to accept defeat, or being diverted by side issues. A lesson in
Japanese history which might well have been taken to heart by
those who faltered, and failed to carry the Dardanelles Campaign
* “ Naval Operations, ” Vol, 11 , page 175.

326 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

to victory, (Also I would add, by those who rule our destinies
now.)

A very successful raid was carried out on the 2nd May by the
destroyer Colne (Commander Claude Seymour) and a landing
party of about 50 New Zealanders ; who raided Nibrunesi
Point, where the enemy had an observation post, which was
believed to control the indirect fire on Anzac beach. Two days
earlier a few men had landed there from a destroyer, and had
found a telephone connection in a trench, but the Turks had taken
alarm and escaped. On this occasion, piloted by Commander the
Hon. Lionel Lambart, the raiders had landed in Suvla Bay under
Lala Baba, and creeping up in rear of the Turkish trench, had
found 17 men asleep in it. Two were killed, two escaped,
and one officer and 13 men were taken prisoners. After
thoroughly examining the place and finding a good spring of
water, these enterprising raiders retired unmolested by the
enemy.

This encouraged the Australians to try their hand on the other
flank against Gaba Tepe, which was a constant thorn in their side,
and evidently controlled the indirect fire in that area. On 4th
May a hundred Australians in four cutters, towed by the Colne^
Chelmer^ Usk and Ribble to within 500 yards of Gaba Tepe, were
covered by the Bacchante and Dartmouth, At daybreak they
dashed in to the beach under a sandy cliff on the northern side
of the bluff headland. The Turks held their fire until they were
within 40 yards and then opened on them with rifle, machine
guns, and a pom-pom. Several men were wounded in the boats,
but the whole party were able to land and get under cover of
the cHff. They had intended to return to Anzac along the beach,
after they had raided the post, but this was now out of the
question, and the situation was a deadlock. My diary records :

It seemed to us in the Queen Elizabeth ^ that the raiders would
be wiped out if they emerged from the cover of the cliff, for
despite the fire from the ships, which was smothering the bluff
above them, some of those infernal machine guns came into
action, when anyone moved.

Then for the next hour or so, we were spectators of most
gallant rescue work by our boats, which covered by the destroyers,
went ashore to bring off the wounded, regardless of the fire

BATTLES FOR KRITHIA 327

whipping up the sea all round them. The Turks were most
chivalrous, for when they saw worinded being carried down in
stretchers, they held their fire until they had been embarked.
The first attempt was made by a destroyer^s whaler, towed by her
little steam cutter, then a dinghy went in. The whaler had
evidently been severely holed on the way in, and we watched her
sinking lower and lower in the water, and men baling, as she
was towed off. Then there was a long pause, and it seemed that
the commanding officer was wondering how to extricate his
men. He evidently decided that it would be less costly to try
and re-embark them, than expose them to the long walk back to
Anzac under fire of the machine guns, which the ships were
unable to silence ; so he signalled for boats, and two picket
boats each towing two cutters, dashed in tinder a heavy fire,
and brought off the whole party. To us onlookers it seemed
incredible that the total losses amounted to no more than six
soldiers and one bluejacket killed, and 18 soldiers and five
bluejackets wounded.”

The Queen Elizabeth and kite balloon were, I think, a very
unpopular combination with the enemy.

On one occasion, while lying off Anzac, some big shells fell
among the transports. The Manuals balloon went up at once,
but no ship was to be seen in the Straits ; the aggressor had
cvidendy run into Kilia Lima Bay and was concealed by the cliflfe.
The then dropped a 15 -inch shell into iht hidden

water, and the Turgoid Reis bolted out of it like a rabbit, and went
up the Straits out of range, pursued by two shells which narrowly
missed her. On j th May the Queen Eliv^abeth engaged Fort 1 3 over
the Peninsula with an aeroplane spotting, and secured some hits.

Meanwhile the preparations for our limited co-operation in the
Army’s attack on the morrow were completed. Naval observation
stations were established on the flanks of the Army, and at General
Hunter-Weston’s headquarters on Hill 138. The Smftsure,
Commallis^ Implacable and Lord Nelson were directed to comply
with General Hunter-Weston’s requirements. The Agamemnon^
with an aeroplane to spot for her, was to keep down the fire of
the batteries on the Asiatic side. On the right flank the Albion^
Vengeance and Prince George were to take it in turns to support
the French. The cruisers Dublin^ Sapphire^ Talbot^ and Minerva

3z8 naval memoirs, 1910-1915

were to support tiae left flank. The Queen EUe^aheth had a
roving commission to use her great power where it was most
needed.

The G.H.Q. was located on board the S.S. Arcadian, to which
Sir Ian, with the whole of his Staff, had transferred from the
Queen Elit^abetb on 30th April. The Arcadian was lying off
“ W ” Beach, connected by telegraph cable with the Divisional
H.Q. at Helles and Anzac, and from her Sir Ian was to control
the battle. But — ^as the military historian points out — ^he would
be able to exercise litde or no influence. " His last re maining
reserve had been handed over in advance to his subordinate
commander on shore, and all that was left to him of the high
office of G)mmander-in-Chief was its load of responsibility.”

His appeal for reinforcements had resulted in the hasty
dispatch of the 42nd Lancashire Territorial Division from
Egypt; its 125th Brigade arrived off Helles on the 3th and
landed on that night and the following day. The two brigades
from Anzac were landed on the night of the 5th-6th, and five
Anzac field batteries had joined the artUlery of the 29th Division.

The Order of Battle consisted of three Divisions :

On the left the 29th Division, augmented by the 123th Brigade,
and die Indian Brigade — ^under General Hunter-Weston.

In the centre the ist French Division, and the Hood, Howe,
and Anson battalions of the Naval Division — ^under General
d’Amade.

On the right a Composite Division — ^under General Paris,
consisting of the Australian and New Zealand Brigades, the
Plymouth R.M.L.I., and Drake battalions of the Naval Division.
The Composite Division was placed imder the orders of General
Hunter-Weston for the batde.

The British artillery consisted of 72 guns, 56 of which were
1 8-pounder field guns.

The French had 21 of the famous 73 m.m. field guns and
12 other guns. They appeared to have almost unlimited high
explosive ammunition for the 75 s, but our batteries had been
supplied with a very meagre allowance of ammu nition, of which
more than half had already been expended, and our field guns
could only fire shrapneL

The expenditure of naval ammunition had been unexpectedly
high, and was causing Ramsay deep concern, for we had to bear

BATTLES FOR KRITHIA

329

in mind our needs for the further operations in the Dardanelles
and Marmora.

On the 6th May, the Army’s great attack, officially known as
the second battle of Krithia, opened at 10.30 a.m. when the
supporting ships fired on such batteries as had been located. At
II a.m. the whole line advanced very slowly, but was soon
held up.

The Queen Elizabeth anchored off the left flank of the 29th
Division and remained there all day. There was too much wind
for the balloon, and her fire was dkected against batteries and
trenches indicated by the observation posts on shore. The
enemy had learnt a lesson from their experience on 28th April,
and never appeared in the open, so we felt very ineffective.

The result of the day’s action was an advance of about 400
yards. The French were reinforced during the day by two
battalions of the and French Division, and the 127th Brigade of
the 42nd Division which was disembarking, was attached to the
Composite Division.

After visiting the British and French Divisional H.Q.s, Sir
Ian decided to renew the battle on the following day.

The action on the 7th was no more successful. The left was
held up by a Turkish position near “ Y ” Beach. The Smftsure,
Talbot 2iid Queen Elizabeth with Manicc^s balloon spotting, HteraUy
blew the top of the cliff off with high explosive, but the observer
in the balloon could find no trace of the Turkish position, which
with its infernal machine guns remained undetected. When
night fell the British line was practically back where it started
from.

It was galling to reflect that the possession of Y ” Beach,
which was in our hands for 24 hours on the 25th-26th April,
should now be of such vital importance.

On 8th May, Sir Ian moved tds headquarters to Hill 1 14, where
he was in telephonic communication with his generals. At
10. 1 5 a.m. the battle broke out afresh, but all day long the troops
could make no headway. The Queen Elizabeth was again on the
left flank and expended a great deal of ammunition on the gully
and redoubt, which were holding up all progress there — but to
no purpose. With the ManMs balloon spotting, she also fired
at a number of batteries, whenever they disclosed their position
by firing. At 5.30 p.m. after a bombardment lasting 1 5 minutes

330

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

from every available naval and military gun, the Allied troops
were called upon for a final effort, and we watched the whole line
surge forward with fixed bayonets, an unforgettable scene of
heroism and tragedy. We could see our men mown down by
rifle ^d machine-gun fire. We watched the Australians and
New Zealanders, who had come up on the left, advance with the
greatest gallantry and suffer cruel losses. (Out of 2,000 engaged
the Australian Brigade had 1,000 casualties.) At this juncture
the ships could do nothing to help, as friend and foe were in
such close proximity.

Our Army in France had just learnt that it was futile and
hopeless to advance against trenches and machine-gun positions
until they had been pulverised by high explosive shell. The
Army in Gallipoli, supported only by the shrapnel of its field
artillery, and a few howitzers and guns, with a very limited supply
of H.E. shell, had now been taught the same lesson.

Watching ftom the Qmm Eli^aheth, the value of H.E. shell was
vividly brought home to us, when we saw the French 73s put
down a terrific barrage in front of their advancing troops, who
marched steadily forward, as if they had no enemy in front of
them, until they occupied the trendies out of which the Turks
had been driven. However, when their barrage was lifted, the
Turkish artillery retaliated and smothered them withH.E. shell,
forcing the survivors back to their own lines.

Thus ended the second battle of Krithia. After three days’
fighting, the Allied line had nowhere advanced more than 600
yards, at a cost of 6,500 casualties. , The Turkish main position
remained intact.

CHAPTER XIX

A POLinCAL UPHEAVAL

Turkish account; The Army checked; Waiting for reinforcements and
ammunition ; The Admiral’s appredation of the situation ; Churchill’s effort
to renew the Naval Offensive ; Fleet condemned to inaction ; Lord Fisher’s
resignation ; Fall of the Government ; Lord Fisher’s ultimatum ; Coalition
Government formed; Mr. Balfour becomes First Lord.

By the jth May, the Allied Anny had a secure footing on the
Peninsula, having repulsed with great slaughter every effort of
the enemy to drive Aem into the sea ; and on the morning of
the 6th, our Army Headquarters was foil of confident hope
that the second battle of Krithia would result in the occupation
of Achi Baba by that evening. On the eve of that battle the
milimry situation from the enemy’s point of view, as given in
the official Turkish account, and Liman von Sanders’ Memoirs,
is of great interest, and shows once again how near we were to
success :

“ After the failure of the Turkish night attacks. Colonel
von Sodenstern was removed fcom the command of the
Southern Group, and was replaced by Weber Pasha, another
German hitherto in command of the troops on the Asiatic
shore. The position on Weber Pasha’s arrival on the
jth May is reported to have been very unsatisfoctory.
Owing to the constant fighting and to the lack of entrenching
tools, little progress had been made in the construction
of a defensive line, and casualties had been so heavy that,
according to one account, the 51 battalions in the Southern
Group amounted to only some ij,ooo rifles. Losses
amongst senior officers had been particularly severe, and
the continual shelling by the fleet had caused so much
demoralisation that the new commander was strongly urged
to order a general retirement behind the Achi Baba Ridge,

531

332 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

where better cover could be obtained. Impressed by these
arguments, Weber Pasha recommended a retirement to
Fifth Army Headquarters, but such a step was firmly
vetoed by Liman von Sanders, who replied that every foot
of the ground must be stubbornly contested, and that there
must be no thought of voluntary retirement, which would
only result in doubling the length of the Turkish front line.
He added that the best way to get cover from the British
ships was to advance rather than to retire, and to establish
a line as close as possible to the Allied trenches.”*

This was a wise and momentous decision, and but for the
resolution of Liman von Sanders, Achi Baba would have been
in our hands by the evening of the 6th. Then the entry of
the Fleet into the battle could no longer have been delayed.

In the course of the three days’ fighting, it soon became
evident that the enemy had no intention of exposing their troops
to the direct fire of the ships, as they had done in the first few
days ; and that the ships could take no part in the great infantry
battle which was raging, with friend and foe at close grips —
as Liman von Sanders had foreseen.

I can think of nothing more detestable than to watch our
troops being destroyed by rifle and machine-gun fire, which, in
spite of our great armament, we were powerless to silence :
and to hear despefke fighting going on all day in the ravines
and gullies, hidden from view by the conformation of the land.

Those three days were a dreadful experience, and after the
first day Godfrey and I agreed that our cruisers would have
been well able to provide aU the support the Army required ;
the Queen Elizabeth would have been much better employed
dropping her heavy shells into the forts across the Peninsula,
and the old battleships in hammering the forts from inside the
Straits and covering our minesweepers, while they swept a way
through the mine'fields. As it was the Fleet looked on, terribly
unhappy, while the Army was brought to a standstill.

It is not surprising that the enemy have never been able to
understand why we did not renew fhe naval attack. Had we
done so on the 6th May, who can doubt that the Turkish defence
would have cracked ? Their Fligh Command knew that their

* ‘‘Military Operations, Gallipoli,” VoL I, page 337.

A POLmCAL UPHEAVAL

353

forts could not withstand another attack such as that of i8th
March; they knew that their minefields were inefficient — ^far
more so than we ever thought. They knew that once through
the Narrows, our ships could bombard their ammuni tion and
store dumps, and the rest camps in Gallipoli, which could not
be reached by ships from seaward. They knew that their
communications, which were beginning to sufier from the
activities of one or two submarines in the Marmora, would be
utterly destroyed by our fleet. They knew, moreover, that
they were very short of ammunition, and, with Roumania and
Bulgaria neutral, the Zeitun Bumu factory on the shore of the
Marmora — ^their sole source of supply — ^would be at the mercy
of the guns of our ships. Not a very hopeful outlook for the
enemy, and they were indeed fortunate that we failed to take
advantage of our wonderful opportunity.

On the evening of the 8th, we learned &om Sir Ian that the
Army was at a complete deadlock, and could do nothing further
without large reinforcements and a liberal supply of a mmuni tion,
neither of which could arrive for three or four weeks. On the
other hand, the power of defence had proved so greatly superior
to that of attack, that his Generals were confident of their
ability to withstand any onslaught which the enemy might deliver.

That evening I discussed the whole situation with the Admiral,
and reminded him of his telegrams with regard to the renewal
of the naval attack — ^they certainly could not be reconciled with
the policy of naval inaction now. With the Army firmly
established on shore, and an efficient and dauntless minesweeping
force, we were far better off, firom a naval point of view, than
we were on the 19th March; when he had declared that the
forts at the Narrows, and the batteries guarding the minefields,
could be dominated, after a few hours’ engagement, sufficiently
to enable minesweepers to clear the Kephez minefield.

Moreover, it was very important to get on as soon as possible,
for according to Admiralty reports, German submarines were
approaching the Eastern Mediterranean, and would probably
soon be with us, which would greatly add to our dMcuities.
The Admiral would not believe it was possible for submarines
to operate so far afield as the Dardanelles, and had expressed
this view in the preamble of a memorandum he issued on the
5th May. “ It is improbable that enemy submarines are in, or

334 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

approaching, this theatre of war. As a precaution, however,
the following patrols will be established, and should a submarine
be reported, squadrons and transports are to act in the Tnann<.f
herein laid down.” Nevertheless the memorandum ordered
aerial and surface patrols to be put into force at once and covered
every contingency.

Before we parted company that night the Admiral said he
would summon the Rear-Admirals in the morning, and hear
their views before coming to a decision. I have recorded that
I sat up with Godfrey till 3 a.m. preparing for the morrow.

On the morning of the 9th May, Admirals Wemyss, Thursby
and Stuart Nicholson came on board the Queen Eli^^abeth, and
the Admiral allowed me to put the case to them, as I had to
him on the previous night. I gave them an outline of the
events to date, and a precis of the telegrams which had passed
between the Admiral and the Admiralty, and I left them in no
doubt as to my own views, and my passionate belief in them,
based on my experience in the Straits, which they lacked.

There was one question to which they demanded an answer,
a question which I have been repeatedly asked ever since. What
would happen if the Fleet got into the Marmora, and the Turkish
defence did not collapse, and the political situation did not
develop as the Government expected ? I replied that that was
the Government’s concern — ^presumably they had good grounds
for their belief (we know now that they had) — but if they were
wrong and we had to withdraw, we could do so without any
great hazard, a channel would have been swept through the
minefield, which could not be renewed ; and the forts would be
taken in reverse and silenced before the passage was undertaken.

Admiral de Robeck questioned the correctness of the Govern-
ment’s opinion as to the effect of an Allied Fleet in the Marmora.
He admitted, however, that a naval attack might be successful,
and, if so, that it would be of vital importance to the Army,
but he feared for the Army’s fate if it failed, and said he was not
prepared to take the responsibility of running the risk of failure.
All the Admirals supported him, in this decision. As a last
resort, I then suggested that he should place the responsibility
on the Government, but begged that he would make it clear
that the Fleet was ready to force the Narrows if ordered to
do so. The Admiral firially agreed to telegraph an appreciation

A POLITICAL UPHEAVAL

535

of the situation to the Admiralty ; Godfrey and I at once set
to work on it, and the resulting telegram, as eventually passed
by the Admiral, was dispatched the same evening.

Here it should be pointed out that there really was no need
for Admiral de Robeck to ask permission to continue the naval
attack. On 19th March the War CouncE had authorised “ The
First Lord of the Admiralty to inform Vice-Admiral de Robeck
that he could continue the naval operations against the
Dardanelles if he thought fit.” He had been urged on 24th March
to renew the attack, irrespective of the landing of the Army,
and had declared on 29th March that directly the Army had
landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula, the Fleet would commence
its attack ; the first objective of both Services would be the forts
at the Narrows, and it was the intention to attack these
simultaneously with all our forces. This decision had never
been questioned by the Admiralty. Admiral de Robeck’s
telegram of 9th May, which precipitated the crisis at the
Admiralty, was really an explanation of his reasons for not doing
so, and an invitation to them to relieve him of any respon-
sibility in the event of failure, if they gave him an order to
attack.

“9th May, 1915. No. 490.

The position in the Gallipoli Peninsula. General
Hamilton informs me that the Army is checked, its advance
on Achi Baba can only be carried out a few yards at a
time, and a condition of af&irs approximating to that in
Northern France is threatened.

The situation therefore arises, as indicated in my telegram
292 quote ‘ If the Army is checked in its advance on Kilid
Bahr, the question as to whether the Navy should or
should not force the Narrows, leaving the forts intact, would
depend entirely on whether the Fleet could assist the Army
in their advance to the Narrows best from below Chanak,
with communications intact, or from above cut off from
its base ’ cease quoting.

The help which the Navy has been able to give the Army
in its advance has not been as great as was anticipated —
though effective in keeping down the fire of the enemy’s
batteries — ^when it is a question of trenches and machine

356 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

guns, the Navy is of small assistance — ^it is these latter
which have checked the Army.

From the vigour of the enemy’s resistance, it is improbable
tbjii- the passage of the Fleet into the Marmora will be
decisive, and therefore it is equally probable that the Straits
will be closed behind the Fleet.

T his would be of small importance if the resistance of
the enemy could be overcome in time to prevent the
enforced withdrawal of the Fleet owing to the lack of
supplies.

The support of the Army, should the Fleet penetrate
to the Marmora, would be entrusted to the cruisers and
certain older battleships, including some of the French,
whose ships are not fit for a serious bombardment of the
Narrows. This support would obviously be much less
than is now given by the whole Fleet.

The temper of the Turkish Army in the Peninsula
indicates that the forcing of the Dardanelles and subsequent
appearance of the Fleet off Constantinople would not of
itself prove decisive.

Points for decision appear to be firstly, can the Navy
by forcing the Dardanelles ensure the success of the opera-
tions ? Secondly, if the Navy were to suffer a reverse,
which of necessity could only be a severe one, would the
position of the Army be so critical as to jeopardise the
whole operations ? ”

It was the best I could get the Admiral to agree to. He was
quite determined not to convey the impression that he was in
favour of another attack until the Army had captured the forts
at the Narrows. Nevertheless, I thought that the telegram
wordd be sufficient to enable the First Lord to carry the matter
through, as did the Admiral, who was certain that he would
be ordered to deliver a naval attack, and called on Admiral
Guepratte to tell him so. Gu6pratte had not been summoned
to the meeting, but I knew that he was of the same mind as I
was, and ardently longed to renew the naval offensive, in fact,
when I told him of my hopes, he said, “Ah, Commodore, that
would be immortalitL” He was elated, and at once telegraphed
to the Minister of Marine as follows :

A POLITICAL UPHEAVAL

537

A fin d’assister rArmee dans son action 6nergique et
rude, nous meditons vive action flotte dans detroite avec
attaque des forts. Dans ces conditions il me faut mes
cuirasses, Suffren^ Charlemagne^ Gaulois dans le plus bref
delai possible.”*

The Suffren and Gaulois had been temporarily replaced by the
Henri IV and Jaureguiberry^ two old battleships, which were
quite unfit for close action with the forts ; they could, however,
be usefuUy employed with the battleships Triumph and Swiftsure^
nine British, one Russian and three French cruisers, to support
the Army ; a formidable force, quite sufficient to carry out all
the Army’s requirements.

While we were waiting anxiously for the reply, the Admiralty
telegraphed to the Admiral that two more infantry divisions
were being sent out with other reinforcements, leaving about
the 17th and 30th of the month. (So at least a month must pass
before the Army could deliver another attack — meanwhile, what
would the enemy be doing ?) The arrival of German submarines
in Turkish waters necessitated the recall of the Queen Elizabeth,
which woxild be replaced by two old battleships — ^the Exmoufh
and Venerable — and two new monitors carrying two 14-inch
guns apiece. Italy was about to enter the war, and owing to
an Anglo-Italian Naval Convention, the Queen, London, Implacable
and Prince of Wales, and four cruisers, would have to go to the
Adriatic to join the Italian Fleet. Two of the cruisers would
be replaced by the Cornwall and Chatham.

This telegram was followed by a personal one from the First
Lord, saying he hoped the Admiral would not be discouraged
by the recall of the Queen Elivrabeth and the unavoidable changes
in the fleet, consequent on the Italian Convention. He assured
the Admiral of his determination to support him and the Army
in every way to the end of their task.

These telegrams were received on the 13 th May ; early that
morning the Goliath, which was supporting the French on the
right flank, was torpedoed and sunk with the loss of 570 lives,
by a Turkish destroyer commanded by an enterprising German
oflScer, who, taking advantage of a misty night, crept down the
Asiatic shore and slipped past our destroyer screen.

* La Guerre Navale aux Dardanelles,” page 147.

338 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

On the 14th May the following reply was received to the
AdmiraFs telegram of 9th May :

"‘343. 15th May, 1915. Your 490. We think the
moment for an independent naval attempt to force the
Narrows has passed, and will not arise again under present
conditions. The Army is now landed, large reinforcements
are being sent, and there can be no doubt that with time
and patience, the Kilid Bahr Plateau will be taken. Your
role is therefore to support the Army in its costly but sure
advance, and to reserve your strength to deal with the situa-
tion which will arise later when the Army has succeeded
with your aid in its task. We are going to send you the
first six monitors as they are delivered, and you will find
them far better adapted to this special work than the old
battleships. You will later receive telegrams about increased
provision of nets against submarines, about fitting special
anti-mine protection to some of the battleships, and about
landing heavy guns.”

So all the great opportunities which had been open to the
Fleet since 4th April were to be allowed to slip away, and the
Allied Army, having suffered 26,000 casualties in its effort to
secure the Gallipoli shore, was to continue the struggle, iu
order that the Fleet might steam by without any undue loss.

It seems that on receipt of de Robeck’s telegram, the First
Lord was prepared to give directions for a limited operation,
the clearing of the Kephez minefield under cover of a bombard-
ment of the forts at the Narrows ; and in the course of a dis-
cussion with the First Sea Lord on the morning of the nth,
he endeavoured, unsuccessfully, to obtain the latter's concurrence.

Lord Fisher has repeatedly stated that after he had reluctantly
acquiesced in the initial effort to force the Straits, he had sup-
ported it in every possible way ; he had even suggested the
employment of the QuBen Eli^abefh^ he had added the two most
powerful pre-dreadnoughts, the Lord Nelson and Agamemnon^ to
the Dardanelles Fleet, and had indeed entered into it totus porcuSy
to quote his evidence before the Dardanelles G>mmission. In
fact, as long as the Admiral on the spot was in favour of the
operation and believed in its success, he supported it; but

A POLITICAL UPHEAVAL

539

de Robeck’s telegram now opened up quite a new situation ; it
was evident that grave decisions and heavy responsibilities would
have to be faced, if the Fleet was to play its part in a combined
naval and military attack on the Narrows, Our overwhelming
superiority in the North Sea might be impaired. The great
armada, which he declared he had built for operations in the
Baltic, would be diverted to the Mediterranean, to the detriment
of his great strategic project. Perhaps most important of all,
heavy responsibilities which the Admiral on the spot was no
longer prepared to carry, would fall on the First Lord^s and his
shoulders, and he had no intention of sharing the burden.

That afternoon Lord Fisher forwarded a memorandum, giving
his views respecting the Dardanelles Campaign, in which he
declared that he could not, under any circumstances, be a
party to any order to Admiral de Robeck to pass the Dardanelles
until the shores had been effectively occupied/’

The First Lord replied that evening that Lord Fisher would
never receive firom him any proposition to rush the Dardanelles,
though it might be necessary for the Admiral to engage the
forts and sweep the Kephez minefield, as an aid to the military
operations. He concluded :

‘‘We are now in a very difficult position, whether it
is my fault for trying, or my misfortune for not having
the power to carry through, is immaterial. We are now
committed to one of the greatest amphibious enterprises
of history. You are absolutely committed. Comradeship,
resource, firmness, patience, all in the highest degree, will
be needed to carry &e matter through to victory. A great
army hanging on by its eyelids to a rocky beach and con-
fronted by the arm^ power of the Turkish Empire under
German military guidance : the whole surplus fleet of
Britain — every scrap that can be spared — bound to that
army and its fortunes as long as the struggle may drag out :
the apparition of the long feared submarine : our many
needs and obligations : the measureless advantages,
probably decisive on the whole war, to be gained by
success.

Surely here is a combination and a situation which requires
from us every conceivable exertion which we can think of.

340 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

I beg you to lend your whole aid and good will, and
ultimately then success is certain.”*

A great army hanging on by its eyelids to a rocky beach
meant nothing to Lord Fisher, who replied on 12th May:

“ Until the military operations have effectively occupied die
shores of the Narrows, etc., no naval attack on the min efipH
can take place, but your letter does not repudiate this.”

The First Lord then dispatched, with Lord Fisher’s con-
currence, telegram 343 (quoted on page 338) and straightway
set to work to expedite the transport and convoy of the two
new divisions which Lord Kitchener had promised, and to
speed the departure of the naval reinforcements he had persuaded
Lord Fisher to agree to.

On the 15 th May Lord Fisher left the Admiralty and sent in
his resignation, concluding his letter to the First Lord : “ I find
it increasingly difficult to adjust myself to the increasing daily
requirements of the Dardanelles to meet your views — as you
truly said yesterday, I am in the position of continually vetoeing
your proposals. This is not fair to you, besides being extremely
distasteful to me.”

Mr. Churchill made every effort to persuade Lord Fisher to
reconsider his resignation at this critical moment, but Lord
Fisher was adamant and replied on the i6th :

“My dear Winston . . . You abje bent on forcing
THE Dardanelles and nothing will turn you from
IT — ^Nothing. I know you so well. . . . Yours, Fisher.”

That is just the point, and he would have succeeded, if that
wonderful old man had devoted all his fierce, ruthless energy
towards supporting, instead of thwarting, the prosecution of an
operation which he had described in January as, “ Vital,
imperative and very pressing.”

The forts at the Narrows would have crumbled, and a way
would have been tom through the minefields by the young
blood of the Navy, had Lord Fisher worked with Winston
Churchill to that end.

When Lord Fisher resigned, the First Lord invited Admiral
of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson to succeed him, and Sir Arthur

* “ The Wotld Crisis/’ Vol. 11 , page 344.

A POLITICAL UPHEAVAL

341

accepted. Two days later Idx. Bonar Law, writing on behalf
of Lord Lansdowne and the Conservative party, which up to
that moment had loyally supported the Government, expressed
their dismay at Lord Fisher’s resignation and their opinion
that some change in the constitution of the Government was
desirable. Whereupon the Prime Minister asked the whole of
his Government to place their resignations in his hands and
proceeded to form a Coalition Government of aU parties.

Mr. Asquith states in his memoirs that he had come to the
conclusion, quite independently, that for the successful prosecu-
tion of the War it was essential that the Government should be
reconstituted on a broad and non-party basis ; and he attributed
the necessity for immediate action to the importance of avoiding
an acrimonious debate in the House of Commons, which Lord
Fisher’s resignation, and an alleged shortage of shells, would
have undoubtedly evoked. Fiorther, that great pressure was
brought to bear on him to remove Mr. Churchill firom the
Admicaity, to which he acceded with great reluctance.

Having heard of the impending changes. Lord Fisher addressed
the following ultimatum to the Prime Minister :

" If the following conditions are agreed to I can guarantee
the successful termination of the War and the total abolition
of the submarine menace. I also desire to add that since
Lord Ripon wished in 1885 to make me a Lord of the
Admiralty, but at my request made me Director of Naval
Ordnance and Torpedoes instead, I have served under nine
First Lords and 17 years at the Admiralty, so I ought to
know something about it :

1. That Mr. Winston Churchill is not in the Cabinet to

be always circumventing me, nor will I serve under
Mr. Balfour.

2. That Sir A. K. Wilson leaves the Admiralty and the

Committee of Imperial Defence and the War Council,
as my time otherwise will be occupied in resisting
the bombardment of Heligoland and other such wild
projects ; also his policy is totally opposed to mine
* and he has accepted position of First Sea Lord in

succession to me, and thereby adopting a policy
diametrically opposed to my views.

342 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

3. That there shall be an entire new Board of

Admiralty, as regards the Sea Lords and the
Financial Secretary (who is utterly useless). Nw
measures demand New Men !

4. That I shall have complete professional charge of the

War at sea, together with the absolute sole disposition
of the Fleet, and the appointments of all officers of
aU rank whatsoever, and absolutely untrammelled
sole command of the sea forces whatsoever.

3. That the First Lord of the Admiralty should be
absolutely restricted to policy and parliamentary
procedure and should occupy the same position
towards me as Mr. Tennant, M.P., does to Lord
Kitchener (and very well he does it).

6. That I should have the sole absolute authority for all
new construction and all dockyard work of what-
ever sort whatsoever, and complete control of the
whole Qvil establishments of the Navy. The
60 per cent, of my time and energy which I
have exhausted on nine First Lords in the past I wish
in future to devote to the successful prosecution of
the War. That is my sole reason for the six con-
ditions. These six conditions must be published
verbatim so that the Fleet may know my position.”*

So certain was Lord Fisher of returning to the Admiralty,
that he gave instructions to his Naval Secretary, who was still
there, to prepare a number of orders for his signature on “ der
Tag,” including, “ All necessary telegrams for ordering home
vessels from Dardanelles, except sufficient for Army protection.”

Lord Fisher’s biographer states :

“It is impossible, after reading such papers as are
available, more especially the draft he had prepared of the
new Board of Admiralty and the other appointments he
proposed to make, to avoid a feeling of relief that Lord
Fisher did not remain under the conditions he had defined
to the Prime Minister. The Board he proposed was a
weak one, and he intended to part with everyone who

* “Memoiies and Reflections,” by the Ead of Oxford and Asquith, Vol. II,
pages 95 and 94.

A POLITICAL UPHEAVAL

343

would attempt to exercise any control over him — ^he saw
himself an uncontrolled autocrat • . . under the arrange-
ment he proposed, confusion and inefficiency were
inevitable/^*

On the 22nd May Lord Fisher was informed that the King
had accepted his resignation of the Office of First Sea Lord,

Mr. Balfour then succeeded Mx. Churchill as First Lord, and
Admiral Sir Henry Jackson became First Sea Lord ; Sir Arthur
Wilson having informed the Prime Minister “ that he was not
prepared to undertake the duties under any First Lord but
Mr. ChurchiU.”

Thus ended a remarkable association with wonderful
possibilities. The Navy lost in the course of a few days the
services of an Admiral who was one of its outstanding figures
of the last hundred years — ^and the greatest producer of material
in its history — ^and of an Administrator to whom it owed, in a
great measure, its readiness for war in August, 1914. Moreover,
one who was responsible for placing a few old battleships on
a stage on which they might ba,ve won imperishable glory for
the Navy, in the achievement of a feat of arms which would
have altered the whole course of the War.

* ** The Life of Lord Fisher,*’ by Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, pages 271 and 272.

CHAPTER XX

SUBMARINE ACTIVnT

Admiral transfers flag to Lord Nelson ; Queen Eliz^hetb returns to England ; British
submarines in the Marmora; Return of E14; Turks attack Anzac;
Repulsed with great slaughter ; Albion aground off Gaba Tepe ; German
submarine torpedoes the Triumph and Majestic; Third Battle of Krithia.

The Adfflitalty’s telegram withdrawing the Qmm BU:(ahth^
four of our best old battleships, and four cruisers could only
mean the abandonment of all idea of renewing the naval attack.
The thought of the Army struggling on with its tremendous
task, practically unaided by the Fleet was acutely distressing;
it needed all die philosophy of “If” to face the future with
confident courage.

I wrote that night :

“Our last night in the Quten Eli^ahetb, we are all
desperately sorry to leave her, we go to the Lord Nelson
in the morning. The day started at about z a.m. with
the loss of the Goliath and over 500 lives, and is the longest
day I have ever spent in my life. I feel dead dog weary
and rather disheartened— not really, because I am confident
of final success — only our luck is dead out for the moment,
and my dream of a great coup de main — which I ardendy
hoped to persuade the Admird and the Admiralty to try —
has faded away. I have faith, and for a stout heart I pray—
one needs both, for fate is buffeting us heavily. The
Admiral had a charming wire this morning, for which I
thank Winston Churchill more than I can say. He really
is very splendid in the way he is sticking to us and seeing
us through. I am afraid he is having a bad time, and
being told that his haste in stardhg the naval operations is
costing us heavily now. But if he had not committed
the Government to the enterprise, they would never have
looked at it, and I am sure our success in the end — ^which

344

SUBMARINE ACTIVITY

345

is inevitable — ^will do more to finish the War than anything
else. If only we had had an army on the 23 th February,
it would have been all over by now.”

On the morning of the 14th the Admiral transferred his flag
to the Lord Nelson^ and later, with heavy hearts, we watched the
Oueen Elizabeth steaming out, playing “Auld Lang Syne.”
Her captain (George Hope) was a great loss to the Staff,

During the day the Admiralty telegram 545 (quoted on
page 338) arrived and it confirmed all my worst fears. There
was nothing to be done but start afresh, pray for the day when
we might be allowed to play our part, and in the meantime see
to it that the Army lacked nothing that devoted service and
good comradeship could provide.

It was fortunate that at Mudros we had an Admiral so well
fitted by his temperament, sense of humour, and tireless energy
to deal with the hundred and one complicated questions which
arose from hour to hour; in a base equipped with nothing
but good will, and a determination to overcome all difficulties
by improvising something to meet every demand upon it.
There must be scores of soldiers and sailors, French and English,
who hold Rosy Wemyss, with his immovable eyeglass, in
affectionate memory.

From the moment the military attack was decided upon, the
whole Mediterranean was scoured for tugs and lighters, and
everything that could be usefully employed was purchased,
Malta Dockyard sent every craft that could be spared, and the
entire resources of the Fleet were absolutely at the service of
the Army, for its maintenance and support; with the one
reservation, that the military efficiency of the ships which were
to take part in the attack on the Narrows and enter the Marmora
was not to be impaired.

All restrictions were removed after 14th May, and we only
had one thought and one aim — ^to lighten the Army^s task.

The gunnery of the Fleet, and the training in our gunnery
schools before the War, had one object — ^battle at sea ; and
training in the employment of ship’s guns in support of military
operations had been utterly neglected in the years preceding
the War, There was obviously room for improvement, and it
was now necessary to develop the fire of the Fleet by every

346 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

means in our power. Ramsay and the wireless and signal
officers of the Staff, and the gunnery officers of the Fleet, worked
incessantly to this end. They were greatly assisted by
G^mmander H. P. Douglas of the Hydrographical Dept, and
above all by Brigadier-General Street, die General Staff officer of
the 8th Corps, who had been a most caustic critic, but became
a fast friend, and to whom we owed a great debt for all he
taught us.

Our beach parties and the crews of the picket boats, lighters
and small craft, who worked incessantly on the beaches in all
weathers, with an utter contempt for the fire of the enemy,
were a source of never-diminishing satisfaction to me, as were
the exploits of my friends the submariners, throughout those
unhappy days.

After ^ii^s exploit in Sari Siglar Bay, there were no targets
within reach of the B ” class, as they had not the submerged
endurance to work above the Narrows. Early in January the
French submarine Saphir arrived oflF the Dardanelles with a
new battery, which her captain declared would take her 140
miles at five knots without recharging. I believe he was forbidden
by his Admiral to try to pass through the minefields without
special permission, but on 15 th January, while diving on patrol
at the entrance of the Straits, he apparently could not resist
the temptation of trying to eclipse ^ii^s achievement. He
succeeded in passing the Narrows, but the Saphir ran aground
off Nagara Point and was lost.

£15 was the next submarine to attempt the passage, and she
was lost, as I have related. Directly AEi arrived from Malta,
she proceeded up the Straits. It was some time before we
learnt how she was lost.* While diving in the Marmora to
escape the attentions of the enemy’s patrol craft, AEz suddenly
got out of control, and alternated between breaking surface
and descending to a great depth. Normally she would have
gone to the surface, or to the bottom, to readjust her trim, but
the presence of the enemy precluded the former, and the great
deptib of water made the latter impossible. When she broke
surface a heavy fire was opened on her and her pressure hull
being pierced she was no longer able to dive. Stoker then had

* Her captain (Iieut.-Commander Stoker) lias written an interesting account of
his brief cruise and experiences as a prisoner of war in ** Straws in the Wind,”

SUBMARINE ACTIVITY

347

no choice but to sufrendef or sink his ship. He ordered his
crew to jump overboard, went below alone to open the seacocks,
and was just able to jump clear as AEi sank in very deep water.

Other submarines subsequently had similar experiences, and
there can be little doubt that AEzh loss of control was due to
the same cause. In the Sea of Marmora our submarines
frequently encountered stratas of fresh water, of much lighter
density than that of the sea generally. A submarine diving
from the lighter density strata near the surface, into the heavier
one below, was liable to speedily lose control if the conditions
were not fully appreciated. Eventually our submarines made
great use of this peculiar phenojnenon, and by carefully adjusting
the buoyancy, used to spend the night lying at rest on the
heavier strata, which was generally to be found about ten
fathoms below the surface. This was a great advantage when
the water was too deep for them to lie on the bottom, and it
was unsafe to rest on the surface, owing to the presence of
patrol craft.

The next submarine to attempt to operate in the Straits was
the French Bernoulli^ which had not sufficient endurance to
reach the Marmora, but hoped to attack the enemy^s ships which
were operating above the Narrows, but she was caught in the
strong current and swept out.

Lieut.-Commander E. C. Boyle in £'14 was the next to try ;
he entered the Straits about 2 a.m. on 27th April, and reported
that night that he was in the Marmora.

On 30th April Admiral Guepratte informed the Admiral
that the submarine Joule would attempt the passage the following
morning, and that her captain would report himself to me
for instructions as to his co-operation with our submarines,
and communication with a British destroyer, which was detailed
to get into wireless touch with them eadi night An obsolete
compromised signal book was used for this purpose, with a
day to day transposition table, it being undesirable to risk the
current book in case of the submarine being sunk in sufficiently
shallow water to be salved.

I was much impressed by the eager enthusiasm of the young
captain of the Jouky du Petit-Thouars, the descendant of a very
distinguished Royalist naval family. I gave him one of our
signal books, and wished him the best of luck, but to our sorrow

348 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

the Joule was lost in the Kephez minefield a few hours later.
Before the enemy jubilantly announced her destruction on tie
wireless we feared the worst, for one of her torpedoes, whidi
were carried in frames on the upper deck, floated out of the
Straits a few hours after the Joule entered them.

So of the five submarines, two French and three British,
which had attempted to pass into the Marmora, only £14 had
survived. We knew on nth May that jE'14 had sunk two gun
vessels, and two transports ; on the 12th she had only one
torpedo left, and it was defective ; nevertheless, Boyle remained
in the Marmora, making his presence known in widely separated
areas, until actually ordered to. withdraw by signal on 17th
May ; £*11 being ready to take her place.

We anxiously waited for £’14^8 return, and much to our relief,
she rose outside the entrance of the Straits on the afternoon
of 1 8th May, after a cruise of 21 days. The first ship to greet
her was a French battleship, whose crew gave her a rousing
cheer. She then joined the Lord Nelson at Imbros, where
Nasmith in Eii was waiting to hear all that Boyle had to
tell him.

The two submarine captains dined with the Admiral that
evening. We were all thrilled by Boyle^s simply-told tale;
and Nasmith was eager to seize the torch. I felt so strongly
that if we had otily faced all that was ahead of us with the spirit
of those two gallant submariners, the Marmora would not
have been denied to us.

Boyle told us that he had steamed up the Straits on the surface
until S14 was picked up by a searchlight off Suan Dere, and
forced to dive by gunfire. He then went to 90 feet under the
Kephez minefield; when he estimated that he was about a
mile below Kilid Bahr, and that it would be sufficiently light
to see, he came up to 22 feet in order to navigate through the
Narrows by his periscope, disdaining mines and gunfire. As
he had to proceed at a good speed to make way against the
current, the periscope made a considerable wash, and this drew
the fire of all the forts as Ei 4 passed by. When off Chanak,
Boyle fiired at a torpedo gunboat ; he said he could only keep
his periscope up for a few seconds at a time, at the moment,
as some men in a steamboat were trying to grab hold of it,
but before he dipped to avoid them he saw a great column of

SUBMARINE ACTIVITY

349

water shoot up as high as the gunboat’s mast, so he presumed
he had sunk her (this was confirmed later). After rounding
Nagara Point, he proceeded at 90 feet, coming up to periscope
depth from time to time to fix his position, and passed Gallipoli
six hours after diving off Suan Dere, There were a number of
small craft about which persistently hunted £*14, and he had
great difficulty in coming to the surface to charge his batteries.

Then followed three weeks without a dull moment. £*14
met AEz on the 29th, and Stoker told Boyle that he had grounded
heavily twice when coming up the Straits ; after sinking a
Turkish gun vessel off Chanak his torpedoes had not run well,
and he had only one left.

Of £’14’$ eight torpedoes, 6ne developed a defect and could
not be fired, one was seen to strike a transport but did not
explode, and two missed their targets. With the remaining
four, Boyle hit two gunboats and two transports. He was
rather apologetic for not keeping his periscope up, to make
certain of having sunk the first transport, but he was being
fired at by a destroyer and did not like to risk his one remaining
periscope; the other had been smashed by a shot the day
before ! The second transport was a big vessel with two
funnels, twice the size of any other ship he saw in the Marmora,
he thought she must have carried quite 2,000 troops ;
there was a terrific explosion when the torpedo struck, and he
saw men and debris thrown into the sea. We know now that
aU four vessels sank, and that the latter was an old White Star
liner, carrying a battery of artillery and 6,000 troops, of whom
not one soul was saved.

They were being hurried down to make good the casualties
of the three days’ battle of Krithia, and apart ftom the loss of
6,000 fresh troops at that critical time, the moral effect of such
wholesale slaughter must have been tremendous.

Boyle found that the current did not exceed knots in the
Straits during either passage, but said there was a strong set
into all the bays. £14 did not touch a mine mooring or
encounter any obstruction. I think his success was due to
bravely facing the risk of mines, and coming to periscope depth
when necessary, in order to navigate his vessel through the
treacherous currents which wrecked the Saphir and z fate
which AEz appears to have narrowly escaped.

350 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Nasmith left after dinner, equipped with all Boyle’s eyppi-ip^ rg^
his own exceptional professional ability, and a vivid imagination.
Sixteen hours later he was resting on the bottom in the Sea
of Marmora, where for the next 23 days he was a holy terror
to the Turks.

That night we heard that Boyle had been given the Victoria
Cross, and his officers and men decorations. The following day
£14 went to Mudros to rest and refit, preparatory to renewing
her attack on the enemy’s communications in the Marmora.
She received a tremendous ovation, and that dear g allant
Guepratte embarked with his flagship’s band, and steamed
round her playing “ Tipperary ” and “ God save the King.”
When she was berthed, he went on board £’14, and much to
Boyle’s embarrassment embraced him, and speaking in English,
called him a “ beautiful boy,” then turning to the ship’s company
he told them they were all “ beautiful boys,” and how much he
admired their exploit. We were profoundly touched by the
generous gesture of this J>reux chevalier.

Wfliile waiting for the promised reinforcements, our troops
in both areas had consolidated and improved their positions
by dint of local attacks, minor operations and strenuous digging.
On the other hand, the enemy had been strongly reinforced,
and was busily engaged in constructing a continuous system
of trenches ; any attempt, therefore, to advance from our
existing positions was bound to be a very costly business.

We gathered from Sir Ian and his Staff that the forts at the
Narrows would have to be approached otherwise than by
continuing the main attack from the south. Nevertheless, in
view of ffie great importance attached by the Admiral to the
possession of Achi Baba, Sir Ian decided to make another
attempt to capture it, before developing an attack elsewhere in
the northern area.

In the southern area, our position had been gready improved
on the left flank, on 13th May, by the capture of ffie Turkish
post which, it will be remembered, held up our troops in the
batdes of Krithia — despite the gunfire of the Queen Elizabeth
and odier ships. This important success, in which the Tdbot
and Wolverine co-operated, was made possible by a flanking
movement of the i/6th Gurkhas, who crept along the beach

SUBMARINE ACITVITY

551

during the night, scaled the cliff at the northern end of Y ”
Beach, and dug themselves in on the flank of the enemy. Our
line was thus advanced 500 yards, and the Y Beach position
was once again in our possession.

The enemy were the first to attack on a large scale. According
to Turkish official accounts, after a visit to the Peninsxila, Enver
Pasha gave orders for a general assault to be delivered on Anzac
by four divisions. The plan was to attack a little before dawn,
break the centre of the Anzac line, drive the troops from their
trenches and destroy them on the beach. At 3 a.m. on 19th
May the enemy advanced with bayonets fixed, in massed
formation, to be literally mown down by the Anzacs. They
only succeeded in penetrating" our trenches at one place, and
then only for a few moments ; by 5 a.m. the attack had been
decisively repulsed, with a loss — according to Turkish official
accounts — of 10,000 men. More than 3,000 dead were counted
in front of the Australian trenches alone. The Anzac casualties
were about 600. For sanitary reasons, an armistice had
eventually to be arranged, to bury the Turkish dead.

At 5 a.m, on Z3rd May, I was awakened by a signal, reporting
that the Albion was on shore off Gaba Tepe. We went there
at once, and found the Canopus had anchored close to her, and
was trying to tow her off, but apparently had made no impression.
It did not look at all pleasant ; shrapnel was bursting all round
the Albion, and she was being repeatedly hit by high explosive
shell. An enemy battleship in the Straits was also dropping
heavy shells close to her; fortunately there was a seaplane
available to direct the L/)rd Nelson's fire, which speedily drove
her off. Some destroyers and small craft, which had been
assisting to lay out anchors and hawsers, were stiU gathered
round the Albion spoiling to help, regardless of the fire, but as
they could do no more good, the Admiral ordered them to
withdraw.

There was great delay in getting signals through, owing to
the enemy’s heavy fire, and the Admiral getting impatient, said
that he would go to her in a destroyer, to see what could be
done. That was, of course, out of the question, and I persuaded
him to let me go instead. I then embarked in the Chelmer
and told her captain (Lieut.-Commander England) to send
everyone below under cover, except the helmsman, and go

352 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

full speed to the Albion. She had been on shore for some
hours and was apparently immovable. I had an extraordinarily
uncanny feeling (for the first and last time during the War)
that if we went alongside the Albion I should be killed ; but a
few moments before we reached her, she suddenly slid off into
deep water, and we all withdrew out of range 1 The Alhion
gave the Canopus a great ovation, which she thoroughly deserved.

Rumours of the approach of an enemy submarine were
persistent, false alarms were frequent; but after 5 ii, which
was watching Smyrna, had reported that she had sighted a
large submarine entering that port, her arrival was obviously
imminent. The Admiral then" reduced the battleships and
cruisers off Gallipoli from eleven to six, gave orders for all
large transports to return to Mudros, and insisted on the
Arcadian^ which was lying off W ” Beach with Sir Ian and
his Staff on board, withdrawing to Kephalo Bay at Imbros.
He also decided to transfer his flag to the Triads a large yacht,
capable of berthing the whole Staff, in order not to risk the
Lord Nelson unnecessarily.

Early in the morning on the 25 th, the Swiftsure reported that
she had seen a periscope close to her ; and a litde later the
Vengeance^ which was proceeding towards Anzac, signalled that
a torpedo had narrowly missed her.

I embarked at once in the destroyer Grampus (Lieut.-Com-
mander R. Bacchus), which was ready for sea, and went
full speed towards Anzac, directing my brother in the
Wolverine^ which was raising steam, to follow as soon
as possible. Before I left the Lord Nelson^ the Admiral
authorised me to give any orders I thought fit, if I satisfied
myself that there really was a German submarine present, which
he still doubted. The Manica was lying off Anzac with her
balloon up, so I ordered her to go to Imbros at once, her great
open balloon compartment making her very vulnerable to a
torpedo. The Triumph was lying off Anzac with her torpedo nets
out, and destroyers steaming round her for protection. The
Vengeance had just relieved the Canopus^ which was returning to
Mudros at a good speed, and I was closing the Vengeance to
enquire about the attack on her, when unfortunately the Canopus
signalled that she had sighted a periscope, so I gave chase.

SUBMARINE ACTIVITY

353

and the Wolverine coming up, joined in. Thus about half an
hour was wasted before we came to the conclusion that the
Canopus submarine was a porpoise, and we had been drawn
away from the danger spot at a critical moment. We had
just turned back towards Anzac and were about five miles away,
when we saw the Triumph slowly heel over, and then suddenly
capsize ; she floated bottom up for half an hour before she
sank. She was surrounded by small craft, which picked up
all but three officers and 5 3 men. The Turks chivalrously
refrained from firing at the rescuing boats. My brother, who
was a pioneer submarine officer, and I, then hunted the submarine
for some hours, and probably prevented her doing any more
damage. The Grampus passed over her at least three times,
but in those pre-depth charge days, there was no means of destroy-
ing a well-hmdled submerged submarine. Before the end of our
hunt, the Admiral arrived to take part in the Triads to which
he had transferred during my absence.

The Admiral then decided that the battleships and cruisers
must withdraw to Mudros or Kephalo Bay, with the exception
of one battleship, which was- to anchor off “ W ” Beach, with
only a few feet imder her keel, and keep touch with the 8th
Corps, calling out other ships from Kephalo to support the
Army if required, Rear-Admiral Nicholson, who was com-
manding the supporting squadron in the southern area, trans-
ferred his flag from the Swiftsure to the Majestic ^ and anchored
the latter close in off W ” Beach, surrounded by small craft.

On 26th the submarine attempted to attack the Jaureguiherry^
which was zig-zagging about off the entrance to the Straits ;
the latter reported that she had nearly succeeded in ramming
the submarine, which withdrew without accomplishing an3rthing.

Early next morning the submarine torpedoed the Majestic^
which capsized within a few minutes. Had she sunk on an
even kee^ her upper works would have been awash, but the
battleships of her day had an unfortunate propensity for
capsizing directly they were holed, and her torpedo nets, which
were quite ineffective in keeping out the torpedo, prevented a
number of men getting clear of the ship when she capsized,
and 43 lives were lost. Her stem served as a beacon for the
remainder of the campaign.

After the sinking of the Majestic the Admiral gave orders
w

354 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1515

for all battleships to retire to Mudros except the Exmoutb,
fitted with specially powerful torpedo nets, which it was hoped
would defeat the net cutters on the enemy’s torpedoes. Rear-
Admiral Nicholson, who had to swim away from his last
flagship, hoisted his flag in the Exmouth and remained at Kephalo.
The support of the Army was then confided to destroyers, which
guarded its flanks, and won the admiration and affection of the
troops for their devoted good comradeship and vigilant service.

The Admiralty had sent out netting to protect our anchorages,
but it was some time before we had sufficient, and a number
of buoys were anchored off the entrance of Kephalo Bay with
tunny nets suspended, in order to mislead the enemy into
thinking that we had some formi of net defence — a ruse which
proved quite effective — ^though there was nothing to prevent
a submarine lying off and firing torpedoes into our crowded
anchorage.

One could only have admiration for the captain of Uii
(the submarine which we know now sank the Triumph and
Majestic\ for his determination and enterprise in bringing his
vessel so far, but it was fortunate for us that he was not so
sldlful as the best of the German submarine captains, for, with
a wealth of great targets off the Peninsula, those two motionless
battleships were his only victims.

We suffered no more losses off the Dardanelles from enemy
submarines, thanks to their lack of skill, and our anti-submarine
measures ; but these monopolised a great many small craft and
required unflagging vigilance. Uzi had, however, succeeded
in driving our battleships, cruisers and transports into harbour,
with a disheartening effect on our troops, and greatly to the
relief of the enemy.

It would certainly have been folly to have kept valuable
ships off the Peninsula to act as targets, but three weeks before
the arrival of the enemy submarine we could safely have left the
Queen Eliv(aheth with enough ships to support the Army, while
we extricated it from its overwhelming difficulties, by forcing
the Narrows and cutting the enemy’s communications.

It is distressing to reflect that we lost three battleships in
a fortnight to no purpose, while looking at our problem from
outside ; more probably, than we should have lost going through
to the Sea of Marmora.

SUBMARINE ACTIVITY

355

Meanwhile the Army was steadily improving its position and
preparing to renew its attack. The Coalition Government
seemed to be undecided as to the measure of its support of the
Dardanelles operations, but by the beginning of June,
ammunition and drafts to make good casualities, had arrived.
Generals Hunter-Weston and Gouraud (the new French General
who had succeeded General d’Amade), were now confident that
they could capture Achi Baba with the forces at their disposal,
and preparations were made to deliver an attack on 4th June.

Naval co-operation was to be provided by the Exmoutb and
Swiftsure manoeuvring off Beach, ready to fire on any

target given to them by wireless from the shore. The Wolverine
and Scorpion lying close inshore to support the left flank with
their fire ; the Talbot^ manoeuvring in advance of the left flank,
to watch for the approach of Turkish reserves ; and inside the
Straits the French cruiser Latombe Trevilk and two destroyers,
to support the right flank of the French.

The destroyers were to disregard submarine risks, but the
battleships and cruisers were to maintain a speed of 12 knots,
their fire, therefore, was unlikely to be very effective. The French
artillery were well provided with high explosive shells, and were
to cover a good deal of our front, but the British artillery still
had a very inadequate supply, and their shrapnel was of little
value in trench warfare.

We watched the action, which was known as the “ Third
Battle of Krithia,’^ from the Triad. It opened at 8 a.m, on the
4th June, with a bombardment which continued until noon,
when the Allied troops advanced to the assault. On the French
ftont the attack was repulsed with heavy loss. The Naval
Division, having captured its objective most gallantly, greatly
assisted by the fiire of the French 75^5, found itself enfiladed
by the Turks, who had repulsed the French, and had to fall
back suffering heavily. The Collingwood Battalion was com-
pletely wiped out. Thanks to the devastating effect of tiie
French artillery’s high explosive shells, the 42nd Lancashire
Territorial Division carried all its objectives with great dash,
and comparatively little loss — ^at that stage. The 29th Division,
composed to a great extent of new drafts, found several of tiae
enemy strong points quite untouched by the British bombard-
ment, notably one manned by sailors from the Goeben and

356 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Breslau; nevertheless, the Division upheld its tradition and
despite terrible losses, carried most of its objectives. The
Indian Brigade on its left greatly distinguished itself ; here also
our troops suffered heavily, owing to the lack of high explosive
shell, and the advance was held up by undamaged strong points.

At the time we only knew that at nightfall the net result of
the battle was a gain of 250-500 yards on a mile front; the
losses of the 8th Corps amounted to 4,500 officers and mpp out
of 16,000 engaged, and the French had about 2,000 casualties.

The thkd battle of Krithia had achieved no more than its
predecessors, but there can be no doubt that in the light of our
knowledge today, once again, Ae issue hung in the balance,
and we narrowly missed capturing Achi Baba.

Early in the afternoon, dthough both flanks were held up,
our centre had pierced the enemy’s front to a considerable
depth. The 29th Division and the Lancashire Territorials had
taken about 500 prisoners, and the Territorials were on the slope
of Achi Baba, with only about one trench between them and its
summit. According to the military historian, at this critical
moment there were 18 battalions in reserve ; had these or some
of them, been thrown into the gap made by the 42nd Division,
decisive results might well have been achieved. But in those
early days of trench warfare, “the broad principle of using
reserves to exploit successes, rather than to redeem failures, had
not been established,” and the British and French Corps
Commanders concentrated on attempting to capture the positions
which had resisted the first assault, nothing being done to rein-
force the centre. Eventually the Lancashire Territorials suffered
cruel losses, withdrawing from the exposed position they had so
gallantly won.

According to Turkish official accounts, their losses amounted
to between 9,000 and 10,000, and the situation was regarded as
highly critical on the night of 4th June. Turkish and German
accounts definitely state that if the British had continued the
attack the next day, the results would have been disastrous.
“ But neither the British nor the French had the power to renew
the attack for many days to come, and the Turks were again
given time to organise a new Hne.”*

♦ “ Military Operations,” Vol. H, pages 51-53.

CHAPTER XXI

THE NEW GOVERN]V£ENT’s RESOLVE

Indecision at Home ; Naval and military reinforcements promised ; Submarine
successes in the iMarmora ; Offensive action in the southern area ; French
attack on right; Visits to Gallipoli; British attack on left; Desperate
Turkish counter-attacks ; British and French attack in centre ; A visit to
Anzac.

The political upheaval had the effect of checking the dispatch
of the reinforcements, which we had been led to expect from
the Admiralty telegram of 13 th May, and for three weeks we
were left in ignorance of the Government’s intentions.

On 28th May Lord Kitchener prepared a memorandum for
the use of the Dardanelles Committee (twelve Cabinet Ministers
under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister) in which he
described the objects and progress of the operations to date,
summarising his conclusions as follows :

“Three solutions offer themselves —

1. Withdrawal.

2. To seek, if possible, an imm ediate decision.

5. To continue to push on and make such progress as
is possible.”

Lord Kitchener favoured the third alternative, but Mr.
Churchill, then Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and a
member of the Committee, replied on ist June with a memor-
andum in which he urged a vigorous prosecution of the
Gallipoli Campaign. Lord Kitchener had informed him before
the 14th May, that he intended to send tv^o divisions, and the
Admiralty had provided transport for them, but Lord Kitchener
had changed his mind and had only sent one division— die
32nd, which arrived in Gallipoli just after the third batde of
Krithia. There was no time to lose ; further delay in sending
the necessary reinforcements, or sending them in driblets, would
end in fighting the Turkish Army in relays.

357

35B

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Lord Kitchener then decided in favour of vigorous action,
and recommended that ample reinforcements should be sent to
carry the thing through. Whereupon the Dardanelles Com-
mittee, which met for the first time on 7th June decided :

1. To send out three divisions of the New Army.

2. To send out certain Naval units, which wodd be
much less susceptible to submarine attack than those under
Admiral de Robeck’s command.*

On 8th June, the Admiral received a personal telegram fiom
the new First Lord, saying that he could rely on the Cabinefs
full support. By the beginning of July his force would be
strengthened by the Endjmion and Theseus (these two vessels
had been fitted with anti-torpedo bulges), four monitors with
14-inch, six with 9.2-inch, and four with six-inch guns, four
sloops, two “ E ” class and four H ” class submarines. By the
same date General Hamilton would be strengthened by three
divisions of the New Army. Mr. Balfour concluded by
expressing his deep personal interest in the operations.

This was a great relief ; further procrastination could only
have ended in disaster. Nevertheless we sailors felt that since
the Army was to do the business, and the Turks had such a
vast reserve of man-power to draw upon, the military reinforce-
ments were none too liberal. However, Mr. Churchill continued
to press for a stronger force. He suggested that Sir Ian should
be provided with two additional divisions (53rd and J4th
Territorial) for his coming offensive, or a total of five reinforcing
divisions in all, in addition to every other man who could be
spared for a short time from England or Egypt. He pointed
out that the British and French had lost over 300,000 men
since April, 1915, on the Western Front, in futile offensives.
All the troops in the Dardanelles would not have been sufficient
to make a decisive change in the situation there. ‘^Here is
the prize,” Mr. Churchill concluded, and the only prize which
lies within reach this year. It can certainly be won without
unreasonable expense, and within a comparatively short time.
But we must act now, and on a scale which makes speedy success
certain.” Fortunately Mr. Churchill had strong support &om
Mr, Balfour and other members of the Committee, which met
* “Dardanelles Commission, Final Report,^* page 25.

THE NEW GOVERNIMENT’S RESOLVE

359

on the 17th June, and Lord Kitchener, by this time converted
to the vital importance of the Dardanelles Campaign, agreed
that if the transport problem could be solved, he would not
limit the reinforcements to the two extra divisions Air. Churchill
had suggested. The Mauretania^ Olympic^ and Aquitania^ each
of which was capable of carrying six or seven battalions, were
at once chartered, and by dint of tremendous exertions on the
part of the Admiralty, five new divisions and many thousands
of drafts were embarked within six weeks, for their 3,000 miles"
voyage to the Dardanelles. This vast undertaking, despite the
efforts of hostile submarines, in home waters and the iEgean, was
completed without a casualty.*

In the meantime the Admiralty had responded most liberally
to the Admiral’s requests. As transports and store ships could
no longer lie off the Peninsula with safety, it was necessary to
have small craft to ply between Aludros, which was now proof
against submarine attack, and the Gallipoli beaches. Small
cargo steamers, fast litde passenger steamers, tugs, trawlers,
drifters (to work submarine indicator nets), motor lighters and
other small craft arrived in great numbers. We never seemed
to have enough, for casualties, due to gunfire and bad weather,
were very heavy. We bought old ships, filled them with
concrete, and sank them to make piers and breakwaters off
‘‘W” Beach and Anzac. The French sank the Majenta^ an
old battleship, and a large steamer, to complete the harbour off
Beach, of which the River Clyde formed one arm. The
foreshore of the Peninsula behind the Army, thus protected fay
breakwaters, was transformed into quays and jetties, on which,
though never free from shell fire, work proceeded continuously
day and night.

I do not think it would be an exaggeration to say that during
this period, the Admiral’s small Staff never worked less than
16 to 20 hours a day ; but my duties often took me to Gallipoli,
where the spirit of the troops made the atmosphere cheerful
and invigorating. A visit to the front line trenches acted like
a tonic, and after an hour or so spent in company with the
wonderful people who occupied them, one went back refreshed
and fortified, to deal with others with whom one was less in
sympathy. It would be impossible to exaggerate the good

* “Military Operations, Gallipoli/^ VoL H, pages 60 and 61.

360 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

feeling which existed between the sailors and the fighting soldiers,
and those who were intimately connected with the military
operations ; but we also had to deal with the different Supply
Services, whose methods we were never able to understand,
and they naturally found it difficult to adjust their ideas to the
peculiar conditions of amphibious warfare. With our very
limited tonnage, it was a hand to mouth existence, on the lines
of communications, between an improvised base and the shell-
swept beaches 60 miles distant. At first it was almost impossible
to meet all their conflicting requirements, but later when we
had sufficient vessels they were allocated to the various depart-
ments for their sole use, an extraordinarily uneconomical system,
but one that was necessary to insure the smooth working of the
machine.

When complaints were made, I usually invited the officer
concerned to accompany me to the Peninsula. On one occasion,
the director of a department complained bitterly, at a Naval
and Military conference, that he was unable to build up his
reserves at Anzac, as he had no lighters. Learning that he had
never been to Anzac, I invited him to come over in a destroyer
with me that afternoon. While disembarking from the destroyer
we were saluted by shell fire in the usual way, and when we
landed, we took shelter behind a stack of trussed hay until the
bombardment, which generally greeted fresh arrivals, had lulled
a bit. From our more or less sheltered position, I was able
to point out to my companion several lighters full of his stores,
lying waiting to be destroyed by shells, or unloaded by military
fatigue parties, when the bombardment abated, or under cover
of darkness. After that, a visit to the trenches completed the
cure. He was most grateful to me for an enjoyable afternoon 1
We never had any more complaints from his department.

While we were suffering from the attentions of f/zi, we were
receiving reports from Nasmith, which showed that Eii was
giving the Turks a good deal to think about in the Marmora.
On 7th June he came out to find Boyle waiting to relieve him
in £*14. The two captains again met at the Admiral’s dinner
table that evening, and Nasmith told us his tale, which was very
refreshing; he had so thoroughly enjoyed himself, and was
obviously looking forward to his next trip.

He said that after passing Qianak he sighted a battleship.

THE NEW GOVERNMENT’S RESOLVE 561

which, with several torpedo craft, opened fire on his periscope,
and fled to the northward. No obstructions or mine moorings
were encountered on the way up, and Eix passed Gallipoli less
than sis hours after she dived off Achi Baba. Nasmith was not
able to communicate for four days, owing to a defect in his
wireless, and we were very anxious about him. However, on the
night of the 23 rd, he reported that he had sunk a torpedo gunboat
lying at anchor off Constantinople. He told us that as she was
sinking, she opened iSre and smashed the top of his periscope.
The nest day he chased a steamer on the surface, and brought
her to with rifle fire. She carried about 60 soldiers, who were
all wearing lifebelts ; they proceeded to abandon ship in the
greatest panic, lowering and ’capsizing two boats, whilst still
under way. An American, who was taking matters quite calmly,
leant over the side and introduced himself as Mr. Silas Q. Swing
of the Chicago Sun and told Nasmith he was pleased to meet
him. Under Nasmith’s directions and with the help of two or
three Turks, who alone remained on board, !Mr. Swing safely
hoisted out the remaining boat, which was lying on the deck, and
with Eii^s assistance, they then proceeded to right the boats
and pick up everybody. Nasmith told us that one Turk drifted
past on an overturned boat, with his fingers crossed and looking
absolutely terrified, much to the amusement of his crew. He
then laid Eii alongside the steamer and finding a six-inch gun
and its mounting, a great many six-inch shells, and several gun
mountings of smaller calibre, he sank her with a demolition
charge. The vessel blew up with a tremendous explosion, and
was evidently full of ammunition. It would be interesting to
read the Chicago Sun with Mr. Swing’s account of his adventure,
he must have been entertained by our light-hearted humane
submariners.

After torpedoeing a ship heavily laden with packing cases,
lying off Rodosto Pier, he diased another ship laden with barbed
wire, which first tried to ram Eii, and then ran herself ashore.
He was standing in to destroy her, when a detachment of cavalry
drove Eii off with rifle fixe. The next day Nasmith dived
unobserved into Q^nstantinople, and fired a torpedo at a large
vessel l5dng alongside the Arsenal ; the torpedo ran in a circle,
owing to a gyroscope failure, and nearly hit jEii ; he then fired
another. Two heavy explosions occurred, so the first torpedo

362 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

must also have hit something. Nasmith was unable to watch
the effect of his torpedoes, as Eii was caught in the swift current
which races out of the Bosphorus, and was swept into shoal
water, at one time she was driven on to the shoal under Leander
Tower. From this perilous position he extricated her with
great skill.

We know now that Nasmith's second torpedo blew a large
hole in the Stamhoul^ which was about to leave for the Peninsula
laden with troops. The German official Naval account states :
‘^The activity of the, enemy's submarines dislocated the
conveyance of reinforcements very seriously and caused many
disagreeable losses.” It adds that after the sinking of the Turkish
transport at the quay no further troops were forwarded to
Gallipoli by sea. There was not enough wheeled transport to
send supplies by road, so most of the food for the army had
always to be taken by water. But it was a hand to mouth
business. . . . The activity of hostile submarines was a constant
and heavy anxiety, and if communication by sea had been
completely severed the army would have been faced with
catastrophe.”*

One moonlight night Nasmith sighted a battleship, which
appeared to be the Barharossa^ with two destroyers screening her ;
it being too dark to see through the periscope, Nasmith
attempted to attack from the surface, but before he could get
into position to fire, he had to do a crash dive to avoid being
rammed by one of the destroyers. One day he encountered a
destroyer convoying five supply ships, and he torpedoed the
largest. Later in the day he fired at another steamer, but the
torpedo ran under her. Torpedoes are normally set to sink in
wartime, but in order not to waste any, Nasmith set his to float.
His First-Lieutenant (Doyley Hughes) swam to the floating
torpedo, and unwound the fan until it locked the firing pistol,
making it safe to handle ; the torpedo was then pulled in through
the stern tube, to be used again. The war head was found to
have been grazed by the bottom of the ship, without the pistol
having come in contact. Another day Nasmith torpedoed a
large modem steamer in Panderma Roads, she was towed ashore
listing heavily. After some days mostly submerged, they found
the atmosphere of the boat very foizl and oppressive, so he went
* ** Der Kti^ zur Sec, 1914-18 ; Die ISCttelmeef Diyision,’’ Chapter XV.

THE NEW GOVERNMENrS RESOLVE 363

into the centre of the Marmora, to give the crew an opportunity
of bathing and cleaning the boat. One busy day he torpedoed
another supply vessel, which was no doubt an ammunition ship,
as she blew up with a tremendous explosion. Later he missed
a small steamer which ran herself ashore and was abandoned
near a small town, but he was unable to pick up the torpedo, as
he was driven off by rifle jSre. That night he sighted two
destroyers convoying a dispatch vessel, which he attempted to
torpedo, but missed ; the torpedo was recovered as before.
The next day he had a very narrow escape of being rammed,
and had to do a crash dive, but directly he did so, his adversary
fled. In fact, by this time Nasmith had established such an
ascendancy in the Marmora, that he experienced great difficulty
in finding targets.

We learnt from our Intelligence Service, that his widely
separated depradations, and visits to the shoal waters off Rodosto,
Panderma, and small coast towns, had made a great sensation,
and we were credited with having half a dozen submarines in
the Marmora.

On 5lii June, finding a serious defect in his “ port main motor,
and his starboard intermediate shaft cracked, it was considered
advisable to return,” to quote Nasmith’s laconic report, and he
started back on the 7th. He had reserved his last two torpedoes
for the battleship which usually lay in the Straits to bombard
the ships off Anz 9 LC. After rounding Nagara Point, and seeking
for her in vain as far as Chanak, he might well have continued
his withdrawal — ^his defective engines might have let him down
at any moment — ^but he had passed a large transport at anchor
above Nagara, and he had two torpedoes left ; so he turned his
crippled ship just above the Narrows, running the risk of being
swept ashore in doing so, and again negotiated the dangerous
turn round Nagara. Having torpedoed and sunk the transport,
he continued his journey down the Straits. Immediately after
rounding Kilid Bahr, Nasmith told us that the trim of the boat
became quite abnormal, and he had to admit eight tons of water
to get her down to 70 feet. He attributed this to change of
density. An hour later he heard a scraping noise as if Hi i
was grounding ; but knowing that this was impossible in the
depth of water, he came up to 20 feet to investigate, and saw
a large mine about 20 feet ahead of his periscope, which was

364 NAVAL MEMOIRS,. 1910-1915

apparently being towed from its moorings by the port hydro-
plane ; he continued his course for another hour, at a depth of
30 feet, and when outside Kum Kale, he went full speed astern
and ejected the water from the after tanks, thus leaving the
bow submerged and bringing the stem to the surface. The
rush of water from the screws, as she gathered stern way,
dislodged the mine which, to his great relief, fell clear. He
had not even told his First-Lieutenant of the horror which had
accompanied them so long.

The Admiral telegraphed that night, to ask the Admiralty
to submit Nasmith’s name to his Majesty for a Victoria Cross.
Sir Ian told us that if the Admiralty declined to do so, he would
telegraph, in the name of the Army of Gallipoli, to beg the
King to grant it.

Eix^s engines were in such a bad state, that she had to be
towed to Malta for repairs.

Both Boyle and Nasmith had reported that a gun would be
of great value to deal with the small craft, and when £'14 went
into the Marmora on the loth, she had a six-pounder gun
mounted on her foremost superstructure. Boyle made the
passage without encountering any obstruction. It was soon
evident that no vessel of any size was moving in the Marmora ;
supplies for Gallipoli were being carried in lighters and sailing
craft, towed by tugs, and escorted by destroyers and gunboats,
which were very vigilant and elusive targets for torpedoes.
The only vessel he found to torpedo was a steamer lying dose
inshore at Panderma, bows to seaward, with several small craft
unloading her, the torpedo stmck her in the bows and scattered
the small craft. He said he thought she must be the vessel
that Nasmith had already torpedoed, lying aground. Boyle
sank a number of small heavily laden sailing vessels, but if they
had no boats in which the crew could escape, or there was nothing
in sight to which they could be transferred, he spared them.
One day he had a number of Turks on board all day, before
he could find a boat for them. On one occasion the crew of a
sailing vessel, having seen him blowing up two others with
demolition charges, became panic stricken when Eit approached.
By the time he came up, he found two men swimming half a
mile from their ship in a very exhausted state. After giving them
a good meal, heretumed them to theirHttle vessel, which he spared.

THE NEW GOVERNMENT’S RESOLVE 365

On 2ist June, Boyle was joined by Lieut.-Commander K.
Bruce in EiZy which was also armed with a six-pounder gun.
After talking things over, they separated to work in different
areas.

Bruce had one very unpleasant experience. Having chased a
steamer towing two small sailing vessels, and brought her to,
with a shot across her bows, he closed her and found that she
was heavily laden with stores. Her crew were standing up
with lifebelts on, but made no attempt to escape, so he ran Eii^s
bow alongside her, and was sending a party on board, when the
Turks threw a heavy bomb (which fortunately did not explode)
on to the deck of and unmasking a small gun, opened fire
with it and rifles. The sailing vessels joined in with rifle fire,
and also tried to foul her propellers. Eiz managed to draw
clear, and sank all three vessels with her gun ; one shot from
which caused a heavy explosion in the steamer. He then chased
another steamer, a lucky shot set her on fire, but she beached
herself under a shore battery, which drove Eiz off. On 26th
June, Eiz was ordered to return, as she reported defects in
her motors, but she got back all right on the 27th.

Lieut.-Commander A. Cochrane in Ej then entered the
Marmora on 30th June, and met £’14 on the following day.
Boyle came safely back on 3rd July, leaving Cochrane in charge
of the Marmora.

Boyle told us that Cochrane and most of his crew were suffering
from the local fever, which was very prevalent in Gallipoli and
the Fleet, so we were rather anxious about him. However, it
did not seem to deter him. He steamed into Rodosto on the
surface, to attack a steamer and five vessels alongside the grain
store ; some troops opened fire on him, but he drove them off
with his gun, and put a party on board the steamer and two of
the sailing vessels, which they destroyed ; the other three were
beached. Unfortunately Lieut. Halifax and an able seaman were
badly burned by an explosion in the forehold of the steamer,
and they suffered much during the next three weeks.

Cochrane’s report remarks : As both available officers and
several of the crew were suffering ftom the prevalent fever, and
the telegraphist had developed dysentery, not much work could
be done ” — ^without mentioning that he himself was a sick man.
Nevertheless after resting one day, he steamed into the Gulf of

366 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Mudania and sank two or three vessels. Another day he found
a vessel of about 3,000 tons alongside Mudania Pier, protected
by sailing ships secured outside her. He dived in and torpedoed
her, causing a very heavy explosion aft. He next dived into
Constantinople and fired a torpedo into the Arsenal camber.
Like Nasmith, he found it very difficult to control his vessel in
the strong and variable currents surging out of the Bosphorus.
He then took up a position off the Zeitun powder mills, and
rested on the bottom until it was dark, when he rose to the
surface and bombarded it. One day he sighted a German
submarine being towed by a destroyer, but could not get near
enough to attack. Another day he went to the Gulf of Ismid
and opened fire on a railway cutting and succeeded in blocking
the line. He then visited the shipyard but found it closed.
While inspecting it, he saw a troop train, and hoping the line
was still blocked, gave chase at full speed ; it evidently was, as
the train returned and took shelter in a belt of trees, which made
spotting difficult, but he fired zo shots at it and succeeded in
blowing up three ammunition wagons. Later he shelled another
train, and hit it several times.

On 2ist Boyle returned to the Marmora in £14, this time she
fouled a mine mooring, which turned her eight points off her
course, but she managed to shake it clear. "When nearing
Nagara, Boyle saw an obstruction, which appeared to be sus-
pended under a number of lighters, but he dived under it at
80 feet. He met Cochrane the next day, and warned him of the
new obstruction.

On 24th July, Cochrane left the Marmora to Boyle’s care,
having sunk, or driven ashore and destroyed, five steamers and
12 sailing vessels in 24 days. He dived to 90 feet under the
net at Nagara, but after passing through the Narrows, he fouled
two mine moorings, one of which swung E~i round head to
the current, and anchored her for half an hour. As full power
had to be used before Cochrane could free his vessel, and he
had been submerged for ii hours, she arrived at the entrance
of the Straits with her battery completely exhausted. Cochrane
(a great grandson of the distinguished seaman, Lord Dundonald)
had certainly made full use of the few opportunities the enemy
now gave our submarines, and had worthily upheld his ancestor’s
reputation for conducting war offensively.

THE NEW GOVERNMENrS RESOLVE 367

Meanwhile Boyle sank all the sailing vessels which ventured
out from the shelter of the anti-submarine batteries, which had
been erected along the coast, and only found one small steamer
to torpedo ; she was lying alongside a pier at Rodosto and blew
up with a heavy explosion.

The only steamers which now ventured into the Marmora
were painted as Hospital ships, and flew the red crescent
(equivalent of our red cross).

The captain of one of Boyle’s victims spoke English ; he said
he was at Chanak during our bombardment in March ; it did
a tremendous amount of damage, and they could not understand
why the Fleet did not come right through that day. He said
that owing to our submarines, kll the troops now went by train
to Rodosto, and then marched three days and nights to Gallipoli.
All supplies to Gallipoli had now to be taken in sailing vessels
and lighters, convoyed by destroyers, along the coast at night.
There was a German submarine at Constantinople, smaller than
£*14, with a crew of 33. Boyle had sighted a submarine in tow
of a Turkish destroyer a few days before, but could not get into
range to torpedo her. He continued to dominate the Marmora
single-handed, until he was joined by Nasmith on the eve of
the August offensive, when their co-operation introduced
another new phase of submarine warfare.

While the Fleet was anxiously waiting for the arrival of the
torpedo-proof monitors and cruisers, and the submarines were thus
endeavouring to sever the enemy’s communications ; the Allied
Army, pending the arrival of the new divisions, was improving its
position in the southern area by a series of successful though costly
offensives, under conditions of indescribable discomfort. Heat,
dust, flies and the presence of a number of unburied corpses in
No Man’s Land, made life almost unbearable for the troops in
the trenches ; but I think everyone was buoyed up by the hope
that at last the new Government was determined to see the
matter through, and would send sufficient ammunition and
reinforcements to make success certain.

On one of my visits to the Peninsula, I accompanied Sir Ian
to the French headquarters, and made the acquaintance of
General Gouraud. He had greatly distinguished himself in
Morocco and the Western Front, he was imbued with the

368 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

offensive spirit, and had undoubtedly raised the morale of the
French corps ; his confident soldierly bearing much impressed me.

The first of the offensives to which I referred was carried out
by the French corps, Gouraud^s plan being to capture the net-
work of Turkish defences covering Kereves Spur. All pre-
parations were made for this attack to take place on the mommg
of the 2ist June. On the i8th, the Admiral and I embarked in
the Prince George and, screened by destroyers, went to the
entrance of the Straits to try and destroy some of the Asiatic guns,
which were annoying the French.

On the 19 th, a German submarine was well hunted by our
patrols off Helles and later actually lay on the surface abreast of
the French, who refrained from* firing, thinldng she might be
British. This was very annoying, as it had been arranged
that any submarine seen in the Straits was to be considered
hostile, unless contrary warning had been given. The submarine
then stood up the Straits on the surface, was met by a motorboat
off Kephe2 and piloted through the minefield. She was evidently
the submarine sighted by £7 and E14.

The French attack opened at daylight on 21st, and the fighting
continued intermittently for three days. The net result was a
substantial gain, but at a cost of over 2,500 killed and wounded.
According to the Turkish official account, their losses exceeded
6,000, and the division engaged had to be withdrawn from the
Peninsula.

On the 25th June we had a most enjoyable afternoon, which
I described in a letter at the time as follows :

The Admiral and some of the 'Staff and I went to Anzac
in a destroyer. They all turned out to see us shelled as
we approached the beach ; the Turks always greet new-
comers, but they left us in peace except for a few rifle
bullets. We landed on ‘ Brighton Beach ’ amongst the
bathers, several hundred in their birthday suits I They
have look-outs and blow a whistle when the first shot is
fired, then they all come tumbling into their shelters ; they
are the most extraordinary careless, cheery people — ^roars of
laughter when the shells fell. The day before one shell
killed four, and wounded 14, no one seemed to mind. As
we landed we were shown where a five-inch shell had gone

THE NEW GOVERNMENT’S RESOLVE 369

diagonally through a water lighter alongside the pier an
hour before.

General Birdwood was bathing that morning, and a shell
fell amongst some bathers near. The water all got red,
and a m an staggered out carrying his arm, which was almost
completely severed. The shells sometimes go into the
dug-outs. The other day one went into one with several
men inside, it was a high explosive ; one after another the
men came out, bright yeUo'w and naturally rather shaken,
to be greeted with roars of laughter ; regardless of the
possibility that there were one or two inside killed or
wounded !

General Birdwood met ils and took us all round, it took
about four hours. Nothing on earth, not even gas (touch
wood), could turn them out, the place is absolutely
marvellous. The hills are trenched and tunnelled in the
most extraordinary way — ^we walked a mile at least under
ground. Once we went along a tunnel and very carefully
poked our heads up one by one, through a hole in the
middle of a cornfield, qiiite dose to the enemy.

There are a good many periscopes — ^the men are so
casual they will run risks, and so they have casualties every
day, even in these wonderful trenches ; many men have
had nasty wounds ftom their periscopes being hit and the
glass splintering.

The Australians and New Zealanders love Birdwood,
he is always in their trenches, and he has something to
say to nearly everyone. The trenches are most beautifully
dean, spick and span — all sorts of cunning devices — ^it
woxild have been impossible to imagine anything deaner.
(It was quite a surprise visit.) Notices on the wall, such as
‘ Everything in its place and a place for everything.’ We
saw no food scraps, dgarette ends or anything lying about.
We were awfully impressed. Towards the end we passed
through a very rough West Australian miners’ battalion.
They are wonderful diggers, and wonderful swearers —
the most app a ll in g language — ^but a very fine fighting lot,
though not as tidy as the others. I think the ones who
impressed me most were the Australian Light Horse.

We were in the miners’ trenches when two shells hit

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

the parapet near, of course, they come in sometimes. One
man said that . . . shell missed a , . . party, meaning us.
They would have been awfully tickled if we had been hit
A little further on, a man had just picked up a shell, which
had hit the parapet and ricco’ed in without bursting — ^we
all criticised the wear of the rifling of the gun, which could
be seen from the scores on the copper driving band. We
came to a place where 39 8.a-inch shells had fallen in an
hour, only three burst, only one man touched, although the
place was swarming with men in little dug-outs.

We went back to the beach to find no one bathing—
apparently there had been a heavy burst of shrapnel fire, so
they were whistled in, only a few minutes before. We got
off very qmetly ; awfully impressed with what we had seen.

While we were there the Lord Nelson^ protected by nets
and destroyers, bombarded Chanak at miles range, and
set it bla^zing, much to the amusement of the Australians.
Chanak was out of sight, but the kite balloon was spotting,
and we could see the fibtre and smoke coming up behind
the hill.

Captain Collett, R.M.A. (who got a Zeppelin shed early
in the War) brought down a German aeroplane two or
three days ago, it was promptly destroyed by the French
75’s as it lay on the ground over a ridge ; they could not
see it, but their aeroplanes spotted for them.

Three days ago our patrol destroyers saw a steamer at
dawn, close to Erenkeui. They (six) led by the
Foxhound rushed at her, in line abreast; they got a
shot through her boiler ; then one of them took her in
tow and pulled her out of the Straits to Kephalo, where she
sank before she could be patched. All the forts in the
Straits blazed at the destroyers and their prize ; luckily very
little damage was done, and only two or three casualties.
The destroyers did not waste any time. The Turkish crew
had jumped overboard, but the destroyers lowered boats
and picked everyone up, including two badly wounded
men ; being fibred at all the time. It must have impressed
the French. The steamer had been towing lighters with
grain &om Constantinople to Gallipoli, but had lost touch
with them in rough weather, came on without them and

THE NEW GOVERNMENT’S RESOLVE

571

lost her way in the Straits, and got below Kephez Point.

She was one of the Golden Horn ferry steamers.”

The next offensive was to be carried out by the a9th Division
and an Indian Brigade on the left flank and Gully Ravine. A
few days before the attack, my brother, in the Wolverine^ took
General Hunter-Weston and General de Lisle (now commanding
the 29th Division), and some Gurkhas, who had taken part
in the unsuccessful offensive on 4th June, to examine the enemy’s
flank trenches, on which he opened fire to show what a destroyer
could do. The Wolverine or Scorpion had been on the left
flank since April, and my brother had spent a good deal of time
in our flank trenches, and had flown over that sector in order to
see how he could best help. The General told me that his
suggestions were invaluable, and the Wolverine* s performance
immensely impressed the Gurkhas.

The action opened at 9 a.m. on the 28th June, with a bombard-
ment by howitzers, including French heavy howitzers, heavy
artillery, and the Talbot^ flying the flag of Admiral Nicholson,
spotted for by the Mameds balloon and screened by four
destroyers. The British artiUery support though superior to
anything that had been given in previous attacks, was still
deplorably inadequate. The Reynard Scorpion^ and Wolverine were
stationed on the left flank, literally alongside and enfilading the
Turkish trenches, which came down nearly into the sea.
According to the Turkish official accounts, the fire of these
vessels entirely destroyed the front line trenches on their
sea flank.

We watched the action from the Triad; all that we could
see appeared to be going very well, and it was a relief, after some
of the distressing sights we had witnessed, to see our men
advancing steadily without casualties, behind a curtain of fire.
But the land dipped down parallel to the cliff into Gully Ravine,
and although the left had syoing well forward, the centre
appeared to be held up. During the night the Turks counter-
attacked heavily, and attempted to turn our left flank along the
shore, but were detected by the searchlights of the Wolverine
and Scorpion:, whose fire destroyed them.

The fighting continued for tie next two days, and the result,
though of great tactical importance, fell far short of what might

37^ NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

have been achieved but for the lack of high explosive shell, and
reinforcements to exploit the initial success.

On 30th June, finding the Turks disorganised by the battle
on the British front. General Gouraud attacked and scored an
important success on our right flank. Unfortunately that
evening General Gouraud was very badly wounded on ‘‘V”
Beach by a shell from Asia. Amongst other injuries he lost an
arm, and was invalided to France — a grievous loss to the Allied
Army, and to Sir Ian, who had found in him a most loyal and
trusted ally, more a co-adjutor than a subordinate,” to quote
his own words.

Desperate Turkish counter-attacks were delivered during the
next four days, culminating, at dawn on the 5 th July, in an assault
by two complete divisions ; these attacks were all repulsed, the
Turks suffering enormous losses, the British losses being
negligible. The Turkish official account admits that between
28th June and 5 th July, their losses amounted to no less than
16,000 men. The British casualties in that batde were 3,500.

The last offensive in the southern area, before the August
battles, took place on the 12th July, and succeeded in bringing
the Allied centre up into line with the advance on the two flanks.

The fighting lasted two days, and resxilted in smashing the
Turkish defences in that sector. Our losses amounted to 3,100, ^
and the French had 800 casualties. The Turks admit that
their losses exceeded 9,000, exclusive of 600 prisoners, and that
in the three actions and counter-attacks that followed, thek
casualties exceeded 30,000.

Had it been possible for us to renew the attack immediately,
with fresh troops and abundant ammunition, victory was
unquestionably within our reach ; but the 8th Corps and the
French had fought themselves to a standstill, and were incapable
of further effort. Two days later the Turkish Second Army
began to reach Kiithia, and by 20th July the Turkish account
states : The crisis was over and the line secure.”*

After these battles General Hunter-Weston came on board
the Triad to stay with the Admiral for a couple of days’ rest,
as he had had a very trying time. He seemed, as , gay ^d as
l^h^picited as ever, but he went down with fever the n^
day and was invalided home a very sick man on 21st July.

* “Military Operatioiis, Gallipoli,” Vol. II, pages iii and 112.

THE NEW GOVERNMENT’S RESOLVE

373

Lieut.-General Sir Francis Davies was appointed to succeed him
in command of the 8th Corps.

Meanwhile Sir Ian had decided to launch his main offensive in
the neighbourhood of Anzac, directly the promised divisions
arrived, and was anxious to refrain from any action which might
induce the enemy to strengthen their forces in that zone. The
Turks displayed no desire to test the Anzac defences, after their
heavy repulse of i8th May, until the 29th June, when they
assaulted the position held % the Australian Light Horse ; they
were thrown back in great disorder, and left 300 dead in front
of our line.

Although no offensive operations were carried out in the
Anzac area, in June and July, the position was greatly improved
by mining and tunnelling, to counter the Turks who were active
in this respect.

One afternoon at Anzac stands out in my memory, and the
following is a letter I wrote at the time to my wife :

29th July.

When I last wrote, I was just leaving for Anzac. I
took Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble, and Generals Altham
and Ellison — ^who have been sent out to pull the com-
munications together, from the military side, as they were
chaotic. They have sent nearly all the senior ofl&cers home,
who were responsible for the trouble, including the Director
of Works, who is responsible for the absence of piers. . . .

After I had done my business with General Birdwood’s
CS.O. and the Naval Transport officer, I went to see
General Godley, and he took me for a walk, until the
destroyer went back. We first went up the trenches which
we visited the first day with Sir Ian ; &en they were being
sniped all the time, and one had to keep one’s head down,
but now they are unoccupied ; we have extended so much
further. Then we went up * Shrapnel Valley,’ where all the
casualties occurred that &st night — ^which so disheartened
the men — ^it is still dangerous. General Bridges was mortally
wounded there, but everything k so well worked now, one
goes up by communication trenches — ^we were not taking any
risks. Everyone carries an anti-gas mask — Godley would not
take his, because I hadn’t one ! They haven’t started gas yet.

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Then we worked our way to ‘ Quinn’s Post,’ it
is the sight of Anzac — but they won’t take Genetal
or Admiral visitors there. However, Godley goes ev«y
other day and Birdwood nearly as often, and I wanted
to see it. It really is wonderful, it is on the crest
of the cliff, with a staircase cut up to it, the steps bound
with brushwood traverses ; then a plateau, with tunnels
and galleries in all directions. Mining and counter-mining
goes on all the time. The sight is a crater, which was
blown in by a huge mine explosion some weeks ago.
During the night the Turks biult a regular fort in the
crater, and from there drove us out of our fire trenches,
and nearly down the hill mth bombs. We replied, and
made it impossible for them to live in the fort, which was
in turn blown up by mining — ^but the fire trench was
untenable by either side, about ten yards from our second
line, and 20 yards from their front trenches. The crater
is only 1 5 feet from their front trench.

Until this fighting commenced, the post was held by
an Australian officer called Quinn, who froze on to it for
a fortnight, when it was isolated except at night — Whence the
name. Then Quinn was killed, and soon after the Turks
were tojp dog, and dominated our people with bombs, as
we' were very shott of them. General de Lotbinifre (the
new Director of Works) made bombs for them out of baccy
tins, jam tins, etc., and slabs of high explosive secured to
a sort of hairbrush shaped piece of wood — ^they made
hundreds a day — ^as do our ships now for the Army. They
selected a New Zealand-Irishman — Colonel Malone — ^to
command ‘ Quinn’s Post.’ He soon became top dog, and
for every bomb thrown by a Turk, we promptly threw
seven — ^now reduced to three. He retook and consolidated
the fire trench, and occupied the crater; has blown 16
mines up imder tiie Turk trenches, and has only been
caught by their mines three times. He took us round.
He is a &e fellow and simply loves it. He took me into
the crater — ^pitch dark except for slits — it is held by four
rifles, they said they could hear the Turks working, and had
just sent for the miners to come and listen and counter-
mine. The Australian miners are quite wonderful, and

THE NEW GOVERNMENT’S RESOLVE

375

can beat the Turks 99 times out of a 100. We were only
15 feet away from the Turkish trench.

Then we went along the fire trench — ^protected
against bombs by rabbit wire overhead, barbed wire
and very deep. Bombing was going on all the time,
and one could see the parapet of the Turkish trench very
clear, only 20 yards away. I asked a man whether he had
had a shot that day, and he said ‘ three.’ A Turk had been
very saucy and had put up his head three times, he thought
he had put him to sleep. Then another man told us that
^ just here ’ a man had put his head back ‘ like this ’ doing
the same himself — ^and got a shot through the head which
killed him, only two or three hours before ; a machine
gun had done it. Then to show me, the man threw a bomb,
and promptly the machine gun went rat-tat-tat against the
parapet, ripping into the wood holding the rabbit wire.
Standing as we all were, it was perfectly safe, but men mil
get careless. I asked whether they liked it ? They said
‘ better than fatigues,^ i.e. carrying water, food, etc. I did
enjoy myself, and I promise you ran no risks.

Then we came down to the pier, which is very shell-
swept as a rule three or four times a day — ^and we had
what the generals described to Sir Ian, as a Court of Enquiry
on the pier, conducted by the Commodore. They had
been complaining to G.H.Q. about lack of transport and
tugs, etc. I was furious when I got the letter, because we
had given them everything the N.T.O. asked for, and he
was satisfied. We could give more than they could or
would take. I pointed out that during the six hours I
had been there, there had been hardly any shelling, but
three lighters had been left loaded, not one ton out of 45
had been moved, etc., etc. General Birdwood "" walked
back ’ very handsomely, put his arm through mine,
and said we knew how thoroughly he appreciated our
work, etc. ... I told him complaints which were made
without proper enquiry . . . and forgave him I Sir
Douglas Gamble and the new Generals were awfully
amused, especially as they aU said, a conclave on the pier
like that would draw a bouquet of shells — however it
didn’t, and I had my say.”

CHAPTER XXn

THE AUGUST OFFENSIVE

The Plan ; Preparations ; Arrival of new vessels and troops ; Secret reinforcement
ofAnzac; The offensive opens at Helles ; Attack on Lone Pine ; Attack on
Sari Bair; Landing at Suvla; Eii and E14 co-operate in the Marmora; Two
days delay ; The Turkish problem ; Attack at Suvla repulsed ; Attack on
Sari Bair repulsed ; Failure of the August offensive.

The main object of the operations which Sir Ian intended to
carry out, directly the new divisions were ready for service,
was to seize a position astride the Gallipoli Peninsula from
Gaba Tepe to the neighbourhood of Kilia Bay, with a protected
line of supply from Suvla Bay. The object of the Anzac Corps
was to throw back the right wing of the Turkish Army opposed
to it, drive it south towards Kilid Bahr, and thus secure a
position commanding the narrow part of the Peninsula betveea
Gaba Tepe and Maidos. For this purpose the Anzac Corps
was to be reinforced by one of the new ^visions and an Indian
brigade. The main attack was to be directed against Chunuk
Bair, and the capture of Sari Bair was considered essential for
the whole success of the undertaking. Simultaneously vsdth
this attack, two of the new divisions were to land in or near
Suvla Bay, and were to seize the heights which commanded
the bay and the plain to the southward.

Sir Ian had asked the Admiral to consider the possibility of
landing in the Gulf of Xeros, but the latter pointed out that it
would mean another long line of communications, 6o miles
from the base, on which it would only be possible — ^now enemy
submarines had arrived — ^to use small cr^t, of which we had
barely enough for our existing commitments. When he learnt
that Sir Ian had definitely decided to use his reinforcements on
die left of Anzac, the Admiral told him that he was warmly in
favour of the plan from a naval point of view. The possession
of Suvla Bay would give us a harbour on the Peninsula, which
could in some measure be protected against submarine attack,
and which would afford shdter in a northerly gale. It might

376

THE AUGUST OFFENSIVE

377

even be possible to make a sheltered harbour for small craft
in south-westerly gales, in the south-east comer of the bay, by
sinking blockships ; if, however, the operations could be
extended to include Ejelma Bay, we would Imve excellent shelter
from the southward, and the small craft could move ftom one
to another as necessary.

About this time we were all grieved to lose the services of
Lieut.-Commander F.H. Sandford, who had been a most energetic
and valuable member of the Staff since 19th March, We had
been anxious to mine the approaches to Smyrna, and having no
mines or minelayer, fitted one of our Fleet Sweepers to lay
French mines, under Sandfprd^s directions ; one exploded
prematurely while they were being laid, and Sandford lost an
eye. The French minelayer Casablanca was blown up on the
same service the next day.

As the operations were to be in the Anzac area, I arranged
for Commander the Hon. Lionel Lambart to join the Staff;
he had come out to the Dardanelles directly the operations
started, had been in the Ocean when she was mined, and since
then had acted as Chief Staff Officer to the Senior Naval Officer
of the vessels off An2ac. He had landed with the Australians
in the first flight of boats on 25 th April, and had led the raid
on the Turkish post on Nibrunesi Point ; his local knowledge
and experience were invaluable. The Admiral, Lambart,
Godfrey and I studied the Suvla position from a hill on the
north flank of Anzac, and from seaward, through powerful
glasses, and formed a strong opinion that a night landing in
Suvla Bay would be inadvisable. The foreshore to the eastward
looked very shallow, and on the northern shore very foul.
Commander Douglas — ^the hydrographical officer on the Staff
— considered that the chart (a very sketchy one 35 years old)
could not be relied upon; for instance, the outlet from the
Salt Lake might well have silted up the eastern foreshore. On
the other hand, we knew that the long stretch of beach from
Nibrunesi Point to the southward was steep to and free
from rocks and shoals. Lambart told us that prior to the raid
he went in, in a destroyer, at right angles to the beach until the
stem almost touched it, and it was quite certain that a very
large force could be landed there simultaneously on a wide front.

Lambart and I examined the position for hours from

378 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

various points through our glasses, during the next few weeks.

It all looked so peaceful, there was not a sign of a trench, wire,
nor a Turk, and we became enthusiastic and hopeful for a great
success. We could see numbers of beasts in the neighbouring
fields, which left us in no doubt as to the presence of plenty of
water, and our raiders had found a good well near Nibrunesi
Point. This was a great relief to us, as water at Anzac was a
ceaseless and haunting anxiety ; there was very little on shore,
and enormous quantities for men and beasts had to be brought
overseas from as far as Egypt or Malta to Mudros, and thence
by lighter to the shell-swept beaches.

When G.H.Q’s draft of the plan arrived, the nth Division
was apparently to be divided equally between Suvla Bay and
the beach by Nibrunesi Point. As it was considered inadvisable
to give the enemy any inkling that we had an eye on Suvla Bay,
boats could not be sent in to survey the approaches to fhe
beaches, and the Admiral told Sir Ian very definitely that he
could not guarantee a landing on a dark night in Suvla Bay.
However, Sir Ian attached the greatest importance to landing a
force to the northward of the entrance to the Salt Lake, which he
feared might be defended or impassable, and delay was un-
desirable ; it was necessary to occupy Kiretch Tepe Heights
before daylight, as they commanded the bay. Of course the
Admiral thoroughly appreciated the importance of this, and
agreed to a landing in the desired position, remarking
optimistically that, provided the troops were prepared for a
long wade, he had no doubt that they would get on shore all
right. So it was arranged, but to meet our views 7,000 troops
were to land south of Nibrunesi Point and 3,000 in Suvla Bay.
We would have greatly preferred to land a force on the northern
slopes of Kiretch Tepe, where they would only have had a short
dimb to their objective. We thought it quite a feasible opera-
tion, and one that had been actually carried out on 20th June
by a very enterprising reconnaissance of a small party of New
Zealanders, who landed there from a trawler after dark, and
struck right across the plain to the “W” Hills and back
unmolested. This party found good water on Kiretch Tepe.
We felt that a landing there on the lines of the “ Y " Beach
la n di n g, might be of great value; but there were apparently
military objections to this.

380 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Among the craft which had arrived from England, were the
first of the new motor lighters, which had been designed for
Lord Fisher’s Baltic project. They were big flat-bottomed
vessels, driven by heavy-oil engines at a speed of six to seven
knots ; their sides and decks were plated with steel, proof
against machine-gun bullets and shrapnel. They could each
carry 500 men or 40 horses, and drew very little water forward,
and only seven feet aft when fully loaded ; they were fitted with
a long ramp forward, which on a steep to ” beach, such as
that at Nibninesi Point, enabled troops to land dryshod. Two
very valuable vessels, fitted to lay 500 yards of heavy anti-
submarine net at a considerable speed, arrived in July. I believe
they were old Isle of Man passenger steamers, and we heard
that the ingenious arrangement for laying the nets was designed
by Sir Arthur Wilson. They were accompanied by a steamer
carrying several more 500-yard lengths, which could be trans-
ferred and ready for laying in a few hours. We hoped with
these vessels to be able to make the entrance of Suvla Bay
practically submarine-proof within 24 hours of the landing.

I begged the Admiral to keep the direction of this new landing
in his own hands ; after all the responsibility would be his,
whoever he placed in charge, and we had so much more experi-
ence by that time than anyone else. He agreed to allow his
Staff to work out all the details, but said he wished Admiral
Christian (who was on his way out from England) to take com-
mand of the naval forces engaged, on the eve of the action, in
order that he might have the same opportunities as Admirals
Wemyss and Thursby had had in April.

Lambart, Godfrey, Ramsay and I worked in the closest accord
with Sir Ian’s General StaflF. Ramsay, greatly assisted by
Douglas, initiated the new monitors and blistered cruisers into the
new methods of bombardment and co-operation with the Army,
and Lambart and I dealt with all the watertight compartments
into which the Army Staff is divided. Braithwaite and the
two new Generals — ^Altham, Inspector-General of Communica-
tions, and Ellison, Quartermaster-General — ^were excellent people
to work with, and we had an agreement, that if anyone introduced
a particle of grit into the smooth working of the machine, bis
head would be blown offl Piers and quays developed with
great rapidity, under the masterful energy of the new Director

THE AUGUST OFFENSIVE 381

of Works — General Lotbiniere — and by the time the offensive
was ready for launching, I think the naval and military co-
operation could not possibly have been more complete or
cordial than it was in the two fighting areas, at G.H.Q., and on
the lines of Communication.

In the light of our knowledge after the event, it was a
deplorable misfortune that the question of rank and seniority
should have governed the selection of officers for high command ;
and that an enterprise with such infinite possibilities should
have been confided to the new divisions, commanded and staffed
by officers who had no experience of the amphibious warfare
in which we had been engaged for the last few months.

It was very hard on Sir Ian that such a situation should have
been more or less forced on him ; he had begged that General
Bruce Hamilton might be sent out, an old and experienced
General of great determination, who had proved his worth in
war. His request had been refused. He then begged for young
and energetic Commanders for the 9th Corps and the new
divisions, and submitted two names for the former, Byng or
Rawhnson. Again his request was refused. He had protested
that the Chief of Staff who had been appointed to the 9th Corps
was unsuitable. His protest was ignored. ,It is true that
General Byng was eventually sent out, but, like ever3rthing else
in this campaign, so dogged with misfortune, tibiee weeks
too late.

The date for the new offensive was fixed for the 6th August.
By the 3rd August the landing of the Anxac Corps’ new drafts,
amounting to about 7,000 officers and men, 40 guns, vast
quantities of stores, ammunition and supplies, had been safely
landed. During the next three nights, the 13th Division, a
brigade of the loth Division, and the Indian Infantry and
Mountain Artillery Brigades were quietly landed and hidden
away at Amiac during hours of darkness ; not a sign of them, or
the vessels that brought them, was to be seen when day broke.
We know now that the enemy remained in ignorance of this
great concentration, though at one time we feared that they
were suspicious. During the night of the 4th a heavy burst of
fire was opened on the beaches during the disembar^tioa. A
small steamer and two horse-boats were sunk, and the casualties
included the Naval Beach Master, who was mortally wounded.

382 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

On the afternoon of the 6th, the 8th Corps was to open the
offensive by a series of attacks in the southern area, with lie
object of holding the enemy opposed to it to their ground.

In the Anzac area the battle was to be opened by an attack
on the enemy’s southern defence system, known as ^‘Lone
Pine,” in order to draw his reserves away from the northern
sector, where the main attack was to be delivered ; with the
object of capturing Sari Bair Ridge as soon as the enemy’s
attention had been directed to the “ Lone Pine ” fight
Simultaneously with the main attack at Anzac, the remainder
of the 9th Corps was to seize Suvla Bay and operate on the north
flank of Anzac.

The naval support and co-operation was to be given by the
four moiiitors mounting two 14-inch guns each, and four cruisers
of the Endymion ” class, armed with 9.2-inch and six-inch
guns. These eight vessels were considered proof against
torpedo attack ; the Bacchante^ Talbot^ ten small monitors, eada
mounting a 9.2-inch or six-inch gun, two kite balloon ships—
the Hector and Manica — ^and a number of destroyers. The
Admiral was to fly his flag in the light cruiser Chatham^ and the
Corps Commander, General Sir Frederick Stopford, and his
General Staff, were to be berthed in the sloop Jonquil^ flying
the flag of Rear-Admiral Christian, which was to anchor dose
in to Nibrunesi Point, in signal communication with the naval
and military signal station on the Point.

The submarines in the Marmora were also to take part;
Boyle in £14 was still there, and on 5th August Nasmilh went
in Ell once again, to co-operate with Boyle in attacking the
Turkish reinforcements, which were certain to march along
the Bulair Isthmus by the Marmora shore, as the road on the
other side, which was to be watched by ^e armoured cruiser
Cornwall and destroyers, was open to direct attack from seaward.

The great August battle opened at Helles at 2.30 p.m. on the
6th with a bombardment by all our heavy batteries and the fire
of the supporting ships. General Davies — afresh from the Western
ftont — ^who was to take command of the 8th Corps immediately
after the operation, which was in progress under the command
of Major-General Douglas, arrived in time to watch the fight,
and has recorded that he was horrified at the total inadequacy
of the British bombardment.

THE AUGUST OFFENSIVE

3«3

The enemy, who had been quiet for a month, consolidating
their positions and husbanding their ammunition, replied a few
minutes after our bombardment commenced, with a heavy
sustained fire which inflicted considerable losses on our troops,
who were waiting in the crowded trenches to assault. At
3.50 the 88th Brigade of the 29th Division — brought up to
strength again with well-trained drafts — ^assaulted as bravely as
ever, and suffered 2,000 casualties out- of the 3,000 engaged,
to no purpose. The following day the 42nd Division attacked
with equal lack of success. In less than 24 hours, in a limited
attack on a mile front, the 8th Corps had 5,500 casualties ;
moreover this sacrifice had not achieved the result hoped for.
We know now that Liman von Sanders decided at daybreak
on the 7th that the risks must be accepted in the southern area,
and he withdrew a fresh division, which had been in reserve
there, to reinforce the northern 2one with all speed.

On learning of this cosdy failure, Sir Ian gave orders that no
further offensives were to be undertaken in the southern area,
and the British line remained practically unchanged undl the
final evacuation five months later.

At Anzac the battle opened at 4.30 p.m. on the 6th, with an
houFs bombardment of '^Lone Pine^^ by 28 guns. The
Bacchante searched the valleys beyond, and the monitors shelled
the Turkish batteries to the north-east of Gaba Tepe. At
5.30 p.m, the ist Australian Brigade assaulted the Lone Pine
defences, and within ten minutes, after desperate hand-to-hand
fighting and despite heavy losses, a number of small posts were
established in the heart of the enemy^s position. For the nest
48 hours the Turks delivered a number of fierce bombing
counter-attacks. On the morning of the 8th the worst of the
fighting was over, but for the next few days several more
attempts were made by the enemy to recapture the lost position.
By the 12th the Australians had gained a complete ascendancy
m that zone. The fighting spirit of the Aimes was simply
unquenchable, and throughout those desperate combats round
‘'Lone Pine,'^ in which only limited numbers could engage,
pickets had to be stationed to control long queues of men, who
were endeavouring to take part in the fight, and offering as
much as five pounds to take the place of those who were
detailed for the front line. I am glad to find that this

384 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

story, which thrilled us at the time, is recorded in the official
history.

Our losses were 1,700, including two Colonels killed. The
Turks lost about 5,000, and over 1,000 dead Turks were removed
from the captured Turkish trenches.

The main attack on the north flank of Anzac was delivered
by the New Zealand and Australian Division, ten of the 17
battalions of the 9th Corps recently landed, and the Indian
Infantry and Mountain Artillery Brigades, under the command
of General Godley. I will not attempt to follow the Military
Historian through the intricate details of General Birdwoods
plan to capture the Sari Bair Ridge, but quote his concluding
paragraph :

“ It will be seen from these details that the whole scheme
of the operations was strewn with amazing difficulties.
The main hope of success was that the very boldness of
the scheme would ensure surprise and enable the attacking
troops to gain the crest of the ridge before the Turks could
muster sufficient strength to stop them."^^

The main advance was to be made in two columns, and was
preceded by an attack in which the Colm gave valuable assistance
to the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade. At 9 p.m. every
night for the three preceding weeks, the destroyer on duty
on the northern flank — either the Colne or the Chelmer — ^had
switched on her searchlight and bombarded the trenches of the
strong posts in the vicinity of Table Top. The Turks, of
course, simply cleared out and took shelter in their dug-outs.
The destroyer would then switch off her searchlight, wait for
a bit to give them time to come back, and then repeat the dose.
It was hoped that after a time the Turks would look upon it
as a matter of routine, and wait under shelter until the destroyer
got tired of it. At 9 p.m. on the 6th the Colm switched on
her searchlight and opened fire, under cover of which the New
Zealanders crept up, screened by the glare of the searchlights,
and when the light was switched off, they rushed the post and
captured or killed the garrison, with trifling loss to themselves.
The Colm then transferred her attention to Table Top ; here a
strong resistance was encountered, but the New Zealanders
would not be denied, and after desperate fighting they captured

THE AUGUST DEFENSIVE

385

it and the other Turkish posts north of Anzac. The way was
then clear for the right assaxilting column to advance on Chunuk
Bair. On the left of the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade,
two battalions of the 13th Division advanced to the northward,
and most gallantly captured a strong Turkish post with the
bayonet, taking zoo prisoners, and the way was open for the
left assaulting column to advance.

One of the battalions of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade,
which formed the right assaulting column, lost its way in the
dark in the steep, difficult country, and when day broke the
other three battalions of the New Zealand Brigade were waiting
for it, still 1,200 yards ftom Chunuk Bair, which was thought
to be xmoccupied, and which it* had been hoped to reach more
than two hours earlier.

The left assaulting column, consisting of the 4th Australian
Brigade and the Indian Brigade, advanced through even more
difficult country, and had considerably farther to go. In
neither case had reconnaissance been possible, and it was not
surprising that they, too, lost their way in the darkness. When
day broke they were more than two hours behind the scheduled
time.

Despite the failure of the two columns to obtain their
objectives, the attacks which were to take place from within
the Anzac position at dawn, vrere delivered with the greatest
gallantry, but repulsed with terrible loss. This sacrifice was
made in vain, for the sole object was to help the New Zealanders
on Chunuk Bair, whose advance had not yet begun.

The failure of the main assaulting columns was not due to
the opposition of the enemy. Thanks to the spirited attack of
the New Zealand . Mounted Rifles, the enemy’s defence on the
north flank had been completely disorganised; the right
assaulting column had encountered no opposition, and at i a.m.
were within 1,500 yards of Chunuk Bair ; at 4.50 a.m. it was
still 1,200 yards ftom its objective, and in the intervening hours
only one Turk was seen.

The left assaulting column had only met with slight opposition
ftom a small body of Turks, who had been driven out of their
positions by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, but according
to the Military Historian it had "" been given a task — ^the capture
of Hill 971 before dawn — ^which even in peace-time, with troops

386 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

in perfect health, would have left small margin for enof^’*
but the majority of the troops engaged had been in the trendies
for three months, were suffering from the prevailing complaint,
and were worn out by their long and arduous climb, heavily
laden with entrenching tools and ammunition.

When the attack on Chunuk Bair was eventually delivered at
10.30 a.m. on the 7th, supported by the fire of all the available
artillery and that of the ships, it made no progress, and the
tired troops dug themselves in where they were. The Australian
Brigade of the left assaulting column was too worn out to
attempt any further advance on the 7th, and the Indian Brigade,
widely scattered, had lost all cohesion ; the heat was tropical,
water was scarce, and nothing further was done that day.

We know now from the evidence of a German officer who
organised the first defence of the Sari Bair Ridge, that the only
Turkish troops on it, when he arrived there at 7 a.m. on the
7th, was a Turkish battery of two mountain guns and an escort
of 20 rifles, who were asleep ! *

Meanwhile the nth Division had landed at Suvla Bay.

Soon after dark on the 6th, ten destroyers (under the command
of Captain C. P. R. Coode), each carrying 530 men, towing
ten motor lighters each carrying 500 men and accompanied by
a picket boat, left Kephalo Bay and steamed in complete darkness,
in line abreast a cable (200 yards) apart, to the neighbourhood
of Suvla Bay. The northern three units entered the bay, to
land their troops on the eastern shore, north of the Salt Lake
cut ; the seven southern units made for the “ steep to shore
to the southward of Nibrunesi Point. The former was called
A ” and the latter “ B Beach. This force was followed by
six trawlers, each towing a naval launch, and a number of boats
from the transports, to assist the landing in case of accidents.

Then followed the Endymion and Theseus in the wake of the
seven southern units, each carrying 1,000 men, to be landed at
‘‘ B ” Beach. To the northward of this force was the sloop
Aster ^ carrying 500 men and towing a motor lighter carrying
eight mountain guns and 40 horses, accompanied by a picket
boat. She had in company three trawlers each carrying 20c
men, and each towing four horse-boats, which carried eight
1 8-pounder guns and 76 horses. These trawlers were accompaniec
* “Military Operations, Gallipoli,” Vol, H, page 205.

THE AUGUST OFFENSIVE

3^7

by three picket boats. This force was to land at “ C ” Beach
immediately to the southward of B.” Twelve more horse-
boats were waiting at Kephalo to be towed to C ” Beach
directly these three trawlers had slipped their first tows. The
naval beach parties for the three beaches were embarked in
three trawlers and accompanied their respective landing forces.

A cable ship was det^ed to run a cable from G.H,Q. at
Imbros to Nibrunesi Point, directly the landing was secure,
A destroyer on the northern flank at Anzac was anchored in a
position to act as a guide to the southern flank of “ B ” Beach,
and she kept her searchlight fixed on Obocolate and W ” Hills to
give the vessels navigational aid during their approach.

Everything went according to plan at B ” and “ C ” Beaches.
At 9.30 p,m., precisely to time, seven destroyers steamed in
very close to the shore and quietly lowered their anchors by
hand off ‘‘ B ” Beach. Seven motor launches shot out and
landed 3,500 men in one rush, returned to their destroyers and
landed another 3,710 men with equal celerity. Thus 7,210 men
were landed dryshod in half an hour without a casualty. Only
one rifle shot was fired by the enemy, which killed a naval
rating. The motor launches then proceeded with all dispatch
to the Theseus and EndyT?non^ which had anchored quietly close
to the destroyers, and 2,000 more men were promptly landed
at “ B ” Beach.

Eleven hundred men were landed at C ” Beach, and 16 guns
and their horse teams were safely ashore soon after midnight.

Meanwhile the three units steaming into Suvla Bay were less
fortunate ; it was pitch dark and the destroyers could see
nothing ; they felt &eir way in slowly, but it was 10.30 p.m.
before they actually anchored, 600 yards from the shore, and
nearly 1,000 yards to the southward of the intended position ;
by that time the enemy were aware of their presence, and they
came under a desultory rifle fire and the fire of a small field gun.
One motor lighter chanced on a good spot, landed her troops
dryshod, and went back to her destroyer for the second load.
The other two ran on a reef about 50 yards from the beach,
and the heavily-laden men had to wade ashore, in some cases
almost up to their necks in water ; seamen took lines ashore to
guide the men landing, but it was an extraordinarily trying
experience for young troops, and they suffered some casualties

388 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

from snipers. It was after midnight before these two Hghtets
were cleared ; one succeeded in getting back to her destroyer
for a second load, the second remained fast. The first lighter
which got back and returned with a fresh load, failed to find
her good landing place, ran aground on a reef at a considerable
distance out, and her troops had to be transferred to boats;
the second lighter did likewise. A third lighter was provided
from B ” Beach to take the place of the stranded one, but it
was not until 3.40 a.m, that the last man of this unfortunate
Brigade was eventually landed. As the Military Historian
remarks, the Navy's reluctance to attempt a landing inside the
Bay had been only too well justified."

The troops which landed at B " Beach quickly gained
possession of Lala Baba, but the battalion which led the assault
suffered rather heavy casualties, mostly from snipers, who hid
in the neighbouring scrub after they were driven out of thek
posts.

Owing to the confusion caused by the failure to land rapidly
in Suvla Bay, Hill 10 was still in the possession of the enemy
at daylight ; but a battalion which had landed at “ A " Beach
had passed to the westward of it in the darkness, and was astride
of Kiretch Tepe Ridge, about two miles to the eastward of
Suvla Point, before dawn.

Watching and listening in the Chatham^ accustomed as we
were to desperate fighting, it seemed to us that our troops were
encountering very slight resistance. There seemed to be less
firing than one heard on a peaceful night at Helles or Amiac.

The Jonquil anchored just inside Suvla Bay, abreast of Nibrunesi
Point, soon after midnight ; by that time all was quiet in that
vicinity, and but for some scattered firing towards Hill 10,
everything seemed to be going well, without serious opposition.
This should have reassured General Stopford, who had been
quite satisfied with the scheme until he came under the influence
of his pessimistic Chief of Staff, but since had made no secret
of his misgivings. The Chief of Staff was an artillery oflicer,
lately from France, who was absolutely obsessed with the
necessity for a heavy expenditure of high-explosive shells on
continuous lines of trenches, before an attempt was made to
assault them. He even told us the exact weight of ammunition
per yard of trench that it would be necessary to fire before an attack

THE AUGUST OFFENSIVE

389

could be delivered with any prospect of success. He ceaselessly
complained of the lack of artillery support at Suvla, and the
folly of attempting to land without support, on a scale which
w’-ould have exhausted our meagre supply of ammunition for
the three fighting areas in the course of a few hours. In fact
he thoroughly disheartened everyone with whom he came in
contact. As there were very few trenches at Suvla, no sign
of wire and very few Turks, his gloomy forebodings were
not helpful, and I shall always regard him as the principal
marplot of the Suvla landing, as I told him on more than
one occasion.

When day broke, the Chatham stood in to Suvla Bay, arriving
about 4.30 a.m. Three lighters appeared to be fast aground
some little way off the original Beach. A column of

troops was marching from the southward along the strip of low
beach between the Salt Lake and the Bay, and were under
shrapnel fire from two or three guns, well inland to the eastward,
which we were unable to locate. These appeared to be dividing
their attention between the troops and the lighters, from which
ammunition was being landed in boats.

The sloop Honeysuckle and five troop carriers under the
command of Captain Burmester (Admiral Wemyss^ Flag Captain)
were anchored in the Bay ; these had arrived at dawn from
Ivlitylene with six battalions of the loth Division, which had
remained tiiere in their transports to relieve the congestion at
Mudros, and give the enemy the impression that we were landing
in Asia somewhere in that neighbourhood.

These troops were to have landed at the original ^^A'^ Beach, to
reinforce the troops on the left flank, but Unwin, who was in
charge of all the motor lighters, had surveyed the approaches
and had told Admiral Qbristian that he did not recommend a
landing there owing to navigational diificulties.

Unwin had collected ten motor lighters, and had placed
sufficient alongside the Mtylene ships, directly they arrived, to
land all the troops in one trip, but as there was no sign of any
movement for more than an hour, the Admiral signalled to the
Jonquil to ask the reason for the delay. Admiral Christian
replied that “ A Beach was impracticable and the troops would
have to be disembarked at B and ‘‘ C Beaches. It was
evident that it was thought in the Jonquil that there was no other

390

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

alternative ; but as the enemy's shrapnel was bursting right
over the column of troops already marching by that route, and
we could see was causing casualties, it seemed folly to give
troops required on the left flank a three-mile march, for at
least a mile of which they would be exposed to shrapnel &e
without any cover, if they could be landed on the northern
side of the Bay unmolested and within a mile of their objective
We could see two sandy coves which might have a clear approach,
but in any case there was no reason why the troops should not
land on the rocks if necessary. So Lambart and I went off in
the Admiral's barge at once, with a message from him to General
Stopford to this effect. As we were crossing the Bay we saw
men crawling about on the ridge towards Kiretch Tepe, hut
could not distinguish whether they were British or Turks.
The early possession of the ridge was essential, as it commanded
the Bay ; so I transferred to a destroyer and steamed full speed
round Suvla Point to the northward until we were in a position
to identify them as British, and I then went to the Jonquil with
all dispatch.

There was still no sign of any movement of troops into the
lighters ; they ought to have been on shore within an hour of
their arrival, and I went alongside the Jonquil in a fever of
resentment at these leisurely proceedings ; everyone there
seemed quite satisfied that all was going well, and immensely
relieved at the ease with which a whole division had been
landed, after the blood-curdling tales they had heard of the
desperate fighting on the beaches on a 5 th April.

I found it quite impossible to refrain from saying what I
thought. I told them that the troops on the northern ridge
were British (of which they were in doubt) and that they had
not made much progress. I understood that the Mitylene
Brigade was to reinforce them. Why march men all the way
round under shrapnel fire if they could be saved two miles and
landed within a mile of their objective unmolested? The
General complained that he had been told that it was impossible
to land on that shore. I said that Admiral de Robeck was
prepared to land them anywhere in daylight, even on the rocks,
if any advantage was to gained. Except for a little shrapnel
fire there appeared to be no opposition on shore ; but haste
was essentii, if full advantage was to be taken of what was now

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591

quite obviously a surprise and almost unopposed landing.
Moreover, transports large and small and store ships were
approaching Suvla Bay, &om which numbers of horses and
mules, vehicles, large quantities of ammunition and supplies
had to be landed with all speed, and for this the motor lighters
which were lying idle were urgently required ; speed was of
vital importance. I submitted that the troops should be ordered
to get into the motor lighters with all dispatch, and in the mean-
time I would run in, examine the approaches, and lead the
lighters to a suitable landing place.

I then went in with Lambart, and we found a steamboat and
a whaler from the Chatham marking the limits of a little beach,
and there was another to the ‘westward of it. We examined
them both and found that there would be no difficulty in landing
troops in motor lighters at either beach. They were then
named ‘^A-East"^ and ^^A-West'^ and were the principal
landing places in Suvla for the remainder of the campaign.

We were just leaving the shore when there was an explosion
near A-East ” ; I thought it was a shell, but as all the beaches
in Gallipoli were under fire it did not seem important ; as a
matter of fact at that time these two beaches could not be reached
by the enemy, and the explosion was caused by two wounded
men who had come down from the battalion on the ridge
stepping on a groimd mine, which blew them up — only we did
not know this till later.

I then went full speed to the Jonquil^ having spoken to Admiral
de Robeck in passing the Chatham ; he told me to tell the General
and Admiral Obristian that he strongly recommended a landing
at ‘^A-East.” They then decided to land the troops, which
had just arrived from Mudros in five troop carriers, at A-East,”
but they would not divert the Mitylene troops. They said
they had already got their orders to go to “ B ” Beach, it was
too late to change, it would cause confusion and delay. Very
few had started, and none had landed. I felt terribly impatient
that they would not change their minds.

Amphibious power is a wonderful possession, but it is very
diSScult to get its value recognised and made full use of.

I then went back to the Chatham and begged Admiral de
Robeck to return with me to the Jonquil. I told him that I had
already said more than I ought to senior officers ; there was no

392 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

reason from a naval point of view why the troops should not
have been on shore within an hour of their arrival, and we
must get a move on. It was 8.30 a.m. when I got back to
tlcii Jonquil^ this time accompanied by the Admiral, who remained
with the General for a long time. I again pointed out to the
Chief of Staff that the delay in landing the loth Division was
disorganising the whole time-table for the disembarkation of all
the essentials for a rapid advance, so vital for success. I begged
him to send a Staff officer to each ship to urge haste. He
readily agreed, and asked General Stopford to lend his A.D.C.,
a very young officer who would obviously not carry much
weight, so I accompanied him and acted as spokesman. “ This
officer has come with orders from the Corps Commander, who
considers it imperative, etc., etc.’^

The officers in command, without any exception, had no orders,
and very naturally wanted to know what they were expected to
do when they. landed; so I found the Divisional-General, who
was in one of the transports, and returned to each ship with a
message from him to the effect that the commanding officers
would find their Brigadier on shore, who would give them all
the information they required on landing.

It was 1 1 a.m. before I finished this round ; I then picked up
Admiral de Robeck in the Jonquil and we accompanied the first
flight of lighters to the northern beaches to assure ourselves
that the arrangements were satisfactory. ‘‘ A-East ” was the
widest beach, and we led the leading lighter to it, the troops
jumped out dryshod and ran on to some small land mines, which
blew up half a dozen men. Their Commanding Officer thought
they were under fire and ordered them to lie down, The second
lighter tried to turn away, but ran aground, and the men had
to wade up to their waists. It was now obvious to us that the
place was mined, so we diverted the remaining lighters to

A-West.^’ This was found to be clear of mines, and the
troops were able to land without diffi mity. .

While we were watching this landing I pointed out to the
Admiral a man who had his head thrown back draining the
last dregs of his water-bottle, within a few yards of the .bea^
During the next few critical days, when military undertakings
were governed by thirst, my thoughts often turned to that
incident, which explained so much.

THE AUGUST OFFENSIVE

395

As we lay off impatiently watching the disembarkation, which
seemed to me deplorably slow, the coxswain of the barge reported
that he had seen two or three Turks’ heads appear in some
scrub a couple of hundred yards away, so we went in and
warned the battalion then landing that they were probably
snipers. A small detachment was sent out to round them up ;
we watched our men wandering about with considerable anxiety ;
they were simply asking for trouble ; but the Txirks did not
open fire and slipped away unseen. Later they caused several
casualties on the beach ; a proper hunt was then organised,
which resulted in the death of three Turks, and relieved the beach
of further trouble.

Submarine risks were simply ignored — or rather, we confided
the safety of the cruisers off the Peninsula, and the ships moving
to and fro, to the drifter patrols and their indicator nets. A
thousand yards of anti-submarine net was laid half-way across
the entrance to Suvla at dawn on the yth ; the ships then went
off to prepare another length, and the defence was completed
early the next morning. Large transports and battleships then
used the Bay freely.

The naval plan of operations, prepared in co-operation with
G.H.Q., was based on the understanding that after the first
landing on the night of 6th-7th, supplies, troops and all necessaries
would be landed at one main beach in Suvla Bay. The most
sheltered from the naval point of view was the south-east comer
under Lala Baba, and it was proposed to station a water ship
and a water lighter there, which would be able to cope with all
requirements, as at Anzac and Helles. It was certainly never
contemplated that large numbers of troops and animals would
require to be supplied with water in three different positions;
two widely separated ftom the third. B ” and G ” became
one beach.)

Lambart and I spent the whole day and half the night going
■ round the various beaches, reorganising the beach parries,
visiting transports and store ships, and speeding up everything
within our province, and striving to make the Military Supply
Services realise the vital need for haste. The places at which
the various items — ^guns, horses, mules, ammunition, stores,
etc. — ^were to be landed, and the order of priority, was a military
concern. We could then use the available transport and the

594 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

beach space to the best advantage. However, it seemed almost
impossible to get a rapid decision, and confusion reigned.
South of Nibrunesi Point the beach space was unrestricted,
but inside Suvla Bay it was limited to two small coves. We
made absolutely certain that water was being delivered at all
three beaches, and finding a water lighter aground on a reef
near the original A ” Beach, we towed it off and placed it
within reach of the shore, for the artillery which occupied
Lala Baba.

We went on board the two stranded lighters of the ill-fated
Suvla Bay landing — the third got off that morning. We found
one deserted except for an elderly pensioner torpedo coxswain,
who was very sober but full of ‘rum. He told us very con-
temptuously that his oificers — ^a temporary R.N.R. Lieutenant
and Midshipman — and the crew had deserted in the lighter’s boat,
when she came under shrapnel fibre at daylight. For his part he had
stayed ‘‘ to soothe the dying moments of the wounded.” These
vessels had been sent out in a great hurry ; there were some
splendid fellows amongst their crews, but a good many changes
had to be made. As usual, of course, there were unlimited
volunteers to man anything that might get under fire.

It would be impossible to exaggerate the furious energy
which was put into the disembarkation of artillery, mules, etc.,
etc., by Unwin and the people working with him and on the
beaches. I counted 127 mules come out of the hold and off
the npper deck of one lighter designed to carry 50 at the most
They worked incessantly, and by nightfall had made up some
of the lost hours as far as we were concerned, by doubling normal
loads and taking considerable risks. Under Service regulations,
high-water mark is the dividing line between naval and military
efiFort. We never recognised any in Gallipoli, and at Suvla there
was nothing we did not undertake to lighten the Army’s task
The original A,” B ” and ‘X” Beaches had all been under
shrapnel fire from daylight xmtil the afternoon of the yth, and
amongst the casualties was Robinson of the Venerable^ who was
severely wounded whilst landing guns on ** C” Beach. Although
the iith Division’s right flank only extended about half-way
from Nibrunesi Point to Amzac, the latter had run a telephone
cable to the iith Division’s Headquarters at Lala Baba, at
daylight on 7th, We heard later that General Birdwood had

THE AUGUST OFFENSIVE

395

told the G.O.C. iith Division that a number of wagons and
a Turkish battery could be seen retiring to the eastward as
early as lo a.m. We thought on the afternoon of the yth that
the cessation of the enemy’s fire might be due to lack of ammu-
nition, but it seemed to me much more probable that the guns
had been withdrawn to avoid being captured by the com-
paratively large army that had landed, and which, in the absence
of any serious opposition, might be expected to advance. From
the nature of the rifle fire, and the absence of machine-gun fire,
it was obvious that our troops were meeting with very little
opposition, and though much regrettable delay had occurred,
there seemed to be no reason, on the evening of the yth, why
the operation should not yet’ proceed successfully. It seemed
incredible to us, who had watched the fighting in April and May,
that over 25,000 men could be held up by such trifling opposition.

It never occurred to me that evening that we would shortly
be faced with the problem of supplying water to an army corps
and an enormous number of animals on the threshold of a well-
watered country, lightly held by the enemy.

Naval support had been given throughout the day by the
Foxhound on the left flank, the Theseus and Grafton off Nibrunesi
Point, and the Talbot in Suvla Bay, under the direction of the
Brigadier-General Royal Artillery of the 9th Corps, who was
embarked in the latter.

When night fell the left flank of the 9th Corps was entrenched
astride the Kiretch Tepe Ridge, about three miles from Suvla
Point ; the right flank was on the beach between Anzac and
Nibrunesi Point, whilst four battalions occupied the Chocolate
and Green Hills, &om which the Turks had retired to the “ W ”
Hills after offering a slight msistance to this vastly superior
force. The artillery was stationed on Lala Baba.

After a very peaceful night it was apparent, when dawn broke
on the 8th, that the troops were not, as had been confidently
expected, occupying the Anafarta Valley and the ridges, so
necessary for the command of the valley and the security of the
Bay. The 9th Corps was, in feet, entrenched in the scrubby
locality near the shore, and on the apparently waterless high
ground to the northward, and, as far as we could see, there was
no sign of an advance. It then became evident to us for the
first time that about 25,000 men and numbers of animals would

396 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

be almost entirely dependent on sea-borne water until they
advanced ; and unless they advanced, the guns which had beea
shelling the beaches on the yth would return, no doubt reinforced.
The speedy accumulation of a large reserve of water on shore,
though a military question, then became a matter of vital
importance from a naval point of view. We had small craft
with a capacity of 480 tons which were discharging water at
four different places, and an enormous quantity of water in the
ships anchored in Suvla Bay to replenish these vessels ; but
strong southerly wind, or damage to water lighters by shell
fire, might make it impracticable to deliver it to the beaches.
Under the most favourable weather conditions it was probable
unless the Army advanced, that the discharge of water would
be limited to the dark hours.

At an early hour on the 8 th, Admiral de Robeck visited the
destroyer Foxhound on the left flank, and found that Lieut.-
Commander Tupper, hearing that the troops on the ridge above
him were short of water, had cut out his fresh-water tank with
chisel and file and landed it and the ship's canvas bath on the
rocks at the foot of the spur, keeping them continually filled
from the ship. This supply was continued for some days until
good wells were found behind the lines.

Meanwhile Lambart and I were visiting all the beaches. It
was evident that there was a fierce battle raging on the heights
above Anzac. Suvla was profoundly peaceful. We found
water being pumped on shore at the three beaches and under
Lala Baba. At the northern beaches the greatest confusion
existed round the shore end of the hoses, as no receptacles had
been provided for receiving and distributing the water, except
some shallow wooden troughs which were leaky and useless.
Men were crowding round and sucking water through holes
they had made in the hoses with their bayonets, and there
was much wastage. The provision of receptacles for the
accumulation and distribution of water was a military responsi-
bility, but the 9th Corps had apparently made none. We then
set to work to improvise means for accumulating a reserve as
soon as possible. Every ship off the Peninsula landed her
canvas baths, tanks, etc., and the Admiral ordered all the ships
at Imbros and Mudros to do likewise. Hoses and fire engines
from the ships were also landed, and naval parties pumped all

THE AUGUST OFFENSIVE

397

day. (This went on until the 14th, when we learnt by chance
that the Royal Engineers' store ship Prah, to which the 9th Corps
had free access, and which arrived in Suvla Bay on the 8^
had any number of tanks, motor pumps and machinery for
boring wells, which had been specify provided but had been
overlooked by the responsible military authority.)

It soon became evident to me that the troops which had been
left in peace throughout the night were not to be asked to make
any further eflfort that day. Hundreds of men crowded down
to the beaches to bathe, and I can find no better description of
the amazing scene we witnessed than that given by the sorely
tried troops fighting fiercely on the Anzac Ridge — “ an August
Bank Holiday."

After a visit to the Jonquil^ which nearly drove me to open
mutiny, I went back to the Chatham, where one piece of cheering
news greeted me.

A message had been received from Eii — ^the first since she
left on the morning of the 5 th ; I had been fearfuUy anxious
about her. It seemed that Nasmith was anxious that his presence
shoxild not be suspected, and feared that if he signalled, the
enemy might detect another wireless note. Not finding the
Turkish battleship in the Straits as he went up, he concluded
that she would come down from Constantinople during the
night, to take part in the battle directly the offensive started ;
so he lay in wait for her off the entrance to the Straits. She
appeared at dawn, as he anticipated, he torpedoed her at 5 a.m.
She capsized and sank a quarter of an hour later.

He also reported that in accordance with his orders, in
co-operation with £^14, he had watched the Bulaic Isthmus toad
for troops, which we knew were at Keshan, and expected to
come south directly our offensive developed. At ir-30 a.m.
the submarines engaged a column of troops which were marching
towards Gallipoli, frequently scattering them, causing great
confusion and driving them off the road. The submarines were
sometimes forced to dive when artillery was brought into action
against them, but they came up in a fresh place and continued
to harass the enemy, until 3.50 p.m., when they were finally
driven off by Turkish artillery. H14 only had a six-pounder,
but Nasmith had had a 12-pounder fitted while Eii was being
repaired at blalta.

398 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

We heard all about this by wireless at 7 a.m. on the 8th ; vjt
learnt later that the battleship was the Barbarossa Harriiln
which was hurrying to Gallipoli with reinforcements, field guns
and aircraft, and the loss of life was very heavy.

Our aircraft had reported on the 7th that Turkish troops on
the Bulair road had been thrown into great confusion by a
submarine, which we concluded was £14. It was a great t^ef
to know that Nasmith had also taken part.

I found the Admiral as unhappy as I was about the Suvla
situation. We discussed what could be done to stir the High
Command out of its apathy, and the result was a signal to
Sir Ian. ^‘It is very important that we should meet, shall
come over and see you, or are you coming to Suvla ? It never
occurred to me at die time, that this message was not responsible
for bringing Sir Ian over in great haste, but I learnt from him a
couple of years later, that he never received it. I suppose that
it was held up because Sir Ian had already left, before the line
was sufficiently clear to receive it. We learnt later that Sir Ian,
who was following the course of events in the three battle areas
from his headquarters at Imbros, was deeply concerned about
the situation at Suvla. The meagre information he had received
from General Stopford, indicated that the 9th Corps landing
had been completely successful, but no report of progress towar(h
its objective had reached him. At an early hour on the 8th,
therefore, he had sent Colonel Aspinall to get in touch with the
Corps Commander and report. Owing to the most deplorable
misfortune, the Arno — an ItaHan-built Portuguese destroyer,
which we had acquired, and which was acting as dispatch vessel
for the General — ^broke down, and it was 11.30 a.m. before
Aspinall arrived, as he had to take passage in a trawler. He
has described his consternation at the situation he found, at
some length in the official military history; and it can be
summed up in a telegram which he asked me to send by wireless
to G.H.Q, at Imbros : Just been ashore, where I found all
quiet. No rifle fire, no artillery fibre, and apparently no Turks.
9th Corps resting. Feel confident that golden opportunities
are being lost, and look upon the situation as serious.” Before
the signal got through, we were able to tell Aspinall that Sir Ian
had already left for Suvla in the Tria 4 -

When Sir Ian arrived at about 6 p.m., we learnt that he also

THE AUGUST OFFENSIVE

399

would have come much sooner, but for the breakdown of the
Amo, Had his desire been properly represented to Admiral
de Robeck, without a doubt, one of the destroyers patrolling
within a few miles could have brought him over within an hour.

The Admiral then placed the Triad at the disposal of Sir Ian,
in the hope that he would stay at Suvla and try to dispel the
ghastly inertia which overhung that area. He made no secret
of his misgivings, and I took Sir Ian straight oif to the Jonquil
in the Admiral's barge, and told him exactly what I thought
about the proceedings. When I learnt that he wished to visit
the G.O.C nth Division, whose headquarters were dug into
a little cliif on the southern shore of Suvla Bay, I landed him
there in a skiff. I came away profoundly depressed. It was
obvious to me that no fiery offensive — ^which could now alone
save the situation — ^was likely to emanate from there. Sir Ian
told me that General Stopford had said all was going well, the
troops needed another night's rest and more artillery, but they
would resume the advance the next morning under the G.O.C.
nth Division, Hence Sir Ian's visit to the latter, to urge him
to advance without further delay, the margin was too narrow ;
the next day might be too late. Enemy reinforcements were being
rushed south ; Tekke Tepe Ridge must be seized, or we would
be forestalled on it. He told me the General had attributed his
failure to advance on the yth, to thirst and lack of mules to carry
water to the forward troops. Orders were, however, being
issued by the G.O.C. for a brigade, which he believed to be
concentrated near Sulajik, to advance on Tekke Tepe at once,
and for the attack on Anafarta Sagir and Hills to be

delivered as arranged in the morning. We then went back to
the Triad and waited anxiously for the morrow. It was going
to be a desperately near thing.

An aeroplane had dropped a message at 3 o'clock tiaat
afternoon, reporting that Turkish reinforcements were approach-
ing Turshun Keui. So little was known about the disposition
of the troops of the iith Division, that two battalions, which
were well to the eastward of Sulajik and exceUendy placed for
an immediate advance on Tekke Tepe, were ordered back to
Sulajik, where four battalions were l^ng concentrated for the
attack- Owing to various causes, the withdrawal of these two
battalions from their advanced position took a considerable

400 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

time, and when the advance on Tekke Tepe eventually started—
within a quarter of an hour of daylight — two Turkish battalions
were approaching the ridge on the opposite side. The race for
Tekke Tepe had been lost by rather less than half an hour.

The ridges, within four miles of the beaches, which could
have been occupied at any time on the 7th or 8 th without serious
fighting, were now in the hands of a resolute enemy — ^who had
marched over 50 miles in less than two days — ^while our troops
had been resting and looldng at their objective — so vital to the
success of their enterprise.

It is now known that throughout the 8 th, the Suvla Plain and
Tekke Tepe Ridge were unoccupied, and the enemy had
withdrawn all his artillery by the ^afternoon of the 7th, to avoid
capture. On our left three battalions were opposed by three
companies of Gendarmerie (about 350 men), holding a post
800 yards from our trenches ; in the centre and on the right,
19 battalions by 1,100 Turks including 300 Broussa Gendarmerie,,
ail of whom were concentrated on a 3,000 yard front between
Baka Baba and Ismail Oglu Tepe W ” Hills).

The casualties of the 9th Corps up to the evening of the 8lh,
amounted to 100 officers and 1,600 men, more than the total
Turkish force then opposed to them. The Turks had no
machine guns nor modern artillery, and no wire, except for a
few rusty strands on Chocolate Hill, which did not form a
serious obstacle. The casualties were caused to a small extent
by shrapnel, but mostly by snipers, who would have been swept
away, if the troops had advanced.

It is interesting to look beyond the ridges which divided
the combatants and examine the problems which faced
Liman von Sanders, and the following is based on enemy official
accounts.

The risk of a landing near Bulak, or farther north in the
Gulf of Xeros, had to be guarded against, and strong reserves
were retained in the northern area, to await the development
of the British onslaught, which was confidently expected early
in August.

On the afternoon of 6th August when T iman von Sanders
heard of the attack at Helles and Lone Pine he held his hand,
and his only action was to warn the Commander of the troops

THE AUGUST OFFENSIVE

401

at Bulair to be vigilant, and the Commander of the troops in the
Suvla area to send a battalion to Anzac.

During the night, however, he ordered three battalions from
Bulair to march with all speed to Turshim Keui, and the Southern
Commander to send a Division to Anzac. Soon after daylight
on the 7th, the armada of ships in and off Suvla Bay, the thousands
of troops on the beaches, and the strong forces on the foothills
of Anzac, convinced Liman von Sanders that the British object
was the capture of Sari Bair, and the envelopment of his northern
flank. He telegraphed at once for two of the Bulair Divisions
to hasten south ; all the troops in Asia to cross the Straits ; and
the Commander of the southern area to send another Division
to the northern area.

At daylight on the Sth, Liman von Sanders who was at
Turshun Keui waiting for the Bulair Divisions, which were
being rushed south by forced marches, was told that the main
column was strung out on the road, and no attack could be
delivered until late in the afternoon. That the handful of troops
opposing Stopford, coiild scarcely be expected to withstand a
determined assault, and that at Anzac strong forces were on the
slopes of Sari Bair. Moreover, the Chief of Staff of the Southern
Army had arrived to urge that the Achi Baba position should
be abandoned at once, and the Army transferred to the Asiatic
shore, in view of the imminent risk of the British attack in the
northern zone reaching the Narrows, and cutting that Army's
communications.

A pretty black outlook, but Liman von Sanders was
undismayed. He telegraphed to the Commander of the Southern
Army, that not one foot of ground was to be surrendered, and
immediately dismissed the Chief of Staffi The Commander of
the small force in the Suvla area — in whom Liman appears to
have had absolute faith — ^was ordered to hold the Anafarta Spur
at all costs. This spur guarded the track from Suvla Bay to
Anafarta Gap, and he felt convinced that Stopford's plan was to
march via Bi3ruk Anafarta to assist in the capture of Koja Chemen
Tepe (Hill 971),

The Commander of the Bulair force was told that it was
imperative that his troops should counter-attack on a broad
front, between Kavak Tepe and Biyuk Anafarta, not a moment
later than sunset. At "that hour Liman von Sanders considered
z

40Z NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

that darkness would protect his troops from the guns of the
fleet. This officer met his Divisional Commanders early in fte
afternoon of the 8 th, to give them their instructions. They
deprecated an attack that evening ; they had not enough
artillery ; their troops were tired and hungry ; half the units
were still on the road ; far more time was needed to get out
orders and deploy the force for attack. (All the arguments
advanced by General Stopford's subordinates.) The unfortunate
General agreed to postpone the attack until daylight on the 94,
and was ruthlessly dismissed by Liman von Sanders, directly
he heard of the decision. Mustapha Kemal, who had been in
command of a Division at Anzac and the northern sector of the
Turkish defences, was then giveii the command of all the troops
on the Suvla front. He arrived on the scene at i a.m. on
the 9th, too late to advance the hour of the attack, but he made
sure that it would be delivered with fierce determination
at dawn.

When the long-delayed British attack opened, at an eady
hour on the 9th, there was no co-ordination between the
scattered brigades and battalions of the loth and iith Divisions.
The 53 rd Division which had been landed during the night of
the 8th and morning of the 9th, was to have been kept as a
Corps reserve, but as the troops became available they were
placed at the disposal of the G.O.C. nth Division, and by tie
evening were scattered and thoroughly disorganised.

After giving details of General Stopford's plan,, and die
action taken to put it into operation, the military historian
remarks : It will be seen, therefore, that with the two brigades
of the iith Division moving forward at different hours, and the
loth Division not even forming its plans until after the nth
Division had started, any form of mutual support in the 9th
Corps area was practically unobtainable.”

Fortunately the Turks were numerically still very inferior to
General Stopford’s force, but they had aU the advantage of
position on the ridge, and the tropical heat sorely tried OT
inexperienced troops.

On the left flank the shooting of the Foxhound was reported
to be very accurate, and here the troops made some progress.
The Turli had no artillery, no machine guns, and had not yet

THE AUGUST OFFENSIVE

403

been reinforced. They still numbered no more than 550.
During the forenoon the troops on the left signalled to the
GrampuSy which had relieved the Foxhoundy that they were
“ dying of thirst,” and the Grampus supplied them with water
throughout the day, her boats running to and fro with every
portable receptacle in the ship ; and by the afternoon her water
tanks were installed on the rocks below their new position.

Elsewhere the jSre of the ships was of little or no value to
our troops, fighting in the open. Our attack was everywhere
repulsed, and the Turks, pouring down from the ridges on to
the plains, drove our troops back to the position from which
they started, and at nightfall dug themselves in near our trenches.

On the morning of the loth the 53rd Division made an
unsuccessful attempt to recapture Scimitar Hill, which had
been abandoned on the night of the 8th. A further attack in
the afternoon petered out and the troops at Suvla, like those in
the other two areas, from thenceforward were reduced to
trench warfare.

The failure of the 9th Corps to exploit, during the first two
days, the wonderful strategic opportunities of its surprise landing
had sealed the fate of the military effort.

Meanwhile, at Anaac, the battle for the Sari Bair Ridge was
raging furiously. The roar of guns and the rattle of rifle and
machine-gim fire was incessant. Here the young troops of the
New Army, resolutely led and imbued with the spirit of Anzac,
were winning imperishable fame.

A New Zealand battalion had captured Chunuk Bair at dawn
on the 8th, and for a short time was able to look down on the
waters of the Narrows. The crest, however, was untenable,
but, with the assistance of two battalions of the 13 th Division,
a valuable position on the south-west end of Chunuk Bair was
held all day, under the command of Colonel Malone (my friend
of Qxiion^s Post), against fierce counter-attacks. The gallant
Malone was killed that evening, but not before his devoted
leadership had made the position secure, and it was reinforced
by fresh troops during the night.

Elsewhere the attacks on the ridges had failed. It had been
hoped that the advance from Suvla would greatly assist the
Amac plan, by threatening the Turkish northern flank ; but it
was soon evident that little help was to be expected from the

404 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Suvla troops, the bulk of whom could be seen resting neatfc
beach or bathing in the sea* Although the attack on Hill “
on the 8th had failed, a battalion of Gurkha§, under the
of Colonel C. Allanson, who had succeeded in collecting thtee
companies of the 13th Division, dug in during the night,
only 100 feet below the saddle connecting Hill
Chunuk Bair.

The general attack on the ridges was resumed on the 9th,
and was preceded by a bombardment by all the An^ac artilleiy
and the guns of the supporting ships. When the bombardment
lifted, Allanson's small force stormed and captured the ridge.

It is such a splendid story, that I feel I must quote &om ft
heroic oificer’s account — ^written 48 hours after the event :

“ At an angle of about 35 degrees and about 100 yards
away were the Turks, . . . During the night a message
came to me from the General Officer Commanding, to try
and get up on to 971 at 5.15 a.m., and that from 4.45 to 5.15
the Navy would bombard the top, I was to get all troops
near me to co-operate. ... As I could only get three
companies of British troops, I had to be satisfied vddi
this. ... I had only 15 minutes left; the roar of the
artillery preparation was enormous ; the hill, which was
almost perpendicular, seemed to leap underneath one,

I recognised that if we flew up the lull the moment it
stopped, we ought to get to &e top. I put the three
companies into the trenches among my men, and said that
the moment they saw me go forward carrying a red flag,
everyone was to start. I had my watch out, 5.15, I never
saw such artillery preparation ; the trenches were being
torn to pieces ; the accuracy was marvellous, as we were
only just below. At 5 .1 8 it had not stopped, and I wondered
if my watch was wrong; 5,20 silerice. I waited three
minutes to be certain, great as the risk was. Then off we
dashed, all hand in hand, a most perfect advance, and a
wonderftol sight. ... At the top we met the Turks;
Le Marchand was down, a bayonet through the heart.
I got one through the leg, and then for about what appeared
ten minutes, we fought hand to hand, we bit and fisted,
and used rifles and pistols as clubs; and then the Turks

THE AUGUST OFFENSIVE

405

turned and fled, and I felt a very proud man ; die key of
the whole Peninsula was ours, and our losses had not been
so very great for such a result. Below I saw the Straits,
motors and wheeled transport, on the roads leading to
Achi Baba. As I looked round I saw we were not being
supported, and thought I could help best by going after
those (Turks) who had retreated in front of us. We dashed
down towards Maidos, but had only got about 100 feet
dow'n when suddenly our own Navy put six 1 2-inch
monitor shells into us, and all was terrible confusion. It
w^as a deplorable disaster ; we were obviously mistaken for
Turks, and we had to get back. It was an appalling
sight. . . . We all flew back to the summit and to our
old position just below. I remained on the crest wdth
about 1 5 men ; it was a wonderful view. Below were the
Straits, reinforcements coming over from the Asia jMinor
side, motor cars flying. We commanded Kilid Bahr, and
the rear of Achi Baba and the communications to all their
Army there. ... I was now left alone, much crippled
by the pain of my wound, which was stiffening, and loss
of blood. I saw the advance of Suvla had failed, though I
could not detect more than one or two thousand against
them, but I saw large Turkish reinforcements being pushed
in that direction. My telephone lines were smashed. . . .
I now dropped down into the trenches of the night before,
and after getting my wound bound up, proceeded to try
and find where ail the regiment was ; I got them all back
in due course, and awaited support before moving up the
hill again. Alas I it was never to come, and we were told
to hold our position throughout the night of the 9th-ioth.
During the afternoon we were counter-attacked by large
bodies of Turks five times between 5 and 7 p.m., but they
never got to within 15 yards of our line. . . . Captain
Tomes and Le Marchand are buried on the highest summit
of the Chunuk Bair, , • . I was ordered back to make a
full report. I was very weak and faint. ... I reported
to the General, and told him that unless strong reinforce-
ments were pushed up, and food and water could be sent
to us, we must come back, but that if we did we gave up
the key of the Gallipoli Peninsula, The General then told

4o6 naval memoirs, 1910-1915

me that nearly everywhere else the attack had failed, anj
the regiment would be withdrawn to the lower hills eailj
next morning** |

The An^ac artillery subsequently declared that the siel
mentioned by Allanson, must have been fired by the Tutk
But Colonel Allanson’s belief that they were naval shells ol
course got about, and caused acute distress to the ships, ^^tose
preliminary bombardment had so greatly impressed him.

Boyle, the captain of the Bacchante^ who was responsible fot
the fire of all ships in that sector, declared that no shipki
reopened fire on the ridge, after the bombardment lifted ; and,
as it was pointed out at the Dardanelles Commission, it 'would
have been impossible for the naval shells to have fallen 100 feet
below the ridge on the reverse slope, as described by AUanson,

By midday on the 9th, the August offensive at Anzac had also
failed, although the indomitable Anzacs would not admit it
The worn-out troops in the advanced positions were relieved by
New Army formations, during the night of the 9th, and
preparations were made to renew the attack on the loth.

Mustapha Kemal, whose command still included the noithem
sector of Anzac, having satisfied himself that the situation at
Suvla was well within his control, now turned his attention
to the. threatened Sari Bair. Before he left for Suvla on the
night of the 8th, he had sent his available reserves on to the
Sari Bair Ridge ; and late in the evening of the 9th, after a
personal reconnaissance of Chunuk Bair, he decided to launch
an attack from that point at dawn on the loth, to drive the
British from the western slopes, and recapture the lost territory.

Our troops were overwhelined by Mustapha Kemal’s fiery
onslaught. Chunuk Bair, and eventually the plateau known as
the Farm were lost, but elsewhere the new line held firm ; and
here the New Army troops of the loth and 15 th Divisions most
gallantly played their part, and suffered terrible losses.

Thus ended the four days^ battle for Sari Bair. Anzac had
suffered 12,000 casualties and Suvla 6,000, and the Turkish
forces, thbugh still inferior in nuimbers, were fiumly established
on every point of vantage. The Turkish strength moreover

* “The Wodd Crisis, 1915,’^ pages 441-443.
f A llan son wss justly recommended for the V.C. but did not get it.

THE AUGUST OFFENSIVE 407

was increasing hourly, while Sir Ian was nearly at the end of
his resources.

The 9th August was the decisive day in the Army’s effort to
capture the Gallipoli Peninsula, and we now know from German
and Turkish ofEcial accounts, that it was so regarded by the
enemy.

Turkey owed the defeat of our enterprise to the wise and
determined generalship of Liman von Sanders and the inspired
and skilful leadership of Mustapha Kemal.

All through the morning of the 9th I watched one distressing
incident after another at Suvla — ^and &om a distance Anzac still
fighting desperately for Sari Bair.

At about noon. Sir Ian, who had been on shore visiting
General Stopford, and as far afield as the Brigade Headquarters
on the left flank, returned to the Triad, and expressed a wish to
go to Anzac, so I took him there.

We called at C ” Beach and picked up Commander Tyndal
Caryll Worsley, much to his delight, to take charge of one of
the new Anzac beaches, replacing the Beach Master who had
been killed that morning.

The brave atmosphere of Anzac, undaunted by its cruel losses
and disappointments of the last three days, was something to
be proud of, but I suppose I could not hide my feelings about
Suvla, for Sir Ian has recorded in his diary :

For the first time in the Expedition, Roger Keyes seemed
down on his luck ; we had often before seen him raging,
never dejected. These awful delays : delays in landing the
Irish (loth Division) ; delay in attacking on the 7th ; delay
all the night of fhe 7th ; delay during the clay of the
8th, and the night of the 8th ; Imve simply deprived him
of speech.”

Well, I had come to the conclusion that the Army had
completely shot its bolt, and that my Admiral would have to
wait until Doomsday to enter the Marmora, if he could not be
induced to take any naval action until the Army had captured
the forts at the Narrows.

A combined naval and military attack alone could achieve
victory, and to that end I devoted myself body and soul until
the final evacuation.

CHAPTER XXIII

CAMPAIGN AT A DEADLOCK

Marking time at Suvla; £14 comes out of Matmora for third time; Gcnctd
Stopford superseded; General dc Lisle takes temporary command; Ym
to Anzac and Suvia ; My endeavours to persuade Admiral to force Sttait$;
Admiralty telegrams ; Sir Julian Byng takes command of 9th Corps ; Frencii
project to land in Asia ; Submarine exploits ; Bulgaria joins Germany.

By the evening of the loth, even Anzac had realised that lk
loss of Chunuk Bair, the failure of the Suvla landing to turn
the northern flank of the Turkish defensive position, and lk
arrival of strong Turkish reinforcements had barred the road
to the Narrows over Sari Bair.

Sir Ian had offered Birdwood the 54th Territorial Division,
which was arriving from Egypt, but the latter had declared
that he had no room for it, and could not supply it. Moreover,
the heavy losses and the fatigue of the troops, after four days’
desperate fighting, had made it impossible to renew the attack
from Anzac for several days, and in any case, without a turning
movement from Suvla, he would have small prospect of success.

That Sir Ian fully appreciated this is evident, and he set to
work to spur the Commander of the 9th Corps on to seize the
surrounding heights before the enemy had time to fortify them.
This was essential, not only for the security of the Bay, but for
the development of an attack on the enemy’s northern flank.
Air reports definitely showed that the Tekke Tepe Ridge was
still neither strongly held nor entrenched. On the other hand,
reinforcements were approaching; haste was imperative, if
success was to be obtained.

The 54th Territorial Division was landed on the afternoon
of the loth, and like the 53rd Territorial Division, was launched
into the depressing atmosphere of confusion and indecision
which pervaded Suvia.

On the nth Sir Ian ordered General Stopford to occupy die
Tekke Tepe Ridge from Kavak Tepe to Anafarta Sagir, wifli

408

CAMPAIGN AT A DEADLOCK 409

the 54th Division, its flanks being protected by the loth and
nth Divisions during its advance.

General Stopford raised every kind of objection. He pointed
out that his inexperienced young troops would have to advance
through broken, scrubby country, which would undoubtedly
be held by Turkish snipers, and declared with some justification
that the troops were quite unfit for such an enterprise.

Sir Ian then came over to Suvla on the nth to try and over-
come General Stopford’s objections ; he arranged for a small
body of trained marksmen and scouts from Anaac to come
and help the Territorials to deal with the Turkish snipers, and
\vhen he returned that evening to Imbros it had been definitely
decided that the 54th Division should assault the ridge at dawn
on the 13th.

Sir Ian’s previous command had been that of the Home Army ;
he had seen the two Territorial Divisions when they sprang
to arms in August, 1914, and had formed a high opinion
of their morale and efficiency ; he apparently did not appreciate
that their value had been impaired by the withdrawal of a high
proportion of the best officers and men to replace the heavy
casualties in France and Flanders — to be replaced in their turn
by inexperienced officers and brave-hearted, weedy boys wffio
had been sent abroad half trained,

I watched the preparations for this attack with great
misgiving.

On the afternoon of the 12th, a Brigade of the 54th Division,
supported by artillery and the fire of the ships, attempted to
gain a position on the foothills to facilitate the attack on the
morrow. After an advance of about 1,000 yards almost un-
opposed, they were held up by fire on both flanks and fell back
to the position from which they started, suffering considerable
loss. We heard afterwards that one small party of 15 officers
and 250 men pressed bravely forward, but were not supported
and were never heard of again.

Braithwaite came over that afternoon, and I was much relieved
wffien I heard that the attack was postponed ; to us onlookers
it seemed foredoomed.

^514 came alongside the Triad in Suvla Bay on the afternoon
of the 1 2th, having left the Marmora early timt morning, Boyle

410

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

got out safely, but must have had a narrow shave ; he blast
through the net, tearing a way through it at a depth of 80 feet
It brought him up to 40 feet in a few seconds ; he said the noise
was tremendous, ripping and tearing past the submarine foi a
few seconds — everything sounds so plainly in the hull Then
later on he fouled a mine mooring, but he was at Suvla by 5 p.m„
having made a very quick passage down the Straits. For lie
last 16 days Stanley, his second-in-command, was desperately
ill, temperature 102 to 104. He lay without spealdng or moving
in a comatose state ; the only thing that woke him was goii^
through the net. We got a doctor at once and sent him off to
a hospital ship.

Boyle told us that on the 8th he torpedoed a large heavily-
laden store ship, about 5,000 tons. She managed to run ashore,
whereupon Eii and E14. went in and shelled her until she
was ablaze.

In her three trips E14 had been 70 days in the Marmora
without any dockyard repairs, though she had steamed ova
12,000 miles since Boyle took command of her at Barrow,

A remarkable achievement. The Admiral sent her down to
Malta for a thorough overhaul and a well-earned rest.

The next day Lieutenant Eden carried out what I tl^
must have been the first aerial torpedo attack, and hit the same
ship with a 14-inch torpedo, unaware that it was already aground,
The pilot was one of the two who succeeded in flying back
to his carrier ship in the Christmas Day air raid.

It was evident to us on the 13 th that General Stopford and
his Chief of Staff were now thoroughly alarmed at the situation,
and even feared that the troops would be rushed and driven
down to the beaches. He seems to have expressed his fean
to Sir Ian, who hurried over to Suvla to try to dispel the pre-
vailing depression by his confident optimism. After his inter-
view he told us that Stopford had complained bitterly about the
inferior quality of the Territorial troops, but he was confident
that if they were put fairly and squarely at their fences they
would fight all right. He attributed the failure to indecision,
lack of leadership and deplorable Staff work, an opinion I fully
shared. He said it was pretty obvious that the 9th,Corps must
be thoroughly reorganised before it could be relied upon to

CAMPAIGN AT A DEADLOCK

41 1

deliver an attack with any hope of success, and General Stopford
was given orders to this effect.

However, on 15th, without any reference to G.H.Q., General
Stopford, in his anxiety to retrieve the situation, launched an
attack on the Kiretch Tepe Ridge, which we know now caused
the Turks intense anxiety. On the left, thanks to the accurate
shooting of two destroyers, a substantial advance was made,
but the 350 Gendarmerie had been considerably reinforced by
this time, and fresh Turkish troops were hurried up, with the
result that after two days’ fighting and suffering about 2,000
casualties, our troops were back in their original line. The
enemy admit about 1,700 casualties, and — although it was not
appreciated at the time by G.H.Q. — it is clear that they regarded
the situation on the 15 th as highly critical. Liman von Sanders
declares that : If during their attacks on 15 th and i6th August
the British had captured and held Kiretch Tepe, the whole
position of the 5 th Army would have been outflanked. The
British might then have achieved a decisive and final victory.”

Before the battle for Kiretch Tepe ended. Sic Frederick
Stopford and the G.O.C. loth Division had left the Perdnsula.
The former was temporarily succeeded by Major-General de
Lisle, commanding the 29th Division, pending the arrival of
Sir Julian Byng, who w’as now at last being sent.

My diary records that :

On Friday 13 th we received rather a panicky message
from Amzac, and after dinner that night Lambart and I
steamed down the coast in a picket boat and landed there
to see General Birdwood. His Staff Officer told me that he
had gone to bed and was rather horrified when I said that
I must see him even if he was turned in, unless he was
fast asleep. So I went iuto his dug-out and sat beside his
bed for nearly an hour. He had again been making panicky
signals without consulting his Beach Master — asking for
things he did not want : wounded to be evacuated, and
when I sent for them they had already been embarked.
For water — ^using that word critical ’ they are so fond of,
which means so much to us and so little to them. I told
him if he had asked his Naval Transport Officer he would
have been assured that there was more water on the beach

412

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

in the water lighters than his pumps could deal with, but
because of the word ‘ critical ^ I had robbed Suvla of a
water steamer, and their right flank had gone short, in
order to send water to him which he could not take.

Of course I was very polite and lectured him with much
deference — all the same he had to have it. Then he told
me of all his hopes and disappointments and cruel losses.
How I hate it, and I feel all the time that we could stop
it and win this great prize. Godfrey and Lambart agree
with me, and I had a long talk with Wemyss this evening
(i6th August). I believe I have persuaded him. My sul>
mariners go up with an even money chance of never coming
back ; they have the only thing that matters, the spirit
that will risk anything to win a great prize. I am sure
that the majority of us would get through ; and with the
Army in a position to gather the fruits of victory, the end
would be very soon, and a most glorious page would be
added to Naval History.”

Meanwhile I had tried my best to persuade the Admiral that
the only chance of success now lay in real naval co-operation,
and that by forcing the Straits, the Fleet would extricate the
Army from the deadlock it had reached in its valiant efforts to
help us, and that together the Army and Navy could yet achieve
a decisive victory. The Admiral was not very encouraging,
and obviously did not agree with me, so I decided to put all
the arguments on paper. After recording the events which I
have related, in a somewhat censored form, in the last chapter,
my diary continues :

"" Godfrey and I have prepared an appreciation of the
whole situation, which I gave the Admiral yesterday
(i8th August). I want him to telegraph it home, but I
am aftaid he won’t. He will, in the end, be driven into
doing what we might so well do now, and in the meantime
this awful fighting will go on on shore. I feel very unhappy
about it, and I am sure I am right.”

The memorandum was as follows :

‘‘V. A. Submitted.

The ftdlure of the recent attack to achieve its object has

CAMPAIGN AT A DEADLOCK

413

brought about a situation which as far as the Army is
concerned promises to become an absolute deadlock.

The attached is the result of much thought and represents
the views of Commander Lambart, Captain Godfrey and
myself.

We are very strongly of the opinion that our proposal
is the only solution of the problem before us and that it
has every prospect of success.

If we fail the Army will be no worse oflF than it is now,
and our casualties can be filled without weakening the
fighting value of the Grand Fleet in Home Waters.

Roger Keyes, C.O.S.

17.8.15.’’

THE POSITION IN THE GALLIPOLI PENINSULA

“A” Military Situation.

After determined efforts to capture Achi Baba and so
open the way for the Navy’s attack on the Narrows — ^the
Army have attempted to achieve this object by a movement
against the Sari Bair ridge and the country to the north of it.

The main object of the General Officer Commanding
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was to seize a position
across the Gallipoli Peninsula from Gaba Tepe to Maidos
with a protected line of supply from Su\t:a Bay.

It was laid down as essential to capture and retain HiU 305
in the Sari Bair ridge.*

The capture of this hill was of vital importance to the
Navy, as with that point available for observation stations'
the reduction of the Chanak Forts could be at once under-
taken with sure chance of success.

The second point of special importance for the Navy was
the securing of Suvla Bay to enable the supplies of the
Army to be landed imopposed ; to ensure this it was laid
down, by G.O.C. 9th Corps, that it would be necessary

to deny the enemy the heights which connect Anafarta
Sagir to Ejeiivier Bay/'

The landing took place nine days ago and neither of the
above essentials have been won.

* Koja Chemcn Tepe, 971 feet high, called Hill 305 (metres) on our maps.

414

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

No body of troops could have tried harder or fought
more magnificently than the A. and N.Z. Army Corps and
the 13 th Division attached to them. They came very neat
to victory, but they failed to gain what had been put down
as essential to our success — ^i.e.. Hill 305,

The nett result of the operations in the northern zone is to
increase the area occupied by the A. and N.Z. Army Corps
and to occupy an area to the northward of it which will be
very difficult to retain and the soundness of the retention of
which is open to argument.

The cost of this success is roughly 30,000 casualties.

As regards these operations certain points stand out :

(a) The enemy was completely surprised.

(b) The landing was practically unopposed.

(d) The sinking of the Barbarossa seriously weakened
the enemy.

The above points were all to our advantage.

On the other side can be placed :

{e) Some delay in the landing in Suvla Bay.

(/ j An absence of sufficient transport at A.N.Z.A.C.
(£) A shortage of water, due almost entirely to the
absence of the wells which the Military counted
upon to provide them with sufficient for
drinking pujj)pses.*

Taken all round no Coup ” could have commenced
under more favourable circumstances, and yet the enemy
were able to launch their counter-attack in time to deny to
us the Chunuk Bair and ]ffill.„505.

How far the Military reckoned on the reported loss of

* This statement was based on information given to ns by the 9th Corps at that
time, but General de Lisle, who reached Suvia on 1 5 th August, stated in his evidence
b^ore the Dardanelles Commission : “ TTiere were wells within a quarter of a
mile of the shore, which I had opened out. On the Kiretch Tepe Ridge, there were
two welk 400 feet above the sea. , , . Between Kiretch Tepe and the Salt Lake
there were as many wells as you liked to dig. You had not got to go down more
than 15 feet before you got as much water as you wanted. On the shore, within 100
yards of high water mark, you had only to dig the sand down four feet to get
water*. • • . The difficulties about water were very much exaggerated.*’

CAMPAIGN AT A DEADLOCK

415

morale by the Turks is hard to say, but the result of the
fighting has shown that the Turk is still full of fight, and
though his supply of artillery ammunition is low, he is well
supplied with small arm and machine-gun ammunition and
he has been well schooled in the use of the latter weapon.

It would appear, therefore, that any success by the Army
on the present lines can only be achieved by an expenditure
of personnel and material quite beyond its present resources.

B Naval Situation.

On the 1 8 th March the Navy made a determined effort to
force the Dardanelles ; the attack failed principally on
account of a minefield which had been missed by our
sweepers, who were then a most inefficient service.

From more than one source it has been stated that the
enemy were on the verge of being defeated on that day, until
the unlucky accidents robbed the Navy of its chances of
victory.

Siuce then the Navy has been exclusively employed in
landing, covering and supplying the Army — that it has
been successful in this task is to a great extent due to the
continual fine weather experienced. There have been
practically no days on which it has been impossible to land
stores, etc.

A continuation of these weather conditions cannot be
counted on and a fortnight of southerly gales would produce
a most serious state of affairs in the Peninsula.

Unless a long drawn-out campaign is to be accepted and
prepared for, with all its dangers and uncertainties from
weather and other sources, there appears to be only one
solution — ^that the Navy should force the Dardanelles,
which feat accomplished, the fate of the Turkish Army in
the Peninsula must be sealed.

The problem of forcing the Straits is not now so difficult
as it was on the i8th March,

An attack would probably surprise the enemy.

It is possible that he has moved many of the small guns
that made minesweeping so difficult.

The presence of the long range monitors makes the attack
on the Chanak Forts, Suan Dere Batteries and the Torpedo

4i6 naval memoirs, 1910-1915

Tubes (if they can be located) much more deadly, as they
can be shelled from the west side of the Peninsula.

The Navy now possesses an efficient air service-— balloon
and aeroplane — so that difficulties of spotting are much less
than when the Qtiem Elizabeth used indirect fire from
Gaba Tepe.

Above all there is now an efficient sweeping flotilla or
one which could be made so with a little practice.

If the attack fails the Navy will be still easily capable of
carrying on its present duties — ^the ships that will be risked
in the attack are those at present in Mudros.

If three or four ships succeed in entering the Marmora
with say six to eight destroyers, the Squadron will, in
combination with the submarines, be sufficient to complete
the domination of that sea.

The submarines have undoubtedly made the supply by
sea of the Turkish Army in the Peninsula a most difficult
matter, but too much cannot be expected of them. They
cannot deal with supplies towed along the shore in shallow
water and convoyed by destroyers, the usual method of
transportation, or with the passage of convoys along the
Bulair Isthmus.*

The presence of a small squadron will achieve these
objects.

The passage through the Straits of say 50 per cent, of the
attacking Fleet does not appear too optimistic, and an attack
on this principle appears to be the only way of avoiding a
winter campaign, which would be fraught with great
anxieties, and of putting an end to the terrible slaughter of
our troops in the Peninsula.

Roger Keyes.

i-jfb August^ 1915.

* This is botne out by the Getman Naval History which declares t^t in the
month of August “ The British Submarines succeeded for the first time in raising
the losses (among supply ships ; aU troops were at that time sent by road) to a
point that caused anxiety. If the destruction of tonnage had been maintained^
anything like the same level during the next few months the resistance of the Hfdi
Army would have come to an end,’’

”Der Kneg zur See, 1914-1918 ; Die Mittelmeer Division.’^

CAMPAIGN AT A DEADLOCK

417

The Admiral then gave me some notes, which included a list
of the vessels available for the operation, and enumerated all the
difficulties we would have to overcome.

I sent a copy of my memorandum to Admiral Wemyss,
remarking that although he had been against me in May, I hoped
he would nov/ feel able to support me, if he was consulted by
the Admiral. He replied as follows :

'' My DEAR Roger,

Many thanks. I should find it very difficult not to agree
with your memo, of 17th. Whilst there was any chance
of the Army winning through, the argument was diJBFerent,
but late events have quite altered the balance of the scales.
A naval attack on our objective is the only way now to
avert a winter campaign, whose greatest achievement can
only be stalemate at the cost of much wastage. The
presence of but a small number of ships on the other side of
the Narrows, would so alter the situation in our favour that
it would surely be worth the loss of an equal number of
ships. Of course there may be political and perhaps even
strategical issues at stake of which we out here know
nothing — but the authorities at home would judge of these.

A British Squadron, however small, in the Marmora
could not, I think, but have an enormous effect upon the
whole war. It is difficult for us out here to weigh the good
effects against the possible losses.

Personally I am of opinion that the result would be in
favour of a shove.

Yours, R. E. Wemtss.^’

Meanwhile Major-General de Lisle had landed at Suvla to
take command of the 9th Corps. I think the difficulties of his
task must have been almost overwhelming ; however, he faced
them with characteristic courage and determination (which was
only to be expected iErom a man who, as a young officer in the
Durham Light Infantry, had trained the Regimental polo team
to be the champion team in India, and had already distinguished
himself in France).

De*' Lisle was ordered to prepare for an attack on the “ W ”
Hills and Anafarta Spur, and was told that a small force would

418 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

suffice to disperse the snipers in Suvla Plain, and push fonvatc
along Kiretch Tepe to Ejelmer Bay.

At the time Sir Ian was quite unaware of Stopford’s unsuccess-
ful and costly offensive along that ridge. In addition to tk
force he had inherited from Stopford, he would have 5,000
dismounted Yeomanry, who were on their way from Egypt,
and he would have the co-operation of a brigade of the A^ac
Corps on his right flank.

General de Lisle made personal reconnaissances everywhere,
and obviously raised the morale of the dispirited troops. After
two or three days he declared that he was convinced he codd
carry out the task Sir Ian had given him, but in order to make
sure of success. Sir Ian sent him the whole of the 29th Divisioa
from Helles. The attack was to be delivered on the 21st, and
the Venerable took up a position in Suvla Bay, well inside the net
to co-operate with the Talbot^ two blistered cruisers, and some
destroyers in supporting the attack.

Meanwhile the enemy had brought guns to bear on the bay,
and the ships discharging their cargoes had to submit to gunfite,
or anchor far out close to the net, and risk being torpedoed
through its meshes ; a choice in fact between the Devil and the
deep sea — ^they preferred the latter. It was fortunate for us
that the enemy submarines were so lacking in enterprise, or that
our patrols were so vigilant, for they had easy targets all day and
every day.

Tixe following extracts from my records give some insight
into our life in those days, and the difficulties and problems that
beset us.

“ On Thursday, 19th August, when we came back from Suvla,

I went up to G.H.Q. to do some business, and they asked me to
attend a meeting on the following morning to discuss the supply
of the Army throughout the winter. It was a very full meeting,
the Inspector-General of Communications, Quartermaster-
General, Director of Works, Ordnance Commissariat, etc., etc,
everyone in fact except Braithwaite ; he has nothing whatever
to do with Supply or Movements, only Operations, hence a
good deal of the chaos which exists, the frequent changes, etc,
etc., which add so enormously to our work and which we simply
don’t and can’t understand in the Navy. The amusing thii^ to
roe was the discussion at great length of arrangements under

CAMPAIGN AT A DEADLOCK

419

conditions which I knew — only was not at liberty to mention —
might not exist in two or three days’ time. (I had just been
talking to Braithwaite.) It seemed to me so strange that a
Lieut.-General^ a Major-General, and three Brigadiers holding
important administrative commands, should have been left: so
completely in the dark. This water-tight compartment system
of running everything may do very well in peace-time, and
possibly in war, when trains and communications are regular,
but when everything depends on an inadequate sea transport,
weather, direction of the wind, state of the beach, etc., etc., it
is hopeless from oxir poiut of view. Though I must say things
have improved enormously since the new men came out, particu-
larly Generals Altham and Ellison ; they have an enormous
Staff, who mostly live in great comfort on board the Royal
Mail liner Aragon.

I get on splendidly with the Generals and have nothing to
do with anyone below them, except that day, when a Brigadier
started grousing about lack of transport at Anzac — ^so I turned
to him and said, " Will you come there with me this afternoon ? ’
He couldn’t say no — ^then General Ellison said he would come,
too. I said the only way to settle these matters was on the spot,
and reminded General Ellison how I pinned down the last
Anzac complaint to a definite statement at that meeting on the
end of the pier, and proved that the complaint was groundless
and that they had never consulted then Naval Transport Officer.
We went off in a destroyer after lunch, and just after we landed
they started shelling, so we did the first part of our business with
the Naval Transport Officer under the cover of some bags of
maize on the pier. When there was a pause we went off to
Headquarters. The whole of Anzac Beach was strewn with
wrecks of lighters and boats. Among the more recent wrecks
is a picket boat of the Lord Nelson^ awash with two shell-holes
in her. After that we walked to a new pier about a mile out,
which is in a place which was death to go near before the last
battle, when Anzac trebled their acreage.

General Birdwood came with us, but as he was rather tired
I said I would take them out to the most northerly post, where I
had been on a previous occasion. We had to go the whole way
along a sap, with overhead cover in some places, but the first
mile and a half w'e walked along the beach road until we came to

420 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

a notice, ^ Beware of Snipers ’ and as we were turning into the
sap, two men repairing a telegraph wire said, " Hurry, a sniper
fires whenever we move/ I forgot to mention Lionel Lambatt
was with me, and he was a little way behind with General EUisoa.

When we got out to the old northerly post it all looked
very different. When I first went there, there were great spaces
one could not venture into — ^now there are troops everywhere
— also many graves- General Godley and Rhodes gave us tea,
and they took us up to a point where we could see the whole
new position and battlefield. The storming of those impossible
heights by the New Zealanders and Ghurkhas will live for ever.
On the way up we picked up Gpneral Shaw, now commandii^
the 1 3th Division ; he is very cheery but has got very fat since
I last saw him before the War. He has done very well, but has
had awful losses ; his infantry is reduced from about 12,000 to
5,200. The losses are due to a great extent to inexperience;
the men bunch together when they get into tight places, or the
country is difficult ; one has seen it so often in the last fortnight
— ^then down comes the shrapnel or machine-gun and rifle-^e,
and the carnage is awful. Shaw was very friendly and explained
that his increase in girth was due to a wound in the leg, which
had prevented him taking any exercise. We had to go up a
very narrow sap, and I thought he would stick. I have never
seen anyone put on so much weight in a short time, and one
notices it here as everyone else is so gaunt and thin.

The 15th Division did very well, much better than the
loth and iith, but they had the advantage of being landed two
weeks at Helles.

It was wonderful to look down upon our trenches and the
enemy’s, apparently touching ; my powerful telescope brought
everything so close. The curious thing is to see the dead ground
swarming with men — ^in dug-outs or walking on newly-made
roads, quite peacefully, within 50 yards of our trenches, which
are the same distance from the enemy’s. The steep hiUs and
broken country are, of course, responsible for this, but it looks
extraordinary through a telescope.

From our position we could see Suvk, and Godley said to
me, ‘ You can imagine my feelings when I watched my men
fighting like tigers, doing practically the impossible, and at the
same time could see-^within three nailes — ^thc loth and nth

CAMPAIGN AT A DEADLOCK

421

Divisions loafing and bathing/ The new Divisions, during the
first few days after they landed, lost very heavily, but mainly
because they bunched and were got by snipers. . . .

General Ellison and the Brigadier thanked me for a most
dehghtful and I had learned the latter not to bother me with
unjustifiable complaints about transport ; he won^t again.

The Anzac people are simply splendid ; there is no other
word for them.

“ On Saturday (21st) I worked on board, and we went over
in the Triad to watch a big attack &om Suvla. Five thousand
Yeomanry had arrived from Egypt, and the 29th Division from
Helles. After half an hour’s bombardment from the ships and
artillery, the effect of which it Was impossible to follow — owing
to the mist and smoke which overhung the plain — our whole line
seemed to spring out of the ground and advance. The spectacle
of the Yeomen of England and their fox-hunting leaders, striding
in extended order across the Salt Lake and the open plain, un-
shaken by the gruelling they were getting from shrapnel — which
caused many casualties — ^is a memory that will never fade. Then
they were lost to view in the dust and mist ; and a little later a
raging bush fire seemed to cut them off. We left at nightfall, and
were told that the position was very fairly satisfactory, but most
of the ground was lost in the night and we had very little to show
for 5,000 casualties. It is awful, I can’t bear it when I t hink and
believe that we could stop it all, and end the business in a few
weeks.

I had it out again with the Admiral on Friday and again on
Saturday. He can only see disaster, and paints pictures — ^which
one ought not to do in war. I told him our forefathers would
never have won great victories such as the Nile and Copenhagen
if Nelson had only thought of the difficulties. Curiously enough
a telegram came from the Admiralty on Friday which might well
have been answered by the memorandum I had given him.
Directly it arrived the Admiral landed abreast of the Triad and
walked out to G.H.Q., a mile or so along the beach to the east-
ward. As soon as the telegram was shown to me I went in
pursuit to try and persuade him to put the matter squarely to the
General, but I could not overtake him, and when I arrived at
G.H.Q. he was already in Sir Ian’s tent. I then went to Braith-
waite and told him that the Admiralty were prepared to back the

422

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Admiral if he decided to attempt to force the Straits, and I begged
him to tell Sir Ian not to miss this opportunity, as our success
could not fail to extricate the Army. We went together to Sir
Ian’s tent, but the Admiral had already left with the answer he
wanted. Sir Ian told me that I was too late, he might have
worded his reply to the Admiral differently, but he considered
it a naval question and had declined to commit himself.

On Saturday morning I was shown the answer the Admiral
had drafted. I held it up, went to him and begged him not to
send it. To wait — ^but he insisted. It is so very different from
the high-spirited telegrams sent by Carden and de Robeck pre^
viously — so full of ardour and high enterprise. Quite inexplic-
able in the light of the telegram "Which I persuaded him to send
in May, which, though not quite what I wanted, at least expressed
readiness to go on and try — ^and took a high tone. He said his
Admirals agreed with him, and that he had consulted the General.
He thought that the Navy could do no more than it was doing.

I thought he would be superseded — ^I believe it would be almost
a relief to him — ^but to-day a very nice wire came from the
Admiralty expressing confidence in his judgment. I am so sorry
for him — ^he is so unhappy, but he is too nice to me for anything.

I really think he is 15 years older. He says he would give any-
thing for just two or three weeks’ rest.

I can’t bear to think of rest until the prize is won — ^it will be,
and in my way in the end, and I will try and possess my soul in
patience, and help the Admiral all I can.

When he sent the telegram I felt inclined to resign my
appointment as Chief of Staff. Staying on, of course, if he would
have me, in some minor capacity in charge of minesweeping, or
something of that sort. But he was so charming to me, I hadn’t
the heart to say any of the things I was simply boiling to say a
few minutes before. He is so very weary. He is a very lovable
person — very difficult sometimes nowadays — ^I expect I am, too !
Always charming to me. A leader with a personality which
commands service, but ^ responsibility ’ is the devil, and it has
been too much for him. Fiery ardour which will accept no
defeat is wanted now.

On Sunday (22nd) morning the General asked the Admiral
to come and see him, and I went too. He told us that it might
be necessary, owing to our heavy losses, to abandon Suvla in order

CAMPAIGN AT A DEADLOCK 4^3

to shorten the line. The Admiral begged him to do no such
thing ; Suvla would be invaluable to us in the winter, when
northerly gales would make Anzac beaches impossible.

Sir Ian then asked me to go over to Suvla with him and
Braithwaite to discuss the matter with General de Lisle ; we went
over at once in the Arm, landed at one of the northern beaches
and walked up to H.Q. of the G.O.C. 9th Corps. We had a
momentous meeting in a dug-out. I had not met General de
Lisle since the Grand Military at Sandown, 1914. He told me
he had commanded the attack in which my brother-in-law,
Geoffrey Bowlby, had been killed near Ypres in M!ay. He said
very nice things about him, and also about my brother Adrian’s
invaluable work off the left flank at Helles,

As I have already mentioned, the attack at Suvla was not
successful but was most gallantly carried out ; the Yeomen were
splendid; Lord Longford was killed leading his brigade. I
remember how hard and straight he used to go in the Bicester
country. One brigade of the poor, gallant old 29th Division,
brought up from Helles to stiffen the New Army, had about
1,200 casualties out of the 3,000 engaged, and we have had over
30,000 casualties in these operations since 6th August. The
evacuation of the wounded on open beaches is no light task, and
their endurance and patience is simply wonderful.

De Lisle told us his story, and said that they so nearly achieved
their object, but not quite, and they had to fall back after dark.
Some Turkish trenches which were captured were held, but the
advance was not great.

The meeting was very interesting, and I said exactly what I
thought about the retention of Suvla. Walking back. Sir Ian
said he had decided to do what the majority of the meeting, which
included me, advised. It was the bolder policy of the two natur-
ally. I forgot to mention that we stopped off Anzac to pick up
General Birdwood and his GO.S. We were on the same side,
of course, and I was representing my Admiral’s views.

“ I don’t dread the guns, the mines, or the torpedoes in the
Straits, but I simply ftmk the winter and all it means to supply
the Anny in those awful winter gales ; but I believe we shall be
spared that and will win through my way, before the weather
breaks. That is my constant prayer. TTie sufferings of the
Army and the anxiety of keeping it supplied is a nightmare. Of

424 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

coutse we will do it all fight, if it is necessary. I am not reallj
afraid, but I would have it otherwise if it can be avoided, and I
so firmly believe it can.

“ Going over in the Arno, Braithwaite told me that flie
Admiral had mentioned my memorandum to him. He said tkt
his Admirals all agreed with him, and did not think my plan m
feasible, or that the Fleet would have a chance. ‘ The Commo-
dore is very confident, but the responsibility is not his.’ Then,
Braithwaite said, he added most awfully nicely, ‘ but it is only
fair to him to say, if it was, he would not hesitate.’ I am glad
he said that. Of course if he feels as strongly as he does, he is
right to stick to it, but the reasons he gives and searches for
against it don’t convince me a bit.. We would not be the Nation
we are if we had always stopped to count the cost.

“ The Turks made a great song about our failure to land by
Enos. This was the truth — ^the French had a company of 300
Greeks led by a French officer, and they begged to be allowed to
create a diversion up there. We rather reluctantly agreed. They
were going to cut the railway, or do something to stir up the
Turks, and, as the Admiral said, the Turks would probably have
the time of their lives hunting them. However, the Greeks did
not give them the chance — ^they did not get very far from the
beach before they were rounded up and driven down ; they had
several casualties, and the Jed, which, with the Minerva, had taken
them, had some casualties in a very gallant and successful effort
to re-embark them. I think only three or four were actually
left behind. It was a silly, futile affeir, but it gave the Turks
something to buck about.”

The telegrams referred to above ran thus :

From Admiralty to Vice-Admiral. No. 836.

20th August, 1915.

If you still think your old battleships could make any
really decisive or important contribution to success of land
operations you will be supported in any use to which you
may think it desirable to put them.”

“ From Vice-Admiral to Admiralty. No. 24.

22nd August, 1915.

Your 836. Have consulted General — consider support
as at present given to Army by ships best means using

CAMPAIGN AT A DEADLOCK

4^5

Squadron. To attack Narrows now with battleships would
be a grave error, as chances of getting even a small eflSdent
squadron past Chanak very remote. Unless this could be
accomplished the heavy loss in ships and personnel entailed
in such an attack would only encourage enemy’s resistance,
also battleships wiU be required to replace monitors as
covering ships in bad weather should campaign continue
through the winter. We could therefore ill afford to lose
them unless decisive result is possible. Regret that I
cannot hold a hopeful view of another grand attack at
present moment, but in light of past experience and present
knowledge, it is only possible conclusion. This also
opinion of other Admiral^.”

From Admiralty to Vice-Admiral. No. 844.

22nd August, 1915.

Your 24. In my 856 we were not contemplating attack
by warships on Narrows. If this comes at ail it will come
later on. We only had considered the probability that
intervention of battleships might give important, perhaps
decisive, aid to land operations. If this were so it would
be worth running some risk with old battleships and we
intended to convey that any decision you may come to on
this point will receive full support from here. We have
fullest confidence in your judgment,”

This Admiralty reply was, to my mind, not very creditable to
whoever was responsible for it. Their first telegram surely only
had one meaning.

Sir Ian has described in his diary his feelings when the Admiral
consulted him :

‘‘ De Robeck knows that when the Fleet goes in our
fighting strength goes up. But he can gauge, as I cannot,
the dangers the Fleet will thereby incur. Every personal
motive urges me to urge him on. But I have no right to
shove my oar in — ^no right at all — ^until I can say that we
are done unless the Fleet do make an attack. Can I say so ?
No ; if we get the drafts and munitions we can still open the
Straits on our own and without calling on the sister Service

420 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

for further sacrifice. So I fell back on first principles and
said he must attack if he thought it tight from the nayal
point of view but that we soldiers did not call for succour
or ask him to do anything desperate : ^ You know how m
stand/ I said ; ^ do what is right from the naval point of
view and as to what is right from that point of view, I am
no judge.’ The Admiral went away ; I have been no
help to him but I can’t help it.”*

Lieut.-General Sir Julian Byng arrived on 23 rd August to
take command of the 9th Corps. As Aspinall remarked : ‘‘ The
experienced pilot has arrived but the ship is already on the rocks.”

I have never ceased to regret that I did not resign my appoint-
ment at that time as J felt impelled to some weeks later — ^it might
have brought things ‘to a head, and settled the matter. The
British Government we gathered, had committed the British
Army to a great autumn offensive in co-operation with the French
Army on the Western Front, and neither reinforcements not
ammunition were likely to be forthcoming until these operations
were over. At a moment when I was beginning to hope, that
with Braithwaite’s assistance, I could persuade Sir Ian to appeal
to the Admiral for help — ^an appeal which he could hardly have
resisted, and I would certainly have resigned if he had — ^the fates
which pursued our enterprise introduced a new complication.

The political friends of a French General (Sarrail) who had
been dismissed by Marshal Joffre, were determined to find him
an independent command elsewhere, and it was at first proposed
that four new French Divisions, together with the two already
in Gallipoli, should be landed on the Asiatic shore under Sarrail’s
independent command, but in close liaison with the British
troops fighting on the Peninsula. In communicating this
proposal to Sir Ian, Lord Kitchener told him, that the two
French Divisions withdrawn from his command, would be
replaced by two good regular Divisions from France.

Sir Ian and his General Staff were of course overjoyed, and
once again saw victory within their reach. They knew that
there were not more than 12,000 Turkish troops on the Asiatic
shore. (W e know now that there were really ojdy 2,000 between
Qianak and Yukyeri Bay.) The importance of my project was

♦ Gallipoli Diaty/’ Voi. II, pages 124 and 125.

AERL\L \aEW OF “W” AND “V” BEACHES, GALLIPOLI
Before Magenta and a French Steamer -nrere sunk to complete “ V ” Beach Harbour

CAMPAIGN AT A DEADLOCK

427

lost sight of, in the enthusiasm that was evoked by the enormous
military possibilities opened by such a reinforcement, and I felt
I could not now press my case to the point of resignation.

The Admiral offered to net in a large area off Tenedos, to
provide a submarine-proof anchorage for the men-of-war
covering, and the ships supplying the new French offensive.
French Staff officers came out to study the problem on the spot ;
I accompanied them to Tenedos, and we lay on the hill top and
scanned the coast opposite through our glasses. It was a network
of entrenched positions and barbed wire, and I soon came to the
conclusion that Sarrail’s campaign would never be launched there.

I had several conversations with Sir Ian at that time, and
gathered that in his opinion, the sis new Divisions, adequately
supported by artillery and a plentiful supply of a mmu nition,
could not fail to carry his August plan to victory. In order to
ensure this, he added : “ I would gladly serve under Sarrail, if
that was made a condition for French co-operation.”

Nasmith’s arrival from the Marmora on 3rd September was
like a breath of fresh air to me, in the hateful atmosphere in which
I was living. He had been to Constantinople again, and had
torpedoed a heavily-laden steamer, which blew up and sank as
low as the depth of water would permit it to. The Italian
Embassy was still at Constantinople and the story of this attack
had readied us. It seems that the steamer had just arrived from
the Black Sea with 3,000 tons of coal, and there was much
jubilation. A committee of officials was standing abreast of
the ship, which was lying alongside the Haidar Pasha Railway
Station quay, and was settling how the coal was to be distributed.
Railways, ships, flour mills, electric lighting and water supply
works all depended on coal, which had to come from the Black
Sea. While they were discussing the matter, the steamer blew
up before their eyes.

When Boyle left the Marmora on lath August, his place was
taken by Lieut-Commander Stocks in Ez. I knew him to be a
very determined and sldlftil submarine captain, and he thoroughly
lived up to his pre-War reputation.

There is a long viaduct on the Baghdad railway near the en-
trance of the Gulf of Ismid. Nasmith and Stocks bombarded it
together, but the Turks brought down guns to drive them off.

428 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

So one dark night after the moon had set at 2 a.m., lieutenant
Doyley Hughes — ^Nasmith’s First Lieutenant — swam ashore
pushing a small raft, carrying his clothes, a revolver, a very sharp
bayonet, and a large charge of guncotton, to try and blow up
the viaduct. He had to land about a mile from it, and striking
the railway near where he landed, he started to walk along the
track, until he nearly ran into three armed Turks who were
sitting beside a fire only about 150 yards from a culvert over a
little stream. He made a wide detour and stumbled into a
farmyard waking up die dogs and poultry but fortunately not
the household. He got quite dose to the viaduct but found a
large body of men with flares, evidently repairing the damage
caused by the submarines’ fire ; he also heard an engine at rest
blowing off steam. Realising that it was impossible to get near
the viaduct, he walked back along the line, looking for some
other vulnerable spot, but found nothing until he reached the
culvert, which presumably the three Turks were guarding. He
managed to dig his charge in right under it, without being heard.
He muffled the fuse pistol with a piece of rag, but it was a very
still night, and when he fired it, the three men jumped up and
ran towards him, firing ; he fled down the line, firing his revolver
now and then to try and stop them, for about a mile to a point
where the line was near the sea, into which he plrmged, quite
three-quarters of a mile from the place where Ex i was waiting
for him. As he entered the water there was a tremendous
explosion, and fragments fell round the submarine, mote than a
quarter of a mile to seaward. Doyley Hughes swam out 400 or
500 yards to seaward, and then along the coast, blowing a whistle
at intervals, and all the while shots were being fired in his
direction. Nasmith being very anxious, hearing the shots, but
not the whistle, took Ex i in until her stem nearly touched the
shore, but Doyley Hughes was the other side of a small promon-
tory, where he had landed to have a rest. By this time the
countryside was astir and dawn was approaching, so direcdy he
got his wind he swam out to sea again, but seeing what he thought
was a Turkish boat — it really was the bow of the submarine — he
swam in to hide again. A little later the visibility having improved
— he-saw die submarine and swam out again, and was pulled on
board almost unconscious with exhaustion. A proper man,
worthyto be second in command to Nasmith.

CAMPAIGN AT A DEADLOCK

429

One evening Nasmith sighted a convoy of eight sailing vessels
being towed by three tugs and convoyed by a destroyer. He
shadowed them all night and at dawn was submerged between
them and the shore, for which they always made at daylight.
He tried to torpedo the destroyer, and very nearly got into
position to do so, when she started to zig-zag. Her presence
made it impossible for him to rise and attack with his gun, and
he told me, he felt rather beat, but fortunately one tug got rather
far behind and the destroyer, like a sheep dog dashed back to
drive her on, so Nasmith promptly rose alongside the leading
tug and gave her and the four craft she was towing a good
hammering before the destroyer could get back and force him
to dive. The sailing vessels scattered under sail, but the tug and
one sailing ship were too damaged to move. The destroyer
evidently did not wish to stay near a submerged submarine and
cleared out, but sent the other tug, which was armed, to take the
damaged tug and sailing ship in tow. Nasmith engaged her
with his gun, and hit her several times, but she replied with such
an accurate fire that he was forced to dive again. This was too
much for the tug, v\^hich expected to be torpedoed, so cut the
tow and fled, abandoning the other tug and sailing vessel to
Nasmith, who promptly rose and sank them both. He picked
up 19 people, including five Germans, all nearly naked. One
fat German, who said he was a banker at Chanak, had nothing
on but a very short pink silk vest — ^not a very pretty sight, said
Nasmith, but a very grateful person — ^he told Nasmith that he
had 5,000 marks in gold in the tug, and the sailing vessel was
full of ammunition. If Nasmith had only succeeded in sinking
the destroyer, he would have bagged the lot ; however, he sank
the third tug before the armed tug forced him to dive again.

Later in the day he captured a small vessel, and put his prisoners
into her, after making her throw her cargo overboard. He said
they were very grateful, at any rate the Turks and the old German,
but the other Germans were just stolid yokels, who seemed to
take everything as a matter of course.

Our aircraft reported that there were four large ships in the
Straits which were evidently landing supplies off Ak Bashi
Liman, the main ammunition and supply depot of the Turkish
Army, so a signal was made to Nasmith to this effect. I knew
that we were setting Nasmith a difficult and dangerous task

450 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

in those swift narrow waters, but had unbounded faith in his
skiU.

He arrived there at 7 a.m. and finding the ships well protected
by a screen of small craft, including a gunboat and a destroyer,
he tried to torpedo the gunboat, but the torpedo ran under her
and exploded amongst some little vessels in-shore. He then
dived up the Straits clumsily showing his periscope, and even
his conning tower, to encourage the pack to hunt him, which
they proceeded to do ; having led them well away from his
quarry by inviting them to try and ram him, he dived deep and
disappeared, returning below them to the two biggest transports,
which he torpedoed with a right and left from his bow tabes,
sinking them both. He then dived across the Straits, torpedoed
and sank a ship on the opposite shore off Nagara, which was no
doubt waiting her turn to discharge at the depot. He now only
had one torpedo left in his stern tube, with which he attacked the
fourth steamer, on his way back to the Marmora. The torpedo
hit her in the bows but she managed to run herself ashore,
where Ez saw her the next day and finished her off with another
torpedo.

Another day Ei and Eii bombarded Mudania Railway
Station; and these vessels gave the enemy very little peace
during their stay in the Marmora. On his way out of ihe
Straits Nasmith decided to charge the net full speed at 80 feet,
having placed Doyley Hughes in the conning tower, with the
dead lights lifted so that he could see the net through the ports
and gain information. He reported that it was apparently made
of a^-inch wires with a ten-foot mesh and that it parted with
the impact.

Cochrane went up to take Nasmith's place ; before leaving he
discussed with me a plan for inflicting damage in the Golden
Horn, which for ingenuity rivalled the most brilliant of his great-
grandfather's exploits, but it was not to be, for jBy was caught
in the net, which fouled one propeller when she was nearly
through, this swung her roxmd and she became hopelessly
enmeshed at a depth of 100 feet. Cochrane struggled for la
hours, trying every conceivable way of breaking out of the net,
including sinking to the bottom in 240 feet, which caused her to
leak dangerously. In the end a heavy charge was exploded close
to the hull, which destroyed all the electric light fittings, and he

CAMPAIGN AT A DEADLOCK

431

had no choice but to bring E-j to the surface to give his crew a
chance of escaping, which he did, and then sent her to the bottom
again. He and his crew were taken prisoners.

Meanwhile Ez was finding very little moving in the Marmora
during daylight hours. On her way through the Straits her
gun mounting had been considerably damaged when bursting
through the net, and finding the plating xonder it strained. Stocks
decided to remount the gun in a fresh position abaft the conning
tower, which he proceeded to do in the middle of the Marmora ;
a remarkable feat with his very limited resources. Ez^s trip
was marred by the loss of her second in command. Lieutenant
Lyon, who swam ashore with a^raft with the object of destroying
a railway bridge on the Constantinople-Rodosto line ; but he
was never heard of again.

About this time Braithwaite sent me a report, which came
from the Italian Military Attache in Constantinople, who spoke
of the intense admiration which was felt in Constantinople, even
by the Germans, for our submarines in the Marmora. Their
work was admitted to have been wonderful, and a German
speaking to him on the subject said that ^^the officers are
evidently far above the average.” And so say all of us, added
Braithwaite.

In the meantime Godfrey had been working out a plan of
attack on the minefields, and the forts at the Narrows, on the
lines of that of the 1 8th March, but with the enormously increased
resources now at our disposal. He suggested that it would be
advisable to issue a memorandum to the Captains of the Fleet
giving them an outline of the scheme of attack, in case the
Admiral was ordered to force the Straits to help the Army and
avoid a winter campaign.

I never lost an opportunity of talking to the Admiral on the
subject, and urging my view, but it was quite evident that he
would have nothing to do with it. On 22nd he showed me a
letter from Ivir. Balfour, ftrom which it is obvious that they had
not the faintest conception of the true state of affairs, and that
they — ^including Lord Kitchener — were building false hopes on
the proposed French offensive, which in my opinion could only
be a dire disappointment. I spent nearly the whole night writing
the following memorandum, which I showed to Godftey in the

432 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

morning. He said it breathed the spirit — ^he would not altet a
word, so I had it typed out and handed it to the Admiral.

Vice-Admiral.

Captain Godfrey has asked me to forward the attached
letter to you. His proposals for an attack are drawn up
on the lines of the minute you gave me after reading my
submission of 17th August covering an appreciation of the
naval and military situation.

The military situation has certainly not improved since
that date. The final check of the 22nd August thoroughly
disheartened the Army, which is up against trench warfare
now in the new area, and I do not believe there is an officer
or man, from Sir Ian downwards, who is not convinced
at heart that the Army has shot its bolt and is incapable
of achieving its object. The Turks have had time to
prepare exceedingly strong positions in front of our new
line, and I know it is the opinion of the General Staff
that any reinforcements which are likely to be forthcoming
— over and above the new formations which may be sent
out to relieve the French on the Peninsula — can only sufl&ce
to strengthen our long line, which is very lightly held in
places, replace casualties and wastage, amounting to nearly
1,000 a day, and relieve the tired troops who are so sorely
in need of rest and reorganisation.

It is evident, however, judging by a letter you showed
me yesterday, that the decisive nature of the check in
Gallipoli, the magnitude of the task before the French if
they land in Asia, and the great difficulties of a winter
campaign under existing conditions are not properly
appreciated at home.

It appears that a great combined attack is to be delivered
on the arrival of the new French divisions, and as you
said a few days ago, in the event of such an attack the
Fleet would go inside the Straits to support the Army ;
I would submit that, in order to be prepared for any
eventuality, a plan of action should be drawn up now and
the organisation of an efficient force proceeded with at once.

It would, appear, according to the same letter, that
much is expected from the next attack of the Army, but

CAMPAIGN AT A DEADLOCK

453

although an expedition on a large scale in Asia might, at
one time, have accomplished decisive results, the effort now
contemplated by the French is surely being made too late.
I do not believe the most optimistic soldier thinks that
the French Army wiU be able to make any appreciable
progress in the face of the strongly entrenched positions
which are being so energetically prepared by the enemy
to oppose an advance on Chanak from the southward.
I understand any wide detour would involve a long line
of communications requiring a far larger force than that
being sent out and any slight optimism which the General
Staff may possess is based not on any possible military
action, but on stories of* Turkish despondency and their
hatred of the Germans, the hope that submarines and muddy
roads will make it impossible for the enemy to supply his
army in the Peninsula, etc., etc. I do not think we have
any right to count on such unlikely possibilities.

I have long felt that decisive results can only be brought
about by naval action, that the forcing of the Straits is the
only way to overcome the impasse at which we have
arrived and that, cost what it may, a determined effort to
do so should be made before the winter gales are upon us.

The daily reports of aircraft show that a very large
number of small and some large craft continue to supply
the enemy by sea in spite of the activity of our submarines.
If a very small proportion of our available force could
succeed in getting into the Marmora the enemy in GallipoH
would very soon be completely cut off by sea and his land
communications could be greatly harassed by day and
night by vessels on either side of the isthmus.

A force above and below the Narrows could, I believe,
soon cripple the defences sufficiently to enable supplies to
be passed up, at any rate by night. The force above
could, however, be self-supporting for at least three or
four weeks and decisive results might well be effected in
Gallipoli within that period with the assistance of the
Allied Armies on either side of the Straits well placed to
take advantage of a naval success.

It is surely worth risking much to win such a success,
and I ftdly beUeve the prhie is well within our reach.

454

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

The arguments which have been used against risking a
naval attack are :

The loss of prestige we should suffer in the event of
failure — and consequent on this — “ trouble in the East”
This is a vague phrase which should mean nothing to us
since we are determined to win. I think that faSure in
such an enterprise can only add to our prestige, par-
ticularly so if naval reinforcements are promptly sent
out to replace our losses. These can be sent without
in any way affecting our position in Home waters, and
their advent would make it clear that we do not intend
to be deterred by any teihporary check.

It is suggested daat failure would jeopardise the
position of our Army on the Peninsula, that it would
dishearten our troops and correspondingly encourage the
enemy. Our Army would be no worse off than it is
now, since it would continue to receive the support of
the protected cruisers and monitors, and our successors
would arrive before any further assistance for a new
offensive is likely to be reqmred.

As regards morale^ if elation on the part of the Turk
inspired him to attack, oxir Army would soon recover
any loss of spirit.

Success or failure would probably mean the loss of
ships and men. The Army has made great sacrifices in
these combined operations and I believe the Admiralty,
if the true state of affairs was put to them, would now be
prepared to risk such loss, if by doing so there is a reasonable
chance of a successful issue.

Personally I am confident that success can be achieved
without disproportionate losses, and I venture to submit
that the plan for co-operating with the Army in the forth-
coming operations should include a detailed plan of action
for forcing the Straits based on your minute, a copy of which
is attached.

In the event of Admiralty approval I would suggest
that this plan should be confidentially issued to the com-
manding officers of the ships which will take part, in order

CAMPAIGN AT A DEADLOCK

435

that they may be thoroughly prepared in good time for
what will be required of them.

I regard the organisation of an efficient minesweeping
force of vital importance. Experience has shown how
greatly our sweepers improve with practice and exercises
can be arranged for destroyers and sloops without necessarily
interfering with their other duties, but in any case so much
depends on tiie skill and determination of our sweeping
force that I think their training should be the first con-
sideration, every opportunity being taken to prepare them
for their great task.

Finally I would submit that the attack should be simul-
taneous with the next ofiensive movement of the Allied
Armies and that we should prepare for it at once.

I concur generally in Captain Godfrey’s carefully thought-
out plan of attack. If you wiU criticise it and give your
directions your staff will prepare a detailed plan for your
consideration.

Roger Keyes,

zyd September^ 1915. Commodore and Chief of Staff.

The Admiral then decided to appoint a committee to study
the question under my directions, consisting of Captain Dent
of the Edgar ^ a Gunnery officer who was giving valuable assist-
ance in the development of naval bombardment ; Captain
McClintock, who had commanded the Lord Nelson in all her
engagements ; Captain Heneage, who had been in command
of the sweeping force which had been trained under his direction
to a high pitch of efficiency by the 4th April ; Commander
Lambart, Cbmmander Ramsay, Captain Godfrey and myself.

Dent was always at Imbros or on the coast, McClintock at
Mudros, and Heneage at sea or in another harbour in Lemnos ;
therefore the committee could never meet, but I took every
opportunity of discussing the plans with these officers
individualiy.

While the British and French Governments were hesitating,
apparently unable to appreciate its immense possibilities, the
enemy was under no illusion as to the vital danger of our
threat on Constantinople.

While the Suvla landing was in progress. Admiral Tirpitz

436 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-15,15

wrote : “ The situation is obviously very critical. Should the
Dardanelles fall, the World War has been decided against us.”

There is clear evidence to show that Falkenhayn— Chief of
the German General Staff— had intended to overwhelm the
British Army in France in the spring of 1915. Howevet
alarmed at the Allied attack on the Dardanelles, and fearing
that if we forced the Straits Bulgaria would come in on out
side, he turned his attention to the eastward, being confident
that the German Western Front was strong enough to resist
any Franco-British attack. After inflicting , a heavy defeat on
Russia, he proceeded to overrun Serbia, in order to open the
road to Constantinople, instead of continuing his attack on
Russia, as desired by the Austrians. “ It is incomparably mnr f
important,” he wrote to the Austrian G.H.Q., “that the
Dardanelles should be secured and, in addition, the iron in
Bulgaria struck while it is hot.”

Meanwhile Bulgaria, who had been sitting on the fence
waiting to see which side was likely to prove the victor, greatly
impressed by the heavy Russian defeats and our Suvla feilure,
decided to back Germany and proceeded to mobilise.

CHAPTER XXIV

A VISIT TO ENGLAND

Sir Ian Hamilton superseded by General Monro ; I return to F.nglan<i to press
for a naval offemive; Interviews with Mr. Balfour and Lord Kitchener;
Visit French Mnister of Marine in Paris ; Return to Eastern Mediterranean ;
Meet Lord Kitchener at Salonika and Mudros ; Interview with General
Monro ; Lord Kitchener recommends evacuation and goes home ; Admiral
de Robeck goes on leave ; Admiral Wemyss takes command of Fleet.

Bulgaria’s threatened intervention brought about a tragic
situation and completed the discomfiture of the military campaign
in Gallipoli.

Appealed to by Serbia and Greece for help, the French and
British Governments decided to send troops to Salonika, and
Lord Kitchener telegraphed to Sir Ian to consider the question
of giving up Suvla, as two British and one French Division
from Galhpoli would have to go to Salonika. At the same timp
he assured Sir Ian that there was no question of withdrawing
from the Peninsula until the Turks were defeated.

Thus at a moment when the Allied Armi es on the Western
Front were launching an attack (which was to suffer 250,000
casualties, in a fruitless effort to break the German line) and
could spare neither troops nor munitions for our enterprise,
which was petering out for want of support, tibe Allied Govern-
ments embarked on yet another Oversea campaign, which was
only a drain on our very inadequate resources.

It was so difficult in those tormenting days to know what to
do. Time was passing and it was evident that the Admiral
had no intention of renewing the attack on the Narrows. On
26th September I wrote to my wife :

“After our daily argument the Admhal concluded:
‘ Well, Qjmmodore, you and I will never agree, but there
is no reason why we should not remain good friends.’
I said : ‘ Our foreftthers would not have hesitated or

4?7

438 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

stopped to count the cost/ He replied, ' You would do
what old Duckworth did : go up and get stuck thete,
and have to fight your way out, losing heavily— having
achieved nothing/ I replied that I was not thinking of
Duckworth but others of another calibre. It is hard to
be patient.'^

Another day I wrote :

I went for a walk with the Admiral, as I do most
evenings when we are at Kephalo, and tackled him again
about my project. I suggested some changes in the plan
of action to meet certain pbjections he had raised. He
agreed, so I asked him to put the whole matter before the
Admiralty. He flatly refused, saying he did not believe
in it, etc. I am torn to know what to do. We have
simply got to do it sooner or later. I told him so and said
I knew I was right, there was not a shadow of doubt that
it could be done. When the Army made an attack, they
did so knowing full well that they would suffer heavily.
We would probably suffer heavily too in ships and men,
but provided that we attacked in sufficient numbers and
in the right spirit we could not fail. I told hdm we had
only to hold our breaths for an hour or so — ^like the sub-
mariners did every time they dived through the minefield
— ^and quite enough of us would be alive to draw a deep
breath the other side of the Narrows and finish the business.

I can do nothing while I am on the Admiral's Staff. I
ought to resign, but if I do and go home, it will be very
difficult to persuade the Admiralty to listen to me; de
Robeck has such a reputation for being a thruster, and
I would only be looked upon as foolhardy. My thoughts
so often turn to John Nicholson on the ridge of
Delhi, and his tormentmg difficulties, and like hhn I
wonder. . . . *

feel sure something will turn up, the Admiral will
see it as I see it ; but time passes, and winter gales which
I dread are approaching. If he do anyidiing, then

* John Nicholson and the stalwart soldiers of his day — contemporaries and
father — ^held our Indian Empire the last time it was in jeopardy,
and shared with the sailors of a previous generation the hero-worship of my youtL

A VISIT TO ENGLAND

439

I must^ but what and how, that is what puzzles me. They
don’t a bit realise what the winter means — ^how I dread it.”

On the 1 2th October we went to Salonika to settle a number
of outstanding questions which the new campaign had raised.
^X^le we were there an American Petty Officer from the U.S.S.
Scorpion^ the Stationaire at Constantinople, arrived on board
with a young British soldier who had lost the sight of both
eyes and had been taken prisoner at Suvla, and had been released
through American intervention. The Petty Officer told us that
they had been held up for two days at Dedeagatch waiting for
their passports to be visaed. He said the Bulgarians were
actively preparing to dispute ^ landing there. He gave much
information confirming the reports of our agents, and he
declared that he himself had seen the Turks loading their
hospital ships with ammunition and stores and embarking
troops. He said that all the officers and men of the Scorpion
could testify to this, in spite of official denials. This no doubt
accounted for the Turldsh protests that we were improperly
using hospital ships as transports.

On 14th October the Bulgarians declared war on Serbia.

On the 1 6th we heard of the supersession of Sir Ian and
Braithwaite by Sir Charles Monro and Lynden-Bell. Our
relations with them had always been so excellent that we felt
very sad. From my point of view it was a great blow, because
I hoped so much to persuade Sir Ian, through Braithwaite, to
call upon the Admiral for help, now that the French co-operation
was very unlikely to mature. The Admiral arranged to send
them to Marseilles in the Chatham the following morning.
I went for a walk with him that afternoon, determined to have
it out, and felt that I was nearer persuading him than at any
previous time. So much so that just before we got down to
the boat I said, “ Then you will telegraph and ask for reinforce-
ments, and put the general scheme to the Admiralty for their
decision,” but he thereupon shut up like a book, and I felt I
was beat. That night Sir Ian and Braithwaite dined in the
Triads and I told the latter I was determined to press my point,
even if it meant resigning.

We learnt that a few days earlier. Lord Kitchener had tele-
graphed to Sir Ian asking him to estimate his probable losses in

440 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

evacuating the Peninsula. Sir Ian had previously declared that
evacuation “ was unthinkable,” He had replied to the telegtam
that his losses would depend on the weather and other uncertain
factors ; he might lose half his force ; he might be lucky and
lose far less ; on the other hand with raw troops at Suvla,
and Senegalese at Helles, it might be a catastrophe. The
Government’s decision to supersede Sir Ian appears to have
followed immediately after his reply was received in London.

The next morning Sir Ian and Braithwaite came on board to
say good-bye on their way to the Chatham, I felt terribly
sorry for them and I told them that if ever I took a knock like
theirs, I only hoped I would meet it with as stiff an upper lip,
We sent them on their way with' the cheers of the whole fleet.

I had confided all my hopes and fears to my wife, and that
day I received a letter from her which was full of encouragement
and faith. She told me that I must do what I thought right,
regardless of consequences, and that my duty was to the country
first. Remember,” she wrote, you belong to England, not
to me, and until the war is over you must not think of us ”

I went to bed that night liappier than I had been for a long
time, with her letter in my pocket, thinking hard of how I
would go to work. About 5 a.m. I woke up with a start,
quite wideawake, out of a very sound sleep, with a most extra-
ordinarily strong impulse urging me to get up and write my
minute to the Admiral, which I did.

I thought about my memorandum all day, had it typed, and
gave it to the Admiral before dinner, saying that I hoped it
would not keep him awake. He said he would not read it before
morning.

. It was as follows ;

Vice-Admiral,

Submitted,

It seems to me to be a matter of vital importance to
force the Straits, whatever it may cost, before the Gerimn-
Austrian-Bulgarian offensive can be carried into Turkey.

In view of the attitude of Greece and Roumania it is
more than probable that this offensive will succeed, and I
submit that no time should be lost in preparing for a
combined Naval and Military attack on the Straits.

A VISIT TO ENGLAND 44^

I am very strongly of the opinion that a Naval atttack, if
it is made with a sufficient force and reserve, must succeed
in forcing the Straits — ^the Navy will then be in a position
to assist the Army to complete the opening of the Dar-
danelles. This opinion is shared by several senior officers
and all the members of your staff.

The arrival of the old battleships and the promise of the
Special Service Ship, Oruha^ revives the idea of using
specially prepared old vessels to clear a passage through
the minefields and mask the torpedo tubes, instead of
employing sloops and destroyers to sweep.

If a Squadron of old Battleships and Special Service
Ships is placed at your disposal, I would propose to divide
the Fleet into five Squadrons :

I St. To support the Army and attack the Forts from
outside the Straits.

and. Inside the Straits to attack the Forts from below
the Kephea minefield.

3rd. To force a passage through the Straits and operate
above the Narrows using Pasha Liman Harbour as a
base.

4th. Redoubtable (late Revenge) and Special Service Ships
to precede 3rd Squadron.

5 th. Old Battleships and Terrible to carry supplies,
nets, etc.

The sloops and destroyers to be similarly divided :

ist. To sweep a channel for the and Squadron in the
lower reaches of the Straits.

and. To join the 5rd Squadron.

3rd, To rush the Straits at dawn or towards the end
of a moonlight night, with the object of attacking vessels
which are believed to be held in readiness to drop drifting
mines and probably to lay fresh minefields higher up
the Straits if the Narrows are threatened.

I have put the general outline of this scheme to the
members of your Secret Committee and I understand that
they are all, with the possible exception of Capt. Dent,* in

* Dent wrote to me later to say he was in favour of a surprise attack.

44 ^

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

favour of a surprise attack. It is a matter for dedsioa
whether the 3rd and 4th Squadrons should attempt a
surprise at dawn or force a passage under cover of a heavy
and deliberate bombardment from inside and outside the
Straits. In either case, I think it is important to rush a
few destroyers up as a first action. If a surprise attack is
decided on the destroyers must of course be closely foUov^ed
by the 4th and 3rd Squadrons at their utmost speed.

I understood you to concur generally in the suggestion
to use ships to dear the minefield instead of sweepers-
and, if you approve, I would submit, since the preparation
of the ships will take some little time, that an outline of the
scheme and a request for the vessels required should be
telegraphed to the Admdralty at once — ^the reinforcements
to include the Albemarle^ Russelly Redoubtable (late Revmgt)
and as many other battleships as can be spared, and about
six or eight Special Service Ships. If the enemy hear of the

passage of several S.S. Ships, they will probably think they
are to be used, like the Oruba^ as block ships off our beaches.
For this reason, I do not think the Oruba should be included
in our S.S.S. Squadron.

If you approve, your Staff will prepare two plans for
your consideration :

1. A surprise rush, followed by a general attack.

2. In the event of an attack being obviously antidpated,
a deliberate bombardment generally on the lines proposed
by Captain Godfrey, R.M.L.I. The Straits to be forced
by 3rd Squadron preceded by 4th Squadron, when the
Forts have been more or less silenced by bombardments.

I would propose to utilize the services of the two officers
of your Secret Committee who are not already on your
Staff — Commodore (K.) in connection with sweeping work
and the destruction of mines, and Capt. Dent, who has
had considerable experience in the Controller's Department
and who has already made valuable suggestions in con-
nection with the preparation of vessels to minirnize the
effects of mine and torpedo attack.

I believe the Admiralty and Govt, would welcome a
definite proposal at this critical moment, and it would

A VISIT TO ENGLAND

443

probably ensure the dispatch of the military reinforcements
indicated in Admiralty telegram No. 104, with the assistance
of which a combined attack could be delivered, which
should have every chance of success.

You have been good enough to suggest several times
that I should go to Malta on leave ; would you instead
allow me to go home for a week to lay the plan of attack
before the Admiralty — so much depends on prompt action
in regard to the preparation and dispatch of the S.S. ships,
and also ample reinforcements — ^to give a good margin for
losses ; for instance four “ King Edwards,” which surely
could be spared, would be invaluable and would not be
unduly risked if employed below the Narrows. Letters and
telegrams are an unsatisfactory means of communication,
and I feel sure I could persuade the Admiralty to send
reinforcements which would enable you to deliver an
attack on a scale which could not suffer defeat.

Roger Keyes,

Chief of Staff. 18 0<r/., 1915.

The following account is taken from my diary :

“ 1 8th October. I went in to see the Admiral before
breakfast and he said very severely, ^ Well, Commodore,
you will go home with the King’s Messenger.’ So it
was all over between us — ^and I felt very sad. I told him
how miserable I was about it — ^I felt like stabbing my best
friend in the back, but that I was so sure a Naval attack
was the only way to avoid a great disaster, that I felt I
had no choice. He was too nice for anything — ^I felt an
awful brute. He said I was perfectly right and only doing
my duty — ^as he was doing his in giving his opinion against
it — ^feeling as I did, he agreed I had no choice. He said
he would give me a feir field to state my case ; all he would
say was that he did not agree, and that if they wanted it
done, they had better send someone out who believed in
it, and would approach it with a fresh mind. He said he
was weary and in need of rest. After breakfast I said I
felt I must resign my appointment ; I would then feel
ftee ; but that having gone against him I could not expect
him to want me back as Chief of Staff — ^but I would like

444

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

to come back in any other capacity. He said of course I
must come back as his Chief of Staff, and that there 'was
to be no question of my not returning to him. He is a
good fellow — ^but I felt that if he wrote as he said he would,
my task at home would indeed be difficult. He said
McClintock could do my duty, and was to come away
with us, as there was much to settle before I went.”

It happened that Adrian’s. Wolverine was due to go to Malta
on 23 rd to refit, and I suggested that she should drop me at
Reggio on the way. I would then catch up the King's Messenget
and be spared a journey to Piraeus in the Imogene^ and on in an
Italian steamer. It might be absurd, but I was most anxious
not to run any risks which might interfere with my scheme, and
the idea of being caught in an Italian steamer by an enemy
submarine and taken to Austria filled me with horror !

Meanwhile our submarines were doing good work in the
Marmora. Stocks in Ei was relieved on i6th September by
Bruce in £12, which had returned from her refit at Malta with
a four-inch gun. A fortnight later Eiz was joined by a
small submarine of American design, built of American material
by Vickers in Canada, Hi was commanded by Lient.-
Commander W. Pirie, a submarine officer who had retired before
the War, but had begged for the command of a submarine when
war broke out. We thought Hi was rather light to charge the
net, but the Admiral gave in to the appeals of Pirie, who did
30 days’ excellent service in the Marmora. Bruce and Pirie
caused the enemy a good deal of loss and annoyance, but were
hampered by bad weather, and their efforts to bombard the
San Stefano powder factory were always frustrated by army
patrol craft and aeroplanes, which were evidently stationed
there for its defence.

The French were very anxious to get a submarine into the
Marmora, and the Turquoise arrived with a new battery, which
it was hoped would give her sufficient endurance for the passage
of the Straits. Adroiral Gu6pratte sent her Captain to me for
instructions as to his co-operation with our submarines ; I gave
him a compromised signal book, with a transformation table,

* Tlie Ifjtagem was a small xiaval yacht formerly attached to the British Embassy
at Constantinople, and then employed to take the King’s Messenger weekly between
Pitseus and Imbros.

A VISIT TO ENGLAND

445

and all necessary information. He reported Ms safe arrival on
the 20th October. The next day Ezo (Lieut.-Commander C.
Warren) which had arrived from England armed with a six-inch
howitzer, with which it vras hoped to do great execution, made
a successful passage and reported having torpedoed two steamers
above Nagara. There were thus four submarines in the Marmora
v^hen I sailed for England.

I learnt later that £’12 after spending 40 days in the Marmora,
had had a terrible experience on her way out. Owing to an
obstruction which she picked up in the net, her hydroplane
jammed, and she dived to a depth of 245 feet, which burst the
scuttles, filled her conning tower, and caused other dangerous
leaks. She appears to have alternated between a great depth
and the surface, where she was heavily fired upon whenever
she appeared. However she freed herself of the obstruction
and Bruce and his crew lived to tell the tale.

Early in November the enemy announced the destruction of
Ezo and the Turquoise^ but it was a long time before we knew
what actually happened. The two submarines had com-
municated and arranged to meet a few days later, but in
the meantime the Turquoise ran ashore and was captured intact
by the Turks who found the Captain’s note-book with a record of
Ezo^s rendezvous. Unfortunately C/J5i4 was at Constantinople,
she kept the Turquoise^ s engagement, and had no difficulty in
torpedoing the unsuspecting Ezo. Warren and eight of his
crew who were on deck were the sole survivors.

On the evening of 20th, the Admiral received a telegram saying
that the Russians would bombard Varna on Thursday, 21st,
and suggesting that the Allied Squadron should bombard
Dedeagatch and the Bulgarian villages on the coast the same
day ; so I went round to see the Captains of the Russian cruiser
Askold and the French cruiser Dupkix^ with Millot and Ramsay.
It was all a great rush, and as it was blowing hard from N.E.,
it was very doubtful if the trawler sweepers would get there in
time. Captain Larken, of the Doris^ who was to command the
Dedeagatch force, was sent for — and everything as far as that
force was concerned was satisfactorily arranged. Millot
volunteered to go with the Russian, in charge of British and
French signalmen.

446 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

The Admiral and his Staff watched the proceedings &om
the Triad. Our object was only to destroy buildings o£ militaiy
value, harbour works, railway rolling stock, etc. The Russians
and French, I am afraid, felt rather out of it, but they -would
have destroyed the town — ^as they did several -villages most
ruthlessly. Our ships were ordered to be very careful to
confine their fire to the objects mentioned, and very little damage
was done to the town. The destroyers were very busy, very
close in, plugging away at the rolling stock, etc. The force
consisted of the Doris (Senior Naval Officer), Theseus, four
monitors and four destroyers. The weather was beastly,
blowing very hard from N.E., bitterly cold. There -was no
opposition and it was a horrid enterprise. I felt we might have
been so much better employed.

On the 23rd October I embarked in the Scourge. General
Godley was on board, and we went to Mudros. Everyone was
full of good wishes, including the Admiral. I had a long talk
with Admiral Wemyss, who gave me permission to say that he
was ready to attack the Straits. He pointed out what a very
awkward position he was in ; being senior to de Robeck he
simply could not take the initiative — ^that must rest with me.
Wemyss said he had told de Robeck that if he put it to the
Admiralty, as he meant to, it was not being fair to me, or gi-ving
me the chance he said he was giving me — ^it would prejudice my
position impossibly. He said he had also pointed out that this
was the first time he (Wemyss) had ever been consulted, and
frankly he agreed with me, and thought it ought to be put to
the Admiralty to decide. De Robeck said he would think it
over. I learnt later from Mr. Balfour and Sit Henry Jackson
that de Robeck wrote that he thought they ought to hear me,
though he differed profoundly from my opinion.

In my diary that night I wrote :

“ The Admiral knows, as does Rosy Wemyss, that I am
not out for myself, but as he won't do it and I am determined
to get it done, I must try some other way. Rosy Wemyss
■was most encouraging.

I went on board the Suffren to tell my dear friend
Guepratte what I was doing. He had just been appointed
to a shore command, and I told htm that if we were allowed

A VISIT TO ENGLAND

447

to force the Straits I would beg that he might be given
command of the French Squadron. He strode up and
down his cabin for some moments, and then, stopping in
front of me, said, with emotion : ‘ I think always of
Nasmith, I think always of Boyle ; if I were permitted to
do this I would think also of myself, moi, Gu^pratte,’
thumpiug his chest and resuming his march. He was most
anxious to come to the Wolverine to say good-bye, but I
said everything was too unsettled, and begged him not to
— ^I would come with the Wolverine close to the Suffren.
I went back to Rosy Wemyss, who wished me God-speed
and good luck. The Admiral let me take jMillot for a
little leave. I thought he would be most useful in Paris
(as he was) if I had the chance of discussing the scheme
with the Minis ter of Marine. We embarked in the
Wolverine about 6 p.m. and manned ship as we passed the
Suffren, which was manned with band on deck. Adrian
led with three cheers for Admiral Guepratte, the Suffren
returned them, and played ‘ Tipperary ’ — dear, gallant old
man, I wish he was staying to take part in our triumph,
which I feel sure wiU come — ^so does he.”

We reached Reggio at 8 a.m. on Monday, 25 th October,
and I disembarked at once, in order to allow the Wolverine to
reach Malta the same evening. A telegram to the Consul-
General at Naples was the cause of an extraordinary reception !
The Mayor, the Captain of the Port, the Prefet, the General
Commanding and their respective Staffs gathered at the Vice-
Consulate at about 8.30 a.m. I produced a box of cigarettes
and the Vice-Consul a bottle of liqueur. During the forenoon
Millot, the Vice-Consul and I motored round and paid return
visits — ^lunched with the Prefet, who had all the same party
and the Deputy of the District to meet me — ^very dvE of them.
We started off again about 3 p.m. and arrived at Rome early
on Tuesday morning, 26th, and went to the Embassy, where
I sat in my old (Naval Attache) chair opposite Colonel Lamb,
who had returned to be Military Attache in December, after an
absence of nine years. I did not feel as if I had ever left Rome
— everything was so familiar, but it was neatly eight years since
I had been there.

448 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910^1915

I arrived in London at 9 p.m. on the 28th October and went
straight to the Admiralty to deliver the official bags, hoping to
start my business at once ; but was told that it was no use
coming until 10.30 the next morning.

The following morning, therefore, I returned to the Admiralty,
saw Sir Henry Jackson and Oliver and put my story to them,
having first given it to Everett and then Oliver to read. They
said that it seemed more than probable that something of the
sort would have to be done, but it must be in combination
with a military move on a large scale, and nothing could be
decided until General Monroes report was received ; it was
expected in a few days. They then asked me scores of questions,
and I did my best to explain the situation generally to them and
the other Sea Lords.

Mr. Balfour was busy all day with Cabinet Councils and
other meetings, but asked me to come at 5 p.m. I only had
about 20 minutes with him as Lord Bertie (Ambassador at Paris)
arrived. Mr. Balfour asked me to come at 3.30 the following
day, Saturday, as he had a Cabinet Council in the morning.

Next day I saw various people at the Adrniraity during the
forenoon, and remember being so struck at the “ wait and see
what will turn up ” attitude of the Sea Lords. I had come
home on fire for reinforcements and immediate action, for time
was flying, and when I wrote my memorandum to Admiral
de Robeck, I had wanted him to wire and put the scheme, and
ask for more ships at once. Of course, the fact that de Robeck
had strongly disapproved of my scheme was making it difficult
for the Sea Lords, but on the Friday I really thought I had
fired them, as I believe I had, so I was very disappointed to
find them almost stone cold on the Saturday I

My diary for the 30th October reads :

^^At 3.30 I went in to see Mr. Balfour. When I
left him on Friday evening I felt almost beat, and I
went out feeling like a boy leaving the ^ Head Master,’
but now I found him quite different somehow. I com-
menced better, I think. I told him I felt I had not
been very convincing, but I was desperately in earnest— I
was not young and foolhardy — had as much right to
have an opinion as Admiral de Robeck or any other

A VISIT TO ENGLAND

449

Admiral — ^told him my age — and then got to work. He
sent for tea about 4.45, and at 5.20 he rose slowly from
the armchair in which he had been lying back, with his
knees as high as his head, listening to me for nearly
two hours, occasionally asking me searching questions.
S tan ding with his heels on the fender coping, he looked
down at me and said: "It is not often that when one
examines a hazardous enterprise — ^and you will admit it
has its hazards — ^the more one considers it the better one
likes it/ He then asked me what the Sea Lords thought
about it. I said I thought I had jBred them the evening
before, but the atmosphere of London in these cold,
foggy, November days was depressing, and they were not
very encouraging this morning. He said I must persuade
them again. Mr. Balfour then said : " I suppose I ought
not to ask you, but who would you recommend for the
command if de Robeck resigns ? ’ I said Admiral Wemyss
— ^he would remain with the main fleet attacking from below
and supporting the Army — ^the Chief must be there. The
rush through was a hazard, and must be done by someone
who believed in it, and would see it through. I wanted
command of that small squadron. He smiled benignly
and said nothing. He told me that there was nothing to
be done for a few days until MLonro’s report had been
considered, so I said I would like to go home to Fareham
that evening to see my children. He said he would like
me to see the Sea Lords again, but on no account must I
miss my train. It was good to play with children, but it
was also good to sleep, and I evidently needed it. He
was most awfully kind. He is a charming person, and
sent a message to the First Sea Lord that I was not to be
delayed as I had a train to catch. I was then exam ined
by all the Sea Lords, who asked me many questions and
then told me to go and have a rest.^'

I returned to London on the 2nd November and spent some
time at the A dmir alty without getting much further. On the
3rd, Mr. Balfour sent me a message to say he wished me to see
Winston Churchill and Lord Kitchener, and I spent half an
hour with the latter at the War Ofl&ce that afternoon. Lord

450

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Kitchener told me of General Monro’s report, and said the
Cabinet wanted him to agree to the evacuation of the Peninsula.

He had absolutely declined to sign any such order, and would
not do so. He was starting for the Dardanelles the following
night — Thursday — and if they gave up the Gallipoli Campaign
and he had to evacuate, he would do it himself and be the last
to leave. I said I would come off with him in the last boat,

He asked me what I thought. I said it did not require much
imagination to see what would happen ; it might be the most
appalling disaster, and we might lose a third to a half of
our force and practically all the guns, etc. I told him what
I thought should be done, and then he said he would land
40,000 men at Bulair, and coal and provision us across the
Isthmus. I said that was absolutely out of the question and
pointed out the difficulties, and said I did not think any General
with local knowledge would recommend a landing there now.
From a naval point of view it meant fresh commitments, and
the revictualling across the Peninsula was impossible. He then
said that he would evacuate Suvla, but I answered that in my
opinion that would be an awful mistake, for it would open up
Anzac to bombardment from the north, and would mean giving
up all our valuable new beaches. If from a military point of
view it was desirable to land men at Bulair, we would do it,
but I did not think it was now a feasible proposition, and it
would be much better to deliver an attack at Suvla. I was sure
that Generals Birdwood and Byng would hold that view. Lord
Kitchener said other things which made it pretty clear that
Monro had been relieved of the Command. He said he simply
could not understand a soldier giving the advice Monro had
given the Government ; in recommending evacuation he bad
said we might lose from 30 to 40 per cent, of the force in
Gallipoli.

I afterwards learned that Lord Kitchener telegraphed that
evening to Birdwood as follows :

Most secret. Decipher yourself. Tell no one. . . .
You know Monro’s report. I leave here tomorrow night
to come out to you. Have seen Commodore Keyes, and
the Admiralty will, I believe, agree naval attempt to force
Straits. We must do what we can to help them, and I

A VISIT TO ENGLAND 45 1

think as soon as ships are in the Marmora we should seize
and hold the isthmus so as to supply them if Turks hold
out. Examine very carefully best position for landing
near marsh at head of Gulf of Xeros, so that we could get
a line across at isthmus with ships on both sides. To find
troops for this purpose we should have to reduce to lowest
possible numbers the men in all the trenches, and perhaps
evacuate positions at Suvla. All the best fighting men
that could be spared, including your boys from Anzac
and reinforcements I can sweep up in Egypt, might be
concentrated at Mudros ready for this enterprise. The
Admiral will probably be changed and Wemyss given
command to carry through the naval part of the work.
As regards command, you would have the whole force
and should carefuUy select your commanders and your
troops. . . . Work out plans for this or alternative plans
as you may think best. We must do it right this time.
I alDsolutely refuse to sign order for evacuation, which I
think would be greatest disaster, and would condemn a
large percentage of our men to death or imprisonment.
Monro will be appointed to command the Salonika force.” * **

This message was followed by one from the War Office
officially Notifying that General Birdwood had been appointed
to command the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, and that
General Monro was appointed to Salonika.

Lord Kitchener was immensely taken with my proposal for
forcing the Straits and asked me to see Sir Henry Jackson at
once, to tell him that he was going out to the Dardanelles, and
that he begged him to give my scheme aU the support possible,
otherwise the Army in Gallipoli was doomed. I suggested
that I should go out with him ; he said, “ Yes, if you can get
the reinforcements you want first, not otherwise. You must
persuade them to agree to your scheme before you leave.”

He was leaving on Thursday night to join a cruiser at
Marseilles. I asked him if his going meant that he had resigned ;
he said no, he meant to remain Secretary of State for War and
take his Seal of Office with him, and be in a position to order

* “ Military Operations, Gallipoli,” Vol. II, page 409 ; also paraphrased in

** Dardanelles Commission Report.”

452 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

the necessary force to Gallipoli when he required it. He added
that he would like to see me again after I had seen Sir Hentv
Jackson.

I then saw Sir Henry. He was very cautious, and said that
the Admiralty could not risk adding a naval disaster to a militaty
one ; the Army must be in a position to take advantage of tie
Navy’s move into the Marmora in order to open the Straits,
He said that Lord K’s scheme for a landing at Bulair was simply
fantastic. I told him that I had practically told Lord K. so,
and I thought he would drop it at once. I felt sure that wlim
he had an opportunity of consulting General Birdwood he
would decide that the next military attack should be in the
Suvla region.

Eventually Sir Henry Jackson gave me a message for Lord '
Kitchener to the effect that if he meant business the Admiralty
would probably agree to forcing the Straits, but that without
definite military support they were not justified in risking
running ships into the Marmora, with the probability of tidr
being cut off. I then telephoned to Lord Kitchener’s Military
Secretary (Colonel Fitzgerald), who asked me to come to York
House after dinner. Lord Kitchener knew that I was dining
with Sir Ian Hamilton and had told me that I could teU Sir Ian
of General Monro’s report.

Directly I arrived at York House that night (3rd November)
Lord Kitchener showed me a letter from Mr. Balfour which he
said had made him furious. The Navy, he said, was afraid to
wet its feet, and Mr. Balfour’s letter was so unhelpful that he
was not going to answer it. I pointed out that the letter, which
represented the view of the Admiralty War Staff, merely , con-
centrated on Lord K’s claim that he could supply the sHps in
the Marmora across the Peninsula. This was of course im-
possible, and he had unfortunately given them something to
ride him off on. I suggested that what we wanted was that the
Admiralty should accept in principle the absolute necessity foi
a naval attack on the Straits. Sir Henry Jackson had already
practically agreed to that, and I was sure that if the Admiralty
knew that Lord Kitchener would be prepared to take advantage
of the Navy’s action by launching a new attack they would
agree. I added that the point for him to make was that the
Navy had started the campaign, and it was up to the Admiralty

A VISIT TO ENGLAND

453

to make a great naval effort to retrieve the situation. Lord
Kitchener seked on this, and at once sat down to write a letter.
He kept on asking me for phrases, but I hated to be mixed up
in it, so said that I vsranted to telephone ! After a little I got
Fitzgerald to go in to Lord Kitchener's room to ask if he wanted
to see me again ; it was then past midnight. Lord K. said
yes, and read his letter over to me. It certainly was rather
offensive, but it put things pretty straight and insinuated that
the Na\7 w^'as declining to come to the Army's assistance,
though the Army in the first instance had gone to help the Nav\\

Lord Kitchener then told me that he was going to Egypt
first, so I said that I would wait behind and try to get the
reinforcements started. I told*him that I wished he was not
leaving quite so soon, as I was afraid that if he left before every-
thing was settled the Admiralty might change their mind, and
I really thought that, as things stood, if he was in favour of
promising military support, the Admiralty would agree to
attack, Fitzgerald told me that if I considered it vital to our
scheme that Lord Kitchener should stay another day, I was to
let him know at once.

The following day, 4th November, to my intense relief,
Sir Henry Jackson sent for me to tell me that the battleships
Hibernia^ Zealandia, Albemarle and Russell and four destroyers
were being ordered to the Dardanelles, and the Fourth Sea Lord
told me that they vrere sending in addition 24 trawlers armed
with i2-potinder gxms.

In my diary that night I wrote :

After lunch I went back to the Admiralty and was
sent for by Mr. Balfour, who had Lord K, with him—
they had evidently made it up. Lord K. asked me if I
had made up my mind whether I was coming with him
or going straight to Mudros. I said I would do whatever
he wished, but I was anxious to get back to Mudros as
soon as I could, and that if he was going to Egypt I had
better go to Mudros direct. Then he said : ^ Do not leave
until you have the reinforcements you require.' Mr. Balfour
overheard and said he had understood we did not require
any reinforcements. I reminded him that I had mentioned
the reinforcements I had hoped for, both verbally and in

454

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

the written appreciation I had given him ; we were prepared
to do the operation without if ships could not be spared
but I had just heard from the First Sea Lord that he was
sending out four battleships and some destroyers, so I was
content. Lord Kitchener said that if I was satisfied — ^that
was all right, he would go, and we would meet shortly
at Mudros.

At that moment Winston Churchill came in for a few
minutes. Mr. Balfour called him ‘ My dear Winston,’ and
Lord K. was very friendly to him. Churchill said I must
dine with him that night. Then he and Lord Kitchener
went off together to see the Prime Minister.

Then I had a long talk with Mr. Balfour, and I gathered
that he was very angry about Lord K.’s letter. I felt a
villain, for I had seen both letters — only of course I could
not say so. Mr. Balfour said that Lord K.’s letter was
intemperate and impossible — ^he had read a meaning into
his (Mr. B.’s) letter which was not there, and had told
Mr. Balfour when he attacked him on the subject that he
had ^ read between the lines.’ Mr. B. said that he prided
himself that he never wrote anything between the lines
and always said exactly what he meant. We then went
through my plan again, and I promised to let him have
the general outline in writing before I went. He was
very friendly and was evidently warmly in favour of my
project. He told me that if I could persuade Sir Henry
and Oliver, that was really all that mattered, and he advised
me to put the whole case to Colonel Hankey — ^the Secretary
of the Committee of Imperial Defence — ^for the information
of the Prime Minister, with whom he had great influence.
(This I subsequendy did.)

Admiral de Robeck’s disapproval of my scheme had
been discussed at every interview with him and the Sea
Lords. I said I felt sure that if de Robeck was approaching
the problem with a fresh mind he would be in favour, but
that he was weary and in need of sleep — suffered from
insomnia — and had authorised me to say he was in want of
rest. In fact he had written to Sir Henry to say so.

I also told Mr. Balfour that Admiral de Robeck had
originally written that if they accepted my scheme they

A VISIT TO ENGLAND

455

must get someone else to do it ; but that he had rewritten
his letter, as he felt it might prejudice my chance of getting
a hearing. I said he was a great gentleman and I knew
no one else who would have treated me as he had. Mr,
Balfour said his opinion of de Robeck was higher than ever
after hearing this.

I repeated that Rosy Wemyss was now strongly in
favour of a naval attack, and again begged that he might
be given command if de Robeck came home. Mr. Balfour
then said he must wire to de Robeck, and he gave me the
outline of a telegram which he proposed to send him
quoting me. I must say I did not like it, and suppose
showed that in my expression. He then took a pen and
wrote for a few minutes, and read it out to me. It could
not have been put more tactfully or more clearly. It was
to the effect that he heard from me with regret, but not
surprise, that de Robeck was in need of rest — ^he was at
liberty to come home at once to recuperate — ^but in handing
over the Squadron, the officer to whom he confided it
must be prepared to force the Straits in co-operation with
a military attack if, during his absence, the Army called
upon us to assist.”

Later, Bartolome (Naval Secretary) told me that this telegram
was dispatched, only slightly altered, to make it quite clear
that de Robeck was not being superseded and was expected to
go back after his leave, and that he must wait to see Lord
Kitchener before starting for home.

My wife and I dined Aat night with the Qiurchiils. He was
evidently convinced that the attack on the Straits would be
made, and he told me that Lord K. was going out pinning his
faith to me and my scheme, and he felt sure it would succeed.

After dinner Churchill told me a great deal about the events
connected with his supersession as First Lord, which followed
on Lord FisheFs resignation. He also told me that he personally
would have ordered us to force the Straits on the strength of
our telegram of the 9th May — ^half-hearted though it was ;
he had in fact drafted a telegram ordering de Robeck to go on,
but Lord Fisher had declined to agree to it. I said, Well,
you nursed a viper when you took Fisher back.” He rapped

456 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

out, And I would do it again ; he brought such fire and
vigour into the production of ships.’’ Curiously enough, Lord
Fisher subsequently used very similar language about ChurcHll.
Writing to Lord Cromer on nth October, 1916, he said, “I
backed him up till I resigned. I would do the same again; he
had courage and imagination 1 He was a War man.”*

Churchill told me that night that the Prime Minister wanted
to see me very much. Mr, Balfour and others had told me so,
too, but Mr. Asquith never sent for me.

Since leaving the Admiralty in May, Churchill had been
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, with a seat in the Cabinet
and in the Dardanelles Committee, which, he told me,
enabled him to exercise some influence and help the
Gallipoli Campaign. But the Prime Minister had just formed
a ‘‘War Committee” of four or five within the Cabinet,
from which he was excluded. He felt that he could no longer
hold a sinecure and was resigning to seek service on the Western
Front. (Within a few weeks he was with the and Battalion of
the Grenadier Guards in the front line trenches, and later in
command of a Battalion of the Scots Fusiliers.)

Churchill was charming to my wife, and when he came down
to see us off and wish me good luck he told her that he shared
with her a stake in my enterprise.

The 4th November was a red-letter day for me. The reinforce-
ments I came home for had been promised ; the principle
that the Navy would attempt to force the Straits, if the Army
would be prepared to take advantage of their action, had been
accepted, and I felt sure that I had won my battle. I did not
know until long afterwards that although Lord K. had left
Mr. Balfour’s room that afternoon confident that the policy
I had urged would be carried out, an hour later, at a final meeting
with the Ministers before he left London, it was decided that
a naval attempt could only be sanctioned as a support to a new
and determined offensive by the Army. In these circumstances,
as there were not enough fresh troops now available to make
such an attack (the Government being committed to the Salonika
folly), Lord K. lost heart and telegraphed to Birdwood to
cancel his previous message, “I fear,” he said, “the Navy
may not play up. . . . The more I look at the problem the
* “ Memoirs,” by Lord Fisher, page 57.

A VISIT TO ENGLAND

457

less I see my way through, so you had better very quietly and
very secretly work out any scheme for getting the troops off.”

If I had only known this at the time I would have gone out with
Lord K., despite the fact that he was going to Alexandria first.

Some years later I read in “The World Crisis, 1915,” the
memoran^ with which Churchill bombarded the Government
during the month of October, 1915. In these he reviewed the
whole situation, pointed out the immense opportunities still
open to us, and the danger and folly of delay, and he implored
his colleagues to rouse themselves to effective and energetic
action, before it was too late. It was deplorable that the one
man with the vision to see, and the courage to shoulder heavy
responsibilty, should have had no influence upon that Cabinet
of indecision, at such a critical moment.

Friday, 5th November. I went to the Admiralty and asked
Sir Henry Jackson to telegraph to de Robeck that I was ready
to return Erectly a passage could be arranged. If he could
not send a vessel to Brindisi or elsewhere, I would go to Naples
to join the Romn, which was refitting and due to sail on ijth.
This should ensure my arrival at Mudros before Lord Kitchener.
Pending de Robeck’s reply I went home to Fareham for the
week-end.

On Monday, the 8th November, we lunched at Admiralty
House, Portsmouth, with the Meuxes. I had a long talk with
Sir Hedworth, and I believe he was thrilled ; anyhow, he gave
me a green stone Maori charm with a great batde history to
give General Birdwood (commanding the Australian and New
Zealand Army Corps) for luck.

On hearing from Admiral de Robeck that I was to return to
Mudros in the Rmah^ I left London for Naples on the morning
of the loth November, having first obtained permission from
Sir Henry Jackson to call upon the French Mkdster of Marine
in Paris to explain the whole scheme to him and to ask for the
co-operation of the French Navy, in the event of the naval
attack being delivered.

Meanwhile, events of which I had no knowledge, but which
were of immense importance to the success of my project, had
been occurring in the French capitaL When Lord IQtchener
arrived in Paris on the morning of the 5th, he found the French
Government (which had recently changed) very strongly of

458

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

the opinion that the Peninsula should not be evacuated. His
hopes apparently revived and he therefore telegraphed to
Birdwood :

“ I mean to do my very utmost to enable you to hold
and improve your position, as I regard evacuation as a
frightful disaster which should be avoided at all costs.
Think over any plan which would enable us to improve
our positions so as to render them . . . secure . . .
against increasing artillery fire. I cannot say what troops
I can now gather for this, but I much hope to assemble
two divisions of regular tried troops — ^possibly 27th and
28th — a brigade of Gurkhas, and Younghusband’s brigade
from Egypt.”*

The British Government, anxious to hasten a decision,
telegraphed to Paris that morning to ask Lord Kitchener to
go to Mudros direct, and at the same time they ordered Generals
Monro and Maxwell (G.O.C. Egypt) and Sir Henry MacMahon
(High Commissioner) to proceed from Cairo to Mudros to
meet him. On hearing this news, Lord Kitchener telegraphed
to the Admiralty on the 5th to ask that I might join him at
Marseilles in order to discuss the scheme for a naval attack on
the voyage to Mudros.

The Naval Secretary to the First Lord, who apparently dealt
with this telegram, did not think it would be possible for me
to get to Marseilles before Lord Kitchener left in the Dartmouth
on 7th, so he, very unfortunately, took no action, and did not
tell me anything about the matter until after Lord Kitchener
had actually sailed.

There would have been ample time for me to have got to
Marseilles by aeroplane and motor, or even by train ; besides.
Lord Kitchener would have waited for me if necessary, as he
was ready to do before he left London. But when I did not
turn up, he cursed the Admiralty once again and wiped out the
possibility of the naval attack on the Straits.

Thus it happened that by the loth November the Egyptian
party and Lord Kitchener, de Robeck, Monro and Birdwood
were all gathered at Mudros, and Lord Kitchener was surrounded
by people with conflicting advice, as General Aspinall-Oglander,
♦“Military Operations, Gallipoli,” Vol. II. page 41 1.

A VISIT TO ENGLAND 459

who was on the spot, has recorded in “ Military Operations,
Gallipoli.*'

Admiral de Robeck considered it foUy to make any attempt
to force the Straits. He was ready to evacuate Suvla and
Anzac, but wanted to hold on to Helles, in order to help the
Navy to blockade the entrance to the Straits.

Sir Henry MacMahon and General Maxwell, with the safety
of Egypt in their thoughts, were averse to evacuation, unless
a landing at Ayas Bay could first be made.

Sir Charles Monro was determined on evacuation and to
secure that end was ready to support the Ayas Bay scheme.

General Birdwood, who had warmly protested against super-
seding General Monro, was ho longer so opposed to evacuation,
on the understanding that no additional troops could be spared
for Gallipoli, and that the Fleet would not renew the attempt
to force the Straits. However, he was strenuously opposed to
a l anriing at Ayas Bay, 800 miles from the Peninsula, if this was
to prsesde the evacuation — ^for naval and militar y reasons which
should surely have been apparent to those responsible for this
amazing proposal.

Meanwhile, on my arrival in Paris I was met by Millot, who
had remained there, and I asked him to arrange a meeting with
Admiral Lacaze. He had only recently become Minister of
Marine, and his appointment seemed to me a particularly for-
tunate one at the moment, as I had made great friends with
Tiitn during the three years we were Naval Attaches together
in Italy. We went into the project very folly. lAe everyone
I discussed the matter with in England, he was alive to ail the
difficulties, but I left him at about 10 p.m., after a two hours
interview, quite enthusiastic. He promised his support and
sis ships, including some of the " Patrie ” class (far superior to the
“ Suffiren ” class) if his Government would agree, in the everit of
the British Government deciding to carry out a combined
naval and military offensive. He even went so for as to say
that he hoped at least one French battleship would accompany
the leading squadron. I asked him, if possible, to appoint
Admiral Guepratte to command the squadron. He had fought
with great gallantry on the i8th March, and was, I knew, an
ardent believer in the naval offensive. Admiral Lacaze regretted
being unable to comply with this request, but assured me of

460 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

his support, as he said he felt that success would be so invaluable
to the cause that risk and loss would be justified, and he wished
me the best of luck. I told him that it was destiny that he
should become Minister of Marine at such a moment, as I. could
never have discussed the matter with a stranger as intimately
as I had with him.

I wrote a full account of my conversation with Admiral
Lacaze to the First Sea Lord, and have never heard that any
exception was taken to my action. Armed with Lacaze’s promise
I continued my journey towards Mudros the following day.

I must confess that I was very unhappy at the thought of
Lord Kitchener among the “ Evacuators ” at Mudros without
me to remind him all the time that the Admiralty were ready
to order a naval attack if the Army would co-operate ; but I
had no reason to think at the time that he had already abandoned
all thought of a combined operation to retrieve the situation.

A delay of a day and a half at Naples, owing to the Rowan
doing an unsuccessful trial after her refit, was exasperating—I
was in a fever to get on. A wireless message received in the
small hours of the 17th told me to come to Salonika, where
Lord Kitchener and his satellites were now gathered, and I
arrived that evening.

I was still full of hope, and so was astounded to hear from
Godfrey that the idea of a naval attack had never been raised,
and that Lord Kitchener had telegraphed home suggesting
landing a large army in Ayas Bay, at the same time evacuating
Anzac and Suvla. I signalled to Fitzgerald to ask for an
interview with Lord K. and was told that he would see me on
board the Dartmouth^ where he was living, the following morning.

Sir Henry MacMahon and Sir John Maxwell dined with the
Admiral and I gathered that the Government had stamped
heavily on the Ayas Bay scheme, which was not surprising — ^as
if we were not deeply enough involved already, without em-
barking on another Oversea enterprise. Apparently the French
had strongly objected and were very suspicious of our entering
what they regarded as their sphere of influence.

My di^ records :

1 8th November. I went on board the Dartmouth and
heard from Fitzgerald of the disastrous efiect my non-arrival

A VISIT TO ENGLAND 4^1

at Marseilles had had on Lord Kitchener ; he said if I had only-
come all might ha-^e gone -well. When I saw Lord K. he opened
by saying, ‘ Well, I have seen the place ; it is an awful place,
and you will ne-yer get through.’ He had spent a few hours
at Helles, Anzac and Suvla, but could not possibly know anything
about the Straits. I asked him how he knew ; had he flown
over the Straits ? He replied. No, but he would like to. I said
that I had watched the Straits for eight months, and had been
fired at by almost every gun in them. I was quite convinced
that we co-uld get through. What had happened to make him
change his m i n d ? When he left England he had been ready to
deliver an attack if the Navy would co-operate and attack the
Straits at the same time. He said the Generals from France
declared that there was not sufficient depth to develop an attack ;
they considered that an attack -was doomed to failure, there was
nothing to - be done. He said that the Admiralty had given
him no assurance that the Fleet would attempt to force the
Straits if the Army attacked. He had telegraphed two or three
times to try and ascertain their attitude ; they woidd not answer.
He had expected me to bring the answer to Marseilles and that
I would be able to confirm what we both understood, but when
I did not come he thought it had all fallen through. I said he
had no right to think so ; the Admiralty had sent out the re-
inforcements I had asked for, in order to be ready to carry out
the attack if required. They had told A dmir al de Robeck he
could come home, but he must hand over the Squadron to
someone who was prepared to attempt to force the Straits, if
called upon by the Army to do so. Although Mr. Balfour iud
thrown cold water on his proposal to supply the Fleet across
the Bulair Isthmus, his letter, which I saw in York House,
made it clear that the Admiralty was ready to co-operate in
an effective offensive. This was confirmed in Mr. Balfour’s
room next day. Matters were exactly where they were when
he left England, and it all depended on him. I said I was
con-vinced that the Fleet could force the Straits, and would do
so if given the opportunity. He got up saying that he only
wished it could happen, walked out of the cabin into his sleeping
cabin and shut the door. So I was dismissed, feeling very sick,
but I could not help feeling sorry for him, he looked so terribly
weary and harassed.

462 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

“ I asked Fitzgerald -what had happened to Lord Kitchener.
He told me that while they were in Paris the French were very
insistent on the importance of Salonika, and Lord K. had
promised his support. My failure to arrive at Marseilles, and
de Robeck’s attitude towards a naval attack, had driven Lord K.
to the conclusion that there was no salvation through the Navy.
General Horne, commanding the 2nd Division in France, who
had accompanied him to give advice, like all other Generals in
France, hated the Gallipoli ‘ side-show,’ and strongly recom-
mended evacuation. Then he met Sir Henry MacMahon and
Sir John Maxwell ; their only concern was for Egypt and they
produced the Ayas Bay project to defend Egypt. Sir Charles
Monro wanted to take the Gallipoli Army to Egypt to train
and recondition it for six months ! It was not surprising that
Lord Kitchener was looking harassed.

“It is difficult to comment temperately on these confused
and defeatist counsels in the middle of a desperate war, when
our only object should be to fight and defeat the enemy with
all the forces we possess. Egypt seems to be Lord Kitchener’s
chief concern now ; but the main Turkish Army is in Gallipoli,
and while our army is holding it there, Egypt is safe. A success-
ful naval attack would ensure the defeat of the Turkish Army.
Since the i8th March the Fleet has been a Commissariat
service, not a fighting force, and apparently it is to continue to
look on.

“I went back to the Triad feeling pretty miserable; even
my friends who think as I do seem to have lost heart.

“ That afternoon I had a long talk with the Admiral, hoping
that the evacuation scare had shaken bim, and feeling that I
ought to do my best to persuade him to seize the great oppor-
tunity open to him. But he would only see all the difficulties.
I told him he would be asked at home how he could reconcile
his present attitude with his telegrams in March. We were
ten times better off than we were in March ; there were 1 3 3,000
men now on the Peninsula ready to take advantage of the Fleet
cutting the enemy’s communications. There was a certainty
of getting siifiSdently strong reinforcements to ensure success,
if he would only back the project. I told him all that had
happened at home and that I knew of Mr. Balfour’s telegram
telling him to hand over the Fleet to someone who was prepared

A VISIT TO ENGLAND

463

to force the Straits if ordered to do so. No one else on board
knew anything about it, except his secretary, and the telegram
was not in the files. He told me that he had intended to leave
for home directly after he had seen Lord K., but a crisis arose
in Greece, and he had to wait until that was settled.

Lord K. had told me during my interview with him that
the situation in Greece was awful. The British and French
Divisions which had endeavoured to get into touch with the
Serbian Army had been so severely checked they would probably
have to fall back across the Grecian frontier, and might be in-
terned by the Greek Army, as the King, having got rid of
Venizelos, was determined to maintain neutrality. The Admiral
also thought that we were involved in an awful Balkan plot.
This amazed me, I said I did not believe that the Greeks would
dare to do anything while the Allied Fleet was in a position to
blockade Greece, destroy her fleet and reach everj^'diing of any
value in Greece with its gunfire. Moreover, the Greek Army
they were so afraid of was dependent on seaborne transport
for its supplies, as there is 40 miles of unfinished railway between
Piraeus and Salonika. The Admiral told me that he had not
slept all night and felt he must give in.

After this conversation I realised that it is all over as far
as he is concerned, that he must go home and have a rest, and
that I must start afresh directly he goes. We sailed for Mudros
that night.

19th Nov. We all gathered on board the Lord Nelson
and tiiere was a succession of meetings all day. Bitdwood
arrived from Imbros in the afternoon and I saw him before he
went in to see Lord Kitchener. I gave him Sir Hedworth’s
greenstone charm, which had belonged to a great Maori warrior,
and wove a story round it, to the effect that it brought amazing
luck, but only to those who fought. I saw him again after he
had had a long talk with Lord K. and to my intense disappoint-
ment he told me that Lord K. had hardly mentioned the naval
attack, and never as a feasible proposition.

MacMahon told me that Lord Kitchener was going to the
Pirseus to see the King of Greece ancTthen direct to England.
So he was leaving without ever having put the case to Birdwood
for a combined attack! Until then I had looked upon
MacMahon and Maxwell and their Ayas Bay project as a nuisance

464 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

which had merely confused and delayed the issue, but I saw
now that I must enlist them, so I got busy with the same old
story, and ended by saying, ‘ If we fight the Turk and beat him
in Gallipoli, isn’t that the best way to defend Egypt?’
MacMahon replied, ‘ Yes, absolutely the best way,’ and he
promised to do his best to get Lord K. to come back. I felt
that if Lord K. went home in his present mood it would add
enormously to our difficulties. Fighting the enemy in Gallipoli
and the Straits will be child’s play to what one is going through
now, fighting one’s friends to make them see.

“ Then I had an attack on General Horne, who I knew had
great influence with Lord K. I told him what Lord K.’s
attitude had been in England and of the attitude of the A dmiralty ,

I said that it was simply maddening that all my efibrts should
now be defeated by him and other Generals from France, who
were incapable of considering anything but the war on the
Western Front. I said I thought the one thing we most prided
ourselves upon was not knowing when we were beaten. The
Germans and Turks thought we were beaten in Gallipoli.*
Now was the time for a great naval and military counter stroke.
After a prolonged fight, having got the Admiralty to agree
tliat if Lord K. made it possible for the Army to co-operate, the
Navy would force the Straits, he refused to give the Admiralty
the assurance they required. How Lord K. could face the
Government after all he had said about being the last man to
leave the Peninsula, and go home without having done anything
to bring about the combined attack, simply beat me. It was
awful to flunk of the British Army being condemned to evacuate
a hard-won position without an effort, and accepting the
possibility of losing 25,000 men — ^the latest estimate of the
combined staffs working on the plan of the evacuation — ^without

* The following extract from a German official Study of the Strategy of the
Campaign is of particular interest, in view of the pessimistic outlook in England
after the failure of the August offensive.

“ Notwithst^ding the satisfactory results achieved in August, General Liman
von Sanders still regards the future with anxiety. . . , The wastage amongst the
Turkish troops was alarmingly Hgh, and the danger was that they would gradually
be bled to death. * . . Furtherrormatioi^ were hardly likely to become available
for Galhpoli. Drafts were coming in more slowly their standard was growing
worse. The increased size of the army enhanced the difi&culty of supply. Not
only were the lines of communication barely able to meet the existing demands, but
the resources of the Capital were running short,*' (“Military Operations/'
VoL IE, p. 567).

A VISIT TO ENGLAND

465

even considering the offer of naval co-operation. The decision,
and Lord Kitchener’s change of mind, was obviously based on
his (General Horne’s) advice and that of Monro. However, it
would not come to that — ^we were going to force the Straits
and win a great victory in spite of them, but they made it very
hard. I said : ^ If you Western-Front Generals don’t like the
idea of attacking, at least be ready to take advantage of our
naval attack when we deliver it.’ I begged him and Fitzgerald,
who had joined in, to persuade Lord K. to be prepared to do
this. Horne, who struck me as being a proper man, was
enthusiastic before I finished and said he only hoped I would
succeed.

Then they all went oflF ta the Piraeus. I felt if Lord K.
reminded the King of Greece that the British Fleet was still in
being — ^though our soldiers seem incapable of realising it — ^we
would not hear much more firom the Greeks about interning
a British army.

Just before they sailed a telegram came from the Govern-
ment asking Lord K. to give a considered opinion about the
evacuation of the whole or part of the Peninsula. The Ayas
Bay affair was definitely off, thank heaven. Lord K. decided
to come back to Mudros, and in the meantime Bkdwood was
to make out a report.

I had a long talk with Birdwood that night and told him
the whole story. I told him that I knew he had been appointed
to succeed Monro, and that he had the chance of a lifetime.
I enlarged on the greenstone story and told him we would
put him on a column as high as the Duke of York’s if he would
only give us the chance.”

I did not know until long afterwards that Birdwood had
practically refused to accept the chief command and the great
opportunity offered him. Replying to Lord Kitchener’s telegram
of 5rd November, he had said : I sincerely trust that Monro
will remain in command here. He has already established
confidence in those who have seen him, and his experience in
France, which I lack, will be absolutely invaluable. He will,
I know, carry out any orders of the Government better than
I can.”* Lord Kitchener’s and the War Office telegrams were
kept secret.

* “ Military Operations, Gallipoli,’* Vol. H, pages 409 and 410.

466

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915
My diary continues :

After Birdwood had gone to bed I went over to see Rosy
Wemyss in the Europa and for the first time since I got back
I enjoyed myself. I had had no opportunity of talking to him
during the day. I told him everything I have written in my
diary. He has now quite made up his mind, but says he wishes
he knew more about what was ahead of us after the Straits
have been forced ; nevertheless he is prepared to do it, because
there is no alterriative.

20th November. Wemyss said he would have it all out
with Birdwood today, and I went off in the Usk to the Peninsula
with some of the Staff to visit the beaches, taking the Director
of Works (Lotbiniere), who, before the day ended, became
the most ardent supporter and non-evacuator.

Strong southerly winds had made work on the beaches
difficult for some time. Sheltered by blockships, however,
there was little interruption until the evening of the 17th
November, when a violent south-westerly gale commenced
with little warning and blew fiercely for 1 3 hours. A number
of vessels were lost, including tugs, horseboats, motor lighters,
steam pinnaces, water boats, etc., and many more were stranded.
The stone pier connecting the Helles blockships with the shore
was swept away, and all the piers and small craft were wrecked
by the sea, which broke through the gap and caused the greatest
havoc. At Anzac one pier protected by a blockship was intact ;
all the other piers have disappeared.

"" At Suvla the blockships were the means of saving a number
of motor lighters and other vessels from total loss, but aU were
severely damaged. I pointed out to General Davies, the Corps
Commander at Helles, that the winter had not yet started, and
evacuation was impossible until the damage could be made
good, I told him very little, except that evacuation was in
the air again, and I knew he was an ‘ evacuator.’ He said he
had told Lord K. that he was against it now. I said, nevertheless
General Birdwood thought he was for evacuation, and if not
he had better let him know as soon as possible, as he was
preparing a memorandum for Lord Kitchener ; so he gave me
a letter to take back.

It is possible to go on landing stores on favourable days,
and we have a big reserve on shore, but one thing is quite

A VISIT TO ENGLAND

467

certain, it will be quite impossible to evacuate for some time to
come, and for this I was most grateful to the stormy elements
for their intervention.

2ist November. Lord K. returned from Greece in the
afternoon. Birdwood, who had gone back to Imbros when
Lord K. left, returned to urge the case against evacuation.
I gathered that the General at Anzac had reported that the
morale of the Turk was very low, and that the Anaacs were
strongly opposed to evacuation. I knew that Davies considered
that, in view of the damage done by the storm, any attempt
to carry out an evacuation at Helles would now lead to certain
disaster, and I was very hopeful that Lord Kitchener would
seize on the naval alternative.*

That night General Davies reported that after a very heavy
bombardment the Turks had attempted to attack in great force,
but very half-heartedly, and they were repulsed with heavy loss ;
which bore out the Anzac view of the low morale of the enemy.

The Admiral, Birdwood and I went on board the Dartmouth.
On the way there I whispered to Birdwood that I hoped he
was going to refuse to evacuate. He said so much depended
on Monro, I had better go and see him. So I went at once to
the Aragon^ a large transport, which berthed the General Staff,
and on board which Sir Charles Monro had quarters. Lynden-
Bell, his Chief of Staff, took me into his cabin, where he was
lying on a sofa with a bandaged foot which he had hurt dis-
embarking from the Chatham,

We had many mutual friends and after establishing friendly
relations, I let myself go and delivered a fiery attack on his
policy. I told him the whole story ftom beginning to end
and ^gged him to help ; but he raised every kind of difficulty,
and even catechised me on the naval side. I said, * That is a
naval matter and if I have got the approval of the Admiralty,
and their concurrence, in that awful atmosphere of London,
you really must accept it.’ His point was that the Army could
do nothing, even if we got through the Straits. He seemed
quite incapable of realising the tremendous effect a fleet in the
Marmora would have on the Turkish army in Galhpoli.

I said the Admiralty were anxious to put the responsibility
on to the Army, but we, who were going to do it, really did
not care whether the Army made an attack or not ; though, of

468 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

course, they ought to be in a position to take advantage of our
success, which would cause intense consternation to the Turks.

I said that Kitchener wanted the Admiralty to take the initiative
in proposing the combined attack, and the Admiralty insisted
on the Army asking for it, but what was really wanted was a
MAN to decide.

“ At the end of this interview, which was very amicable m
spite of my scathing remarks, I said I would beat them yet ;
if they did not want to share in the glory, some other soliers
would. Sir Qiarles said, ‘ Look out, Lynden-Bell, the Commo-
dore is going to attack us ; I can’t get up.’ Looking at his
foot, which looked hot and red, I said innocently as I went out
of his cabin, ‘ It doesn’t look very cold, sir.’ Then I went off
with Lynden-Bell and Neil Malcolm, and at the former’s
suggestion we drank to the success of my enterprise.

“ It was quite obvious that I would get no support from
Monro, and that he had come out absolutely determined to put
an end to the Gallipoli Campaign, and nothing would deviate
him from his intention. But aU the same I felt that if he was
ordered to co-operate in a naval attack we should have good
comrades in him and his Chief of Staff.

“ 22nd November. I had a long talk with Wemyss today ;
he says he feels very awkward about de Robeck ; it is so difficult
for him to go against everything he has said and done, and he
asked me if I had anything to suggest. I said apparently they
were determined to evacuate Anzac and Suvla and de Robeck
had made no protest. If he thought as I did, that it might be
a great disaster, and if de Robeck went home, leaving him to
carry it out, without ever consulting him, surely he must be
free to give his views to the Admiralty, and point out the hazards
of evacuation now that the weather had broken, and give a true
naval appreciation and suggest the alternative. He said, ‘ Yes,
and we will force the Straits, Roger.’ From that moment he
was splendid and never faltered in his determination to save the
situation, in spite of de Robeck’s opposition.”

That night a conference was held by Lord Kitchener on
board the Dartmouth. Monro was unable to attend, but had
sent a written appreciation, urging complete evacuation and
an early decision. Maxwell, MacMahon, Birdwood and de
Robeck were present ; the latter withdrew after a few minutes.

A VISIT TO ENGLAND

469

He told me that they were going to evacuate Anzac and Suvla,
and hold on to Helles, but he had left the conference because
he regarded it as a militaty matter. He telegraphed to the
Ad mir alty that the evacuation of Anzac and Suvla was not
favoured by the Navy, but that “the Generals from France
seem to have the view that the war can be ended only by In'lling
Germans, which must be carried out in France.” He reported
later that he was not present when final discussion and decision
was made, but I understand evacuation was decided onafterreading
Monro’s appreciation. Previously, General Davies at Helles and
General Birdwood at Anzac were in favour of holding on.”

The following is the official history’s account: “(22nd
November) Lord Kitchener* cabled home his long-expected
report. He stated that, as German assistance for the Turks
was now ‘ practically available,’ and as in this case the British
positions could not be maintained, evacuation seemed inevitable.
He recommended that the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac
should be proceeded with, but that Helles should be retained,

‘ at all events for the present.’ This would prevent the Turks
from establishing a submarine base in the Straits;* and would
also facilitate the task of withdrawal ftom the two northern
beaches. ‘The above,’ he added, ‘is the considered opinion
of the Admiral, MacMahon, Monro and Birdwood.’”f The
War Committee rejected the plea for the retention of Helles
in the belief that the naval arguments in favour of this course
were not commensurate with the military disadvantages.!

My diary continues :

“ 23rd November. Birdwood came on board in the morning
and again in the afternoon, in the depths of depression. I told btm
to cheer up, we were not beaten yet. He said it was too late to
stop it. I said it was too late to evacuate, that was quite certain.

“ In the afternoon, he, de Robeck and I went on board the
Dartmouth to say good-bye to Lord Kitchener. He and
de Robeck talked for some time ; Birdwood sat looking very
glum and unhappy waiting for his turn, while I talked to Fitz-
gerald; I told him that de Robeck had not put the naval
objections to evacuation half strongly enough. Fitzgerald

* My italics,

t “ Military Operations, Gallipoli,” Vol. II, page 421.

^ “ Dardanelles Commission, Final Report, page 57.”

470 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

replied, ‘de Robeck object 1 Why, he originally suggested
leaving Amzac and Suvla and holding on to Helles 1 ’

I told Fitzgerald that as soon as de Robeck left, Wemyss
would send an appreciation from the naval point of view, and
I hoped Lord K. would take advantage of it. He said llmt I
must see Lord K. again. A little later I was sent for. Lord K.
said two or three times that he simply hated the evacuation
and would do anything to avoid it, but it was now inevitable ;
and I replied each time that we could and would force the Straits
if he would only help, and that directly de Robeck left, Wemyss
would return to the attack. My last words were, ^ I am not
beaten yet. Sir, and I am not going to be,’ and we shook hands
on it, Birdwood told me afterwards that he said I was ‘ a very
pertinacious young man 1 ’ ”

Actually, , though I had no idea of this at the time. Lord
Kitchener had heard from Mr. Asquith that day that the War
Committee was in favour of complete evacuation, and the
decision would be communicated when the Cabinet had con-
sidered its report.

Lord Kitchener then appointed Sir Charles Monro to the
command of all the British Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean,
including Salonika, and General Birdwood in command at
Gallipoli, to carry out the evacuation. He then left for England.

General Monro issued orders for the preUmdnary work of
evacuation to be hurried on with all possible speed, and he
informed General Birdwood that orders to evacuate the whole
Peninsula were imminent, and that the conduct of the operation
would be left entirely to him. On the ajth November, Admiral
de Robeck handed over the Naval Command to Admiral Wemyss
and sailed for home in the Triads taking Ramsay, Bowlby and
his Secretary with him.

Thus the Admiral and the General who were really entirely
responsible for the lamentable policy of evacuation left the
execution of this unpleasant task to an A dmir al and a General
who were strongly opposed to it 1 Admiral Wemyss transferred
his flag from the Europa to the Lord Nelson^ and during the next
four weeks, under his leadership, a most desperate effort was
made to avert what I shall always regard as one of the most
disastrous and cowardly surrenders in the Naval, Military and
Political history of our country.

CHAPTER XXV

FINAL EFFORT TO AVERT DEFEAT

Wemyss opens his campaign ; Fierce blizzard causes* heavy losses ; Efforts to
persuade Monro to co-operate in naval attack ; Conference with Gallipoli
Genercls ; Our hopes raised by probable abandonment of Salonika ; I visit
Salonika to hasten transport of troops ; Kitchener endeavours to bring about
a combined attack ; ^ Evacuation of Anzac and Suvla ordered ; Wemyss
recommends evacuation of Hellos if Army will not co-operate in another
naval attack.

It -would be difficult to imagine a more invidious situation than
that in which Admiral Wemyss found himself on the departure
of Admiral de Robeck.

He told me that he had made it clear to de Robeck that he
considered himself free to give his o-wn opinion on evacuation,
as he had been left to carry out the appalling task -without ever
having been consulted. He has recorded in his memoirs his
final interview -with de Robeck : “ I went to see him before he
left, but no mention was made of the matter uppermost in
both our minds, and I assumed command in a state of uncertainty
as to whether my tenure was temporary or not.”*

Wemyss also told me that de Robeck had not mentioned the
telegram which Mr. Balfour read to me on 4th November,
the day before it was dispatched. I actually saw it and his
reply for the first time when the oflficial military history was
published 16 years later. It was as foUo-ws :

“ First Lord to A dmir al de Robeck. jth November.

I am sorry but not surprised to hear from G)mmodore
Keyes thatyou are badlyin need of a holiday. Please consider
yourself at liberty to take one. Lord Kitchener arrives
... on Tuesday evening. I think you should see him
and discuss the situation. He is fully acquainted -with
Keyes’ opinion. ... In making arrangements for your
substitute during your absence, please bear in mind the

♦ ** The Navy in the Dardanelles Campaign/* by Lord Wester Wemyss, page 21 j.

472

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

possibility that an urgent appeal from the Army to co-
operate with them in a great effort may make it necessary
for the Fleet to attempt to force the Straits. The Admiral
left in charge should therefore be capable of organising
this critical operation, and should be in full agreement
with the policy.”

Admiral de Robeck replied on yth November, 1915 ;

“I am remaining at Mudros to meet Lord Kitchener.
There is no hurry to leave in my case, but I should be grateful
for a short holiday and will ask to proceed to England
for few days later if service admits. In regard to various
points raised in your telegram, a naval and military com-
mittee is considering all plans for evacuation of Peninsula.
Certainly position of our Army on the Peninsula is not
critical at present time as far as I am aware. Until I have
seen Lord Kitchener, I am not clear what the policy is, but
Admiral Wemyss and all Senior Officers agree with my
opinion that unless we can show that some substantial
and definite object can be attained by a portion of the
Squadron eventually forcing their way into the Sea of
Marmora, the sacrifice entailed in effecting this, and the
consequent inability to safeguard the Army on the Peninsula
and the new expedition to Salonika will be grave error.”

I suppose as de Robeck thought that evacuation was inevit-
able, he did not consider it necessary to conomunicate either the
telegram or his reply to Wemyss.

Since May, Wemyss had been most fully occupied administer-
ing the Allied base at Mudros and the lines of communication,
and had had nothing whatever to do with operations, or the
policy connected with them. On assuming command, how-
ever, he went very thoroughly into the whole matter with me.
To quote his memoirs : “ He (Commodore Keyes) and I spent
many hours together elaborating a series of telegrams to the
Admiralty, urging an immediate naval attack and putting forward
every argument in its favour. In this we had the invaluable
assistance of Captain Godfrey, who saw, as we saw, that in our
proposals lay the only chance of saving the situation.”*

* “ The Navy in the Dardanelles Campaign,’* page 216.

FINAL EFFORT TO AVERT DEFEAT

473

First we went together to the Aragon and did our best to
establish the same kind of good relations with Generals Monro
and Lynden-Bell as had existed between Sir Ian and Braithwaite
and de Robeck and myself. At first all went well, and we formed
the impression that if we managed to get their poliqr reversed,
they would work whole-heartedly with us. We put aU our
cards on the table, and I suggested to Lynden Bell — ^with
Admiral Wemyss’ approval — ^that we should show each other
the telegrams of our respective Chiefs, as Braithwaite and I had
always done in the past. He readily agreed, provided Sir
Charles concurred, and I had every hope of maintaining the
spirit of good comradeship which had prevailed between the
Naval and Military Commands from the first, in success and
failure, in fair weather and foul.

Admiral Wemyss put the case for a combined operation to
General Monro and asked him to consider certain points in
connection with naval and military co-operation. He promised
to reply by letter.

Immediately after this interview Wemyss opened the campaign
by telegraphing to the First Lord that after Admiral de Robeck’s
departure he had had a long interview with General Monro,
and had pointed out the great danger of evacuation, from a
naval point of view, in winter weather. He begged that a
definite decision should not be given until he had consulted
further with Monro and other Generals and had sent a naval
appreciation on the situation. He added that personally he
viewed the operation with grave misgivings.

The A dmir alty replied directing him to report fully at once
by telegram, and Admiral Wemyss forwarded the following
appreciation :

“ 28th November, 1915. I understand military reasons
for evacuation are generally speaking based on following
grounds :

1. The conviction that the Army alone cannot
succeed unless they receive prohibitive reinforcements.

2. The wastage in personnel is large and regular ;
consequently better to lose heavily in evacuation than
continue maintenance of a defensive army.

3. Anxiety lest overwhelming German artillery be

474

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

sent here, rendering our position untenable and roaking
evacuation even more difficult than at present.

4. The Anzac-Suvla position is not well adapted to
withstand sustained attack,

5. The Peninsula Army would be better employed
elsewhere.

The evacuation of the Army is, I consider, almost entirely
a naval operation.

Of the purely naval difficulties the most serious appear
to be :

1. A lengthy spell of fine weather is essential; to
count on this at this season pf the year is highly optimistic.
The weather is constantly changing, north-easterly winds
being quickly followed by strong southerly winds,
sufficient to drive all our small craft on to the beach and
bring evacuation to an abrupt end.

2. The beaches, especially at Amzac and Suvla,
shelve gradually, making the task of loading men into
lighters and boats, without grounding, one of very great
difficulty and of great length. The number of piers is
quite inadequate to cope with such a force. At present,
^ter recent southerly gale, piers are practically non-
existent.

5. The submarine danger prevents any large trans-
port approaching nearer to the beaches than Kephalo —
possible exception Suvla.

The following facts accentuate these difficulties :

1. There is no portion of any of our beaches that
cannot be shelled by the enemy.

2. G>vering fire from warships cannot deal effec-
tively with this fire.

5. Enemy’s artillery is so registered on the beaches
that these can be shelled accurately at night.

4. There would be no necessity for the enemy to
husband his ammunition.

The evacuation, once commenced, would have to be
continuous and should be carried out as rapidly as possible
to take advantage of fine weather ; taking into consideration

FINAL EFFORT TO AVERT DEFEAT

475

the shortage of piers and the difficulties of evacuating from
an open beach, it must be accepted that very few wounded
could be removed; consequently all losses would be
absolute, and men evacuated under such conditions would
have difficulty in recovering their morale.

The position on the Peninsula is absolutely abnormal.
Theoretically an evacuation in face of strenuous opposition
means the probable loss of most of the force detailed to
cover the re-embarkation of the main army by keeping the
enemy out of gun range of the beaches. The operation
now proposed is a re-embarkation of a main army without
such a covering force.

General Monro places the probable losses at 30 per cent. ;
I do not think he exaggerates.

I am, however, strongly of opinion that such a disaster
should not be accepted without an effort being made to
retrieve our position.

I consider that a combined attack by Navy and Army
would have every prospect of achieving decisive results.

The initial blow would be struck by the Navy, and
whether the attack was successful or not the Army would
still be supported adequately in its present positions, and
the evacuation could then take place under no more adverse
circumstances than at present.

I am prepared to submit a plan for the naval operations,
and personally I feel assured Sir Charles Monro would be
ready to vigorously co-operate in a joint attack if such
were ordered.

Any doubt I may have had as to the value of a Squadron
above Nagara before the Straits are securely opened has
been outweighed by the gravity of the situation/^

We had made a little harbour of refuge at Kephalo, protected
by a couple of old Italian steamers as blockships. After our
experience of lyth-iSth November, this was greatly improved
by sinking the Oruba (one of Lord FisheFs dummy battleships)
filled with concrete, to extend the breakwater. Thus an excellent
harbour was formed, into which the small craft from the Gallipoli
beaches could take shelter from both northerly and southerly
gales.

476 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

On 26th November a strong southerly gale was accompanied
by a heavy downpour of rain, which lasted for 24 hours and
drenched everyone on the Peninsula. This was followed, with
hardly a pause, by an icy northerly gale, a fierce blizzard, then
a heavy fall of snow and a very severe frost. The storm raged
for three dreadful days and the sufferings of the troops on the
Peninsula were terrible. At Anzac and Helles they stood it
pretty well and were able to get some shelter in the ravines,
dug-outs and galleries. But at Suvla, the troops on Kiretch
Tepe felt the full force of the blast ; those on the low-lying
plain were flooded out of their trenches, and numbers, of friend
and foe alike, were actually drowned, and many died of exposure.
Our losses amounted to 200 dead, '5 ,000 cases of severe frost-bite,
and another 5,000 were evacuated sick. The enemy suffered
even more severely, and numbers of dead bodies were washed
down in the torrents which flooded the plain from the high
ground overlooking it.

This quite abnormal blizzard was a tragedy. On the other
hand, it made evacuation impossible for the time being.

When the southerly blow started, remembering the gale of
17th to 1 8th, the small craft at Anzac and Helles were sent to
the harbour of refuge at Kephalo. Unfortunately, in the
northerly gale one of the old Italian steamers broke up and
the sea running through the gap thus formed, wrecked the
piers and jetties and piled up aU the small craft on shore. The
total losses included a torpedo boat, a water ship, several tugs,
motor lighters, pinnaces, etc. Submarine Hi, which was
standing by to go into the Marmora, suffered serious damages
and had a very narrow escape. Eventually she lay on the bottom
until the gale abated, with her periscope just above the water ;
it was feared that she was lost, but to the intense relief of the
onlookers on shore, it was noticed that her periscope revolved
from time to time.

It was essential to have a harbour of refuge for small craft
in Kephalo, the nearest shelter being at Mudros, and sudden
shifts of wind made it impossible to risk leaving them on a lee
shore. The Admiral therefore telegraphed to the Admiralty
that if evacuation was decided upon he proposed to sink the
armoured cruiser Terrible, or an old battleship, to close the gap
in the Kephalo breakwater.

477

final effort to avert DBi'lwVr

In the meantime, in response to a telegram from the A 4 iniMlt s. ,
Admiral Wemyss telegraphed :

“The plan proposed is for the Navy to f'>ra fho Dar-
danelles, whilst the Army is prepared for vigonxis k
and held in instant readiness to do so at the psyt ho *0*^1 al

moment. ... _ 1 . .1

The Army would not necessarily be expected to at lack

simultaneously with the naval attack, but by vij'oroiis
feints it could materially assist by holding the enemy to his
ground and preventing him reinforcing the liglu:
defences* of the minefields.

The naval attack will be carried out generally on the
lines submitted by Commodore Keyes when in
with whom I discussed it before his departure. ...

Such an attack cannot but have a most detiwtralising
effect upon the enemy, particularly so if, as is hoped, he
is taken by surprise.”

After dispatching this telegram the Admiral and I went on
board the Aragon and showed it and the preceding one to
Monro and Lynden-Bell. Sir Charles said that if ordered to
co-operate they would do so thoroughly, but . . . and it was
obvious he intended to do all he could to stop it.

I had two or three long talks with Sir Charles, and at that time
he was exceedingly nice to me and was most tolerant of my
outbursts. After one interview I wrote : “ General Monro’s
shortsighted outlook is simply astounding. He said, * Well, if
it aU succeeds, you go through the Straits into the Marmora
and we occupy Constantinople, what good is it going to do ?
What then ? It won’t help us to win the war ; France is the
only place in which Germany can be beaten. lELvery man not
employed in killing Germans in France and Flanders is wasted.’
I said ; ‘ The troops you get out of here won’t go to France but
to Egypt.’ He retorted that he did not believe in the danger
in Egypt. I said I did not either, but the ‘ Egyptians ’ (Sir
Henry MacMahon and General Maxwell) did, and the Govern-
ment would be bound to send a big army there when the
Turkish Army \yas released.” That rather beat

♦ We iiad good reason to believe that most of them had been remove<i
operations against the Army, and we know now that this was the case.

478 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

He used the argument Lord Kitchener had been given by
Horne, as to the lack of depth in the Gallipoli position, which
made it impossible to deploy and develop an attack. I replied
that the sea was very deep, and asked where in France, or any-
where else for that matter, could a position have been reinforced
by 25,000 men without the enemy having any suspicion of it,
as An2;ac was for the August offensive. Or where could 7,000
men have been launched into an attack (10,000 to 15,000 could
have been equally well employed) and deployed for action within
half an hour, as they were between Nibrunesi Point and Axmc
on 6th August — entirely unsuspected by the enemy. Such
operations were surely an absolute impossibility in land warfare ;
but they seemed incapable of appreciating the value of amphibious
power.

I went on to say that the Germans were checked in France,
Flanders and Russia ; this was their one remaining outlet, and
we were going to give them a free hand if his recommendations
were carried out.

He said it was too late for a combined naval and militaty
attack. I said that one would have been ordered early in
November but for him. He did not like that. He said senti-
ment should not be allowed to interfere with Higher Military
Strategy ” ; which appeared to amount, in his opinion, to no
more than killing Germans. In fact,” I wrote in my diary
that night, “ he can see no further than the wire in No-man’s-
land on the Western Front.”

General Monro took everything I said in very good part,
and when I asked him after his foot, remembering my parting
shot on another occasion, he said, It will be well enough soon

to get up and kick somebody’s stern,” I said, That is

splendid, the best thing I have heard for some time — ^you mean
the Turks, sir.”

It was a black day for our enterprise when the Government
decided to substitute Monro for Hamilton. Sir Ian had
the vision to see its unlimited possibilities ; the know-
ledge and experience to appreciate the immense value of a
fleet above the Narrows ; and faith in the Navy to carry out
its undertakings. He would have welcomed Wemyss’ offer
to force the Straits and would have backed u§ up for all he
was worth.

FINAL EFFORT TO AVERT DEFEAT

479

On 30th November I accompanied Admiral Wemyss to
Imbros to confer with General Birdwood and the Generals
from the Peninsula about evacuation. General Byng did not
come, but sent his Chief of Staff.

The havoc at Kephalo was far worse than we imagined ; the
whole beach was a mass of wreckage and vessels piled up on top
of one another. We almost rejoiced, for evacuation for some
little time was a naval impossibility, and in the meantime wiser
counsels might prevail.

Admiral Wemyss opened the meeting by putting our case
to the Generals, and telling them what we proposed to do, and
then he told me to tell them what had happened at home, so
I took them through the history of the operations — ^from a
naval point of view — ^from our check on the 18 th March rmtil
the present date, and concluded by telling them that we were
confident of our ability to sever the enemy’s communications.

It was obvious that, with the exception of General Byng’s
Chief of Staff, they all hated the thought of evacuation. They
told us the morale of the Turks was very low, that they had
suffered more heavily than we had in the blizzard, and numbers
were surrendering every night ; the prisoners declared that many
more were ready to come in, but were aficaid of being shot
firom behind or in front.

General Davies handed in a written statement to General
Birdwood, giving very strong reasons against evacuation; in
fact, he decked, in the present state of his beaches it was an
impossibility.

General Birdwood showed us the tdegram he sent on
2nd November, when Lord K. asked for his opinion about
evacuation, after he had received Monro’s report recommending
it. It set out very dearly his objections to evacuation. He
said it still represented his opinion, when conside ri n g the local
situation. Lately he had been asked to give an opinion on
larger grounds, which gave him no option but to agree to
evacuation. Ndther he nor any of the Corps Co mm a nd ers had
ever contemplated a combined offensive. In feet the possibility
of a naval attack had never been suggested to them by Monro
or Kitchener.

It was a great pity General Byng was not there. I had seen
a good deal of him before I went home and he had always made

480 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

use of the same phrase, I can get on, but if they won’t let me
get on, I must get out.” He had inherited a thoroughly dis*
heartened and defeated Corps, but he had greatly raised its morale
and even after the loth Division was taken from him for Salonika
he still declared that he could “ get on ” without reinforcements.
He was never allowed to try, and his Corps had never fought
under his command. It was not surprising that he was in
favour of getting out,” on the information given to him by
General Monro.

I think everyone at Imbros was cheered by the thought that
there might be a way out of their difficulties, for, as Brigadier-
General Aspinall (then Chief Staff Officer to General Birdwood)
remarked, the recent gale had shown how great a risk would
be run in the final stage of withdrawal, and it was beginning
to appear that a decision to evacuate would be an even greater
gamble than a decision to stay.

Meanwhile the Cabinet or the Council of War was apparently
unable to come to a decision, and we were in great hopes that
Admiral Wemyss’ telegrams were the cause of this delay. We
know now that this was not the case. The Government at
this moment had practically decided to withdraw from Salonika.
Lord Cur2:on had written a very strong memorandum against
the evacuation of Gallipoli. Colonel Hankey had submitted
an appreciation to the Prime Minister, in which he pointed out
that the evacuation of the Peninsula would enable Germany to
obtain her ambition of increasing our difficulties in the !^st,
without any effort at all on her part. . . . Lord Kitchener
was already asking for 14 divisions to protect Egypt. . . .
There was even a fear that Russia might sign a separate peace.
He urged that the arguments in favour of holding on to Gallipoli
were overwhelming, provided that it could be done. “ It so happens,”
his paper concluded, that good divisions are about to be set
free from Salonika, and the main plea of this paper is that the
question may be considered from the point of view of their
■possible use to save the position on the Gallipoli Peninsula,
and if possible to take the offensive. ...”

The opponents of evacuation then gained ground. The
official history states :

‘^Wemyss’ request to be allowed to force the Straits

FINAL EFFORT TO AVERT DEFEAT 481

had not, it is true, found much favour with the Government,
for Admiral de Robeck had now reached England, and at
a meeting of the War Committee on the and December,
in addition to emphasising the hazards of the undertaking,
he pointed out that, ' though it might be worth while if
there was a definite object to gain by it, he himself could
see none/ But it had now been decided that the Salonika
enterprise must be abandoned at all costs, and Lord Curzon’s
minute (against evacuating the Peninsula) had made such
a vast impression that there was strong support for con-
tinuing the Gallipoli Campaign. Counting on the help of
four divisions to be brought firom Salonika, Lord Kitchener
again changed his mind, and was supporting this plan.”*

Lord Kitchener telegraphed to General Monro on and
December :

“ The Cabinet has been considering the Gallipoli situation
all day. Owing to political consequences, there is a strong
feeling against evacuation, even of a partial character. It
is the general opinion that we should retain Cape Helles.
If the Salonika troops are placed at your disposal for an
offensive operation to improve the position at Suvla, could
such operations be carried out in time, with a view to
making Suvla retainable by obtaining higher positions and
greater depth ? The Navy will also take the offensive in
co-operation.”

General Monro replied on 3rd December :

I fully recognise the complexity of the situation which
has arisen. I do not, however, think that the proposal
to employ four fresh divisions in order to gain a more
secure position at Suvla can be regarded as an operation
offering a reasonable chance of success. ... In respect
of naval co-operation, the character of the terrain on the
Peninsula is such that naval guns cannot search the Txirkish
positions. The fire of howitzers would be needed to do
so effectively. The many deep ravines and gullies are
very favourable for the concealment and protection of the
Turkish reserves and for their rapid transference in case

* “ ^Military Operations, C^Uipoli/* pages 4Z8 to 436.

482 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

of bombardment. Nor do I think the supply of the Turks
on the Peninsula by the two lines available to them would
be prevented by naval action.”

General Monro’s experience was limited to one visit to the
Peninsula ; he landed at Helles, Anzac and Suvla on
30th October and remained for about half an hour in the
vicinity of the beach at each place. His Chief of Staff never
kfided on the Peninsula at all. The opinion of the Generals
with experience in Gallipoli, who were opposed to evacuation,
was ignored.

With reference to naval co-operation, General Davies had
actually reported most favourably on the great value of naval
gunfire in an attack that was delivered at Helles on
15th November.

General Monro had been informed that the Agamemnon^
Endymion and a monitor, operating in the Gulf of Xeros, had
bombarded Kavak Bridge and completely destroyed the two
centre arches and seriously damaged the northern approaches
to the bridge and the road. The Kavak River and marshes
being full of water at this season, the enemy’s communications
along the seaward side of the Bulair Isthmus were thus cut.
Ships in the Marmora could completely control the other road,
as well as all sea-borne transport.

Nevertheless, the last paragraph of General Monro’s telegram
expressed his opinion on a naval matter — ^which was quite
outside his knowledge or experience — diametrically opposite to
the opinion which Admird Wemyss and I had repeatedly
impressed upon him. Moreover, he knew that the Admiral
was ready to stake his life, his reputation and his fleet on the
belief that he could force the Straits, cut the two Turkish lines
of supply and thus extricate our Army from its difficult position.

We soon got an inkling that something was on foot, for on
3rd December a telegram was received from the Admiralty
directing the Admiral to report how soon four divisions at
Salonika could be transported to Mudros. The Admiral and
I went on board the Aragon at once to make arrangements with
the General Staff. We were kept in complete ignorance of
Lord Kitchener’s telegram and General Monro’s reply I
(I saw these two telegrams for the first time when the final report

FINAL EFFORT TO AVERT DEFEAT 483

of the Dardanelles Commission was published in December,
1917.) I wrote that night : “ The most awfiil difficulties were
raised. They simply don’t know how to make war. What
wouldn’t I give for Johnme or Hubert Gough to put life into
the proceedings. They simply hate our trying to hurry things.
It is hard to ‘ wait and not be tired of waiting ’ and ‘ make
allowance for their doubting too ’—but I am trying to.”

The next day we were told that it would take 15 days to
transport the troops from Salonika. I felt inclined to weep or
swear, and the Admiral said I might go to Salonika to hasten
matters. The Admiral and I went on board the Ara^ofj again
to try and find out what they wanted in the way of transport,
etc., as the (fivisions were equippgjj^ of course, with all sorts
of things which we knew they would not require in Gallipoli.
Lynden-BeU promised to let me know the foUowing morning.
In an unguarded moment he said : “ Well, we are in for it—
we are going to do it ; you have got your way.” My hopes
rose sky-high.

Wliile I was on board I talked to Deedes, who was Intelfigence
Officer on Sir Ian’s Staff. He knows Turkish hke a T nrV and
said the prisoners are very downhearted. They detest the idea
of the Germans in Constantinople, and a success now would
bring about a coUapse of the German domination there. He
said it was the most unfortunate time to fbifiJk of evacuating, but
he had never been consulted. I told him what we wanted to
do and he said he thought it was the only way out of the awful
position into which we had drifted.

That evening we received a signal from Nasmith in the
Marmora, saying he had torpedoed the Yar Hissa, a French-built
Turkish destroyer, and had picked up two officers and 40 men
out of a crew of 85. Later he had put them on board a sailing
vessel. He had also sunk the Bosphorus, a 3,000-ton steamer,
by gunfire.

Next morning I went to see Lynden Bell and found him stone
cold. He had seen his Chief in the meantime, who said he
would not agree to any portion of the four divisions being
brought without their whole paraphernalia, heavy guns, mechani-
cal transport, etc., etc. The Q.M.G., who was present, dwelt
on the absolute necessity for embarking everything complete
and very deliberately. I sat quiet and good, because we could

484 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

not have any friction, though I nearly howled ; but after they
had said that if anything was left behind they would never see
it again, I remarked it would be a small loss compared to what
they were contemplating in the evacuation of Gallipoli, and
surely the units not required could be safely left behind at
Salonika. Lynden-Bell said, on the contrary, the Germans
would be in Salonika in a very short time. “ These are the
people,’’ I commented in my diary, on whose advice the
Government are acting 1 ”

As it was quite certain that Monro would throw cold water
on any suggestion for a combined offensive, in spite of the
troops from Salonika, Admiral Wemyss, Godfrey and I con-
cocted a telegram to the Admiralty, breathing encouragement
and confidence. After remarking on the low morale of the
Turks and their sufferings in the blizzard, the Admiral declared
that he was ready to carry out the offensive with the ships then
in the Mediterranean. He reported that the Turks were being
continually harassed by indirect gunfire from the ships, in the
villages where they were known to take shelter, and that the
heavy monitors had been registered on to the forts on both
sides of the Straits and had experienced no difficulty in repeatedly
laitting them by indirect fire over the Peninsula.

On the 5 th the Admiralty telegraphed suspending all landing
at Salonika ; in the meantime I had learnt from Birdwood what
would be required, and I left that night in the Ha\el with Lambart
to speed up the transport of the troops from there. The result
of my visit was that arrangements were made to transport all
the troops of the four divisions, eqmpped with all that they
would require for operations in Gallipoli, in the available
transports, battleships and cruisers, within a few days. I
returned to Mudros on the yth very elated.

Admiral Wemyss told me that Admiral Le Bon, a great
friend of his and mine, who had been in charge of the French
lines of communication fromMudros,and had just been appointed
to command the French Squadron at Mudros, had come on
board the previous night to see him, and had told him that he
thought evacuation was a terrible mistake; he felt sure the
Allied Fleet could and ought to force the Straits. He was
delighted to hear that we were now very hopeful of being
allowed to do so.

FINAL EFFORT TO AVERT DEFEAT

485

I went to bed that night simply full of buoyant hope, to be
awakened in the small hours (8th December) by the Admiral’s
Secretary, who told me that the following telegram had been
received : In view of unanimous military opinion, his Majesty’s
Government have decided to shorten the front by evacuating
Arrzac and Suvla,” I turned my face to the ship’s side and felt
that I was almost beaten.

After breakfast we set to work again, and the Admiral tele-*
graphed to the Admiralty as follows (6a6) ;

8th December.

The reason given for this decision is a very great
surprise to me and one .which I feel convinced has been
arrived at under a misapprehension by the military at home.
I have never seen any of G.O.C.-in-C’s telegrams or
appreciations, though I have shown him all mine. I
confirm strongly all I said in my telegram of 28th November
re evacuation.

The Navy is prepared to force the Straits and control
them for an indefinite period; cutting off all Turkish
supplies which now find their way to the Peninsula either
by sea from the Marmora or across the Dardanelles from
Asiatic to European shore. The only line of communica-
tions left would be the roads along the Isthmus of Bulair,
which can be controlled almost entirely &om the Sea of
Marmora and the Gulf of Xeros.

^Taat is offered the Army, therefore, is the practical
complete severance of all Turkish lines of communication,
accompanied by the destruction of the large supply depots
on the shores of the Dardanelles.

In the first instance I strongly advocated that the naval
attack should synchronise with an Army offensive, but
this is not a necessity and if the Army will be prepared to
attack in the event of a favourable opportunity presenting
itself, nothing more need be required of them.

The Navy here is prepared to xmdertake this operation
with every assurance of success.”

The Admiral followed this by a personal telegram to
Mr. Balfour, who I knew was immensely taken with the idea

486

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

of a naval offensive when I saw him in I.ondon a month earlier.
It was as follows (631) ;

8 th December.

The unanimous military opinion referred to in Admiralty
telegram has, I feel certain, been greatly influenced, and
naturally so, by the military appreciations of Sir Charles
Monro. These I have not seen but their purport I have
gathered in course of conversations. The Corps Com-
manders I know view the evacuation with the greatest
misgiving.

The forcing of the Dardanelles as outlined in my telegrams
has never been put before them and I am convinced that
after considering the certain results which would follow
a naval success, they would favour an attack on the lines
indicated, especially in view of the undoubted low morale
of the Turkish Peninsula Army, of which we have ample
evidence.

A few days ago General Monro remarked to me : ^ If
you succeed and occupy Gallipoli, and even Constantinople,
what then ? It would not help us in France or Flanders.’

I mention this to show that he has quite failed to realise
the significance of the real German objective in the Near
East. He is obsessed with the idea that the only method
by which the Allies will be victorious is in killing or
capturing such a number of Germans that they (the Germans)
will be unable to continue fighting. He looks upon any
action which does not have the above for its immediate
objective as a waste of effort.

The very extensive German propaganda being pursued
aU over the Near East, accompanied by the expenditure of
vast sums of money, is not, I feel convinced, being under-
taken merely as a side issue to the European War.

A position of stalemate on both fronts of the principal
theatres of war appears the natural outcome of the present
situation.

This opinion is freely expressed in the higher military
drdes in Greece and would therefore appear to be fostered
by the Germans, a significant point.

By surrendering our position here, when within sight of

FINAL EFFORT TO AVERT DEFEAT

487

victory^ we are aiding the enemy to obtain markets, the
possession of which may enable her to outlast the Allies
in the war of exhaustion now commencing.

A successful attack would once and for il disperse these
clouds of doubt — a large amount of shipping would be
released, and the question of Greece and Egypt settled.

I do not know what has been decided about Constanti-
nople, but if the Turk could be told that we were in the
Marmora to prevent its occupation by the Germans, such
a course would inevitably lead to disruption and therefore
weakness amongst them.

I fear the effect upon the Navy would be bad. Although
no word of attack has passed my lips except to my im-
mediate Staff and Admkals, I feel sure that every officer
and man would feel that the campaign had been abandoned
without sufficient use having been made of our greatest
force, viz. the Navy.

The position is so critical that there is no time for
standing on ceremony, and I suggest that General Birdwood,
the officer who would have to carry out the attack
or evacuation which is now ordered, be asked for his
appreciation.

The logical conclusion, therefore, is the choice of evacua-
tion or forcing the Straits. I consider the former disastrous
tactically and strategically, and the latter feasible, and so
long as troops remain in Anzac, decisive.

I am convinced that the time is ripe for a vigorous
offensive, and I am confident of success.”

On the 9th December I went over to Kephalo to attend an
evacuation conference, and was much impressed by the disgust
expressed by the fighting soldiers at the shame and folly of
clearing out when we had the enemy beaten and demoralised.
The Australian Brigadier-General G.S. at Anzac was par-
ticularly scathing in his comments. I reported this to Admiral
Wemyss when I returned that night and he telegraphed again '
(638) to the First Lord :

9th December.

From information I have received today, I am more
than ever convinced that the true extent of the proposed

488 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

naval action has never been placed even before General
Birdwood and that therefore any opinion already expressed
by him has been given under a misapprehension. I there-
fore urge that the suggestion contained in my telegram of
the 8th be acted on. At Anzac, where they know that
they have the enemy beaten, the spirit has never been higher,
and evacuation as discussed in the papers is ridiculed.”

The Admiral then decided to go to Kephalo with me the
following day, and asked General Birdwood to arrange for the
Generals from the Peninsula to meet us.

On the loth December therefore, we went back to Kephalo
in great hope that Birdwood could be induced to take a strong
line, in view of the courageous statements against evacuation
he had repeatedly made to us. On our arrival Birdwood
told us that on the morning of the 6th he had received a
telegram from Monro telling him to prepare a scheme for using
four divisions from Salonika, mentioning that the Navy would
take the offensive in co-operation. He said he thought we had
won, and he was delighted. He showed us his reply, which
was to the effect that both he and Byng were of the opinion
that, with fresh troops and plenty of howitzer ammunition, it
was still possible to advance at Suvla. But he made no mention
of the low morale of the Turks, of their nightly desertion into
our lines, nor of the great effect a fleet above the Narrows
would have on the enemy’s communications. The blizzard
had evidently shaken him, for he dwelt on the perils of a winter
capipaign and concluded by describing the suggested operation
as a complete gamble.” After showing us his telegram,
which he said General Monro had forwarded to Lord Kitchener,
he remarked that we could see he had declared for an attack ;
but we did not feel very much encouraged and went sadly
back to Mudros, realising that there was nothing to be hoped
for from that quarter.

We know now that when Lord Kitchener heard that we could
transport the troops from Salonika so rapidly, he refused to
accept General Monro’s verdict and again asked for the opinion
of Birdwood and Byng, Monro was then able to send Bird-
wood’s reply (which he had shown us at Imbros) and one to
the same effect from Byng, whose Corps had suffered so fearfully

FINAL EFFORT TO AVERT DEFEAT 489

in the blizzard and who, by this time, was himself thoroughly
disheartened by his long-enforced inaction.

So, once again, it was left to General Birdwood to make a
big decision ; but, as on a previous occasion when he was
actually appointed to supersede Monro, his great loyalty to his
Chief decided his action and he was not prepared to accept any
independent responsibility.

On our retxim to Mudros we found two telegrams from the
Admiralty.

“ Admiralty to Vice-Admiral. loth December, 1915.

As Admiralty are not prepared to authorise Navy single-
handed attempting to force the Narrows and acting in
Sea of Marmora cut off from supplies, the decision of the
Government to evacuate Suvla and Anzac will not be
further questioned by Admiralty in view of the individual
and combined appreciation of the responsible Generals
and the great strain thrown on naval and military resources
by the operations in Greece. Holding Cape Helles and
the mouth of the Straits will enable another attack to be
started later working on a diflFerent plan should the Govern-
ment decide to undertake it.”

Mr. Balfour’s personal reply to Admiral Wemyss breathed a
finer spirit :

Your telegram has been very carefully considered.
I personally agree with your appreciation of German
designs in the East, and I view with deepest regret the
abandonment of Suvla and Anzac. But military authorities,
including Birdwood, are clear that these cannot be made
tenable against an increased artillery fire, while the Admiralty
hold that the naval arguments against forcing the Straits
are overwhelming. Naval authorities here are convinced
that while success is most doubtful, very heavy losses are
certain, and it must be remembered that nothing would
have a worse effect on our Eastern position than a serious
check to the Navy. This would be represented as a heavy
blow at our naval supremacy.”*

* This telegram is incorrectly attributed to the First Sea Lord,Sit Henry Jackson»
on page 59 of the Dardanelles Commission’s Final Report,

490 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

It is difficult to reconcile the official Admiralty telegram \?ith
the fact, which is now on record, that when Lord Kitchener
decided to throw the Salonika troops into Gallipoli and called
upon the Admiralty to provide the naval co-operation in a
combined attack — ^which he had been led to count upon—
Mr. Balfour had to inform the Government that the Sea Lords—
who in the meantime had consulted de Robeck — ^were no
longer prepared to allow the Fleet to force the Straits.

Admiral Wemyss, who was striving with such determination
for a more courageous policy was left in ignorance of this and
other important matters and it was a long time before we knew
what was actually taking place at home.

We know now that the Cabinet’s decision to evacuate was,
in the end, dictated by the action of the French Government,
who, supported by the Russian Government, were determined
that our troops should not leave Salonika, and pressed their
point to the verge of a rupture. They declared that if the
Allies gave up that port, Roumania and Greece would join the
Central Powers and Salonika would become a base for German
submarines.

It is almost incredible that our Government should have
accepted such a plea ; but the French military authorities, like
our own, seemed to be incapable of understanding the value of
sea power, or of realising the impossibility of a hostile Greece,
or a German base at Salonika, while the Allied Fleet was in
being in the Eastern Mediterranean.

It was now clear that we had to accept the evacuation of
Anzac and Suvla as inevitable. But to hold Cape Helles in order
to enable another attack to be delivered later seemed to us
sheer procrastination, and the Admiral, Godfrey and I discussed
how we could best bring matters to a head. It was essential
that, if another attack was ever contemplated, it should be de-
livered directly after the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac, with
the object of capturing Achi Baba, the possession of which
would fulfil the conditions which Admiral de Robeck (who
was now on his way back) had considered necessary before he
would undertake to renew the attack on the Narrows. If the
General was not prepared to undertake this, we felt that we
should make every effort to bring about the evacuation of Helles

FINAL EFFORT TO AVERT DEFEAT

491

at the eatliest possible moment. We felt that it was not fair
to ask the Army to endure the daily losses which were suffered
at Helles and which would increase when the Turks at Anzac
and Suvla were released, simply to make it more easy for us to
watch the Straits. The possession of Helles could not possibly
affect the enemy’s submarine campaign, as suggested in Lord
Kitchener’s telegram of 23 rd November.

By that time the co-operation of ships’ guns with the Army
was far ahead of anything contemplated at home. The enemy’s
batteries, trenches, bivouacs, etc., were jfixed by aerial photography
and other means, and excellent maps were issued to the firing
ships. Indirect fire was developed to a high degree of accuracy,
with the aid of aerial and shore observation. Mark buoys were
laid, and aiming points, ranges and deflections were registered
on to any position on which fire was required by the Army ;
indirect fire could then be opened at short notice without waiting
for aerial observation. At Helles the ships had the great
advantage of being able to engage the enemy from the front,
both flanks, and from the rear, and were able to deny them many
favourable positions for their batteries and continually
forced them to change their positions.

As I have mentioned. General Davies had expressed warm
appreciation of the value of naval gunfire in co-operation with
a military oflensive ; his letter to Admiral de Robeck on the
subject ran thus :

1 6th November, 1915*

The excellent shooting, of the cruiser and monitors
yesterday undoubtedly contributed very largely to the
ease with which our troops seized two important positions
in the enemy’s lines and added enormously to the moral
effect and material damage done to the enemy.

All who saw it agree as to the accuracy and value of
the monitors’ fire, but the chief point is that it has been
established that co-operation in an attack has now become
a practical reality and that a system has been established
which, with further development, will prove a powerful
factor both in attack and defence.

As regards the fire of the batteries, there is, of course,
no record as to the actual damage done, but the fact that

492

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

the Turkish artillery, though they fired more ammunition
than they have done since our big attacks some months
ago, have never fired more wildly and their fire did
practically no damage and did not hinder either the capture
of the trenches or the consolidation of them afterwards,
is sufficient evidence of the success achieved.”

Armed with this I went over to Helles and discussed it fully
with General Davies and Brigadier-General Street. Admiri
Wemyss then forwarded the following telegram (662) to the
Admiralty :

“ 13th December, 1915.

On completion of evacuation of Suvla and Anzac a most
serious situation will present itself at Helles.

The whole of Helles zont is exposed to artillery fire from
the Asiatic shore and from the north of Achi Baba. The
intensity of this fire is likely to be more than doubled on
account of the number of guns released from the northern
zone and the influx of ammunition and heavy howitzers
from Germany may cause it to become so severe as to
force the Army to evacuate.

The Helles position even with the addition of heavy
artillery will be untenable unless the Army is in possession
of Achi Baba ; the capture of this position appears to me
essential if we are to retain our footing on the Peninsula,

I consider the decision must be made at once and acted
on without loss of time, and if possible before the Turks
can move their artillery from Anzac and Suvla,

A policy of holding on to our present position at Helles
and waiting until spring for offensive action will be suicidal
for the Army. Better to evacuate that position immediately
than to suffer a second and more decisive reverse by
procrastinati n g.

The capture of Achi Baba position does not seem beyond
our powers.

The G.O.C. 8th Corps attributes the capture of trenches
on 15 th November, wida insignificant loss, to a great extent
to the support afforded by the naval squadron consisting
of one specially protected cruiser and three monitors, who,
after careful registration, used indirect fire without the

HNAL EFFORT TO AVERT DEFEAT

493

assistance of spotting by aeroplane, rendered impossible
by high wind. ;

Fifteen miles of heavy net is available here now ; with
this it will be possible to guard an area off the left flan]<-
where battleships will be able to lie and support the Arm y
in a sustained attack.

Once Add Baba is in our hands we shall be in the
position desired last April and the attack on the Narrows
can be carried out with every hope of success.

I strongly hold that this is not a purely military matter
but one of combined naval and military importance, and
I therefore have no hesitation in putting forward my views
and consider it my duty to do so as the Admiral Command-
ing at this critical moment.”

A copy of this was sent to General Monro, who promptiy
telegraphed the following protest to Lord Kitchener :

“ 14th December, 1915.

I have just received a copy of telegram No. 662 which
Admiral Wemyss sent yesterday to the Admiralty. In this
telegram the Admiral deals with the military situation at
Helles and urges an attack on Achi Baba without delay.
I wish to dissociate myself from the views expressed by
the Admiral. An attack on this position presents an
undertaking the magnitude of which he is not in a position
to appreciate. I hold the opinion that our military responsi-
bilities, at any rate at the present juncture, in this theatre
of war, should not be further increased, especially for such
a problematical prospect as the Admiral foreshadows,”

General Monro followed this up with another telegram to
Lord Kitchener :

15 th December, 1915.

I think it would be well if Admiral here were to confine
himself to an expression of opinion on naval matters.
We work in complete harmony but he omits no effort to
try and secure mili tary support to his scheme of combined
military and naval operations for forcing the Dardanelles.
{Surelj that is what we were there fori) I make no comment

494

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

on the naval problem, but I decline to offer military support
unless ordered by you. As to his predictions that Cape
Helles will become the objective of heavy bombardment
on the evacuation of Anzac and Suvla, the Admiral does
not realise the actual facts in respect to the effect of evacua-
tion of Arzac and Suvla on the position of Helles. Turks
have always been able to use as many troops on Helles
front as they could deploy and there can be 'no change in
this respect. Provided the necessary guns and ammunition
be forthcoming it would always be possible for- them to
mass dangerously powerful artillery against Helles. Chief
difference in new situation^ will be that whereas Turks
would probably have massed against Suvla or Anzac if
we had held them, while mainly containing us at Helles,
they can now only mass against Helles. Of course, HeUes
being held by itself offers an attractive objective to the
Turks, and it is quite possible that they may make a serious
effort against it, but the capture of Achi Baba will not in
any way reduce the dangers which the Vice-Admiral
predicts so far as land defence is concerned and its capture
is quite beyond our resources, and I contend a fruitless
undertaking in the existing military situation, not even
clearing the beaches at Helles so long as Turkish guns
are maintained on the Asiatic shore. I would remind
you of my paper submitted to you while you were here,
pointing out the disadvantages of holding the Helles
position alone and making it clear that I looked upon its
retention only as a lesser evil than the retention of Anzac
and Suvla as well as Helles.”

A messenger brought a copy of this to the Admiral, and at
the same time delivered a letter from General Monro covering
a memorandum from General Birdwood, pointing out that it
was essential for the security of the Helles Division that certain
naval action should be taken, to comply with which would
have meant the retention of a nxrmber of ships in close support
of the Army continually off the Peninsula, including battleships
held in readiness at Kephalo. Birdwood's memorandum clearly
visualised the possibility of a big offensive in the spring and
drew attention to the great value of naval gunfire, particularly

FINAL EFFORT TO AVERT DEFEAT

495

that of battleships, in the event of an offensive being ordered.

In reply to the memorandum, Admiral Wemyss assured the
General that the Fleet would do all in its power to support the
Army throughout the winter, but he pointed out the difficulties
of maintaining monitors, cruisers and destroyers in the desired
positions in stormy weather, or close to the Peninsula in the
event of the enemy mounting lon^-range artillery, since these
vessels were all unarmoured. He also sent the General a copy
of the following telegram (670) to the Admiralty :

“ 17th December, 1915.

General Monro has given me a copy of a telegram he
has sent to Lord Kitchener with reference to my telegram
No. 662. He considers the question of the possibility of
retention of our footing on Peninsula to be merely a milit ary
one. I regret I cannot concur in this. The important
work of landing supplies for Army is a naval question, as
is that of naval gun support. I am very surprised he does
not consider that capture of Achi Baba would reduce
dangers which I anticipate firom enemy’s increased artillery
fire. As an observation station alone it is invaluable to
whoever holds it. It has always been talked of by higher
Military Commanders as the key of the southern position.
With it in our hands. Gully Beach would be available for
landing stores should increased fire from Asiatic batteries
make this impossible on “ W ” and “ V ” Beaches. It
would greatly increase effectiveness of naval gunfire by
giving us an ideal observation station when spotting &om
aeroplanes will be impossible owing to weather. The
reported advent of heavy Ge rm a n artillery in northern
zone has increased anxiety of militar y c ommand ers to
evacuate as quickly as possible. It is hardly logical to
neglect this contingency in the southern zone. Given
suitable artillery, the enemy could drive supporting vessels
out to a range firom which their support would no longer
be effective. The possession of Achi Baba would per^t
ships to lie dose in to Gully Beach and render effective
support by filing over heads of our troops.

General Monro states that the capture of Achi Baba is
quite beyond our resources and he considers it a fruitless

4^6 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

undertaking under existing noilitary situation, I believe
he underestimates the support which the whole Fleet can
give in a general attack under the present conditions and
before the enemy’s artillery can be reinforced. however
his viem are accepted^ I am of opinion that evacuation of Helles
should take place at once. To renew the attack after enemy has
had free access to arsenals of Germany for some time would, I
fear, be attempting the almost impossible.

General Monro has always showed me every consideration
and we work together with greatest amity. I regret
exceedingly that my views should differ from his, but I
should be lacldng in duty were I not to place them fully
before you.”

This was Admiral Wemyss’ last broadside, and Godfrey and
I hoped that it would have the effect of bringing home to tbe
Government the folly of further procrastination and result in
the evacuation of Helles, since it was evident that nothing
would induce General Monro to co-operate with us in our
effort to force the Straits.

This telegram brought a prompt reply (471) from Mr. Balfour ;

17th December, 1915.

Your views as to importance of capture of Achi Baba
seem to me perfectly sound and were, I thought, held by
all authorities, military and naval. VJThat is in doubt is
not whether it is worth capturing, but whether Achi Baba
can be captured. This is a military and not a naval problem,
and the soldiers seem now to have arrived unanimously to
the conclusion that the position cannot be taken by direct
attack.”

Nevertheless our plan was put forward after consultation with
General Davies and his Chief of Staff (Brigadier-General Street),
who were prepared to carry it out if sanctioned.

On receipt of Admiral Wemyss’ telegram and memorandum,
General Monro wrote an apology which ended the matter :

1 8 th December, 1915.

I regret having given you the impression that I considered
the possibility of the retention of Helles solely a military

FINAL EFFORT TO AVERT DEFEAT

497

question. The purely military question is the possibility
of our capturing Achi Baba with the military resources at
our disposal, I agree that the capture of Achi Baba would
give us certain advantages, if it were possible, but it would
not really reduce the essential danger, which is continuous
intensive bombardment of our lines from three sides. With
your main argument as to the ‘dangers of the Helles situation
I agree, but can only repeat that I see no prospect of success
in an attack on Achi Baba, I concur in your opinion as
to the necessity for the evacuation of Helles, but I have
always understood that its retention was determined on in
deference to the Navy^s representations that it was necessary
from a naval point of ^ew to maintain a hold on the en-
trance to the Straits. I am sending a copy of this letter
by telegram to Lord Kitchener.^’

The General having won his battle and the Admiral having
lost his, they resumed cordial relations, but it is no use
pretending that the wonderful good comradeship which had
existed between the Naval and Military Headquarters, when
both were animated by a determination to win a great victory,
was not strained when their policies were diametrically opposed.
However, fortunately for us and the Army in Gallipoli who had
to carry out the evacuation, the new G.H.Q. did not concern
themselves with the operation, beyond communicating the
Government’s decision to the Dardanelles Army Headquarters
at Imbros ; and there we were among friends with whom we
had been associated from the outset in an alliance as close as
that of Wolfe and Saunders oflF Quebec in 1759.

CHAPTER XXVI

EVACUATION

Collier sunk to complete harbour at Kephalo ; All ships ordered to Mudros and
boats to Kephalo ; Frequent visits to Peninsula ; Fine weather lasts until
evacuation of Suvla and An2:ac on 19th December ; Sudden gale on 20th
causes havoc ; Admiral de Robeck returns ; Discussions afout Hellcs ;
Admiral Wemyss leaves ; Evacuation "of Helles ordered ; Difficulties and
anxieties ; Heavy attack by Turks on 7th ; Troops successfully evacuate
Helles night of 8th January in rising gale.

When Lord Kitchener sailed for England on the 23rd November
and recommended the evacuation of Anzac and Suvla, the opera-
tion entailed the withdrawal of about 93,000 men, 200 guns,
over 3,000 animals, and vast quantities of ammunition and stores.

By the time the Government’s decision to evacuate was
received on 8th December, surplus stores had been removed,
and the blizzard and other causes had reduced the garrison to
about 83,000 men. The date of the final evacuation was then
settled for the night of 19th December, the last phase being
divided over that and the preceding night.

On 13 th December Admiral Wemyss arrived at Kephalo
with his flag flying in the Lord Nelson. We were amused and
surprised to learn that after our visit to Imbros on the 30th
November — a report of which the Admiral sent to General
Monro — General Birdwood had received a definite order that
neither he nor his Generals were to hold any further com-
munication with the Admiral except through G.H.Q. As
General Birdwood had received orders to carry out the evacua-
tion of Anzac and Suvla, and co-operation was essential from
hour to hour, the earlier order had to be disregarded, and I
ihink that there can be no better example of naval and military
co-operation in history, than that of General Birdwood and
Admiral Wemyss and their respective Stafis throughout the
evacuation, or that of the Corps Commanders and the naval
oSicers concerned, working out the local details.

498

EVACUATION

499

General Birdwood’s experience was, o£ course, unrivalled,
and Aspinall, who had started the campaign as a captain on
the Staff of Sir Ian, and had been intimately associated with
the Naval Staff in the landings and subsequent battles, was an
admirable Chief of Staff and an excellent colleague. The
mili tary plan was a naasterpiece of good organisation.

When they started to work oht the details of evacuation,
Birdwood, Aspinall and other soldiers, including French officers,
said that they did not anticipate any difficulty in a military
withdrawal under modern conditions of trench warfare. General
Godley went so far as to say that the withdrawal from Anzac
would be effected without the enemy knowing anything about
it, or the loss of a single man. * They all agreed with us, however,
that the naval part of the operation was simply an unknown
quantity and, at that season, a gamble with die weadier until
the last moment.

A safe harbour of refuge at Kephalo was absolutely necessary,
in order to shelter and hide, as far as possible, the vast fleet of
small craft which was gathcriag there, and an air patrol was
kept throughout the daylight hours to prevent hostile
observation.

The Admiralty had demurred when Admiral Wemyss tele-
graphed to say he would sink one of the old batdeships or the
Terrible, and they assured him that one of the special service
ships (dummy batdeships) was being hastened out to act as a
blockship. But we could not afford to risk another disaster
like that caused by the northerly blizzard, so a large collier
containing 1,500 tons of coal was moored head and stern across
the gap in the Kephalo blockship breakwater, ready to 1 m sunk
if a northerly blow threatened before the blockship amved.

On the 13 th December, as the blockship was still some
days away, the collier was sunk, much to die distress of her
,-o pt.iiifi. A salvage vessel pumped water into her hold, the
engine room and stokeholds being left empty, and her living
quarters were above the water line when she had sunk. Whm
the blockship eventually arrived to take her place, the collier
was pumped out again and raised undamaged, and she steamed
away none the worse for her immersion.

The batdeships which had been sent out to reinforce the
squadron but which had been engaged with a French Squadron

JOO NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

demonstrating against Greece, and all the vessels 'which could
be spared from Salonika, were ordered to Mudros and their boats
were sent to Kephalo. Officers and men of all ranks and ratings
begged for employment and every boat and small craft which
could be collected was brought into service to assist the evacua-
tion. Officers who had particularly distinguished themselves
were selected for special dutids. Captain Boyle of the Bacchante
and Captain Corbett of the Glory embarked in sloops and took
charge of the vessels off An2ac and Suvla respectively. Captain
Staveley — a most imperturbable officer — was principal Beach
Master at Anzac, and Captain Unwin, V.C., df the River Clyde
at Suvla. Among the selected beach masters was Mulock of
the Jed, who took me up the Straits bn the night of the i8th March
to search for the Ocean and Irresistible.

I went frequently to the beaches in Gallipoli with Lambart
during those days, and found General Byng very depressed
and unhappy. He told me a month of hard fighting would
have been much less trying than the last month of anxiety.

At Anz ac one day I lunched with General Godley. I wrote
that night (i6th December) :

“ The Anzacs are full of fight and buck ; they say that
with two more divisions they believe that they could
break out across the Peninsula, and that they are thoroughly
disgusted at the utterly unnecessary evacuation. Of course,
they did not suffer like the troops at Suvla. They believe
both at Anzac and Suvla that they will get away without
any loss, and it seems quite possible if the weather keeps
fine. They told me that there was great competition to
be the last to leave the front-line trenches. Those who
had been on shore longest claimed it as their right ; on the
other hand the newest arrivals claimed the right to be given
an opportunity of acquiring merit.”

I found that they still had 1,900 mules and donkeys at Anzac,
and they feaxed that they would have to kill at least a thousand.
We then made desperate efforts and during the next three nights
embarked all except about 70, which were required to supply
the front-line trenches until the last.

The weather remained wonderfully fine and calm, except for
a stiff north-easterly blow on the 15 th, which did not affect the

EVACUATION

501

beaches, but would have wrecked the small craft at Kephalo
but for the collier. By the afternoon of the i8th, 44,000 men,
130 guns and several thousand animals had been embarked
without apparently causing the slightest suspicion. Nothing
was done until it was dark, and by dawn everything was normal
again. There were still 40,000 men and 50 guns on shore,
and it was arranged to withdraw 20,000 men and 30 guns on
the night of the i8th if the weather looked promising. Thus
throughout the 19th the whole front would be very hghtly
held by 20,000 men and 20 guns with a force of about 100,000
enemy in dose proximity. In some places the opposing trenches
were only a few yards apart.

Generals Byng and Godley were each provided with a sloop
from which to direct the retirement, and at either flank of the
two positions cable connections from every point of co mm and
were brought off to buoys, which could be picked up by the
Corps Commander's sloop. Wireless communication was
reserved for the fire control of the supporting ships, which
was of the utmost importance in the absence of artillery.

Ever3rthing went without a hitch during the night of the 1 8th.
On the morning of Sunday, 19th, I went over to the Peninsula
with Lambart and General Birdwood, and after landing the
latter at An2ac we went to Suvla, where I spent some hours
walking round with General Byng, who was cheerful and
optimistic. He had spent the night on board his sloop. His
Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General Read, would remain there to
keep in cable communication with the ftont, but he told me
that he intended to spend the night of i8th on shore and be
the last to leave. I told him that he would have trouble with
Unwin, who would claim the Navy's prerogative, since the last
to leave must be the naval beach party. He said that he would
gladly give way to Unwin, for whom he had an unbounded
admiration.

I congratulated him on the wonderful arrangements for
evacuation at Suvla ; there seemed to be nothing for his Corps
to do but march down to the boats and set light to the bonfires
— ^large piles of provisions, stores, fodder and petrol, which it
was decided to abandon rather than prolong the evacuation.
He said, Don't congratulate me ; my Chief of Staff has thought
of notlfing else but evacuation for the last four months I "

502 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

The naval arrangements were excellent ; Unwin had provided
for every possible contingency. Thanks to the long spell of
fine weather since the heavy southerly blow at the end of
November, it had been possible to make wonderful preparations
for rapid embarkation ; but one southerly blow would have
wrecked everything. The blockship harbour on the north
shore of Suvla Bay, which was connected by a light railway
with the depots inland, was equipped with piers, pontoons
and ramps, which enabled guns, heavy wagons and lorries to
run down to the lighters, and animals could walk straight on
board. There were berths for five motor lighters, capable of
carrying 500 men apiece. The main embarkation, was to take
place in motor lighters here, two* adjacent beaches, and under
Lala Baba where a new pier had been constructed. A number
of steam pinnaces, each with two cutters in tow, were stationed
along the foreshore ready to pick up any stragglers.

General Byng told me that the enemy had been seen digging,
rolling out new wire, and generally preparing to resist an attack,
and during the previous night two deserters had come into our
lines with the same story of depression and low morale.

The field hospital tents were left standing, well equipped
with medical stores and comforts, in which to leave the wounded
who could not be etnbarked. It was hoped that we should be
able to get the badly wounded off the following day under a
flag of truce.

There was a certain amount of desultory shelling, and at
about noon, the Turks shelled the beach under Lala Baba pretty
heavily for about half an hour, evidently registering on to it.
Otherwise it was a very quiet day.

The battleships Cornwallis and Prince George were anchored in
Suvla Bay inside the nets, the Theseus^ three monitors and two
destroyers covered the position from outside. The Grafton^
Talbot^ Humber^ two monitors and five destroyers were off
Amzac. Several ships were standing by at short notice at
Kephalo.

We could hear a battle in progress at Helles during the
afternoon. General Davies had been ordered to carry out a
minor offensive to distract the attention of the Turks from
the northern area. After blowing up a series of mines on the
left of our line, our troops delivered a successful attack, seized

EVACUATION

503

several Turkish trenches and resisted all counter-attacks. They
were supported by the Edgar^ three heavy monitors and two
destroyers, which greatly contributed to the success.

Lambart and I left Suvla about 2 p.m. and went to Anzac,
where we remained until dusk. General Godley had embarked
in his sloop during the previous night, and General Birdwood
had returned to Imbros. I wept round with an Australian
Colonel.

It was distressing to find enormous piles of boots, clot h i n g,
stores and provisions, which might have been destroyed if
arrangements had been made for bonfires, but I was told that
they had orders not to run any risks, as the enemy, by a very
short advance, could seize jhe position on the crest of a hill
overlooking the beach, from which they could command it with
machine guns at a range of less than 500 yards, if they discovered
we were evacuating.

I suggested that they might make piles and surround them
with fodder and petrol, as at Suvla, in order that we might
destroy them by gunfire later, but they said they did not want
to risk an accidental bonfire as the enemy were registered on to
all the beaches and might open fire at any moment.

The main evacuation was to be carried out by motor lighters
from the only two piers it had been possible to maintain on the
exposed shelving foreshore, but the troops from the flanks were
to be embarked in a number of pulling boats, towed by picket
boats. On the right flank the embarkation would be in foil
view of the Turkish observation post on Gaba Tepe, which
could bring down a devastating fire on to the beach. Captain
Boyle had arranged for the destroyer Rattlesnake to lie off there
and switch her searchlight on to the foreshore, to the southward
of our most southerly position, at intervals throughout the
night — and several preceding nights — ^thus makin g it impossible
for the Turks to see through the screen of light she placed
between them and our troops. Although the Rattlesnake had
often been shelled, and had had to switch her light off and shift
berth occasionally, the enemy were pretty well used to her by
the night of the evacuation, and her intervention was invaluable
to the troops, who were withdrawn unseen, though within full
view of the Turks.

The An2acs were determined to give the enemy a shake up

504 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

before they left, and had undermined Russell Top with a ton
of ammonal, which was to be blown up ten minutes after it
was evacuated.

The motor lighters were all in their berths before we left,
and an armada of troop carriers and boats was approaching
as we stood across to Kephalo in a destroyer. We joined
Admiral Wemyss on board the Chatham^ in which he had hoisted
his flag, and embarked the General and his Staff. We spent
the night off the northern area, where there appeared to be
a normal amount of firing for a quiet night, but the time passed
very slowly to us onlookers. At 3.30 a.m. there was a heavy
explosion — ^the Russell Top mine — ^followed by a tremendous
outburst of rifle and machine-gun fire in its vicinity, which
went on for half an hour or so, but by that time the troops
must have been well on their way to the beach. At 4.30 a.m.
we learnt that the last man had left Anzac, where all was quiet
for the rest of the night except for spasmodic rifle fire and a few
shells on the beaches.

At Suvla our guns fired as usual for some time before with-
drawing, and there was a certain amount of rifle fire. At 5 a.m.
the bonfires were lit, Suvla Point was ablaze, and we knew that
the evacuation had been successfully completed. The enemy
fired heavily at the bonfires, presumably thinking that our
people would be endeavouring to extinguish them. When
dawn broke about 6.30, all the troop carriers and small craft
were well on their way to Imbros and Mudros ; only the
covering ships were off the Peninsula. A mist hung over the
beaches and it was not until about 7 a.m. that the enemy began
to realise that something had occurred. Under cover of a
very heavy bombardment small parties were then seen to
advance, and our ships opened fibre on them and on the piles
of stores at Anzac and the burning dumps at Suvla. The
enemy must have suffered heavily, particularly at Anzac, where
our fire was withheld until they were well exposed.

Our total casualties on that last night were one man wounded
early in the evening at Anzac. At Suvla not a gun, wagon or
animal was left on shore. The stores were completely destroyed
by fire, and the only things that fell into the enemy's hands
were the hospital tents and equipment.

At Anzac a vast quantity of valuable material was left behind,

EVACUATION

505

and though the ships made every effort to destroy it by gunfire, :
a good deal must have been serviceable to the enemy. It was
not, however, until nightfall that they could examine their
capture with comparative safety ; even then they were frequently
disturbed by destroyers running in to very close range, switching
on their searchlights and opening fire with guns, machine guns
and rifles. Twenty mules and 50 donkeys which were required
until the last moment were killed. Nine old howitzers and guns
were left behind, as they were considered necessary for the
security of the position until the end; they were practically
worn out and were destroyed. All the ammunition which
could not be brought away was thrown into the sea.

Although every available small craft was brought into service
the main evacuation had to be carried out in three trips, and
there was a very small margin for either a naval or a military
error in the time-table, if the work was to be completed before
dawn. However, everything went like clockwork, and to
quote the German military correspondent of the Vossische
Zeitmg : ‘‘ As long as wars last this evacuation of Suvla and
Anzac will stand before the eyes of aU strategists as a hitherto
unattained masterpiece.”

The Chatham returned to Kephalo after taking part in the
shelling of Anzac, and the Admiral transferred his flag to the
Lord Nelson. Lambart and I went over to Helles in a destroyer
to see what we could do to help them there, now that we had
greatly increased resources.

I wrote that night (20th December) :

“We were well shelled on landing at ‘W^ Beach.

I had tea with General Davies and told him the whole
story of our efforts to be allowed to force the Straits, and
begged him to bear in mind the tremendous naval support
which we could now afford him from behind nets, but not
continuously throughout a long winter. He told me that
he was very keen to get on and capture Achi Baba, and
that with four good divisions he could do it. Well, we
have nine available now ; at least four of these are really
good ones, but the Authorities will never agree, unless
some miracle lifts the scales from their eyes, so the only
thing is to evacuate Helles before it is too late.”

5o6 naval memoirs, 1910-1915

It came on to blow very hard suddenly that night, and 16 hours
after the last man embarked a heavy southerly gale completely
wrecked all the piers and stages which had been built at Anxac
and Suvla and almost destroyed the harbour at the latter
Several small craft, including four motor lighters and two
picket boat^, which were returning to Mudros after the evacua-
tion, were lost, but their crey/s, with the exception of one man,
were saved by their escorts. At Helles the gale caused havoc!
It was a timely reminder of the great risks that had been run.
Had the gale commenced so suddenly 48 hours earlier, it would
have caused disaster ; 24 hours earlier it wpuld have caused
great loss of life and material.

Admiral Wemyss had intended to sail during the night to
Mudros, but an enemy submarine was reported outside and as
there was a bright moon he decided to wait until daylight,
when the Lord Nelson could be screened by a destroyer escort.
The following day we returned to Mudros in a howling gale
and learned that Admiral de Robeck was expected to arrive
on the 22nd.

Admiral Wemyss told me that he simply could not settle down
to the humdrum grind of his job at Mudros after his month of
high command. To his delight, on the morning of the 22nd,
he received a telegram from Mr. Balfour offering him the
appointment of Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies, which
he told me was what he most wanted in the world, but thought
it had been intended for someone else, as no doubt it was, but
Wemyss had proved himself such a big man during the past
month and the fighting ones at home must have delighted in
the spirit shown in his telegrams. Nothing ever perturbed
Wemyss, and having recommended a step on which he had
staked his reputation, his fleet, and his life, he would go to
bed and sleep peacefully for eight hours. He was indeed a
delightful person to serve, as having made up his mind, no
thought of responsibility ever worried him.

Admiral de Robeck arrived that afternoon in the yacht Eileen,
I had written to him a few days before to say that if he came out
again it was out of the question my remaining as his Chief of
Staff. I had done everything in my power to bring about
the forcing of the Straits, and since it was obvious that the
Government would never sanction that now, I had done every-

HliACH (riAS'l)

EVACUATION

507

thing I could thmk of to hasten the evacuation of Helles, both
of which were in direct opposition to his views and recom-
mendations. , I hoped that he would select Commodore Heneage,
who was in command of the minesweepers and submarine-
hunting craft, as his Chief of Staff, and that he would give me
that command, as long as the Army was in Gallipoli, We
had no idea that he was returning ^o soon, and the letter missed
him, so I had to say it all, which was not too easy. He was as
charming as ever and insisted on my remaining as his Chief of
Staff, which was ^very generous of him. I felt it my duty to
do so while the Campaign lasted, though I was not too happy
about it, as I found that he was still determined to hold on to
Helles, and I could not bear *the thought of it, unless we were
prepared to force the Straits.

The Eilee;i was commanded by Captain Sir Alfred Paget,
R.N.R., one time Vice-Admiral Commanding the Coast of
Ireland ; he had volunteered directly the war broke out, for
service in small craft: in any rank, like so many Admirals Dug
Out."’ He begged me to send him to GalhjppJi^^and^T-dicTsor^
Fortunately — since he liked it — ^the beach was being heavily
shelled ; a lighter alongside the pier on wliich he had landed
was sunk while he was there and the pier was smashed by a
shell a few yards behind him. He came back delighted and
most grateful.

On the 23 rd Admiral de Robeck received a telegram from
Mr. Balfour asking him what new circumstances had arisen to
modify the decision to retain Helles ; which was unanimously
recommended by Lord Kitchener, General Monro and himself
a few weeks previously; as Wemyss and Monro now both
advised immediate evacuation.

Admiral de Robeck replied that Monro had informed him
that he was led to this opinion by the statement of Wemyss
that the retention of Helles was of no naval importance, and that
the military value was not sufEcient to warrant holding the
position. He added that his own opinion was that Helles w^as
of great naval value and that if the Army could hold it, its
retention should be insisted upon. He telegraphed later that
he had consulted Birdwood, who declared that he and Davies
considered that Helles could be held. He went on to say that
there had been considerable shelling of the beaches, which

5o8 naval memoirs, 1910-1915

•would probably continue as long as the enemy thought that
we were about to evacuate. If evacuation was ultimately
decided upon, it should not take place for some time. He
concluded : “ Personally I maintain that the holding of Helles
is of great naval importance.” I profoundly disagreed with
this and called his attention to the daily casualty list, which
was considerable (about 80) 'on even the quietest day.*

That evening £’11 came safely out of the Straits, having spent
47 days in the Marmora, during which Nasmith was responsible
for the destruction of a destroyer, 1 1 steamers, five large and 50
small sailing vessels. This brought his total bag up to 100
vessels destroyed during 97 days in the Marmora.

On the a4th December Wemyss sailed for home in the Eileen,
taking Lambart for a short spell of leave. Godfrey and I felt
very sad.

Next day I had an amusing passage of arms with Lynden-
Bell. To quote my diary :

“ He said it had been a great fight between us, and a
good clean one with all our cards on the table. I said
that they had missed the biggest thing in history. He
said that they had done the biggest thing in history, to
get 80,000 men away to Egypt ; they were being wasted
where they were. I said, ‘ Yes, since you would not let
them fight, but surely you do not take any credit for it ? ’
He said, ‘ Yes, some, but we give you the bigger share.’
I said we wanted no credit, it was simply a matter of good
staff work in which they had no share, but to God Almighty
alone was the credit due. It might have been a shocking
disaster, and would have been, had the weather broken
24 hours earlier. Also we owed some of it to the Turks,
who were now a very poor enemy, as they would have
found if they had attacked. He chaffed me about my
‘ Swan Song ’ — ^the offensive against Achi Baba. I said,
‘ Your telegram about it was rather offensive, and your
appreciation of the situation was rotten from every point
of view.’ However, they had not got a rise out of us,

•After the evacuation, I had a table made of the daily casualties at IMes.
During the 19 days which intervened between the evacuation of Anzac and Suvla
and that of Helles — ij officers and 332 men were killed, and 42 officers and 1,141
men were wounded holding the line and on the beaches.

EVACUATION

509

and our answer was unanswerable, as their next telegram
— ^which was a very dvil climb down — showed. Apropos
of the appreciation I said, ‘ You did land in GahipoH once,
Belinda, idn’t you ? ’ thinking he had accompanied Monro
and not knowing at the time that he had never landed there.
He replied, ‘ It was not necessary to land to make up one’s
min d about a show like thaf. We made up our minds
before we left England, and WuUy Robertson (who had
just been appointed C.I.G.S.) will soon put a stop to that
other rotten ^show at Salonika.’

In an unguarded moment he gave everything away.
If our naval attack succeeded, it would only be an em-
barrassment ; troops would have had to remain to exploit
our success. These side-shows were a mistake, the troops
were wanted in France.

Lynden-BeU said the nicest things about the fight we
had put up, and said he wished to Heaven he could have
backed me up, but I was wrong and Monro was right.”

Much to my relief, on the 28th December orders were received
to evacuate Helles. We were at Salonika at the time and returned
to Mudros on the 30th.

General Monro had been appointed to co mman d the First
Army in France, and wished to go to Egypt before returning
to England. He embarked in the Cornwallis, and before sailing
held a farewell meeting — ^which de Robeck and I attended —
to give his instructions to the Army for the evacuation of Helles.
These he read from a Staff memorandum which closely resembled
General Biedwood’s instructions for the evacuation of Anzac
and Suvla, but for naval reasons these would have to be departed
from very considerably for the evacuation of Helles. After
this he said good-bye to everyone — except me — and I did not
see him again for about ten years, when we struck up a warm
friendship, of which I have many pleasant memories — ^but we
never mentioned GalhpoU !

The Admiral then took the Lard Nelson to Kephalo, and we
remained there until the evacuation was completed.

I alkali always look back on the next eight days as a nightmare.
I wrote at the time :

“The Admiral is convinced that the forcing of the

510

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Straits could only have ended in disaster, and now that
there is no chance of the fleet being subjected to such a
risk he is optimistic and himself again. To me the evacua-
tion of the Army is so much more frightening than the
forcing of the Straits, because so much depends on chance
and the weather, and there are such appalling possibilities
of a ghastly failure ; whereas the other is our proper job,
and offensive which is the only way to win in war.’’

As evacuation was then inevitable, there was no object in
risking submarines in the Marmora any longer; and the Admiral
ordered Stocks to come out at his convenience. Ei went in
on 9th December and came out safely on 3rd January, having
sunk a steamer and 19 sailing vessels.

Both Ez and Eii sighted enemy submarines in the Marmora,
and Ell was narrowly missed by a submarine’s torpedo.

They both burst thxough a chain net ojff Nagara on the way
down the Straits.

The following extracts from my diary give some idea of our
life in those last days.

One day (3rd January) I asked H.Q. at Helles to provide
two horses, in order that I might ride round all the possible
embarkation places, and I invited Millot to accompany
me ; he was always a good companion. There was a good
deal of sheUing, and we happened to ride past a field battery
which was having a spirited duel with the enemy. Two
cheery young subalterns told us that they had been there
two months and their battery had not been discovered yet ;
they had a dummy one zoo yards ahead which, they said,
got properly ^ str^ed.’ They almost found the real one
that day and we and our horses were glad to move on.
We rode to Gully Beach, which the Admiral wishes to
make full use of on the last night ; then back to ‘ X ’
Beach and thence across the Peninsula to ‘ V,’ now the
French beach ; and to the River Clyde^ where our naval
people live who are working there. The lieutenant in
charge was from the Zealandia and had recently arrived,
I asked him if he did not think it was better than the North
Sea. He grinned and evidently thought so ; they had
just had a good shelling from Asia, and every now and

EVACUATION

5x1

then Asia dropped a few shells among the working parties.
It was extraordinary how little attention was paid to them.

It came on to blow while we were on shore and we
had a long, rough passage oflF to our destroyer, which had
been driven well out to seaward by shell fire. Our picket
boat was a very old veteran, with a broken stem and much
shot about ; she coiild only stekm about three or four knots
and as she chunked her way out in the rough sea one
could hear the water surging about in her bilges. When
she eventually reached the destroyer and lurched alongside,
a large fender which hung over her side to take the impact,
took it ail right but stove her in and she began to sink.
We all managed to scratiible on board the destroyer, and
the picket boat drifted astern almost perpendicular, and
went down stern first. I suppose she knew her days were
numbered and preferred to go down with her coloxirs
flying, off the beach she had served so well, rather than
return to her parent ship, where she would certainly have
been condemned to the scrap heap.

Staveiey and Mulock came on from Anzac and are
Principal and Assistant Beach Masters at HeEes. The
former is very good at making out detailed plans and he
works very well with Davies’s Staff, but we want a few
Unwins to hustle things, and Unwin is on his way to
Egypt. When I saw Byng after the evacuation he told
me that on the way off in the last boat from Suvla, a soldier
fell overboard and Unwin jumped in and saved his life.
He said, ‘You must really do something about Unwin;
you should send him home ; we want several little Unwins.’

With the exception of the crews of a few guns, six of
which were worn out and were going to be destroyed,
the French troops were all evacuated between the 1st and
3rd of January and their positions have been taken over
by the Naval Division.

At present my chief anxiety is to get horses and mules
off the Peninsula— there are still (5th January) 5,600 on
shore. Last night I hoped that they would embark 1,000,
but they only took 197. The day before only 28 owing
to bad weather. When I last landed it was very unpleasant ;
a few shells fell among a number of mules waiting to be

;i2 NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

embarked and several were killed. Then a bit later some-
one flashed a torchlight on board a lighter full of fnnV;^
which caused a stampede ; the lighter capsized and was
lost and several mules were drowned. A few nights ago
it was beautifully fine, and a steamer called the St Osmld,
on her way over to embark 1,000 mules, was rammed and
sunk by the French battleship Suffren. So we are not
having much luck. They say that we shall have to leave
at least 1,400. Not if I can help it. . . . In the gale
last night we lost two picket boats, apd a mule lighter
with a lieutenant and a midshipman R.N.R. and 15 men
is missing ;* and a motor lighter and a trawler are stranded.

I am going over to Helles ih the morning, as the General
wishes to alter the whole plan of embarkation for the last
night.”

Captain Mitchell, R.N., who had been on the staff of Sir Ian
and was then with General Birdwood, came on board that
evening to explain the change of plan. I gathered from
Mitchell that they were very concerned at Birdwood’s Head-
quarters at the slow progress of the evacuation of animals,
stores and ammunition and wanted me to go over and look
into things.

I wrote on die evening of the 6th January :

“ I have been at Helles all day, a lovely fine day after
a stormy, dirty night. It had originally been intended
to leave 22,000 men until the last 48 hours and 1 5,000 until
the last night. These were to be evacuated from Gully,
*X,’ ‘W’ and ‘V’ Beaches. Gully Beach is close
behind our lines ; it and ‘ X ’ Beach are practically firee
from shell fire and the Admiral is anxious to make full use
of these two on the last night.

Owing to the rapidity with which the Command
changed at Anzac in the last phase, which added to our
difficulties. General Birdwood arranged that Major-General
H. Lawrence should take charge of die actual evacuation.

* The lightef was fotuid the next day wrecked on a little tocfcy island. The
people and some of the mules got on shoie, but one of the muleteers died
of exposure.

LORD KITCHENER GREETING GENEILU, BAILLOUD AT “ V ” BEACH

November, 1915 ’

OUTSIDE \TII CORPS HEADQUARTERS AT TEKKE BURNU,
DECEMBER, 1915

Brig.-General Street, Commodore Keyes, General Davies, General Lawrence,
Lieut. Millot and Colonel Aspinall

EVACUAXEON

5^3

I found liim a splendid person to work with^ and this
was an excellent arrangement.

We met in General Davies’s H.Q., which is dug out
of the cliff at Cape Teke. In addition to Davies’s Staff,
the following attended : AspinaU (representing Birdwood),
Mitchell, Lawrence, Staveley and Admiral Fremantle (in
command of the ships affording gunnery support to the
Army), and I represented Adt^al de Robeck.

The weather had been so bad that General Davies
had come to the conclusion that as two consecutive fine
days could liot be counted upon, a suificient number of
men and guns must be left: for the final night to hold our
position for six or seven days if necessary. No doubt
they were right, but the new plan entailed embarking
17,000 men on the last night, and we had not sufficient
small craft to do this in two trips. They also wished to
keep 64 guns for the last night but were prepared to destroy
17 old worn-out guns, including six French.

I found that Staveley had worked out the new plan
on a basis of three round trips, using the same craft for
each. -I felt that was leaving too much to chance, and
that it might well result in our being caught with the
work uncompleted when day broke. The General also
wanted to cut out * X ’ Bcadh and limit the embarkation
from Gully Beach to 700 troops — ^the last to leave the
left flank. He was afraid that if the enemy saw our craft
going into Gully Beach, they would suspect we were
leaving. They must know that we are going* The only
thing they did not know was the date, and if they discovered
that we were actually leaving, they could drop thousands
of shells into ‘ V ’ and ‘ W ’ Beaches, where the main
evacuation must take place. Much better, he said, to
try and sneak away &om those two beaches unseen and
unsuspected.

I xmdertook to get the motor lighters required for the
troops from the left flank, unsuspected into Gully Beach
by 9.15 p.m., after the moon set, by striking the coast
well to the southward and towing them up with picket
boats, thus avoiding the risk of the enemy hearing the
noise made by the internal combustion engines of the

514

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

lighters. I pointed out, however, that GuUy and ‘X’
Beaches would be impossible, if the wind was from the
due north or had any west in it ; it would have been out
of the question to have attempted to embark from t>ipm ,
for instance, when I rode there a few days previously,
and, if necessary, the troops on the left flank must be
prepared to march to ‘ W ’ Beach under cover of the cliffs.

When we heard that the Army wanted to retain more
men until the last night, the Admiral and I discussed it,
and he authorised me to say that he would provide sufficient
destroyers to take off the last 6,000 men, and at the meeting,
on his behalf, I suggested that if they would improvise
staging alongside the blocksjhips, and repair the piers con-
necting them with the shore, I would guarantee that six
destroyers would be lying ready to take them off. They
could then march straight on board ; the destroyers would
have no difficulty in taking at least 1,000 each. All the
other destroyers would be employed on the flanks to
protect the retiring troops, fixing on the enemy trenches,
covering the boats looking for stragglers, etc. So it was
arranged, and the Royal Engineers undertook to build
the necessary staging and piers. The heavy south-westerly
gale in November had swept away the causeway connecting
the westerly blockships with the shore, and the R.E. had
been able to do very little towards repairing it. So we
sank a small steamer there that afternoon ; this did not
quite fill the gap and cases of biscuit and bully beef were
thrown in to complete the causeway. Of course, a westerly
blow would wash these away, but we hoped for the best.
It was decided to construct a floating bridge to connect
the outer blockship with the shore under cover of the
breakwater.

We went back to Imbros that evening and were able
to report to the General and Admiral that the new plan
was satisfactory.

During the night the Garrison was reduced to 19,000
men and 63 guns. The next day (7th January) was calm
and springlike and everything was peaceful and normal
until about noon, when every battery in Gallipoli and
Asia seemed to open fire. It was the most severe bombard-

EVACUATION

515

ment yet experienced ; the enemy must have fired many
tons of high-explosive shells, from Germany or Austria,
probably brought across the Marmora in hospital ships.

Vessels were hurried out to reinforce the Grafton^
Raglan and Wolverine^ which were on duty off the Peninsula,
and a brigade at Imbros was held in immediate readiness
for transport to Helles, Fortitnately the few guns remain-
ing had unlimited ammunition, and the fire from the ships
was intense ; for instance, the Grafton fired 1,000 rounds of
six-inch, and the Wolverine^ lybig close in shore on the
enemy’s right flank, fired every projectile, rifle and machine-
gun cartridge in her magazine, before she was replenished
by a consort.

After about four and a half hours there was a lull for
some minutes, and then a -terrific outburst for half an hour.
Soldiers who had been in France said they had experienced
nothing more severe there. At 5 p.m. the enemy evidendy
intended to deliver an overwhelming attack. The Turkish
trenches were full of men with bayonets fixed, and oiBcers
could be seen trying to drive them forward, but very few
could be induced to advance, and those that left their
trenches were mown down by rifle and machine-gun fire.
The attack fizzled out before 6 p.m. with terrible loss to
the enemy. Our trenches were badly knocked about, but
the cover was good and our casualties were comparatively
light — ^about 164 killed and wounded by shell fire. We
onlookers expected to hear of very heavy losses.”

We know now that TJman vdn Sanders was determined that
the evacuation of Helles, which was obviously in progress,
should not be carried out with impunity, as at Anzac and Suvia.
Specially trained troops were selected for the assault and the
Turkish artillery was strongly reinforced by Austrian and other
batteries set free from the northern area. Misled by the
strength of our defence and the volume of our fire, much of
wliich w^as attributed to our shore artiller}^ rather than to the
ships, the enemy came to the conclusion that we could not be
going for some days.

^‘Although their attack was a complete failure, had it

5i6 naval memoirs, 1910-1915

taken place 24 hours later it would have thoroughly upset
our arrangements for evacuation that night.

The night of the yth was very quiet and 2,000 troops
and nine guns were evacuated. On the morning of the
8th I accompanied General Birdwood to Helles. He told
me he hated leaving so many animals to be slaughtered—
on the grounds of humanity. I said, so did I. E he liM
to stay for a few more days we could embark all the anitTmU
and many hundreds of tons of ammunition, stores, etc.,
which he would have to destroy if he went that night.
If it remained calm we could get away a good many animolc
as well as the troops that night, including the teams of
horses retained to bring down the guns. But in view of
the very unsettled weather and the enormous increase in
the enemy’s artillery fire, I personally thought he was
wise to go as soon as possible and sacrifice beasts if
necessary.

The wind changed to the south-west during the day
and we knew it was boimd to freshen. Quite a moderate
breeze from that quarter would make Gully Beach
impossible and ‘ W ’ and ‘ V ’ very difficult. We passed
a very anxious day watching the weather. The Admiral
had to decide by about 6 p.m. one way or the other ; the
glass was high, but the glass gives very little indication
in that locality, and it was a fearfully difficult decision in
all the conflicting considerations. Eventually he made up
his mind that we could complete the evacuation before it
came on to blow too hard.

The Admiral, his Staff, and General Birdwood and
some of his Staff embarked in the Chatham, and when it
was dark we approached Gallipoli with a regular armada
of vessels steaming towards Helles from Mudros and
Imbros.

AE the * blistered ’ cruisers and monitors took up
their positions previously fixed by buoys. The shore
marks which were used for registering on their objectives
were lit, and their guns were laid on the Turkish batteries,
and the areas through which the enemy would pass if
they advanced in pursuit of our retreating troops.

The Triad, which had just returned from her xefit.

EVACUAHON

517

was anchored off Cape Teke and connected hy telegraph
and telephone with the whole front. General Davies then
embarked in her and was able to keep in touch with his
Chief of Staff and General Lawrence throughout the
operation.

The wind freshened, clouds banked up to the south-
ward and there was an ominous swell from that direction.
About II p.m., to add to our anxieties, the Signal Station
at de Totts reported that they could hear what sounded
like the engine of a submarine on the surface standing
down the Straits.

By 2 a.m. the weather was very bad, but the enemy
had not been shelling the beaches to anything like the
extent they usually did on a normal night, and they were
evidently not in the least suspicious. About that time two
white rockets shot up, which meant that an enemy sub-
marine had been sighted. The Prince George^ which had
just embarked 2,000 men of the Naval Division, reported
that she had been struck by a torpedo which did not
explode.* The MarSy with 2,600 men on board, was
close to the Prince George^ and we stood over towards her
at once fearing the worst. By that time ail the other
troop carriers had sailed, and there were only 3,200 men
left on shore to come off in four destroyers.

As at Anzac and Suvla, hospital tents were left ffiUy
equipped for the wounded, and the dumps were not to
be &ed if any wounded were left behind.

At 3.55 a.m., to our intense relief, the bonfires were
lit, which meant that the last man had left the shore. Five
minutes later our store dumps were in a colossal bla^e.

At last the enemy realised that we were really going,
scores of rockets shot into the sky ftom Asia and Gallipoli.
Every enemy gun burst into flame and the beaches and
piers, which half an hour before were crowded with men,
were smothered with hundreds of bursting shells. Our
ammunition dumps all over the Peninsula, exploded by
time fuses, contributed to the confusion ; finally our main
magazine blew up with a terrific roar.

* Despite a most circumstantial report, we now know there was no
submarine there.

jiS NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Then the enemy realised that we had gone. But I
think they had every right to consider that the evacuation
of the whole army, which had withstood their attack on
the previous day, should have been a physical impossibility
on that stormy night.

The only casualty was one bluejacket killed by a piece
of falling debris, as the- last boat plunged her way to sea-
ward in the teeth of what was, by that time, a sou’westerly
gale.”

We learnt later that one motor lighter at Gully Beach had
stranded on the lee shore. General Maude, commanding the
13 th Division, which had provided the rear-guard on the left
flank, after putting as many men as possible on board the
surviving motor lighter, ordered the remainder to march to
“ W ” Beach. He brought up the rear with his Staff Officer
and batman, who had returned with him to the stranded lighter
to recover his valise. By the time he arrived embarkation was
very nearly impossible. Seas were sweeping over the causeway,
the pontoon bridge connecting the western blockship to the
shore had been smashed, and the troops had to be ferried over to
the destroyer waiting for them. At “ V ” Beach the blockships
had given excellent shelter and the rear-guard were able to
march on board the destroyers lying alongside them.

When the last soldier had embarked, Staveley and his Staff
followed ; he had been the last to leave Anzac and now had the
honour of being the last man to leave the Gallipoli Peninsula.

After the evacuation of Gallipoli was complete, General
Headquarters prepared a dispatch for Sir Charles Monro, which
was pubBshed in the London Gees^tte. Their short stay in
the Mediterranean had taught them nothing about the brother-
hood into which the campaign had welded the fighting soldiers
and sailors, nor their respective roles and responsibiBties in
amphibious warfare.

A soldier who had played a distinguished part throughout
the campaign read the dispatch to me, and when he came to
the end, he paused for a long time.

I fancy his thoughts turned with noine to that last anxious,
stormy night, so little understood by General Headquarters a
thousand miles away in Egypt.

EVACUATION

519

The beach lashed with bteaking waves — blighters and boats
crashing against the fragile piers and stagings. The skill and
devotion of the officers and men working on the beaches
and manning the troop carriers, trawlers, drifters, lighters and
boats. The admirable seamanship displayed by the destroyer
captains, as they manoeuvred their frail vessels in pitch darkness
on a lee shore, in order to pluck the rear-guard from the inferno
that might be let loose at any moment. Seamen all — ^from
every branch of His Majesty’s Sea Service, Mercantile ^Marine
and Fishing Fleet.

I expect he was pondering over these and many unrecorded
things. After a long interval he looked up at me with a friendly
and understanding smile and said, as he laid down the dispatch :
“ And then the Army swam to Mudros.”

CHAPTER XXVII

AN© AFTER

Admiral Wemyss spent a few days in England before taking up
his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies
Station. The following is an extract from a letter he wrote to
me at that time :

“ Mr. Balfour was most sympathetic and assured me that
he had been in sympathy with our policy and plans from
the very beginning. ... He told me that he had been
outvoted all round, and ended up by saying ; ‘ Well, it is
no use crying over spilt milk.’ I said there was no doubt
the milk had been spilt, and with a vengeance, and asked
him if there was any point that I had missed in the various
telegrams. He said no, that we had used every possible
argument. Jackson told me that the Admiralty had been
fully prepared to order the naval attack if only the soldiers
had played up in any way, but they didn’t and wouldn’t and
that after mature consideration they (the Admiralty) had
felt they were not prepared to go into the business single-
handed again.”

This seems hardly fair in view of the Admiralty’s attitude
towards Lord Kitchener’s belated effort on and December,
1915.*

I remained in the Eastern Mediterranean for five mo nths after
the evacuation of Gallipoli. During much of this time the
Admiral stayed at Salonika, where a great Allied Army was
constructing an entrenched camp, extending from the Gulf of
Orfano to the Vada River, to defend Salonika from an attack
which was never delivered, and was probably never seriously
contemplated by the enemy, who no doubt were well aware
that they could not occupy Salonika in the presence of a
hostile fleet.

* See pages 481-490.
jao

AND AJFTER

521

I had many opportxinities of visiting the front, which covered
a distance of about 74 miles and was strongly fortified at vital
points with heavy artillery, including some naval guns. One
day the Admiral and I rode with General Sir Bryan Mahon,
who commanded our Army, for forty miles along the British
front, from Salonika past Lakes Langaza and Beshik, which
were occupied by British motor boats, to Stavros, where our right
flank rested on the sea and was supported by “ blistered ” cruisers
and monitors. Another day we accompanied General Sarrail
— ^who commanded the Allied Army — ^along the whole French
front, connecting a chain of veritable fortresses, with its left
flank resting on the Vada River.

All sorts and conditions -of people gathered at Salonika,
which was a hotbed of intrigue in those days. My hospitable
Admiral entertained liberally, and one heard all kinds of views
expressed at his table. One night when General Sarrail was
dining on board the Lord Nelson I had a long conversation witli
him, and tried to find out what he hoped to do with his army.
Apropos of the desperate and fruidess fighting on the Western
Front, he said he felt that before long our authorities would
realise that it was not good enough to attack there under con-
ditions of modern trench warfare, and that they would seek a
new field for offensive action ; here, for instance, holding our
line in France and Flanders in sufficient strength, and sending
him a large army. He went on to say that he would require
an enormous army to achieve decisive results, and there was
no sign of sxifEcient troops being sent yet. It would take time ;
transport by sea was a lengthy proceeding, and transport in
Macedonia was a difficulty owing to the single railway line and
lack of roads. Until roads were constructed our army was
almost immobile, with its lavish cornrnissariat, dependent to a
great extent on motor lorries for transport. He told me he
hoped to have over 100,000 Serbians before long.

I said I supposed his main object would then be Constantiaoplc.
He dwelt on the difficulties of making an attack on Con-
stantinople under modem conditions from this direction, but
said that our holding Salonika was a terrible thorn in the side
of the German-Austrian-Bulgarian group.

If that was all, it seemed to me a pretty poor outlook for
which to have sacrificed the Gallipoli Campaign. So I opened

522

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

fire, and told him exactly what I thought about our lost oppor-
tunities. How for weeks we had counted on him coming to
our aid with his six divisions. I had accompanied his Staff
officers to Tenedos to point out the area we would net for his
transports, but was not surprised, after seeing the preparations
which had been made to resist a landing, that he had abandoned
his campaign in Asia, but why could he not have come to
Gallipoli with his army and' burst through the Turkish defences
from Suvla ? I gathered from liis reply that as he had com-
manded the Third Army in France he could hardly be expected
to serve under Sir Ian.* I told him that Sir Ian would have
been. quite prepared to serve loyally under his command, if
that was a condition for the co-operation of the French reinforce-
ments in Gallipoli, j* Sarrail was incredulous. I swore that it
was true and that Sir Ian had told me so at the time. I said
that Sir Ian had only one thought and that was the success of
the enterprise ; he was quite ready to efface himself to that end.
If he (Sarrail) had come with his six divisions, we would have
been in Constantinople by now. The Fleet had last fought on
the i8th March and the Army on the 21st August ; since then
the campaign had been allowed to peter out. His Salonika
Campaign had assisted to kill ours. I told him that he had missed
the opportunity of a lifetime ; if he had only come to Gallipoli
he would have been Sarrail de Constantinople.’’ I am sure
that he believed me. He sat glum and frowning and said:
‘‘Je le crois, Commodore.” In the record I wrote of this
conversation that night I concluded : “ I don’t think Sarrail
sees his way clear to any big achievement here.”

It was torment to me to think of what might have been if
that splendid army, which was employed for several months
digging entrenchments and making roads in a malaria-infested
country, had only been allowed to co-operate with the Fleet in
forcing the Dardanelles.

In 1919 Mr. Balfour told me that after his conversations with
me in London in 1915 he had always felt convinced that I was

* I did not know until I read “ Military Operations, Macedonia,’^ Vol. I, page 37,
that Sarrail had originally been appointed to succeed General Gouraud, when the
latter was badly wounded, but had declined to serve under Sir Ian, and had insisted
on an independent command.

t “Gallipoli Diary,^* Vol. H, page 194.

AND AFTER

523

right about forcing the Dardanelles ; I was then a comparatively
junior officer : was I still of the same opinion in the light of
my more recent experience ? I replied that the forcing of the
Straits with armoured ships would have been child’s play to
one hour within range of the Belgian coast. He repeated that
he had always felt certain of it, but how many ships would we
have lost ? I said I really could nbt say ; two or three, possibly
more, possibly none if we were lucky ; but we would have had
19 battleships, quite independent of the vessels which were
supporting the, Army. If we had merely steamed steadily
through at a moderate speed in line ahead, with the anti-mine
devices we had developed, quite sufficient ships would have got
through into the Marmora ’to achieve our object; and we
could have done much better than that with all the experience
we had gained.

Why could he not have trusted Admiral Wemyss, who was
backing it with everything that mattered in life ? He said that
he was a constitutional minister and had to be gmded by his Sea
Lords, and that they had declared that we should lose twelve ships.

I could not refrain from retorting that not one of his Sea
Lords had any experience of the Dardanelles, or had ever seen
a shot fired in war. But supposing that they were right, and
we had lost twelve ships, whiA was absurd, seven would have
been enough to do the business in the Marmora, and even
twelve obsolete battleships would not have been too high a
price to pay for all that could have been accomplished.

The Allies would have had free access to Russia, and might
well have saved the unhappy Russian people from the agony
through which they passed, and their ghastly fate.

The Turkish armies in Gallipoli and Asia Minor would liave
been cut off from their sole source of supply, and Turkey would
have been forced to make a separate peace, as she was two and
a half years later. But in the meantime vast British armies had
acted on the defensive, in Mesopotamia, Egypt and Macedonia,
and when they eventually took the offensive they had had to
fight long drawn out, costly campaigns before Turkey was at
length driven to sue for peace.

In the light of our knowledge toda,y, can anyone doubt that
the forcing of the DardaneUes^would have shortened the war
by two years, and spared of lives ?

APPENDIX
AND INDEX

APPENDIX

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON
DURING NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS, FEBRUARY AND MARCH, I915

Battleships : Armament.

Queen Elit^abeth

1 5 in.

6m.

guns

Lord Nelson

izin.

9.2in.

Agamemnon

izin.

9 . 2 in,

Cornwallis

Irresistible

•

Ocean

Albion

Canopus

Vengeance

I2in.

6 in.

Majestic
Prince George^
Swiftsure
Triumph

loin.

7,5m,

Battle Cruiser :

InfleAbk .

•

lain.

4in.

Cruisers :

Dartmouth

•

6in.

guns.

Dublin .

•

6in.

Doris

6in.

Amethyst

4in.

Sapphire .

4in.

Blenheim Des-

troyer Depot

6in.

Ship

•

4in,

Destroyers :

8 “Beagles’*

8 “River” class

Submarines :

5 “Bs”

I AEz (Australian “E” class).

528

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910-1915

Minesweepers :

35 Trawlers*

Seaplane Carrier :

I Ark Royal

French Squadron :

Sajfren . Flagship of Contre-Amiral Guepratte.

Charlemagne

Gatilois , 4 'lain* 12 5.9in. guns.

Bouvet

DcsttojQis : 6 .

APPENDIX 11

TURKISH DEFENCES OF *THE DARDANELLES

Outer Defences :

European side :

I. Cape Helles .

. 2

9.4in. Krupp

IB. Tekke Burnu

- 4

4.7in. howitzers

3. SeddelBahr.

. 2

1 1 in. Krupp

lo.zin. „

9.4in. „

3.4in. Q.F.

Asiatic side ;

4. Orkanie

. 2

9.4in. Krupp

6. Kum Kale .

. 2

iiin. „

lo.zin. „

9.4in.

S.ain* „

5.9in.

New Intermediate Defences :

European side :

48 howitzers, mortars and siege guns of 2.9in. to 5.9in.

including 5 long range 5 .9in. Q.F. in Battery 7.

10 S.ain, howitzers and a few field guns.

Asiatic side :

16 5,9in. and eight S.zin. howitzers.

6 5.9in., 3^of which were modern long range Q.F. guns
mounted in Battery 8, 3 Krupp mounted in a new
battery above White Cliffs, and a few field guns.

APPENDIX

}Z9

Old Intermediate Defences prior to 5rd November, 1^x4^
were:

European side :

10 small field guns.

Asiatic side :

2 5.9in. Q.F, modern long’range guns (Battery 8).

10 2.2in, to 3.5in, Q.F.

Inner Defences :

European side :

22. Derma Burnu . 6 9.4in. Krupp

17. Namazieh . - ^ ”

X io.2in. „

II 9.4111. „

3 8,210. „

3 5.910. howitzers

16. Hamiaeh U . .2 1410. Krupp

13. Rumili Medjidich . 2 iiio* »

4 9*4!^*

9, Yildiz . • • ^ ”

Asiatic side :

33. Nagara

24. Anodolu
00. Mec^idieih •

23. Medjidieli Avan.
20. Oiemelik

19, Hamidieii X •

•10.210.

- 5 >

9.410-

5.910*

1110.

104210 .

>9 ■

9 . 4 i 0 -

S.ain.

8.210.

mortars

I 4 ia.

Krupp

9.410.

8.210.

4 ^

5 . 9 i 0 .

howitzers

2 '

I4i0.

Krupp

9.410.

INDEX

yihoukir, 68, io6, 109, iio
Aehi/ks^ 108

Adamant^ 44, 60, 67, 145, 147
Addison, Captain, Director of Dock-
yards, 36, 40, 63

Agamemndn^ 193, 195, 196, 206, 209, 228,
230, 232, 233, 234, 248, 251, 280, 286,
287, 327, 338,482

Air raid, Christmas Day, 1914, 153-158,
Alhmarky 442, 453

Albion, 189, 195, 196, 197, 202, 203, 205,
237 » 259» 251, 279, 301, 327, 351, 332
AkctOy 44, 128

AUanson, Colonel C., quoted on August
offensive, 404-406
Altham, General, 380, 419
Amade, General d*, 223, 306, 309, 314,
328, 355

Ambuscade, 143, 146

Ametl^sty 62, 68, 90, 206, 21 1,213,283,292

Ampbion, 67, 69

sinks Kdnigin Loidse, 68

mined, 70

Antelope, 39

Anzac, evacuation ordered, 490 ef seq

Turkish attacks, 335-336

Anzacs and fleet’s gunnery, 319

bravery of, 383

Aquitania, 359

Ara^, 419, 467, 473, 477, 482, 483
Arcadian, SS . , 328, 352
Arcbimede, French submarine, 140, 141,
146, 150, 151, 158

Aretbusa, 82, 83, 83, 86, 92, 93, 95, 96,
98, 121

Ariadne, sunk, 89, 96
Ariel, 68

Ark Royal, 197, 281
Armstrong, Whitworth and Co.,Jkfessrs,,
30, 34

Amo, 398, 399, 423, 424
Askold, Russian cruiser, 279, 443
Aspinall, Colonel, 39S, 426
Aspinall-Oglander, General, 300, 310,
317, 438, 480, 499, 313
Asquith, Mr. See Oxford and Asquith,
Earl of
Aster, 386
Aurora, 163, 164
Australie, steamer, 187, 188

Baccbanie, 61, 68, 90, 319, 320, 326, 382,
385, 406, JOO

Bacchus, Lieut.-Commander R., 532
Backhouse, Commander Roger, 30
Bacon, Captain R., Inspecting Captain
of Submarines, 24

Bacon, Admiral Sir Reginald,quotcd,343
Bailey, Admiral, 42

Balfour, Earl of :

and forcing of Dardanelles, 3 22-3 23

becomes First Lord, 345

interview with Ke\^es, 448-449

telegram to de Robeck, 471

telegram to Wem^'ss enforcing of

Straits, 489

-Ti — telegram to Wemyss on evacua-
tion, 496

343 » 35S, 43 L 44 < 5 , 44S, 45 ^, 433 *

45 5 > 461, 462, 490 > 52-0
Baltic, submarines enter, 116-126
Barharossa, 362, 414
Barharossa Harradin, 398
Bartoiom6, Naval Secretary, 455
Basilisk, 320

Battleships, with armament, during
naval engagements, Dardanelles,
February and JMarch, 1915, 524-325
Beatty, Earl :

letter to Keyes on Dogger Bank

Battle, 163
. 4 J, 56. 81, 89

Henning, Lieut.-Commander C. S., 119
Beresford-Fisher controversy, 20-21
Bernoulli, French submarine, 347
Bertie, Lord, 448
Birdwood, General Sir W. R. :

appointed to command at Galli-
poli to carry out the evacua-
tion, 470

arrives at Dardanelles, 200

declines to accept chi^ command

at GallipoH, 463

letter to Admiral Thursby, 503

ordered not to hold any further

communication with Wemyss
except through G.H.Q., 498

urges the case against evacuation,

467

199, 200, 201, 232, 236, 260, 290,

29 304. 319. 32°. 324. 369. 594.

41 1, 419,425,450,452,456, 457,

458. 459.465. 465.466,468,469.
470. 479. 4S4. 487.488,489. 494.
495. 499.501. 503. 307. 512.516

Birmingham, rams the first German
submarine, 33 (note)

Blenheim, 213, 216, 219
Blticher, 145, 152, 164, 163, 166, 167
Blunt, Captain, 76, 106
Bonaventure, 39

Bosphorus, Turkish steamer, sunk, 483
Bou6 de Lapeyrere, Admir^, 187
Bouvet,j.^z, 228, 234, 237, 23S, 245
sunk, 236

Bowlby, Geoffrey, killed near Ypres, 425
Bowlby, Hugh, Flag-Lieutenant to
Admiral de Robeck, 222, 322, 470

531

NAVAL MEMOIRS, 1910- 1915

Boyle, Caplfkin, 6i, 319, 406, 500, 503
Boyle, Lieut.-Commander, 119, 321,

347, 348, 349. 55°. 360. 364, 365, 366,
367, 5S2, 410. 427. 447
Btady, Coxswain, 319
Braithwaite, Major-General Walter :

superseded, 459

223, 225, 256, 303, 380, 409, 418,

419, 421, 425, 424, 42S, 431
Brandt, Captain F,, submarine officer, 25
Breslau, 188, 321, 356
Brilliant, 127
Britannia, 87

British Army at Gallipoli checked, 333
British Expeditionary Force, passage of,

Brodie, Lieut.-Commander C.G,,i 89,288
Brodie, Lieut,-Commander T. S., loi,
287, 290

Bruce, Lieut.-Commander K., 365, 444,
445

Bulgaria mobilises, 436
Burgoyne, Mr. Alan, an amateur naval
expert, 24

Burmester, Captain, Flag Captain to
Admiral Wemyss, 389
Byng, General Sir JuHan :

takes command 9th Corps at

Gallipoli, 426

381, 411, 479» 488, 500, 501, 502,

511

Callaghan, Sir George, 46, 47, 50, 55» 57 >
58, 60

retired, 68-69

Campbell, Admiral, 6 r, 68, 90
Campbell, Lieut. Harold, 62
Canopus, 205, 208, 21 1, 212, 216, 229,
243, 280, 351, 352
Carden, Admiral Sir S. H. :

illness and resignation, 216-221

proposals for Dardandles action,

180, 226

takes command of Allied Fleet off

Dardanelles, 188

188, 222, 225, 270, 422

Casablanca, French minelayer, blown up,
377

Cayley, Captain Cuthbert, 67, 70
Cbctrkma^e, 195, 228, 234, 250, 337
Chatfield, Sir A. E. M., 163
Chatham, 337, 582, 388, 389, 391, 397,

439. 440. 467. 504. 305. 316

CMmer, 132, 233, 241, 242, 326, 351, 384
Childers, Lieut. Erskine, 158
Christian, Admiral, 73, 74, 380, 382, 389
Churchill, Right Hon. Winston S. ;

criticisms of, 274-275

efleort to renew the naval offensive

at Dardanelles, 339

on Fisher, 45 5

on Gallipoli campaign, 183

Churchill, Right Hon. Winston %r—con . :

quoted, 148-149, 221, 262-266*

339-340

telegrams, 269-270, 272

28-29, 43-44, 54, 104, 189, 221,

340,344,357,358,454,455,457

Coalition Government, 341
Cochrane, Lieut.-Commander,. 119, 365,
366,430,431

Collett, Captain, brings down a German
aeroplane, 370

Collingwood, Lord, 173, 174
Collingivood, 48, 50

Colne, 252, 233, 241, 242, 245, 319, 326,
384

Colville, Admiral Sir Stanley, 46, 47, 48
Constantine, King of Greece, 463, 465
Goode, Captain C. P. R., 386
Copplcstone, Lieut.-Commander F. L.,

"IJ9

Corbett, Captain, 500
Corbett, Sir Julian, quoted, 246
Cornwall, 337, 582

Cornwallis, 192, 193, 195, 203, 207, 215,
229, 283, 295, 301, 327, 502, 509
Cowan, Captain Walter, 45, 46
Craven, Lieut.-Commander C., 36
Cressy, 61, 90, 92, io6, 108, 109, no
Cromie, Captain, murdered by Bolshev-
ists, 126

Cruisers,. with armament, during naval
engagements, Dardanelles, February
and March, 1915, 524
Crusader, 127

Curzon, Lord, against evacuation of
Gallipoli, 480, 481
Cuxhavcn, 152

Danzig, 89
Dardanelles :

attack on outer defences, 190-220

preparations for combined attack,

278-290

passim

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